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 Towards a Decent Labour Market for 
Low-Waged Migrant Workers
An Introduction
Tesseltje de Lange and Conny Rijken
Abstract
This editorial chapter sets the stage for the groundbreaking chapters that 
comprise this volume. We discuss in some detail the fragmented legal 
framework of intra-EU mobility and labour market access of third-country 
nationals coming to the EU. In the discussion of the concept of decent 
labour and decent labour markets, we identify three dichotomies at the 
intersection of (the regulation of) labour markets and migration that 
underlie this volume. This is followed by a discussion of the collected 
chapters, each of which describes and problematises aspects of the road 
and obstacles towards a decent labour market for low-waged migrant 
workers. The chapter concludes with a multilayered framework and some 
unconventional thoughts on how to achieve such a decent labour market.
Keywords: labour migration, low-waged migrants, decent labour market, 
intra-EU mobility, EU migration law
This book is the f inal output of a research project – Protecting labour 
migrants in the Netherlands: past, present and in the future that allowed 
us to collaborate with the selected contributors to this volume.1 Together, 
we dive into the position of low-waged migrant workers from within the 
EU, possibly working under worse labour conditions than nationals, or 
under the level of their education attainments, as well as third-country 
1 The project was f inanced by Institute Gak, (www.instituutgak.nl ) project title: ‘Bescherming 
van arbeidsmigranten in Nederland: toen, nu en in de toekomst’. 
Rijken, Conny and Tesseltje de Lange (eds): Towards a Decent Labour Market for Low Waged 
Migrant Workers. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018  
doi: 10.5117/9789462987555_intro
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nationals, especially those in low-paid jobs such as seasonal workers, 
asylum seekers or those without legal residence. These migrant workers 
contribute to the labour market, valued for their work but are vulnerable 
to abuse. The research aim of this project was to contribute to developing 
theories and strategies to overcome this vulnerability and window for abuse: 
to work towards a decent labour market for low-waged migrant workers. 
Understanding the fragmented legal framework and its consequences for 
migrant workers was a f irst step to achieve this aim. Together with the 
contributors to this volume, we looked into opportunities to mitigate the 
negative consequences.
It cannot be denied that migrant workers are an integral part of EU 
labour markets. Dynamics of globalisation, individualisation, flexibilisation, 
and liberalisation are only a few factors that determine the state of labour 
markets today. After the recent f inancial crisis, we see a rise in employment 
rates and shortages in the labour market. Today, we see migration flows of 
rather diverse groups of migrant workers under a great diversity of legal 
schemes, ranging from intra-EU mobility of EU nationals, to asylum seekers 
and international students. Not all migrant workers profit equally from the 
positive dynamics of economies on the rise. It seems to be a general notion 
that the divide between the privileged and the unprivileged, the haves and 
have nots, in the labour market, is widening.2
In this editorial chapter, we f irst discuss terminological ambiguities 
employed in this f ield and define the limits of this volume. Next, we discuss 
in more detail the relevant fragmented legal framework and the concept of 
a decent labour market as used in our research. We discuss the concept of 
decent labour and decent labour markets and identify three dichotomies 
at the intersection of (the regulation of) labour markets and migration 
that underlie this volume. This is followed by a discussion of the collected 
chapters, each of which describes and problematises some aspect of a road 
towards a decent labour market for low-waged migrant workers. In the f inal 
section, we draw our conclusions. This edited volume is unique, not only 
because it studies different legal areas in their interrelatedness but uses 
2 On this divide, see, for instance: R. B. Freeman (2007), ‘The Challenge of the Growing 
Globalization of Labour Markets to Economic and Social Policy’, in E. Paus (ed.), Global Capitalism 
Unbound. Winners and Losers from Offshore Outsourcing, Palgrave pp. 23-39; also C. Teney, O.P. 
Lacewell, and P. de Wilde (2014), ‘Winners and losers of globalization in Europe: attitudes and 
ideologies’, European Political Science Review, 6(4) pp. 575-595; W. Tiemeijer (2017), Wat is er mis 
met maatschappelijke scheidslijnen? WRR.
TowaRds a deCenT labouR MaRkeT foR low-waged MigRanT woRkeRs 11
insights from other disciplines – e.g. economics, anthropology, political 
sciences – to understand the problem and to look for ways to improve the 
position of migrant workers.
Terminological ambiguity
A f irst terminological ambiguity we face, regards the concept of ‘migrant 
workers’: migrant workers come under many – legally speaking – differ-
ent frameworks. We look at overarching legal regimes that are central to 
this study, which are migration law, the laws on access to the national or 
EU labour market, and the laws describing the rights of migrant workers. 
Migration law def ines migrant workers according to their status upon 
arrival, which can be facilitated by laws such as the free movement laws 
for EU nationals or EU labour migration laws for third country nationals 
(TCN) or by EU and national laws governing the arrival of TCNs coming to 
the EU for reasons other than work. Indeed, not all migrant workers arrive 
as workers: they might arrive and remain legally within the EU as family 
migrants, as foreign students,3 or may enter to seek refuge, or have other 
reasons for entry; if they are working, they too are considered migrant 
workers. Those migrants that enter legally for reasons of work are labelled 
as labour migrants. They often receive (restricted) work permits for specif ic 
jobs, employers, or geographical areas within a country.
Migrant workers’ legal status is not f ixed, but may change over time for 
better or for worse.4 Migrant workers might arrive without permission to stay 
and work, labelled as ‘undocumented’, ‘unauthorised’, ‘irregular’ migrant 
workers.5 Their irregularity can be caused by loss of a previously held legal 
3 T. de Lange (2015), ‘Third-Country National Students and Trainees in the EU: Caught between 
Learning and Work’, IJCLLIR, 31(4) pp. 453-472.
4 R. Paul (2015), The political Economy of Border Drawing. Arranging Legality in European 
Labour Migration Policies, Berghahn; M. Ruhs and B. Anderson (2010), Who needs migrant 
workers? Labour shortages, immigration and public policy, OUP.
5 Still very relevant is the discussion on undocumented migration by S.H. Legomsky (2009), 
‘Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A dialogue’, Georgia Law Review, 44(65). Also see 
B. Bogusz, R. Cholewinski, A. Cygan, and E. Scyszczak (2004), Irregular Migration and Human 
Rights: Theoretical, European and International Perspectives, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; A. 
Triandafyllidou and D. Vogel (2010),’Irregular Migration in the European Union: Evidence, 
Facts and Myths’, in A. Triandafyllidou (ed.), Irregular Migration in Europe: Myths and Realities, 
Farnham: Ashgate pp. 291-299.
12 TesselTje de lange and Conny Rijken 
residence status,6 can be uncovered through measures of intensified control,7 
and can be dissolved through regularisations.8
All migrant workers, whatever their status as a migrant is, and regardless 
of the protection or lack thereof offered in migration and labour market 
access laws, are also workers. As workers, they may fall under the scope of 
labour laws and receive legal protection.9 But how to determine what kind 
of worker the migrant qualif ies as; as employed, or seconded, or provider 
of a service, or self-employed? This is another terminological – and legally 
relevant – ambiguity central to this volume. In the next paragraph, we will 
elaborate on this legal fragmentation.
A Fragmented Legal Framework for EU Labour Mobility
The ambiguity of the concept of the migrant worker is shaped by, and can 
only be understood within, the legal and regulatory regime of the EU, by 
current debates and sensitivities on migration in general, and by the opening 
of the labour market for EU nationals from relatively newer EU Member 
States.
Intra-EU migration is based on Title IV on free movement of persons, 
services, and capital of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). The chapters in Title IV def ine the rights of EU nationals 
moving into another EU Member State as workers, to establish a business 
or to provide a service. It is a legal framework with blurry boundaries 
between the legal categories of movers. The Regulation on Free Movement 
6 L. Goldring, C. Bernstein, and J.K. Bernhard (2009), ‘Institutionalizing precarious migratory 
status in Canada’, Citizenship Studies, 13(3) pp. 239-265; F. Düvell (2011), ‘Paths into irregularity: 
The legal and Political construction of irregular migration’, European Journal of Migration and 
Law, 13 pp. 275-295.
7 See, for instance, A. Desmond (2016), ‘The development of a Common EU Migration Policy 
and the Rights of Irregular Migrants: A Progress narrative?’, Human Rights Law Review, 16(2) 
pp. 247-272.
8 See, for instance, S. Chauvin, B. Garcés-Mascerenas, and A. Kraler (2013), ‘Working for 
Legality: Employment and Migrant Regularization in Europe’, International Migration, 51(6).
9 This is at least the case in the Netherlands today and, to our knowledge, in most EU countries, 
although the legality of a job contract in case of illegal employment of irregular migrants, and 
thus the protection offered through labour laws, has been contested; see, for instance, A. Bogg 
(2013), ‘The immoral trap: migrant workers and the doctrine of illegality’, in B. Ryan (ed.), Labour 
migration in hard times: reforming labour market regulation?, Institute of Employment Rights; 
E. Dewhurst (2011), ‘The Right of Irregular Immigrants to Outstanding Remuneration under the 
EU Sanctions Directive: Rethinking Domestic Labour Policy in a Globalised World’, EJML, 13(4) 
pp, 389-410.
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1612/68/EC explicitly mentions in its preamble the ‘social advancement’ 
of the worker as one of the aims of free movement of workers. Whereas 
Regulation 1612/68 allowed for a protection of the national labour market 
in the EU context, the social advancement was never used as an aim and 
subsequently abolished in the Regulation 492/2011, tipping the balance of 
interests involved towards the interests of employers and their need for 
work force over the migrants’ interest in ‘social advancement’ through 
working elsewhere in the EU. A similar process occurred when adopting 
and negotiating the Posted Workers Directive (PWD).10 Framing posting 
of workers under the free movement of services and choosing this as the 
sole legal basis for the PWD, the position of posted workers was dealt with 
under the freedom to provide services. Regardless of the (limited) protection 
clauses adopted in the PWD to guarantee minimum rights to posted workers, 
the PWD diminished their position.11 In relation to the free movement of 
services, the Services Directive was adopted in 2006.12 Because the risk 
of social dumping13 was considered too high when the ‘country of origin’ 
principle was applied, this was not included in the directive. Other measures 
to protect service providers were, however, not included. According to 
Article 14, Member States are prohibited to make the provision of services 
conditional to nationality or residency requirements of the providers and 
other conditions, making it nearly or practically impossible for service 
providers from other Member States to provide services in that Member 
State. Article 15 explains which conditions can be imposed that are not 
discriminatory to service providers from other EU Member States. This 
volume shows how this directive is creatively applied, e.g. through letter 
box f irms, to increase f inancial prof its to the detriment of the position of 
the (migrant) service provider.14
Current political debates on the free movement of workers and services, 
on the one hand highlight how intra-EU mobility is strongly supported at 
the EU level and considered ‘one of the unfulf illed promises of the EU’.15 On 
10 Directive 96-71-EC of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework 
of the provision of services, OJ 21/1/1997, L 18/1.
11 See Chapter 3 by Houwerzijl and Schrauwen in this volume.
12 Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, OJ 17/12/2006, 
L376/36.
13 Although social dumping has not been def ined it is understood as a set of unfair and 
uncompetitive practices aimed at gaining (monetary) advantages which could have negative 
consequences for economic processes and workers’ social security.
14 See, for instance, Chapter 4 by Cremers and Dekkers in this volume. 
15 J. Donaghey and P. Teague (2006), ‘The free movement of workers and social Europe: maintain-
ing the European ideal’, Industrial Relations Journal, 37(6) pp. 652-666.
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the other hand, host states are rather ambivalent and may consider the use 
of free movement of workers and services by nationals from new Member 
States as a threat rather than a potential benefit. Although, for a long time, 
these free movement rights led a dormant life, they became actively applied 
after the last two enlargements of the EU, and especially after the restrictions 
towards these freedoms were abolished. High unemployment rates in host 
Member States and perceived use or abuse of the social benefits have now 
led to a negative image of EU workers.16 The differences in wages, labour 
conditions, and opportunities to work throughout the EU are a constant 
incentive for people living in the EU where wages and conditions are low, 
to try to improve these in other EU Member States where wages and labour 
conditions are high. From an employer’s perspective, free movement creates 
opportunities to lower labour costs either by using service providers from 
other, low-wage EU countries or by moving the business to such countries. 
This creates a continuous tension on the one hand between the economic 
benefits of free movement of workers and services, and, on the other hand, 
upholding labour rights standards.
In legal and political discourse, there is a strong claim that open 
labour markets should be accompanied by enhanced labour standards 
or stronger EU social policy.17 The lack of full competence at the EU level 
in the f ield of social policy makes it more diff icult (not to say impossible) 
to adopt and include social safety nets in regards to the free movement 
of workers and services. This is called the problem of the ‘Social def icit’ 
of the EU construction. The competition between economic freedom 
and fundamental social rights includes the risk of a race to the bottom 
in terms of labour rights. Moreover, Achtsioglou and Doherty argue that 
a lack of correspondence of EU declarations on social values, ‘without 
an expansion of the EU’s competences within the social f ield, any social 
objective will remain simply declaratory’.18 Recent developments amending 
the posting of workers directive to guarantee ‘equal pay for equal work’ 
16 Editorial Comments (2014), ‘The free movement of persons in the European Union. Salvaging 
the dream while explaining the nightmare’, Common Market Law Review, 51 pp. 729-740.
17 J. Donaghey and P. Teague, p. 662. In November 2017, the so-called ‘pillar of social 
rights’ was signed, proposing a decent labour market for EU citizens, not mentioning 
resident non-EU nationals though. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/pri-
orities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union/european-pillar-social-rights/
european-pillar-social-rights-20-principles_en.
18 E. Achtsioglou and M. Doherty (2014), ‘There must be some way out of here: The Crisis, Labour 
Rights and Member States in the Eye of the Storm’, European Law Journal, 20(2) pp. 219-240.
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may be perceived as an example of a move in a more social direction.19 
The directive focusses on enforcement of social norms to prevent social 
dumping. Donaghey and Teague on the other hand conclude that practices 
of social dumping and wage dumping as a consequence of open labour 
markets is not widespread nor supported by solid evidence. The threats 
to national social security as expressed by some ministers in the EU 
Member States have not been suff iciently supported by quantitative 
data, they argue.20 We remark that it cannot be denied that corporations, 
temporary work agencies, as well as self-employed persons and companies 
hiring migrant workers have shown great ingenuity in circumventing 
rules of equal treatment covering migrant workers albeit, often through 
legitimate legal constructions.
Besides circumventing behaviour and the ‘social def icit’, a third aspect 
complicating the application of the free movement of workers and services 
is the issue of def ining work relations. It is not always clear when a person 
is posted, or working by means of hiring out, or when a person is a worker, 
(bogus) self-employed person, or service provider. The providing of services, 
either as (bogus) self-employed person, posted worker, or through trans-
national temporary work agencies, has been widely used and abused. This 
has led to a variety of constructions in which minimum wages are not paid, 
access to social benefits is denied, people are dependent on their employer 
or agency while they off icially work as a self-employed person, and thus 
do not receive minimum wages nor benef it from collective agreements 
and protection regimes for workers.21 For each of these different types of 
workers a different legal regime exists with different rules on limitations to 
the freedoms that can, and do, create incentives to frame a labour situation 
according to the regime with the most opportunities to limit equal treatment 
and to maximise profits.
19 Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20171016IPR86114/posted-
workers-better-protection-and-fair-conditions-for-all. Also see Chapter 3 by Schrauwen and 
Houwerzijl in this volume.
20 Letter sent in April 2013 by the UK Home Secretary and her Austrian, German, and Dutch 
counterparts to the President of the Justice and Home Affairs Council regarding the strain on 
services and national welfare systems posed by the free movement of Union citizens and the 
response of Czech, Hungarian, Polish, and Slovak ministers, in December 2013, highlighting the 
benef icial nature of such movement for host Member State economies.
21 J. Cremers, J. Dølvik, and G. Bosch (2007), ‘Posting of workers in the single market: attempts 
to prevent social dumping and regime competition in the EU’, Industrial Relations Journal, vol. 
38(6) pp. 524-541.
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Labour Migration to the EU
Apart from intra-EU mobility, people move from third countries to the EU 
as well. The legal regime on migrant workers from outside the EU – non-
EU nationals also called third-country nationals (TCN) – coming to live 
and work in the European Union Member States, is laid down in title V of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), on the areas of freedom, 
security, and justice. This title of the TFEU includes a chapter on border 
check, asylum, and immigration policies. As far as relevant for this volume, 
Title V states that the EU shall develop a common policy on visas and other 
short-stay residence permits. Furthermore, it shall develop a common 
policy on asylum, subsidiary protection, and temporary protection with a 
view to offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring 
international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of 
non-refoulement. It shall set the standards concerning the conditions for 
the reception of applicants for asylum or subsidiary protection. Finally, it 
shall develop a common immigration policy aimed to ensure, at all stages, 
the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country 
nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and 
enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking of human 
beings. In this respect, measures shall be adopted regarding the condi-
tions of entry and residence and combating both illegal immigration and 
unauthorised residence and trafficking of persons. Furthermore, the Member 
States remain free to set conditions and admission quotas of third-country 
nationals coming from outside the EU to seek work, if not covered by the 
specif ic EU directives.
Based on these TFEU provisions, the EU has concluded several Directives 
with specif ic relevance for labour migration. These are the Single Permit 
Directive 2011/98/EU aiming at eff icient entry procedures but not setting 
any criteria for admission.22 Both migrants admitted for reasons of work, 
and working though admitted for other reasons, fall within the scope of this 
Directive and are entitled to equal treatment with nationals.23 Only one 
EU Directive sets standards for migration into lower skilled jobs, this is the 
22 Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 
on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and 
work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers 
legally residing in a Member State, official Journal L 343. 
23 See: A. Beduschi (2015), ‘An empty shell? The Protection of Social Rights of Third Country 
Workers in the EU after the Single Permit Directive’, in P. Minderhoud and T. Strik (eds.), The 
Single Permit Directive: Central Themes and Problem Issues, Oisterwijk: WLP.
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Seasonal Workers Directive.24 This Directive sets entry conditions, sanctions 
for employers who do not abide by the rules, and an equal treatment right 
for the workers, but grants no right to family reunif ication, for instance. In 
contrast, however, there are numerous directives covering sectors with highly 
skilled labour migration, an area of migration where political agreement is 
easier to reach.25 The f irst was a directive for the admission of scientists, the 
Scientif ic Researcher Directive, which was subsequently assimilated into a 
directive for the admission of foreign students and scientists.26 Researchers 
may teach in addition to conducting research as long as research remains 
the primary task. Next came a directive for highly qualif ied and highly 
remunerated migrants, the European Blue Card Directive.27 This directive, 
which is currently under review, is only widely used in Germany. Relatively 
new is the Intra Corporate Transfer (ICT) directive.28 The ICT directive 
regulates admission in the event of intra-group transfers of managers, 
specialists, or interns for a period of more than 90 days. The legal status of 
migrant workers and their family members transferred under this Directive 
is very similar to that of seconded workers under the Posting of Workers 
Directive and is not equal to the position of nationals. Like the Seasonal 
Workers Directive, it only allows for temporary labour migration.29 Finally, 
there is the Employers’ Sanctions Directive, which stipulates that EU 
Member States are obligated to punish employers who hire third-country 
nationals who have not been granted a lawful right of residence and/or 
work permit.30 In addition, and important for our discussion, the Employ-
24 Discussed in this volume by Zoeteweij and Herzfeld Olsson (Chapters 5-6).
25 A.A. Caviedes (2010), Prying open Fortress Europe. The turn to Sectoral Labour Migration, 
Lexington Books.
26 Directive 2016/801/EU of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange 
schemes, or educational projects and au pairing (recast), Official Journal L 132/21.
27 Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualif ied employment, Official Journal L 155/17.
28 Directive 2014/66/EU of 15 May 2014 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer, Official Journal L 157/1. 
29 C. Costello and M. Freedland (2016), ‘Seasonal Workers and Intra-corporate Transferees in 
EU Law: Capital’s Handmaidens?’ in J. Howe and R. Owens (eds.), Temporary Labour Migration 
in the Global Era. The Regulatory Challenges, Hart Publishing; T. de Lange and S. van Walsum 
(2014), ‘Institutionalizing temporary labour migration in Europe; creating an “in-between” 
Migration Status’, in L.F. Vosko, V. Preston, and R. Latham (eds.), Liberating Temporariness? 
Migration, Work, and Citizenship in an Age of Insecurity Liberating Temporariness? Migration, 
Work, and Citizenship in an Age of Insecurity, McGill-Queens University Press.
30 Directive 2009/52/EC of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and 
measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, Official Journal L 168/24.
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ers’ Sanctions Directive also provides that Member States must provide a 
certain degree of protection for illegally employed foreign nationals. The 
European Commission concluded in its review of the Employers’ Sanctions 
Directive that the level of protection offered to illegally employed TCN by 
the Netherlands, as well as by a number of other Member States, is not yet 
adequate.31 Other EU Directives deal with different kinds of migration rather 
than labour migration, such as family reunif ication, long-term residence32 
or asylum-seeking, and set standards for labour market access for non-EU 
nationals as well. But for the right to work of asylum seekers, as discussed by 
De Lange in this volume (Chapter 7), these other directives remain untouched 
here. Although Directives include the obligation to provide for a certain level 
of equality, not all migrant workers are to be treated equal to nationals of 
the receiving EU Member States.33
This legal framework – together with the labour, tax, or social security 
laws of the country where a job is performed – creates the legal regime 
applicable, and defines the position of the migrants, both EU nationals and 
TCN, on the labour market in the receiving Member States.
The Concept of Decent Labour in a Decent Labour market
Given this fragmented legal framework and using the position of the 
migrant worker to look at it, what challenges can be identif ied? Labour 
lawyers, migration scholars, and political theorists have delved into these 
themes, compartmentalising the topics and/or groups, looking at intra-EU 
mobility, (temporary) labour migration, labour exploitation, integration, 
undocumented migrants, or seasonal workers. A sound ‘solution’ doing 
justice to all categories of migrant workers and their specif ics may not exist, 
but we depart from the normative stance that, if a better balance can be 
struck between interests of all labour market actors, a more decent labour 
market can be created.
So how do we define decent work and does decent work imply a decent 
labour market? Decent work takes place on the individual level and, as 
such, f its the perspective chosen in this volume, namely the perspective 
31 See Chapter 9 by Berntsen and de Lange in this volume.
32 On labour mobility within the EU of long-term residents, see L. Della Torre and T. de Lange 
(2017), ‘The ¨importance of staying put¨: third country nationals’ limited intra-EU mobility 
rights’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2017.1401920.
33 B. Friðriksdóttir (2016), What happened to Equality. The Construction of the Right to Equal 
Treatment of TCN in EU Law on Labour Migration, (PhD Thesis) Radboud University Nijmegen.
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of the migrant worker. A decent labour market refers to the way in which 
the labour market is organised, namely in such a way that it stimulates 
decent work and diminishes elements that facilitate or allow practices 
that are detrimental to workers, including migrant workers. We look at 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO), EU Social Charter, and EU 
Directives for further guidance. The ILO description of decent work reads:
Decent work sums up the aspirations of people in their working lives. 
It involves opportunities for work that are productive and deliver a fair 
income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, better 
prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for 
people to express their concerns, organise and participate in the decisions 
that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all 
women and men.34
Overall, we see neither specif ic policy aims nor practices that actually 
implement this broad definition of decent labour, especially not for migrant 
workers. For instance, long-term perspectives or vocational training for 
migrant workers are rarely established. Although the Seasonal Workers 
Directive requires equal treatment with respect to vocational training, few, 
if any, EU countries facilitate a future career for their seasonal workers other 
than, maybe, a fast-track visa procedure, once again, for seasonal work.35 
A decent labour market protects migrant workers against exploitation and 
offers them opportunities according to their abilities.36 As such, labour 
market policies must facilitate equal and fair participation of all migrant 
workers, including those in low-waged jobs. Throughout this volume, 
situations, regulations, and abuses are identif ied that undermine a decent 
labour market.
If we look at the EU legal framework, this directs us to the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 14, for instance, states that Everyone 
has the right to education and to have access to vocational and continuing 
training. Vocational and continuing training are typically investments 
employers make in their workers to encourage commitment. State-run 
or f inancially backed training provided to temporary low-waged labour 
34 Available at: http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm.
35 Chapter 8 by Rijken in this volume.
36 A. Sayer (2009), Contributive Justice and Meaningful Work, Department of Sociology, Lancaster 
University, Lancaster; S. Bolton, K. Laaser, and D. Mcguire (2016), ‘Quality Work and the Moral 
Economy of European Employment Policy’, JCMS, 54(3) pp. 583, 598 DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12304.
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migrants (and to citizens performing these jobs as well) could add to building 
a sustainably decent labour market with workers’ career perspectives in 
both the receiving and sending countries.37 Article 15 of the Charter on the 
Freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work starts 
by saying that ‘Everyone has the right to engage in work and to pursue a 
freely chosen or accepted occupation’ (emphasis added). But this freedom 
is, in practice, restricted for labour migrants, low-waged or not, in case 
their admission for reasons of employment is tied to a specif ic employer. 
If they chose to work somewhere else, without the required permission, 
they fall into irregularity. So far, this has not been interpreted to mean 
that tying a migrant to an employer through a work permit, common in 
almost all labour migration regimes, is in conflict with the Charter or must 
be considered as illegal. However, it has been argued by scholars that it 
increases vulnerabilities to abuse and exploitation.38 In the f inal paragraph, 
article 15 reads ‘Nationals of third countries who are authorised to work 
in the territories of the Member States are entitled to working conditions 
equivalent to those of citizens of the Union’. But how decent is the labour 
market if TCN seasonal workers must be treated equal to citizens, while 
EU nationals sent across internal borders, through posting, to perform a 
service, are not? Here, we support the view that a decent labour market 
in low-waged sectors can only be achieved in a sustainable manner if the 
‘mission statement’ of the ILO that labour is not (merely) a commodity, is 
taken seriously for all (local, migrant, and posted) workers alike.
Finally, during the 2015 UN General Assembly, four pillars of Decent Work 
were defined – employment creation, social protection, rights at work, and 
social dialogue. This is a narrower definition than presented by the ILO. We 
feel that, at the EU level and at EU Member State and local levels, there is 
a need to work towards this kind of inclusive decent labour market, where 
there is dialogue with the (undocumented) migrant workers, countries of 
origin, as well as employers and local workforce representatives. In this 
volume, we will show how legal structures, obligations, and practice do or 
do not contribute to the creation of such a decent labour market.
37 Indeed, we can conclude from Siebers: if this is not actively pursued, the risk is eminent 
that children of low-waged migrant workers grow up without the (soft) skills to perform on a 
changing and socially demanding labour market, in this volume, chapter 11.
38 D. Demetriou (2015), ‘¨Tied Visas¨ and Inadequate Labour Protections: A formula for abuse 
and exploitation of migrant domestic workers in the United Kingdom’, Anti-Trafficking Review, 
5, pp. 69-88; S. Mullally and C. Murphy (2014), ‘Migrant Domestic Workers in the UK: Enacting 
Exclusions, Exemptions, and Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, 36(2) pp. 397-427.
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Literature delineates specif ic pitfalls that stand in our way of working 
towards a decent labour market for low-waged migrant workers and are 
discussed in this volume. ‘Disconnections’ between the economy – the 
economic need for the migrant workers’ labour – and the social substance 
of society has shaped migrants’ inclusion and mainly exclusion.39 The 
disconnections have huge political impacts, with Brexit as an obvious 
example. We see at least two disconnections that add to the creation of a 
failed decent labour market.
First, we see a disconnection between labour migration mechanisms for 
third country nationals providing workers to f ill labour market shortages, 
and, on the other hand, the lack of social protection and equal treatment 
for third country migrant workers. Options to migrate legally with the aim 
to perform low-wage work are limited. However, Directives such as the 
Single Permit Directive 2011/98/EC and the Seasonal Workers Directive 
2014/36/EU try to strike a balance and, thus, do contribute to a decent 
labour market to some extent. The margins for discretion in the national 
implementation however, are wide and leave plenty of room for deviations 
to a lower standard of ‘decency’.40
Second, and as explained above, we see the disconnection between EU 
social rights and the laws of the internal market. In the European internal 
market with the free movement of workers and services, economic interests 
prevail. Creatively manipulating boundaries of these freedoms by employers 
and companies has led to maximised prof its from mobility at the cost of 
labour migrants.41 Attempts are made to combat practices that undermine a 
decent labour market and to facilitate practices that add to a decent labour 
market. The recently proposed changes to the posting of workers directive 
is an example thereof. Creating a more central position of the migrant 
worker in which the rights of the migrant worker serve as a corrective 
39 S. Bolton, K. Laaser, and D. Mcguire, (2016), ‘Quality Work and the Moral Economy of 
European Employment Policy’, JCMS, 54(3) pp. 583, 598 DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12304. 
40 C. Rijken (2015), ‘Legal Approaches to Combating the Exploitation of Third-Country National 
Seasonal Workers’, The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
31(4) pp. 431-452; J. Fudge (2015), ‘Migration and Sustainable Development in the EU: A Case 
Study of the Seasonal Workers Directive’, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations, 31(3) pp. 331-349.
41 R. Muffels and A. Wilthagen (2013),‘Flexicurity: A new paradigm for the analysis of Labour 
markets and policies challenging the trade-off between f lexibility and security’, Sociology 
Compass, 7(2) pp. 111-122; C. Rijken and E. de Volder (2010), ‘The European Union’s struggle to 
realize a human rights-based approach to traff icking in human beings’, Connecticut Journal of 
International Law, 25(49) pp. 49-80.
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mechanism to the erosion of these rights contributes to a sustainable and 
decent labour market.
Three Observations on Labour Markets and Migration
Let us conclude this section with three observations on the connection be-
tween labour markets and migration that underlie the chapters in this volume.
Our first observation on the theme of labour markets and migration is that 
the theme is often framed in the context of exploitation, precariousness, and 
vulnerabilities, and the use or presumed abuse of the law through ‘construc-
tions’ to engage in less protective or less regulated mechanisms.42 Practices 
in which migrant workers do not receive the salary that was promised or 
are paid below minimum wage, or, even worse, are forced to work, should 
be strongly rejected, qualif ied as labour exploitation, and treated as the 
criminal act of human traff icking.43 However, there are practices that are 
less severe and in which migrant workers have entered voluntarily. Then 
the question must be raised whether the qualif ication of exploitation, 
precariousness, and vulnerability does justice to the labour market needs 
for flexible (and affordable or even cheap) labour on the employers’ side, as 
well as the needs and willingness of labour migrants to work, and even the 
needs of their country of origin for economic remittances.44 On the other 
hand, we see a disregard and denial of labour standards towards labour 
migrants, especially at the low end of the labour market. These seemingly 
discordant but interrelated mechanisms of migrant workers aiming to raise 
their income by accepting lower labour standards abroad and the combat-
ing of exploitative practices, against a background of employers trying to 
increase financial benefits, raise the question if we could maybe find a better 
mechanism in labour and migration law to balance the interests involved.
Our second observation on the theme of labour markets and migration 
concerns the flexibilisation of the labour market in general. A wide variation 
of flexible contracts and labour relations has seen light since the turn of the 
42 B. Anderson (2015), ‘Precarious Work, Immigration, and Governance’, in C.U. Schierup, R. 
Munck, B. Likic-Brboricand, and A. Neergaard (eds.), Migration, Precarity, and Global Governance. 
Challenges and Opportunities for Labour,, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 68-82. 
43 M.S. Houwerzijl and C. Rijken (2013), Responses to Forced Labour in the EU, in country report 
for JRF.
44 M. Ruhs (2013), The Price of Rights. Regulating International Labour Migration, Woodstock: 
Princeton University Press; C. Costello and M. Freedman (eds.) (2014), Migrants at Work: Im-
migration and Vulnerability in Labour Law, Oxford University Press. 
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century, such as subcontracting, work via recruitment agencies, pay-rolling, 
0-hour contracts, ‘traineeships’, and increased solo-self-employment. As a 
steady job is becoming an anomaly, especially for migrants arriving newly 
on a labour market, we see labour migrants in these low-waged ‘f lexible’ 
positions or postings (not necessarily coined as jobs) with fewer rights 
then national workers might have had before in the same position.45 As 
indicated above, these flexibilisations were and still are often facilitated by 
(EU) law and are especially at play in the intra-EU mobility as well as the 
labour market integration of refugees. At the intra-EU level we have seen 
the development of a more worker-protective framework build up during 
the past f ive years,46 with a strong voice for less f lexibility within the EU 
internal labour market. This, for instance, has contributed to the proposed 
amendment of the PWD towards ‘equal pay for equal work’. Other countries, 
such as the UK, gear towards the protection of their labour market against 
intra-EU mobility, denying the dependence of some sectors on workers 
from other EU countries.47 The question is raised if we could allow for the 
flexibility that businesses require of a labour market, in order to compete 
internationally, while still providing a decent labour market for both migrant 
and domestic workforces (often with a migrant background) alike.
Our third and f inal observation concerns the existence of a ‘shadow 
economy’ created by those living on the margins of the formal labour market 
or falling outside of the formal labour market. An example of the latter are 
undocumented migrants. They are not authorised to stay or to work within 
host societies, nevertheless it is common knowledge that they live and 
work in our midst. Undocumented migrants perform valuable tasks on our 
behalf, without receiving societies’ acknowledgement.48 In global cities, the 
45 College voor de Rechten van de Mens (2013), Poolse arbeidsmigranten in mensenrechtenper-
spectief, report; C. Costello and M. Freedman (Eds.) (2014), Migrants at Work: Immigration and 
Vulnerability in Labour Law, Oxford University Press; K. Strauss and J. Fudge (2014), Temporary 
Work, Agencies and Unfree Labour: Insecurity in the New World of Work, New York: Routledge; L. 
Berntsen (2015), Agency of labour in a flexible pan-European labour market: A qualitative analysis 
of migrant practices and trade union strategies in the Netherlands, Groningen University Press. 
46 A.A.H. van Hoek (2016), Re-embedding the transnational employment relationship – can 
the commission proposal deliver? in Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
2016-69, Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper No. 2016-16; M. Seeliger 
and I. Wagner (2016), Workers United? How Trade Union Organizations at the European Level 
Form Political Positions on the Freedom of Services, MPIFG Discussion Paper 16/16. 
47 Houwerzijl and Schrauwen actually shed some more than interesting light on how a different 
legislative and policy turn in the 1990s might actually have prevented the need for a Brexit, in 
this volume, chapter 3. 
48 J. van der Leun (2003), Looking for Loopholes, Amsterdam University Press.
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undocumented (domestic) workers facilitate the highly skilled workers by 
allowing them to work outside the home, by providing the necessary home 
care in their absence.49 They work in the ‘shadow economy’, and, as such, 
they run a higher risk of exploitation, precariousness, and vulnerability, 
due to the lack of legal authorisation to stay and work. How can we allow 
for migrants to perform these jobs without running these risks? And how 
can we provide a decent labour market for those undocumented migrants? 
Regularisation mechanisms are employed in some EU countries, but a call 
for legal entry into the EU and the EU labour market for low-wage jobs, 
is heard over and over again, but without success.50 Such a (temporary) 
migrant worker programme would grant access to formal labour markets 
and rights, even if not (necessarily) fully equal treatment.
So how can we f ind a proper balance between the benefits of the EU’s 
internal market, business and private household labour market needs, and 
build on the concept of a free market as well as a decent labour market for 
(undocumented) migrant workers in low-wage jobs? This volume tries to 
f ind answers to this question by understanding the dynamics between 
different actors and the impact of different legal regimes looked at from the 
perspective of the position of the labour migrant. Furthermore, it presents 
some directions for solutions.
Content of this Volume
The book constitutes 12 chapters and is divided into three sections. We start 
with a conceptual introduction of the relation between labour and migration 
and the rule of law. The two chapters in this section explain how (legal) 
boundaries are drawn and the function of these boundaries. Section two 
is about migrant worker access to the labour market from both within the 
EU, and from outside the EU. As this volume takes the perspective of the 
migrant as the lens through which we look at labour migration, the third 
section addresses the imbalances and vulnerabilities in the labour market 
for migrant workers at the low end of the labour market, even after migrant 
workers have participated in the labour market for quite some time.
49 S. Sassen (1991), The Global City, Princeton University Press.
50 G. Battistella (2017), ‘Temporary Labour Migration: A f lawed system in need of reform’, in 
S. Carrera, A. Geddes, E. Guild, and M. Stefan (eds.), Pathways towards legal migration into the 
EU, Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels.
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As mentioned, an important element in the study of migrant workers’ 
rights in the EU context is defining the relevant legal framework applicable 
to the migrants’ situation. The variety of migration law frameworks can 
be linked to factors such as the migrant workers’ nationality, the job to be 
performed, or salary to be earned, which may again depend on the legal 
structure of the work relationship; it can be about race and, even more so, 
about class structures. Our goal is an in-depth analysis of the conflict areas 
of migration where law has a role to play. Other arrangements of ordering, 
such as the economy, politics, and education, are not discussed.
Section 1: Setting the Scene and Drawing the Boundaries
Bert van Roermund immediately twists our mind with def ining labour as 
human beings reproducing themselves, including the process of determining 
the ‘plural self’, the ‘we’, and, as such, drawing a border between those who 
are included and those who are excluded. In this way, labour and migration 
are intertwined. This understanding of labour is far more complex than the 
reproduction of goods and is represented in the ILO def inition of decent 
labour as discussed above. Based on different characteristics of law, he 
determines the role of law in this conflict between labour and migration. 
Only when this conflict is disruptive for society, does law address it. By trying 
to get a fuller understanding of the conflict, he implicitly provides some 
guidance for lawmaking. In his ‘diagnosing exercise’, he identif ies inequality 
and unequal treatment of equal cases as a general parameter. Secondly, he 
stresses the dire need to involve major stakeholders such as international 
businesses and banks, labour unions and consumer organisations, and 
nongovernmental organisations dealing with migration and poverty in 
labour. Thirdly, he reviews structures of authority in order to enhance 
legal certainty for migrant workers. With the fourth parameter, Roermund 
gives further guidance to perform the tasks with a strong emphasis on 
the relationship between morality and lawmaking and the importance of 
fundamental rights, which prevent reducing humans to workers.
Regine Paul, in her contribution, challenges the notion of borders as 
territorial demarcation lines. By ‘critically unpacking the normative under-
belly of regulatory distinctions of migrant workers in European migration 
governance’, she shows that border drawing is a multilayered process that 
reaches beyond merely physical border drawing. The outcome of this process 
is a dubious categorisation of different groups of migrant workers, which 
she coins as a ‘selective meaning-making processes’ in which the state plays 
a crucial role by using its power to create ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ categories of 
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migrants. For her analysis, she builds on Bourdieu’s reflections on classif ica-
tion and symbolic power. This border-drawing framework is illustrated with 
a comparative study conducted in Britain, France, and Germany, which 
demonstrates the reasoning and institutional logic behind the distinction 
between high-skilled and low-skilled labour migration.
Section 2: Access to the Labour Market for EU Citizens and Third-
country Nationals
The chapter by Mijke Houwerzijl and Annette Schrauwen, by focusing on the 
position of mobile workers in particular in low-wage sectors, sketches and 
juxtaposes the respective historical evolution of the narratives on posted 
and ‘migrant’ EU workers, while displaying their differing legal impacts 
on workers’ rights. They assess the extent to which the pending proposal 
for ‘targeted revision’ (a possible new chapter in the ‘saga’ on posting of 
workers of the Posted Workers Directive) improves the position of the posted 
worker. Their overall conclusion of this assessment is a cautiously positive 
one, especially when combined with the already adopted posted workers 
enforcement directive. They furthermore acknowledge that the problem of 
enforcement is not restricted to posted workers alone, but also contributes to 
illegal practices for workers and service providers (e.g. as bogus self-employed 
service providers). According to the authors, the limited legal basis of the 
PWD is one of the reasons that social rights are excluded, which further 
hampers the position of posted workers.
Jan Cremers and Ronald Dekker rightly point out how the use of the blurred 
boundaries between legal categories might bring short-term prof its to 
employers, but may not necessarily contribute to the concept of a decent 
labour market; even worse, these blurred boundaries create opportunities for 
abuse of migrant workers. This so-called ‘arbitraging’ jeopardises the intra-EU 
mobility framework altogether. Based on the work of a long-term cooperation 
project of labour inspectors and research in the EU and the Netherlands, they 
identify the role of HR advisors and intermediaries stimulating corporations 
to abuse the loopholes created by the fragmented legal framework.
Margarite Zoeterweij centralises the legal framework for third-country 
national seasonal workers, which should have been implemented by all 
Member States of the EU by 30 September 2016, in her chapter. She critically 
assesses the extent to which this directive makes equal seasonal workers’ 
positions with national workers’. The chapter concludes with the thesis that 
the seasonal workers’ directive reinforces the inferiority of the position of 
the unskilled workers on the labour market. This conclusion is based on 
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the absence of family reunif ication rights, social rights, and the fact that 
seasonal workers are bound to their employer for residence rights according 
to the directive. Her f indings are underpinned with the examples of Spain 
and Italy, which show a lack of implementation in practice.
Petra Herzfeld Olsson addresses the situation and the regulatory regime 
for migrant berry pickers in Sweden. They mainly come from Thailand to 
pick wild blueberries and lingonberries in the remote forests in the north 
of Sweden. Most of them are employed by Thai temporary-work agencies 
and posted to Sweden. She shows the interaction between legal regulatory 
regimes and practice, by focusing on the 2008 reform of the Swedish labour 
migration regime. Initially, this reform left the abusive practices of Thai 
berry pickers untouched and, some say, even enhanced these practices. Only 
after introducing pre-arrival reliability checks of employers and recruit-
ment agencies, combined with targeted interventions by trade unions and 
municipalities, were these practices addressed. Step by step, the trade union 
movement and the Migration Agency have strengthened their engagement 
in this sector with very positive results. However, practices then anticipated 
these interventions by recruiting EU nationals, mainly as posted workers or 
(bogus) self-employed persons, to have the berries picked. Olsson puts the 
f inger on the sore spot by raising the issue of long working hours consented 
to by the berry pickers as a survival strategy for this sector.
Tesseltje de Lange discusses asylum seekers’ access to the labour market: 
What are their rights? And what hurdles do they face in order to enter the 
labour market? Based on recent research conducted in the Netherlands, De 
Lange considers how EU law sets the stage for the rights of asylum seekers 
who are awaiting the outcome of the evaluation of their asylum claim and, 
more specif ically, how this EU law is implemented in the Netherlands. By 
focussing on (temporary) participation in the labour market and creating 
opportunities for unpaid employment to facilitate integration, the Dutch 
approach possibly adds to increased vulnerability instead of f inancial 
independence, for which EU law aims.
Section 3: Imbalances and Vulnerabilities
Conny Rijken, in her chapter, argues that the term ‘exploitation’ is easily 
used in those cases in which labour rights are infringed. Labour exploitation 
has not been def ined nor is it clear when bad labour conditions turn into 
situations of labour exploitation, both nationally and internationally. The 
discussion in this chapter takes into account the international and Euro-
pean context as well as recent discussions on modern slavery and human 
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traff icking. She analyses the European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR) 
case Chowdury v. Greece ruled in March 2017 to unpack the concepts of 
exploitation, forced labour, and human traff icking.
Lisa Berntsen and Tesseltje de Lange base their chapter on a f ile study 
conducted in the Netherlands of cases in which the employer was f ined 
for illegal employment. In their chapter, they show how the Dutch Labour 
Inspection, although assigned with the task to perform the obligations 
laid down in the Employer Sanctions Directive, did not perceive itself as 
involved in migration policy. Yet, employer sanctions under EU law fall under 
migration policy and not labour policy. These blurred, fragmented, or even 
opposing legal frameworks and on-the-ground practices, do not contribute to 
creating a decent labour market. As such, the Employer sanctions directive 
not only aims at labour market regulation and migration control but also 
aims to improve the protection of labour migrants as well.
Lucia Della Torre also focusses on undocumented migrant workers, but in 
the context of Switzerland. In her chapter, she discusses the regularisation 
(or partial regularisation) of these workers in the canton of Geneva. The Swiss 
stand towards undocumented migrants has, for quite some time, mirrored 
the European one of – at best – isolation and indifference. Yet, it is precisely 
from Switzerland that a new attempt to promote the regularisation of 
Sans-Papiers has very recently arisen. Coming from a Cantonal government, 
this operation resembles the creative practices of social inclusion already 
experimented with in some communities. Unlike the latter, however, this 
Swiss operation received the endorsement of the Federal Government, thus 
presenting itself as an example of ‘Swiss pragmatism’, which could become 
an interesting model for other European countries.
Hans Siebers’s chapter demonstrates how even nationals with a migrant 
background face migration-related challenges as they lack the soft skills 
needed to perform on an equal footage as locals in the labour market. 
Ethno-migrant inequality in the labour market is a persistent problem 
in many countries. In the Netherlands especially, people with a f irst- or 
second-generation ‘non-Western’ migration background f ind themselves 
in subordinated positions in the labour market. The aim of this chapter 
is to outline a framework of explanation. Inspired by Bourdieu, Siebers 
distinguishes various forms of capital – human, social, cultural – that may 
give access to economic capital, like getting a well-paid or satisfying job. 
However, based on empirical studies, he identif ies and discusses indirect 
discrimination when non-job-related capitals such as social and cultural 
capital play a role in harming the chances for people with a ‘non-Western’ 
migration background to access economic capital.
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Johan Graafland has researched the impact of collective agreements on 
female management and job opportunities of employees from disadvantaged 
groups (including migrants or their descendants) in 4053 enterprises in 
Europe. He f inds that collective agreements stimulate the female pres-
ence in board and executive positions and the inflow of employees from 
disadvantaged groups (e.g. migrant workers, people with disabilities, long-
term unemployed). Moreover, female management further enforces job 
opportunities for disadvantaged workers. Countries with high coverage of 
collective agreements, therefore, directly as well as indirectly, through female 
management, foster integration of employees from disadvantaged groups 
into the labour market. The results imply that dismantling extensions of 
collective agreements on the labour market increases gender inequality and 
inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged groups of employees.
Some Conclusions, a Policy Agenda, and Ideas for Future 
Research
With this broad pallet of topics, concerns, imbalances, and a great variety 
of actors at regional, national, and European levels, it is quite a challenge 
to draw conclusions. But it would be a missed opportunity not to pull some 
strings together, based on the significant observations made in the contribu-
tions to this volume. The improvement of the position of the migrant worker, 
the central focus of this volume, can take place at supranational, national, 
and sectoral levels. Each of these levels has its own legal and regulatory 
frames, specif ic actors and opportunities to achieve such improvement.
At the supranational level, the level beyond state level, it must be 
acknowledged that f lexibilisation of labour, labour mobility (within the 
EU), and labour migration (to the EU) is a reality and so is circumventing 
behaviour. This circumventing behaviour is facilitated by the fragmented 
legal framework, lack of enforcement, and the corporate focus to maximise 
profits, often to the detriment of the position of (migrant) workers, coined 
by Marx as the commodification of labour. In the EU, these dynamics are 
further enhanced by the free movement of workers and services, as well as 
the blurred boundaries between the two. Increased mobility of workers and 
service providers from middle- and Eastern European countries have multiple 
effects; it leads to abusive practices by intermediaries and companies of 
workers and service providers, to a diminishing of wages of migrant workers 
(prof itable for businesses, but disadvantageous for workers and service 
providers from the host country), to labour displacement and social dumping, 
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but also to an improvement of the competitive position of companies and 
industries in the host countries. Ideally, the combination of labour-market 
openness and labour standards should be in harmony, and if labour standards 
are not guaranteed there should be a corrective mechanism that f its within 
the acquis communautaire. Future EU policies on labour mobility and on 
labour migration from TCN should build on this. The future will tell whether 
the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive (PWED)  and the adaptation of 
the PWD are examples thereof. So far, restrictions to the free movement, e.g. 
for protecting minimum wages for migrant workers and service providers, 
have not been accepted by the CJEU. However, and in line with the concept 
of the rule of reason in relation to the free movement of goods, in future 
research, it is worth exploring the application of this concept in the area of 
free movement of workers and service providers to protect migrant workers.
At the national level, states are the main actors. First, and if not regulated 
by EU law, they are to determine under what conditions third-country 
nationals are allowed to work on their territory. Especially in the area 
of low-waged migrant workers, EU law only addresses the legal position 
of seasonal workers in the SWD and, albeit hardly effective, the employ-
ment of illegally employed migrants without legal residence under the 
Employer Sanction Directive. This brings us to the second role of states, 
namely as the addressees of EU law who are responsible for the correct 
implementation of EU law. As will be shown in this volume, the more 
sensitive the topic, the more diff icult it is to achieve agreement amongst 
the EU Member States, and the more there is left to the discretion of 
individual Member States to implement in practice EU legal provisions. 
Consequently, protection and guarantees of migrant workers need to be 
realised at the state level rather than the EU level, creating considerable 
differences between EU Member States. A third role of the state is the 
enforcement of the regulatory regime, regardless of whether it originates 
from the EU or the state level. Looked at from the position of the migrant 
worker, this requires profound knowledge of social security, tax laws, 
labour law, as well as migration law, indicating that this is a complex task. 
Furthermore, it requires cooperation with other EU countries, which is not 
an easy task either. Fourth, and linked to the f irst task, states have a role 
to play when the outcome of their migration policies hamper the position 
of migrants, including illegally employed and possibly undocumented 
migrant workers, but who perform an important role for the economy 
and perform work that nationals are often not willing to do. By looking 
at the Swiss example on regularisation, discussed by Della Torre in this 
volume, we f ind inspiration for renewed regularisation schemes that could 
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be applied in other countries as well. Such regularisation based on both 
economic performance and humanitarian reasons could f ill a policy gap 
in western EU countries like the Netherlands.
At the sectoral level, directly related to the position of the migrant worker, 
the legal regulatory framework is only of limited value. Of course, what is 
unacceptable from a normative perspective should be prohibited or, in Van 
Roermunds’ words, ‘what is socially disruptive, should be determined by 
the law’ and consequently excluded, forbidden and prosecuted. However, 
before the law ‘steps in’, it is other actors such as trade unions, intermediaries, 
corporations, and HR off icers that can improve the position of the migrant 
worker. Their role should not be underestimated. They are crucial for migrant 
workers to realise their rights, and, at the same time, they are the ones who 
deny migrant workers their rights.
To conclude and in order to improve the position of migrant workers, 
actions need to be taken at all three levels. Actions should be equally crea-
tive and provocative as some of the circumventing strategies employed 
by corporations, intermediaries, and others. But we also have to think 
ahead. In a globalised world, we should have the courage to explore global 
opportunities. If a sector (e.g. agriculture) can only survive in an EU Member 
State by jeopardising our legal framework and its underlying value of equal-
ity, the question if such an industry should not be moved to other places, 
may be legitimised. Another controversial avenue would be to address the 
root causes of EU mobility, namely large differences in wages and labour 
conditions between EU Member States. The effect of large numbers of Middle 
and Eastern European workers leaving their country to work in Western 
Europe is also a detriment to increasing wages and labour conditions in 
these countries of origin. Levelling wages and labour conditions at EU level 
could mean considering lowering wages for some sectors in high-income 
countries in parallel with increasing incomes in those countries in which 
incomes are low. If we take decent work seriously, we should not be afraid 
to consider unconventional measures to support it.
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Setting the Scene: Imbalances on the 
Labour Market

1 The Challenge of Migration
Politics as Labour and Labour as Politics
Bert van Roermund
Abstract
Van Roermund coins the fundamental concepts in this book to be 
‘labour’ and ‘migration’. Plus ‘law’, of course. However, the latter is 
not at par with the former two. Law will enter the argument as the 
normative viewpoint from which the basic conceptual discourse 
on migration and labour will be analysed. In other words, f irst and 
foremost, he explores the conceptual geography of these complex 
phenomena directly. Section 1 presents their fundamental differences; 
section 2, their relationship based on these differences; and, against 
this backdrop, section 3 spells out the implications in the form of a 
few general parameters for lawmaking. As the angle of this paper is a 
philosophical one, primarily, it will not come as a surprise that these 
implications will be accounted for in terms of legal principles rather 
than rules, doctrines, or policies.
Keywords: conceptual discourse, reproduction of human existence
1 Migration and Labour: Different Perspectives of Political 
Ordering
It goes without saying that ‘labour’ is more than a job; it is more than even a 
market full of jobs that are in demand and on offer. By the same token, it is 
more than everything we call ‘employment’ – being employed or providing 
employment. In essence, labour is the variety of ways in which human 
beings as a species reproduce themselves in multifarious exchanges with 
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their environment.1 A woman giving birth is said to be ‘in labour’ because 
she is doing exactly this, reproducing human existence from a body that, 
towards the end of pregnancy, has gradually become as much her (intimate) 
environment as herself. Only against this conceptual backdrop we can 
understand why, in daily life, the production of ‘value’, usually in the form 
of goods and services, emerges as the hallmark of labour.
It is important to appreciate the inherently multifarious character of these 
exchanges. In contemporary western society, we tend to lend prominence 
of place to industrial production, driven by the intertwinement of labour 
force and capital. A little reflection, however, suffices to show that industrial 
production is only a contingent default for what labour is about. Take art, 
for example. Arguably, making art is an essential aspect of reproducing 
human existence. But it resists, to a large extent, industrial production, 
and it is much more geared to craftsmanship than to entrepreneurship. Or, 
again, consider crop and livestock farming – without doubt, a classical area 
of labour. These practices, as one witnesses on a daily basis, soon appear to 
work against human health (hence, human existence) if they are governed, 
from beginning to end, by the laws of industrial production. This is why 
effects of pesticides and transmission of animal diseases on humans are 
called ‘adverse’.
What is at the root of labour, much more than industrial production, 
is that it requires coordinated division and distribution. Even artists, say 
professional musicians and painters, are dependent on the contributions 
of others towards what is, in the end, their performance. They rarely make 
their own instruments, their canvasses, or their basic colours. They need 
theatres and galleries, as much as the galleries and the theatres need their 
talents. Note that artists are among those who are most tempted to work 
on an individual basis. But if division of labour is already inevitable in the 
case of small-scale art production, how much more necessary is it in situa-
tions where the ‘job’ to be done requires large amounts of skills, or time, or 
money? Still, coordination in labour practices does not necessarily bring in 
dedicated coordinators. Rather, what is necessary is a process of reciprocal 
1 I summarise early Marx here: ‘Denn erstens erscheint dem Menschen die Arbeit, die Leb-
enstätigkeit, das produktive Leben selbst nur als ein Mittel zur Befriedigung eines Bedürfnisses, 
des Bedürfnisses der Erhaltung der physischen Existenz. Das produktive Leben ist aber das 
Gattungsleben. Es ist das Leben erzeugende Leben. In der Art der Lebenstätigkeit liegt der ganze 
Charakter einer species, ihr Gattungscharakter, un die freie bewusste Tätigkeit ist der Gat-
tungscharakter des Menschen.’ ‘Zur Kritik der Nationalökonomie – ókonomisch-philosophische 
Manuskripte’ [1844] in K. Marx, Werke – Schriften, Bd. I, hrsg. v. H.-J. Lieber and P. Furth, (1971) 
Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, p. 567.
the Challenge of migration 41
‘tuning’ by the participants themselves. It is the job that dictates, in the f inal 
analysis, what is to be done, who should do what, when and where it should 
be done, etc. Of course, in complex situations, one calls on coordinators to 
make authoritative decisions. But still, the quality of their decisions, hence 
their authority, can be measured against the demands of the job that is 
to be done. In principle, whose proposals, efforts, and achievements will 
count as ‘contributions’ is often decided ex post, depending on whether or 
not it appears to f it, in hindsight, into the coordination scheme at hand. 
Sometimes, a seemingly ‘useless’ activity, like counting insects on ten square 
metres of land for f ive years, suddenly appears of crucial importance for 
the development of innovative produce.
Such a coordination scheme, in turn, is a function of what the job is 
about; which, in the end, is about reproducing human existence. Thus, what 
lends a sense of direction to these reproduction processes are values, in 
the sense of more or less shared preferences in societies. These values are 
the variables that determine what is regarded, for instance, as a flourishing 
human existence. They are also decisive in what we call ‘skills’, as well as 
in the hierarchy we make of ‘low’ and ‘high’ skills. Last but not least, they 
are at the bottom of individual self-respect. This is a variable independent 
of the said hierarchy, since, under certain conditions, lower skills may be 
valued as very high, and vice versa. To mention just one case in point, if 
a coordination scheme is merely driven by the values of cost-eff iciency 
and opts for division of labour by inf inite parsing of tasks at the cost of 
individual job satisfaction, it becomes highly probable that the scheme 
will run idle and be abandoned. This happened, for instance, in Japan in 
the 1990s, when so-called ‘lean production’ at conveyor belts fell victim to 
shortage of workers who successfully looked for more satisfying employment 
opportunities.
I will return to the implications of all this in Section 2. Here, I would like 
to emphasise that, from the viewpoint of labour and division of labour, the 
constraints of social ordering are dictated by coordination. In the simplest 
of words, the more people are prepared to join and do the job, the better, 
provided that their actions can be coordinated. Or, again, in a specif ic sense, 
division of labour is inclusive, even if it is divisive. Predicates like ‘foreigner’, 
‘migrant’, or ‘child’, for instance, do not register for those who are primarily 
interested in labour and coordination of labour. Their sole concern is the job 
that is to be done; and to get it done, they ignore any boundaries external 
to the job, including political boundaries, be they territorial, functional, 
or ideological. This is why large-scale projects, like seasonal harvesting or 
the Olympic Games, attract large crowds of people from all over the place. 
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It is why, for instance, IOC or FIFA are called ‘moving sovereignties’; they 
are in the habit of partially taking over the legal order in the place they 
happen to land in, demanding special tax regimes, extra infrastructure, 
exceptions on social security, etc., and getting away with it. But it is also 
why, as I saw in Rwanda, a project of labour, like building a house together, 
may start a complex process of reconciliation between women who lost 
their husbands in the 1994 genocide, and women whose husbands were 
imprisoned as guilty of the same slaughtering. So the inclusive nature of 
labour is ambiguous. It brings people together, sometimes to their benefit 
and sometimes to their detriment.
A very different perspective on sociopolitical ordering is opened if we now 
ask what migration is about. The question is itself a misfire. The term ‘migra-
tion’ can only be used by those who pretend to transcend political ordering 
and speak from a politically neutral vantage point. People ‘migrate’ in all 
sorts of ways. They are on the move to drive their business, to do research, 
to get education, to satisfy their curiosity by seeing remote places, to f ind a 
job, or indeed also to escape from violence and hardship. By presenting all 
these kinds of behaviour under the heading of ‘migration’, we extract the 
political sting out of the problem. Migration becomes a problem of political 
ordering only under the guise of im-migration and e-migration, i.e., if we 
acknowledge that it is about leaving or entering a polity. From a political 
angle, a polity is a bounded whole, and its boundaries are set (not once and 
for all, but again and again) by self-inclusion.
In this respect, the concept of a polity is crucially different from that 
of a society. Or, if one does not like this kind of ‘essentialist’ terminology, 
one may revert to its linguistic equivalent: political discourse is crucially 
different from social discourse. Different societies are separated, but also 
connected by gradual transitions in languages, cuisines, customs, religions, 
and their ilk. Polities are separated by lines; and, as we know, lines have 
length, no width. In everyday communication, we think about these lines, 
boundaries, or borders in terms of bars and barriers. But these are just one 
kind of epiphenomena (‘marks’) of what is meant. Not only national states, 
but all polities include a ‘we’ by various strategies of representation. This 
f irst-person plural ‘we’ is always determined from the inside, thus including 
some and excluding others. Only by presupposing this bounded whole is 
it possible to use typically political discourse and refer to such important 
issues as ‘the general interest’, ‘the gross domestic product’, ‘the common 
wealth’, ‘the national security’, or ‘third-country Nationals’. Obviously, these 
boundaries are construed, and they are not construed from nothing. They are 
often built on rather arbitrary data, such as the presence of a mountain range 
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or a river, differences in physiognomy (‘ethnicity’), etc. But a polity cannot 
afford not to construe them, or pretend that they are just f ictitious, hence 
nonexistent. Every politician and every citizen of a polity has to participate 
in this terminology of ‘the bounded whole’ if they want to claim relevance 
and credibility for their words and actions in the society they seek to order.
There is no point in denying that the boundaries of a polity are and 
should be flexible, porous, and malleable rather than rigid, impenetrable 
and petrif ied. A polity can only survive if it remains relatively open to 
pressure experienced as ‘coming from the outside’. Preserving its resilience, 
it should be able to respond to changes in, for instance, the global economy, 
standards in technology, or regional climate. But then again, such responses 
will always be geared towards the preservation of the polity over time, thus 
cast in the mould of how the polity sees itself from the inside, in particular 
with regard to the sustainability of its boundaries.
The problem of emigration and immigration can only arise against the 
backdrop of this ‘logic’, i.e., of what is ineradicably political about politics. 
Obviously, neither emigration nor immigration will register as problems as 
long as the agents (‘migrants’) can be categorised in terms imposed on them 
by this logic of the political. They register as either ‘regular’ or ‘irregular’ 
migrants. Or, if this political logic has managed to determine the legal order 
(to some degree), they will be counted as either ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ migrants. 
Here, those on the inside decide about those on the outside, a maxim that 
makes principled issues of migration vanish into thin air.
The problem of migration emerges as a principled problem only if it is 
regarded as a problem of massive trespassing on boundaries drawn from 
the inside. In the case of emigration, the legitimacy of these boundaries 
is challenged by insiders; in the case of immigration, by outsiders. It is 
tempting to think of such challenges as so many checks on the resilience 
of the polity’s boundaries, to see if and how they should be redrawn. On a 
small scale, they probably are. But large-scale immigration and emigration 
mean much more. These challenges become particularly edgy if and when 
they leave no space for alternative boundary setting. In these cases, the 
message conveyed to the polity by both emigration and immigration is a 
radical one: boundary setting is not at issue. In other words, the polity in 
question, as it sees itself, may as well not exist as far as the challengers are 
concerned. This message is understandable from their point of view. They 
want to avoid, at all costs, being trapped in yet another round of discourse 
in which the boundaries are redrawn, at the end of the day, by those who 
are already inside. The same message, however, is also rather frightening for 
the insiders, as it confronts them with the contingencies of their political 
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order. These contingencies are deeply felt when the political metaphor of the 
line having no width, of the doorstep neatly separating inside and outside, 
appears to be false in social reality. Immigrants landing at the shores of a 
country may be pictured as being ‘at the doorstep’ of the polity, but, in point 
of fact, the doorstep already appears to be part of the inside of the house; 
a position that may be reclaimed by the residents, as they may construct 
new thresholds for entrance over and over again, leaving newcomers in an 
inferior position for years to come. But doing so only contributes to proving 
the point at issue: They have reason to fear that their boundaries, at the end 
of the day, may as well not count in the eyes of others, even if, for themselves, 
they are the very def inition of an ordered society.
This fear is not really different if we turn to the polity that faces emigration 
rather than immigration. Potential emigrants seeing no future in their own 
country may be treated (i.e., threatened, in many cases) as being ‘inside’ by 
the authorities of their polity. In point of fact, however, even the fences at 
their borders appear to be, literally, an area of transition for those who are 
determined to leave. In conclusion, we may say that massive emigration 
and (probably even more) immigration, violate, indeed jeopardise, the 
inherently exclusive logic of the political. Note, however, that the predicates 
‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ in this context do not imply any normative, let 
alone moral connotations. They just capture the general lines of two ways 
of ordering society.
2 The Interplay between These Perspectives
How, then, do these two perspectives or ‘logics’ of ordering society – the 
inherently inclusive character of ordering governed by labour division 
and the inherently exclusive character of ordering dictated by the polity – 
relate? At f irst sight, on the account above, they seem to be incompatible. 
If this would be the end of the argument, there would be only one solution 
remaining to usher this conceptual analysis into everyday practice: We 
would have to argue for a hierarchy, lending priority of one over the other. 
In this vein, many would defend that the political should take priority over 
the economic logic that comes with the division of labour. For them, politics 
is the overarching practice ordering all social practices, from relaxing to 
religion and everything in between. But others would certainly argue that 
this claim about the role of politics is outdated, and that global division of 
labour should take priority so that we can all prof it from the wealth it will 
bring. On closer inspection, however, the picture becomes much richer. So 
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let us ask if it is possible to intertwine both perspectives and explore the 
implications for the principles of lawmaking.2
We start at the end of labour. The commitment to values is the point where 
labour and division of labour take on a genuinely political dimension. What 
is at stake in this commitment is the kind of societal structure that will 
count as ‘order’ – hence also what will count as disorder, or inferior order, or 
superior order. Note, however, that the values reflecting how a society sees 
itself flourishing, are far from mere wishes or blueprints. Values determining 
this order present the conditions under which the reproduction of human 
existence, intertwined with a specif ic environment (i.e., labour), is seen 
to become and remain sustainable – in a f irst-person plural perspective, 
i.e., from the vantage of a ‘we’. What values express are not these abstract 
pictures of possible social worlds, as is sometimes thought. In promoting 
values, one cannot picture any society as the ‘ideal’ one. Values are very much 
underpinned by facts from which ‘we’ cannot cut loose. Indeed, more often 
than not, our values are better called ‘interests’ – what we seek to achieve 
in between (inter-esse) the life we desire and the facts with which we have 
to reckon. In this sense, interests are realistic, and so are, in principle, the 
demands to be met in divisions of labour. As a polity, we cannot seriously 
claim that we have an interest in becoming the world’s leader in producing 
hydroelectrical energy if our country does not have powerful water currents. 
In brief, values are more or less shared preferences in a polity, but since this 
polity and its members are always, already situated at a specif ic time and 
place, these preferences matter, to themselves as to others, to the extent 
that they are promoted to, and register as, interests.
This should not, however, count against the conclusion that division 
of labour is value-driven, and that, from the agent’s own perspective, this 
valuing cannot be separated from articulating the collective identity that 
comes with the f irst-person plural, i.e., the ‘we’ we are committed to, but 
under conditions of greater sustainability. This ‘we’ decides what the task 
at hand amounts to, how it should be pursued, what should count as a 
contribution, and who is therefore invited to join the venture. In other 
words, the political perspective of self-inclusion cannot be kept at bay if we 
try to look at social orderings from the economical vantage point of labour.
If we depart from the other end of our analysis, migration under its 
politically relevant guises of emigration and immigration, we may discover 
2 The argument below prof its greatly and gratefully from discussions with C. Raucea, who 
defended her PhD thesis, (18 December 2017) Citizenship Inverted: From Rights to Status? at 
Tilburg University.
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that we are pursuing a path taking us into the division of labour rather 
than the reconfirmation of boundaries. To cut things a bit short, I take the 
liberty to focus on immigration rather than emigration, leaving it to the 
reader to draw the parallel. Let us return to the point where the frightening 
character of massive, nonregulated immigration was explained. I submit-
ted that the threat consists of the members of a polity being inevitably 
confronted with the contingencies of the body politic they happen to live 
in. Immigrants appearing at their borders in considerable numbers without 
visa applications, invitations or registrations, i.e., people ignoring the legal 
requirements for entrance, signal to be indifferent to the constitutive act of 
the residents’ polity, i.e., the act of self-inclusion. In this sense, the message 
of immigrants is that their ‘host’ polity might as well not exist at all. It is 
without entitlement, precisely because its boundaries have been set without 
any opportunity for them to raise their voices. This does not mean, of course, 
that, as outsiders, they contest the insiders’ right to live in some polity. But if 
massive immigration is frightening, what are the reasons for that exactly?
One reason often given is that it collapses the polity into problems of 
distributive justice. To give people their due of the common wealth, i.e., to 
divide the profits as well as the burdens of social goods like education, health 
care, infrastructure, etc. equally, one should be able to count the number 
of those involved in the distributive scheme of the polity, and the number 
should be f inite. If, by hypothesis, social goods are scarce, hence in limited 
supply, it is logically impossible to distribute them if the denominator of 
the division is inf inite. It is in virtue of this f initude that self-inclusion is 
part and parcel of political action. This is a pretty strong argument, and its 
persuasive force is greatly enhanced by the rhetoric of the cake at a birthday 
party. To divide the cake in accordance with the exigencies of distributive 
justice, i.e., to give all guests an equal part of the cake, one should start by 
counting the guests (and stop counting at some point). But it is precisely 
this metaphor that allows us to probe the weak spot of the argument. Prior 
to counting the guests and dividing the cake equally, there should be a 
cake to divide in the f irst place. This cake is not brought about by sheer 
command. It has to be produced by coordinated and sustained action of 
a plurality of agents. Indeed it requires … labour, hence division of labour. 
This explains why, in western societies, immigration is welcomed to some 
extent, on the condition that it enhances the common wealth of the polity, 
e.g., by bringing in a qualif ied workforce, or a workforce of unskilled labour, 
or (in particular) a cheap workforce.
Of course, at f irst sight, this takes us back to what was said about this 
perspective a moment ago. This does not reach beyond the political vantage 
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point of self-inclusion. If a polity opens its borders solely for what it deems 
prof itable, it just demonstrates with greater clarity what self-inclusion is 
about and how it comes around. However, the argument of the cake having 
to be produced before it can be divided is stronger than the metaphor sug-
gests. It does not easily collapse into the political logic of self-inclusion and 
exclusion. What is to be produced is not just a cake, it is the very identity 
of the ‘we’ that grapples for self-inclusion. It is not a matter of ‘us’ baking a 
cake, i.e., something pre-determined outside of us, but of ‘us’ reproducing, 
i.e., reinventing ourselves. There is no other way to ‘reproduce human exist-
ence’ than by reproducing society; and there is no other way to reproduce 
society than by reproducing a plural self, a ‘we’. Precisely this process of 
jointly carving out a plural self is itself a matter of labour, hence division 
of labour. Thus, at the heart of the political order, we discover its opposite 
form of social ordering, namely labour. And, as we saw, from the viewpoint 
of labour, there is no a priori reason for exclusion. We can never be certain 
beforehand about who on the outside will matter to those on the inside. 
In other words, none of those excluded in actual practice can be excluded 
in principle. As a f irst-person plural, we can neither cut loose from self-
inclusion nor achieve it completely. Without ‘negotiating’ such identity (in 
all meanings of the word ‘negotiate’), the process of self-inclusion would 
become inconceivable. Indeed, ex hypothesi (see above), any political action 
would then be undercut from the beginning, as all political action starts 
out from discursive references to this identity in the sense of a plural ‘self’. 
At the same time, however, these references never reach what they target. 
Our plural identity escapes us in the moment we think of defining it. These 
references remain efforts to grasp what can never be grasped completely 
and what therefore remains contestable, namely a def initive ‘we’.
Nevertheless, there are a few strongholds that may enhance the success 
rate of this negotiation process. We mentioned one already: in search of 
identity, it seems wise to aim at flexibility rather than rigidity, as conditions 
in a group’s environment are in the habit of changing in unpredictable ways. 
There is, however, another side to this coin, namely reliability. To make 
references to a plural self reliable, the ascriptions of its properties should be 
reliable. These can only be trusted to be reliable if they are tested against 
criteria that are not controlled by the same agents that make the ascriptions. 
To a considerable extent, political identity is based on recognition from 
‘outsiders’. As in the case of the individual person, not just self-awareness but 
reliable self-awareness is the key to sustainable social orderings. This does 
not imply any form of collectivisation in the sense of subjecting individuals 
to the group, but there is no point in denying that ‘identity’ – in both the 
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singular and the plural mode of the self – comes with ‘targeted unity’. Split 
polities are as pathological as split personalities if their parts are radically 
antagonistic (as is the case in unconstitutional secession and civil war), and 
cannot see themselves as parts of a larger (bounded) whole.
Pathology aside, let us stay focussed on the point where I said that the 
process of self-identif ication in a polity has to do with (division of) labour. I 
should explain what this has to do with (im-)migration. Remember what was 
said about labour at the very beginning of this paper: In the f inal analysis, 
labour is about reproducing human existence in interchange with one’s 
environment. On this account, the process of articulating a plural self may 
indeed be characterised as ‘labour’. This is most evident in the case of revolu-
tions, that more often than not come with a promise of the birth of ‘a new 
human being’. Typically, what initiatives of revolt need, is the contributions 
of ‘the many’ or ‘the multitude’, as an inf inite reservoir, not only of forces 
but also of ideas. Under these circumstances, participation is maximally 
open towards both agents and action. As the polity itself is at issue, there 
is no pre-given decision with regard to what counts as a contribution and 
who counts as a partisan. The process is under-coordinated, which is one 
of the reason why, soon after a revolution has proclaimed its success, it 
tends to ‘devour its own children’. It is not different in less dramatic cases, 
in which a society gradually transforms into what it sees as a new era for 
itself, demanding the articulation of a new, more reliable and sustainable 
‘we’. In what sense does this reveal the logic of labour emerging at the heart 
of political logic? In what sense does it emerge through massive immigration, 
in particular? Take, for instance, how a polity P that thinks of itself as 
‘western’, ‘modern’, ‘democratic’, ‘liberal’, ‘welfare directed’, etc., prepares 
for human-induced climate change, or for genetic engineering. Note, f irst 
and foremost, that we ascribe such preparations to ‘society’ rather than ‘the 
polity’. This simple change of words already suggests that we are trying to 
capture a level of social life that is not yet affected by the inside-outside 
gambit of political action; political action comes with the claim to order 
social life, and thus precedes it, conceptually. Note also that, in the case of 
climate change, the phenomenon of ‘climate refugees’ coming P’s way as 
potential immigrants, hugely enhances P’s awareness of the challenge it has 
to face, hence the need for a reliable plural identity. It is this very influx, as 
well as P’s response to it, that I propose to regard as ‘labour’. Look, secondly, 
at the manifold of pursuits converging and diverging around such alleged 
phenomena; the narratives told, the technologies presented, the policies 
announced, moral debates arising, stock markets moving, etc. All of these 
dynamics transgress the basic fault line of P’s self-inclusion, though not 
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without returning to it at the end of the day, reiterating P’s identity in a new 
key. For P, there is little point in denying, for instance, that a large amount 
of these narratives, announcements, and movements, are conveyed to it 
by what immigration from China to P (and similar polities) has achieved 
on a global scale: the business China acquired, the resources they bought, 
the infrastructure they erected. P facing China as the new economic and 
military world leader is what I call ‘labour’ in the sense proposed consist-
ently from the beginning of this paper. It is part and parcel of the process 
of reproducing human, hence societal, existence. This ‘job-to-be-done’ is 
a political exercise that, at its heart, exceeds the logic of political ordering 
in order to re-order, re-re-def ine, and re-produce it. Assess, thirdly, how 
inclusive and under-coordinated this process of labour and labour division 
is. Reports on South Korean experiments with cloning, or disastrous flood-
ing in Myanmar, do not register as faits divers from remote places, but as 
challenges to a western society like P is exposed to. They matter because 
they propose a division of labour to which P cannot afford not to respond, 
in the short or the long run. Here, once more, migration matters. It registers 
not only as ‘im-migration’ from the viewpoint of established polities like P, 
as we saw in the f irst section. It also registers, within P, as e-migration from 
other polities. It matters to P in the f irst-person plural. To express this more 
perspicuously, I propose to add this ‘P’ (for a specif ic polity) in superscript 
to the f irst-person plural pronoun.
We may say then, that migration matters to usp, not only as ourp political 
problem (what about ourp borders?), but also as their political problem 
spilling over into oursp (what about their borders?). Their and ourp interests 
meet, i.e., wep are involved in their interests, neither out of curiosity nor 
out of moral concern, but because of ‘the job’ that needs to be done. This 
is not to say that there is a common problem, as their political perspective 
may well be radically different from oursp. But wep cannot be blind to this 
perspective, insofar as emigration, for the polity left behind, often means, 
e.g., brain drain, capital flight, demographic ageing, diminishing labour force, 
exploitation, impoverishment, etc. In this sense, the seemingly neutral term 
‘migration’ often refers to practices proposing a global or regional division 
of labour that is far from indifferent to any polity left or entered. It is not at 
all sure beforehand where, eventually, the costs or the benefits of a certain 
division will fall. P would not be entirely wrong if it would come to see its 
dealings with problems of immigration as delayed payments for its colonial 
invasions of the not too distant past. In sum, we may say that the challenge of 
massive immigration and the response it evokes do not just cause problems 
for labour and the labour market, they are themselves forms of labour.
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3 Implications for Lawmaking
We have to take stock by asking what the intertwinement of labour and 
migration means for lawmaking. I started out by explaining the basically 
different perspectives of social ordering in which the concepts of labour and 
migration are usually perceived. The economic perspective of reproducing 
human existence is home to the concept of labour requiring a division 
that is as inclusive as can be, given the (re-)production ‘job’ that needs to 
be done. The political perspective of establishing a bounded polity that is 
sustainable (hence, f lexible and resilient) over time immediately makes 
migration dovetailing into immigration and emigration, depending on 
the vantage point of the polity where migration registers. Upon further 
reflection, however, both of these perspectives come to include the other, 
so that they become intertwined without merging. The joint enterprise of 
reproducing human existence requires a form of joint valuing that inevitably 
poses the question of identity, thus introducing the political logic of self-
inclusion, hence exclusion. Then again, articulating this political logic in the 
form of productive action necessarily comes under the guise of division of 
labour, which is inclusive in principle as long as coordination is warranted.
Already at this level, there are conclusions to be drawn for policy-making 
in general, regardless of the role attributed to law. If the argument above 
is basically sound, it is probably not wise to expect that the dedicated 
representatives of the economy and the dedicated representatives of 
the polity will agree on shared arrangements. In all probability, they 
will talk at cross-purposes, as they will cling to the primary perspective 
they represent, despite the crossovers between the two perspectives. As 
representatives, they will be unable to represent the intertwinement 
from their respective vantage points. They can act and speak either as 
economists or as politicians, but not as both, without forsaking their 
roles as representatives. This is why there is scope for a third perspective, 
namely law.
Although it is an unwarranted generalisation, I presume that many a 
trained legal mind would now be tempted to hold that it is the task of law 
to strike ‘a balance’ between these two perspectives. Indeed, for all practical 
purposes, this is precisely what ought to be done. In doing so, however, the 
drift of my argument should not be taken as a plea for a conceptual synthesis 
of the two perspectives. On the contrary, my aim is to show that they are 
conceptually irreconcilable. They are and remain as alien to each other 
as my left leg to my right leg. Perhaps this metaphor is a felicitous one; we 
need both legs to walk, alternating their functions of lending support and 
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moving forward. This is, in my view, how, from a legal point of view, one 
should go about the two perspectives, striking a balance by negotiating 
their ineradicable difference.
A critical reader will ask what it means to strike a balance if the metaphor 
neither captures a conceptual synthesis nor complies with its own narrative 
by revealing what – in imagining a balance – is the correlate of ‘gravity’? My 
answer is that law does present such a correlate, at least in western culture. 
It is possible to say what it is (all) about in the end, generalising a number of 
legal orders and trying to grasp their ‘telos’. Law is geared towards ending 
and/or preempting conflict that is potentially disruptive to social order, 
by means of authoritative decision making. This thumbnail def inition 
accommodates a number of features that are characteristic of law. Let me 
mention just three of these:
– Law is primarily interested in ending or preventing conflict in society, 
rather than ‘solving’ the underlying problem; although it is obvious that 
solving the underlying problem is a solid way to end or prevent conflict.
– Law does not aim to prevent or end all conflicts in society, only those 
that are considered socially disruptive. Obviously, what is disruptive of 
social order depends very much on which society is at stake and how it 
has evolved (is evolving) over time.
– Law is dependent on authority – a notion too complex to detail here any 
further. Suffice it to say that without recognising and shaping structures 
of authority, decisions taken in the name of the law are null and void.
From these features, one may infer some implications for lawmaking with 
regard to the intricate relationship between labour and migration. It is 
crucial to determine, f irst and foremost, the problems of this relationship 
in terms of conflicts that are potentially disruptive to the societies involved. 
Not all the problems it raises usher in conflicts – as I mentioned already, 
for instance, an established welfare society welcoming an unskilled labour 
force, in spite of the problems of immigration. Some of these problems 
are to be addressed by policies other than lawmaking and/or by policies 
other than by state agents (e.g., entrepreneurs redef ining their long-term 
corporate interests or labour unions reinventing themselves). Moreover, 
not all conflicts are socially disruptive (some conflicts further cohesion 
and resilience), not all conflicts disrupt the same societies, and different 
societies may be affected in ways that may turn out to be the root causes 
of conflicts between them. Let me try to formulate a few ‘tasks’ that should 
take priority in this ‘labour on labour’ and let me link them to the parameters 
or values of legal validity that Gustav Radbruch proposed in his canonical 
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work.3 The f irst task at hand is an in-depth analysis of the conflict areas of 
migration where law has a role to play, as distinct from areas that should 
be left to other arrangements of ordering, such as the economy, politics, 
education, etc. The general parameter in this diagnosing exercise from a 
juridical point of view is inequality. In principle, unequal treatment of equal 
cases is the root cause of social conflict. Defining an overlapping consensus 
between political ideologies will be crucial in determining what case is 
equal to what other case(s), and what treatment will count as ‘equal’ in all 
cases. The second task, with regard to policy design, is to involve major 
stakeholders in labour who are not primarily driven by the logic of the 
political, for example, international businesses and banks, labour unions 
and consumer organisations, nongovernmental organisations dealing with 
migration, refugeeship, and poverty. Their responsibility is to lend ‘voice’ 
to migrants as the primary stakeholders, which obviously entails letting 
them speak for themselves wherever this seems possible. Without such 
involvement, policy-making will not be ‘expedient’. The third task is to 
review structures of authority that could ground legal decision-making, so 
as to enhance legal certainty for migrant workers. Here, EU authorities could 
take the lead in the pursuit to enhance international, indeed supranational 
authority with regard to labour and migration. It should aim, for instance, 
at a more robust integration of the ILO in the current WTO environment, in 
spite of the lack of enthusiasm at the WTO end of the rope (the latest update 
on their relationship at the WTO site is from ten years ago).4 This does not 
necessarily mean that such structures have to precede legal decisions. There 
is a two-way street here, in the sense that legal decisions establish structures 
of authority as much as they make use of them. This is especially the case 
if and when such decisions impose not only an end to a conflict, but lead 
on to solving the underlying problem(s) in a sustainable way. Of course, by 
calling these three projects ‘tasks’, I do not imply that they are yet to be 
performed; the better part of both the literature and the policy-making on 
labour and migration falls squarely within these lines.
But is it possible to enhance the sense of direction that should guide these 
efforts? Here, I can only point to a few general parameters (and I will not 
hide my inability behind the confines of this paper). First and foremost, we 
should be aware of the fact that law is a political artefact. It is, itself, made 
(i.e., posited in the encompassing sense of enacted, executed, and applied) by 
3 Cf. his Rechtsphilosophie, 4. Aufl., hrsg. v. E. Wolf and H.-P. Schneider, Stuttgart, Koehler 
Verlag, 1950.
4 Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/ilo_feb07_e.htm.
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political action. It therefore cannot evade the logic of the political explained 
above. But then, though made by politics, it is not reducible to politics 
once it is made. It also undercuts politics, preventing self-inclusion from 
becoming relentless. In some polities, there may be largely shared moral 
reasons in the background of this undercutting. Since law should also be 
able to create social order when and where moral reasons go in radically 
different directions, one should not underestimate the political reasons in 
favour of exercising political self-restraint. Equal treatment, for instance 
of labour force, is a case in point here. Going rigorously by the logic of the 
political, i.e., of the polity including itself as a bounded whole, it would be 
perfectly acceptable to enhance the common wealth by what is usually 
called ‘social dumping’. Large groups of legal as well as illegal immigrants 
are particularly vulnerable to the various practices that come under this 
name. To counter these practices, one may use moral arguments that point 
to pervasive notions such as human dignity or moral rights. But it is often 
more convincing to appeal to the danger of a rigorous pursuit becoming a 
rigid pursuit, at the cost of harm to the very polity venturing such pursuit. 
The Viking and Laval cases before the European Court of Justice, for instance, 
banned unequal treatment because it jeopardises the internal market of the 
European Union rather than its moral virtuousness. Similarly, on a global 
scale, there is increasing evidence that a WTO labour rights clause is to 
be advanced for the sake of greater productivity, hence trade capacity, in 
low-wage countries, hence for the sake of ‘good’ (‘smooth’) trade worldwide, 
rather than for the sake of allegedly ‘universal’ moral rights.
Going on to a second parameter, for the very same reasons, democracy 
appears to be a relatively successful format of lawmaking. In a polity con-
sisting of changing majorities and minorities, it holds on to the principle 
that any majority may follow its preferences, on condition that it abstains 
from the use of violence in leaving to any minority, the institutionally 
warranted chance to become a majority. It is only consistent (though not 
logically compelling) that the same polity would apply this very principle 
in the relationships with other polities as well. Prior to all metrics of voting 
and electing by which one may articulate ‘majority rule’, this principle 
anchors the idea of ‘self-government by the people’ in institutional reality. It 
harbours an understanding of the people’s ‘self’, i.e., their identity, in terms 
of majorities and minorities constantly in flux, with only one permanent 
point of reference: their commitment to majority rule. By the same token, 
it shows that the ‘identity’ of a plural self does not necessarily take us into 
the conceptual realm of monolithic polities, totalitarian states, central 
authority, and their ilk. On the contrary, it opens up to political strategies 
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for large groups of relatively powerless people to gain power by getting 
organised. Thus, we may say that democracy is a powerful format to arrange 
political self-restraint in lawmaking, but it is not the panacea of lawmaking 
under all circumstances. Under conditions of so-called ‘transitional justice’, 
i.e., in the transition from a polity torn apart by oppression or civil war 
to a polity under the rule of law, democracy is in transit, too. Preempting 
major conflict in such a society, e.g., by enforcing lucid (rather than strict) 
anti-corruption policies, may well require temporary authoritarian rule, 
on the very same grounds that would ‘normally’ foster democracy. Rwanda 
seems a case in point here.
As a third parameter, I suggest that, as a matter of principle, lawmaking 
should be regarded as transboundary, by all three powers involved in it: 
legislative, governmental, and judicial. I prefer the predicate ‘transboundary’ 
over, for instance, ‘supranational’, for various reasons. The most salient one 
is that I propose to steer away from the idea that one should f irst establish 
cooperation and, indeed, institutionalisation of dedicated legal bodies on 
a level beyond the national state before one can embark on lawmaking. 
Important as such cooperation may be in its own right (cf. the transposi-
tion of EU directives, the reinforcement of the role of the ILO), the driving 
force of labour lawmaking should be elsewhere. A ‘transboundary’ vantage 
point should be the hallmark of both national and supranational legal 
agents who opt for law as political self-restraint. This applies to legislators 
implementing supranational rules and standards, to governments enforcing 
them by international cooperation, to judges exercising discretion after due 
comparative research informed by legal principles rather than domestic 
black letter rules. With regard to the latter, ‘judicial dialoguing’ – as it 
is sometimes called – should take place not only between the judges of 
supranational polities like the EU, but also between judges in sending and 
receiving migrants, diff icult as these dialogues may be.
A fourth parameter regards the attribution of fundamental rights to 
migrants, often used by a polity to differentiate not only between legal and 
illegal immigrants, but also between different subcategories on both sides 
of this divide. I would like to point to the interconnectedness of fundamental 
rights. You cannot have one without the other. It is common policy, for 
instance, to distinguish free movement rights of workers from rights to family 
life, rights to health care and education, and political voting rights. The latter, 
again, are often subdivided into voting rights on various institutional levels 
of the polity, e.g., municipal, national, federal, and their ilk. One should 
see these differentiations as varied efforts to negotiate the boundaries 
of the polity. As I argue above, such efforts are part and parcel of the way 
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polities exist, and there is no point in dubbing them ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ as 
such, let alone in arguing that they should be abandoned in the name of 
morality. What morality may demand is that they should be made under 
provisions of self-restraint; a demand that backs up, by principle, what is 
often enough already demanded by prudence. It is precisely the exercise of 
political self-restraint that will make legal authorities recognise that access 
to education and health services come in the wake of the right to family life, 
which sooner rather than later turns out to be a sequel to a permission to 
enter, which, in turn, only illustrates that fundamental rights root in human 
rights, and one cannot reduce humans to workers. After all, labour, indeed, 
is about reproducing human existence.
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2 How ‘Low-Skilled’ Migrant Workers 
Are Made
Border-Drawing in Migration Policy
Regine Paul
Abstract
When discussing labour migration governance in Europe, many observ-
ers – including academics – rather intuitively take for granted regulatory 
distinctions. This includes schisms such as EU free movers vs. workers 
from outside the EU, or high-skilled vs. low-skilled migrant workers, and 
also a relative acceptance of the different rights regimes that apply across 
categories of migrant worker. This chapter challenges physically biased no-
tions of borders, often featured in migration policy research, as territorial 
demarcation lines that lose their effectiveness when migrants cross them 
without authorisation. Instead, migration governance is conceptualised 
as a border-drawing activity by which migrants are classif ied and thus 
constructed as ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ in highly selective and structurally embed-
ded processes of ‘meaning-making’. Paul forges a conceptual hub for 
critically unpacking the normative underbelly of regulatory distinctions 
of migrant workers in European migration governance, and for discussing 
how such deeply political distinctions fashion (exploitable) positions for 
low-waged migrant workers.
Keywords: labour migration, governance, migrant categories, border-
drawing, symbolic power, cultural political economy
1 Introduction
When discussing labour migration governance in Europe, many observers 
– including academics – rather intuitively take regulatory distinctions for 
Rijken, Conny and Tesseltje de Lange (eds): Towards a Decent Labour Market for Low Waged 
Migrant Workers. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018  
doi: 10.5117/9789462987555_paul
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granted. Opposing categories usually include EU free movers vs. workers 
from outside the EU and high-skilled vs. low-skilled migrant workers. These 
schisms belittle, however, a) the creative activity of constructing these 
categories through regulation, b) their interaction with complexly stratif ied 
labour market relationships for both EU and non-EU workers, including wage 
biases based on the patchy recognition of non-domestic qualif ications on 
European labour markets, and c) the ways in which formal and informal la-
bour markets are themselves shaped by regulatory distinctions in migration 
law. This chapter conceptualises labour migration regulation as a powerful 
categorisation activity. It does so by interrogating the normative underbelly 
of migrant classif ications as ‘low-skilled’ or ‘low-waged’ migrant workers 
in contrast to high-skilled categories, as well as in the context of the EU’s 
free movement regime for EU citizens (who are not considered as migrant 
workers here, but as free movers). Such a critically minded unpacking of 
regulatory categories in migration policies towards so-called third-country 
nationals contributes, I hope, to an analytical framework for ref lecting 
on the structural and discursive conditions by which low-skilled migrant 
workers’ often vulnerable labour market positions – plentifully detailed 
in other contributions of this volume – are facilitated in the f irst place. It 
offers a way to acknowledge labour migration regulation as a complexly 
structured activity of statehood wielding far-reaching classif icatory effects 
for migrant workers themselves. At the same time, such conceptualisation 
overcomes the physical concepts of borders that feature in much political 
sciences and migration policy research.
To do so, I propose to analyse migration policy as border-drawing.1 With 
border-drawing, I mean the state’s capacity to impose classifications – that is: 
categories of thought about how, and according to which criteria of distinc-
tion, to best categorise the social world – through immigration legislation. 
Based on a problematisation of the physical bias in border concepts, featured 
in the ‘control gap’ literature in migration research, Section 2 delineates 
a Bourdieusian reading of statutory classif ication activities. Rather than 
losing their effectiveness when migrants cross them without authorisation, 
borders are conceptualised as concerning the state’s privileged symbolic 
power to construe and construct various ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ categories of 
migrants, and to associate differentiated sets of rights to such classif ications. 
Section 3 embeds the border-drawing concept in a cultural political economy 
1 This draws on a larger research project whose f indings have been published in a monograph: 
R. Paul (2015), The Political Economy of Border-Drawing: Arranging Legality in European Labour 
Migration Policies, Berghahn Books.
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framework to highlight the selectivity of meaning-making processes un-
derscoring migrant classif ications – their normative underbelly – as well as 
the structuration of such meaning-making by existing institutions. Section 
4 illustrates analytical uses of the border-drawing perspective through 
empirical examples from my past research, paying special attention to the 
volume’s interest in low-skilled migrant labour markets. Section 5 concludes 
and discusses implications of the border-drawing concept for the analysis 
of ‘low-skilled’ and low-waged labour markets for migrant workers.
2 Migration Policy Research and a Physical Bias in 
Mainstream Border Concepts
Twenty-f ive years after Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller f irst announced 
the ‘age of migration’2, research on the regulation of international migration 
has become a loyal analytical companion to migratory phenomena. Many 
social sciences accounts have since diagnosed a rather limited ability of 
statutory regulations to control migratory flows. From a Weberian reading, 
states rely on borders to delimit a) the territory they legitimately rule, and 
b) the individuals who acquire rights and access to public goods (including 
jobs and welfare) on this specif ic territory, and who are bound by the state’s 
rules. The ‘invention of the passport’ has been crucial in statutory attempts 
to differentiate who is included and excluded from the Staatsvolk, fueling 
the ‘state monopolisation of the legitimate means of movement’ since the 
late eighteenth century in Europe.3 In line with Weberian thinking on the 
prerequisites of state sovereignty, most migration policy scholars start from 
the premise that governments ‘want to be able to choose which people to 
admit, how many, for what purpose, and for how long. They do not want 
these decisions to be made by employers, other governments, or would-be 
migrants’.4
The diagnosis of a ‘global migration crisis’5 rests on the assumption that 
migration challenges the states’ monopoly to control movements into their 
demarcated territories. Examples include the ‘unintended consequences’ 
2 S. Castles and M.J. Miller (1993), The Age of Migration: International Population Movements 
in the Modern World, Palgrave MacMillan.
3 J. Torpey (2000). The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 4.
4 M. Weiner (1995), The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights, 
HarperCollinsCollege, p. 12.
5 Weiner, n. 4.
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of Western European guest-worker programmes in the 20th century, where 
workers settled rather than returned to their countries of origin after 
their labour force was no longer needed6 (i.e. an alleged failure to enforce 
return); the prominence of mass regularisations of irregular workers (often 
in low-skilled labour markets) in Southern Europe7; the limited success of 
deportations of irregular residents8; or the policy and allocation dilemmas 
the EU is facing after the large-scale entries of asylum seekers during the 
so-called refugee crisis.9 Observations of limited control have provoked 
manifold scholarly efforts to explain the ‘gap’10 between restrictive policy 
goals and rather liberal policy outcomes. They include rational choice 
political economy claims11, neo-institutionalist arguments12, and ideas 
from organisational theory.13
Rather than explaining an alleged control gap further, my premise is 
that such a focus risks missing some of the highly consequential effects of 
(potentially ‘gappy’ or not fully enforced) migrant regulation, notably for 
migrant workers and their employers. Of course, this is where we enter the 
terrain of critical legal scholarship, which has duly examined the effects 
of variable, complex, and often contradictory admission criteria as well as 
migrants’ treatment in law depending on their legal status.14 By assuming 
6 W.A. Cornelius and T. Tsuda (2004), ‘Controlling Immigration: The Limits of Government 
Intervention,’ in W.A. Cornelius and J.F. Hollif ield (eds.), Controlling immigration: a global 
perspective, Stanford University Press; S. Castles (1986), ‘The Guest-Worker in Western Europe – An 
Obituary’, International Migration Review, 20.
7 E. Reyneri (1998), ‘The Mass Legalization of Migrants in Italy: Permanent or Temporary 
Emergence from the Underground Economy?’ South European Society and Politics, 3; S. Sunderhaus 
(2007), ‘Regularization Programs for Undocumented Migrants, Migration Letters, 4.
8 A. Ellermann (2009), States against Migrants. Deportation in Germany and the United States, 
Cambridge University Press.
9 S. Carrera et al. (2015), The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis: Taking Stock and Setting Policy 
Priorities, CEPS Essay. 
10 W.A. Cornelius, P.L. Martin, and J.F. Hollif ield (eds.) (2004), Controlling Immigration: A 
Global Perspective, 2nd ed., Stanford University Press.
11 G.P. Freeman (1995), ‘Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic-States’, Interna-
tional Migration Review 29 p. 881; G.P. Freeman and A.E. Kessler (2008), ‘Political Economy and 
Migration Policy’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 34.
12 J.F. Hollif ield (2004), ‘The Emerging Migration State’, International Migration Review, 38 
p. 885; C. Joppke (1998), ‘Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration’, World Politics 50.
13 C. Boswell and A. Geddes, (2011) Migration and Mobility in the European Union (Palgrave 
Macmillan); C. Boswell (2007), ‘Migration Control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the Absence 
of Securitization’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45.
14 See, for instance, T. de Lange (2015), ‘Third-Country National Students and Trainees in the 
EU: Caught between Learning and Work’, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations, 31; also see T. De Lange and C. Rijken in the introduction to this edition.
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that states have reached the point where attempts to control physical borders 
have become untenable, many political science approaches to migration 
policy tend to conceptualise borders as taken-for-granted, merely physical, 
demarcation lines that lose their functionality when someone crosses them 
without prior authorisation. Such an understanding tends to underestimate 
the powerful and consequential role of regulation in def ining ‘legal’ and 
‘illegal’ statuses, as well as many in-between categories of semi-legality, 
and in carving out a highly differentiated rights regime on the basis of 
such classif ication. As we will see later, classif ication crucially hinges upon 
migrant skill levels as a proxy criterion for distinction. Skill level thereby 
comes to co-determine the sets of rights available to incoming and resident 
migrant workers (and their families).
3 Conceptualising Migration Policies as Selective Border-
drawing
To expose the normative underbelly and structural consequences of migrant 
admission regulation, I propose a Bourdeusian reading. This treats borders as 
complex regimes of highly differential rights and statuses for migrants, pro-
duced and reproduced through symbolic classif ications that are themselves 
structurally embedded in existing institutions. Rather than taking borders 
for granted as physical demarcation lines, a border-drawing perspective 
highlights the analytical need to explore their mutual construction and 
structuration in highly selective classif ication processes.
Migration Policies as Bourdieusian Classifications
Pierre Bourdieu’s reflections on classif ication and symbolic power15 help us 
carve out a basic concept of regulation efforts in the migration domain as 
border-drawing. Bourdieu sees classifications as social mechanisms by which 
positions and relations between individuals and groups are constructed and 
reproduced in the social world. He considers classif ications as products of 
‘symbolic struggles’ over the legitimate ‘vision and division’ of the social 
world. This means that the ‘space of relations’, later called ‘social space’, is 
not completely structurally determined, but is constantly constructed and 
15 P. Bourdieu (1989), ‘Social Space and Symbolic Power’, Sociological Theory, 7 p. 14; P. Bourdieu 
(1991), Language and symbolic power, Polity Press; P. Bourdieu (1998), Practical Reason, Polity 
Press.
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reconstructed in powerful ‘symbolic’ struggles over classif ication. While 
some properties of individuals, such as age, gender, race, and educational 
attainment, are perceived as ontologically real by Bourdieu and can have 
structuring effects on the agents’ position in the social space, the specif ic 
way in which they structure these positions is not predetermined. Rather, 
a person’s status and position in the social space depends, to a great deal, 
on the ascription of meaning to (some of) their individual properties in 
classif icatory struggles, and in the recognition of these meanings as valid 
visions of difference. Policies, in this reading, are preliminary codif ications 
of meaning, temporary winner stories in the struggle over legitimate clas-
sif ication. Whether my educational attainment, my professional skills, my 
age, my biological gender, or my nationality are advantageous for (or indeed 
detrimental to) my entry and residence in country X, is a matter of the value 
ascribed to these credentials in the countries’ labour admission policies.
A second chief claim in Bourdieu’s work considers the privileged role of 
the state in classif icatory struggles. This is closely related to the condition 
of recognition that Bourdieu associates with ‘winning’ a classif icatory 
struggle. His concept of symbolic power acknowledges that the state wields 
much classif icatory authority: while anyone can say and mean anything 
semiotically speaking, not anyone can impose any vision of the world on a 
whole society sociologically speaking.16 Asymmetric power relations and 
unequal access to symbolic capital in the éspace sociale found a particularly 
powerful role for the state in classif icatory processes: ‘In the symbolic 
struggle for the production of common sense or, more precisely, for the 
monopoly over legitimate naming, agents put into action the symbolic capital 
that they have acquired in previous struggles, and which may be juridically 
guaranteed’.17 States’ relative authority to impose semantic visions and 
divisions of the world onto others, and to have such prescriptions ‘recognised, 
that is misrecognised as arbitrary’18, relies on the ‘monopoly over legitimate 
symbolic violence’ and the power to pass collectively binding legislation. In 
Bourdieu’s words: ‘One of the major powers of the state is to produce and 
impose categories of thought that we spontaneously apply to all things in 
the social world – including the state itself.’ It is therefore ‘in the realm of 
symbolic production that the grip of the state is felt most powerfully’.19
16 P. Bourdieu, Language and symbolic power, n. 15 p. 74.
17 P. Bourdieu, ‘Social Space and Symbolic Power’, n. 15 p. 21.
18 P. Bourdieu, Language and symbolic power, n. 15 p. 170.
19 P. Bourdieu, Practical Reason, n. 15 p. 35 and 38.
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In addition, when legislation engages in ‘naming’ and ‘labeling’, say 
through creating a legal category for nominally ‘low-skilled migrant 
workers’ and by its regulatory distinction from the category ‘high-skilled 
migrant workers’, this usually does not remain a merely semantic exercise. 
Rather, regulation typically attaches highly differentiated and structurally 
consequential sets of rights and obligations to semantic classif ications. 
By linking the symbolically produced category of a ‘low-skilled migrant 
worker’, for example, to distinct sets of rights, such as access to the labour 
market, public welfare, public services, family reunion rights, or franchise, 
the state regulation powerfully shapes the socioeconomic and political 
position of the affected person in the ‘host’ country. Bridget Anderson has 
nicely summarised the status-producing effects of borders in this context:
‘International borders are commonly presented as f ilters, sorting out the 
desirable from the undesirable, the genuine from the bogus, the legal from 
the illegal. […] However, […] borders are not simply territorial, but they reach 
into the heart of political space. […] Laws and practices of citizenship […] 
may be more usefully analysed as producing rather than reflecting status, 
as creating specif ic types of social, political and economic relations’.20
Eventually then, the ability to classify and define ‘legal workers’ in official 
legislation – and to exclude all others from the scope of these def initions 
and the rights or duties attached to them – must be conceived as one of the 
most triumphant instances of the state’s symbolic power in action. This, 
of course, is in dire contrast to the perception of powerless liberal states 
conveyed in the control gap literature.
Normativity and Institutions in Border-drawing
Two further specif ications of the border-drawing concept are useful for 
empirical research, the f irst concerning the inescapability of meaning-
making and the second concerning its structural embeddedness. The f irst 
claim relies on the insight that there can be no classif ication without a 
criterion for distinction, simple as it may be. The classif ication of migrants 
into different status categories – for example, using a legal distinction 
between high-skilled and low-skilled migrant workers – is not determined 
by any natural laws. Migrant categories come into being through a set of 
politically inaugurated principles that define the grounds on which a migrant 
should be classif ied as legal or illegal, as what type of legal and with access to 
20 B. Anderson (2013), Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Controls, Oxford 
University Press, p. 2.
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what kinds of rights, or with what type of sanctions in the case of ‘illegality’. 
Legal migrant workers, for example, are typically selected and classif ied 
according to their skill level, but criteria for their distinction could also 
include, inter alia, their age, nationality, family status, language proficiency, 
or previous links to the country of destination.21 Anyone not matching the 
predefined skills profiles is consequently deemed either to remain outside 
the country or to occupy a notionally ‘illegal’ position without access to 
many fundamental rights. At the same time, any existing categories for 
admission can, of course, also be used strategically by prospective migrant 
workers, for example by entering through seemingly less stringent routes.
Classif ications inevitably entail political choices about the norms that 
should guide regulatory divisions and access to rights in the ‘host’ country. 
As Chavez has suitably pointed out, ‘illegality’ is ‘a status resulting from 
political decisions made by governmental representatives, who could just as 
well have decided to allow migrants to enter’.22 The specif ic combination of 
classification principles in the regulation of migrant admissions thus entails a 
highly selective normative vision of the world that cannot be taken for granted 
in scholarly policy analysis but instead requires critical reconstructing.
So how are specif ic credentials chosen to matter as markers of distinc-
tion in migrant classif ications then? My second specif ication draws on 
the supposition that existing institutions structure, though never fully 
determine, the room of possible meaning-making in border-drawing. The 
normative underbelly of migrant classif ications is not radically contingent 
but interacts with preexisting institutionalised sets of meaning and material 
structures of capitalist labour markets. This view borrows from the works 
of Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum23 on cultural political economy, which I 
review more fully elsewhere.24
21 R. Paul (2012), ‘Limits of the Competition State: The Cultural Political Economy of European 
Labour Migration Policies’, Critical Policy Studies, 6; R. Paul, The Political Economy of Border-
Drawing: Arranging Legality in European Labour Migration Policies, n. 1.
22 L.R. Chavez (2007), ‘The Condition of Illegality’, International Migration, 45 p. 192.
23 B. Jessop and N. Sum (2010), ‘Cultural Political Economy: Logics of Discovery, Epistemic 
Fallacies, the Complexity of Emergence, and the Potential of the Cultural Turn’, New Political 
Economy, 15; B. Jessop (2009), ‘Cultural Political Economy and Critical Policy Studies’, Critical Policy 
Studies, 3; N. Sum and B. Jessop (2013), Towards a Cultural Political Economy. Putting Culture in Its 
Place in Political Economy, Edward Elgar Publishing; N. Sum (2009), ‘The Production of Hegemonic 
Policy Discourses: “competitiveness” as a Knowledge Brand and Its (Re-)Contextualizations’, 
Critical Policy Studies, 3.
24 R. Paul, Limits of the Competition State: The Cultural Political Economy of European Labour 
Migration Policies, n. 21; R. Paul, The Political Economy of Border-Drawing: Arranging Legality 
in European Labour Migration Policies, n. 1, Chapter 1.
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At its most basic, cultural political economy (CPE) starts from an analyti-
cal distinction of two modes of complexity reduction, which actors, organisa-
tions, and social systems use to go on in an otherwise incomprehensibly 
and unmanageably complex world.25 One is ‘meaning-making’ or ‘semiosis’, 
the other one is ‘structuration’. Semiosis concerns discursive strategies of 
accentuating some selected aspects of the social world, while ignoring or 
silencing others, or combining and recombining sets of meanings. A selective 
stressing of the negative welfare effects of low-skilled migration that ignores 
its economic utility, in our case, would be a typical semiotic complexity re-
duction mechanism. Structuration concerns the ‘extra-semiotic’ or ‘material’ 
aspects of complexity reduction that can be found in institutionalisations of 
specif ic forms of social relations, such as relatively stable organisations or 
transaction models. Material structuration could concern, for example, the 
labour shortages and demographic decline on domestic labour markets – a 
macroeconomic factor that might then affect the extent to which the import 
of migrant labour is seen as a legitimate answer to so-called skill gaps.
A CPE approach joins both modes of complexity reduction in one analy-
sis to acknowledge both (a) the productive potential of meaning-making 
processes (which we have captured with the Bourdieusian language of 
‘symbolic production’ above) and (b) the impact of structural preconditions 
on the possibility for certain discourses to gain substantial influence beyond 
semantics. In a nutshell, this suggests that the institutional landscape 
delimits the range of possible (or ‘compossible’ in Sum and Jessop’s words26) 
social formations from which new meanings can be selected and vested 
in policies. Such understanding is also relevant for policy analysts in the 
interpretivist camp more generally. Henk Wagenaar27, for example, highlights 
the power of often implicit ‘presuppositional concepts’ to offer patterns of 
meaning in distinct social or cultural contexts and thus silently shape our 
understandings of what a particular policy is – and indeed should be – about.
Overall then, border-drawing in migration regulation never acts in a 
vacuum and cannot create just any meaning. Rather, the moment of selectiv-
ity that is so crucial in classif ication processes is historically and socially 
embedded; it interacts with existing institutions and their normative founda-
tions. At the same time, the view on structural embeddedness – and this is a 
clear departure from assuming institutional path dependencies – should not 
25 Summary in B. Jessop, Cultural Political Economy and Critical Policy Studies, n. 23.
26 N. Sum and B. Jessop, n. 23 pp. 235-236.
27 H. Wagenaar (2011), Meaning in Action: Interpretation and Dialogue in Policy Analysis, M.E. 
Sharpe, p. 18.
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lead to an underestimation of the powerful construction of ‘facticity’ through 
policy-making.28 Facticity means that new taken-for-granted assumptions 
are brought into being through statutory classif ications of migrant workers 
in regulations, which can create new statuses and opportunities or amend 
previous ones. CPE employs the term ‘sedimentation’ to capture the moment 
in which selective interpretations of the social world make it into the higher 
realm of ‘facticity’ to ‘give them the form of objective fact of life’.29
Once created, migrant classif ications such as the notion of a low-skilled 
vs. a high-skilled migrant worker tends to ‘become hard realities, facts that 
constrain us, not merely norms that guide our autonomous judgment’.30 
Low-skilled migrant workers will feel their inability to bring their spouses 
to live with them (such as is the case with migrants coming to work in 
the EU under the scope of the Seasonal Workers Directive discussed by 
Zoeteweij in this volume), a direct function of the rights attached to their 
classification as ‘low-skilled’ migrant workers, as a very hard reality indeed. It 
is precisely such construction mechanisms by which the inevitably selective 
claims to meaning that underpin regulatory choices – e.g., ‘we do not need 
lower-skilled workers’ or ‘high-skilled workers boost economic growth’ – can 
acquire the status of tacit knowledge beyond contestation.
Eventually, border-drawing and respective migrant classif ications are 
not just shaped by the socioeconomic formation in which they emerge, i.e. 
in contemporary capitalism. They simultaneously reconstitute this setting 
through the very process of producing or rearranging policy meanings and 
can hence come to shape future classif icatory struggles. In other words: 
it might prove hard to retreat from the claim that ‘we do not need lower-
skilled migrant workers’, once it has sedimented through legislation and 
related labour market positions with societal discourses having reached 
the stage of seemingly factual knowledge. While many contributions to this 
volume critically clarify such a claim through careful empirical analysis 
on real labour markets and in real work places, this chapter’s conceptual 
contribution lies in detailing how such classif ications come about in the 
f irst place: in powerful statutory acts of border-drawing in which statuses 
are allocated in highly selective and yet institutionally embedded ways.
28 F. Fischer (2003), ‘Beyond Empiricism: Policy Analysis as Deliberative Practice’, in M.A. Hajer 
and H. Wagenaar (eds.), Deliberative policy analysis: understanding governance in the network 
society. Cambridge University Press.
29 B. Jessop, Cultural Political Economy and Critical Policy Studies, n. 23 p. 340.
30 N. MacCormick (2007), Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory, Oxford University Press 
p. 33.
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4 Analysing the Regulation of Low-skilled Migrant Workers 
as Border-drawing
How can a border-drawing lens, with its focus on selective meaning-making 
processes that are both structured by existing institutions and produc-
tive of new sets of meaning, facilitate critical analyses of the regulation 
of low-skilled migrant workers and their jobs? To illustrate the empirical 
application of the border-drawing framework, I rehearse key f indings from 
a larger study I conducted from 2009-2012, comparing labour migration 
regulation in Britain, France, and Germany.31 This serves to demonstrate the 
reasoning and institutional logic behind a common regulatory distinction 
between high-skilled and low-skilled labour migration. It also indicates how 
the context of EU free movement structures entry options and statuses for 
those non-EU migrants classif ied as low-skilled workers.
The Relevant Other Category: Classifying High-skilled Migrant Work 
as Innovation-boosting
The f irst key f inding concerns the structural and discursive conditions 
under which contemporary labour admission regimes for non-EU workers in 
European Member States classify lower-skilled migrant jobs as economically 
undesirable, by way of comparison with the nominally highly desired, 
high-skilled migrant workers. Labels and specif icities of respective permits 
may vary, but the three countries I studied broadly structure the regulatory 
terrain by skill level as guiding criterion for distinction: 1) high-skilled 
professional routes, including post-study job search and intra-company 
exchanges; 2) shortage routes for skilled workers, and 3) lower-skilled routes 
that are sometimes inactive (Britain). Legislation in all three countries 
privileges high-skilled workers with more secure residence statuses (even 
including access to immediate permanent residency in Germany), easier 
and more comprehensive labour market access, but also encompassing 
family reunion rights. In contrast, migrants working in lower-skilled jobs 
are tied to their employers, at least initially, and they can usually only stay 
31 R. Paul, The Political Economy of Border-Drawing: Arranging Legality in European Labour 
Migration Policies, n. 1; further f indings in R. Paul, Limits of the Competition State: The Cultural 
Political Economy of European Labour Migration Policies, n. 21; R. Paul (2013), ‘Strategic Contex-
tualisation: Free Movement, Labour Migration Policies and the Governance of Foreign Workers 
in Europe’, Policy Studies, 32; R. Paul (2016), ‘Negotiating Varieties of Capitalism? Crisis and 
Change in Contemporary British and German Labour Migration Policies’, Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, 42.
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for the duration of the work contract. Any change of employers requires 
consent by the employment and migration authorities; a requirement that 
is certainly most pronounced in the British sponsorship certif icate system. 
Additional labour market protection mechanisms in the guise of shortage 
lists, resident labour market checks, and bilateral recruitment agreements or 
country-specif ic quotas, further add to the impression of a tightly regulated 
domain.
This finding concurs with several studies32 evidencing that the rediscovery 
of migrant workers as ‘potentially useful human resources’ in the 1990s – after 
decades of off icial recruitment bans – came with highly selective admission 
regimes: ‘migrants are welcome as long as they promise to contribute to the 
prerogatives of a business-friendly national economic growth strategy.’33 
Clearly, arguments of economic utility are not being accepted as suff icient 
for legitimising legal entry for migrants of lower skill levels. Unlike in the 
so-called guest-worker period after the Second World War, when countries 
such as France and Germany recruited mainly lower-skilled or unskilled 
workforce to build up flourishing postwar economies, active recruitment 
since the 1990s has been mainly focussed on high-skilled workers.34
A border-drawing perspective helps exploring the seeming desirability 
of high-skilled workers as a selective accentuation of innovation goals in 
the context of the so-called ‘knowledge-based economy’. For example, the 
European Commission, in a 2005 green paper, highlighted ‘the need to 
review immigration policies for the longer term, particularly in the light of 
the implications that an economic migration strategy would have on com-
petitiveness and, therefore, on the fulf ilment of the Lisbon objectives.’35 The 
normative underbelly of any migrant classif ication by skill level is shaped 
by the selective assumption that national economies compete desperately 
for high-skilled workers in a globalised ‘knowledge-based economy’, and 
that state policies ought to facilitate economic competitiveness and growth 
strategies by attracting high-skilled foreigners. As a British policymaker 
32 cf. S. Castles (2006), ‘Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection?’, International Migration 
Review, 40; M. Ruhs (2013), The Price of Rights. Regulating International Labour Migration, 
Princeton University Press; M. Ruhs and B. Anderson (2010), Who Needs Migrant Workers? Labour 
Shortages, Immigration, and Public Policy, Oxford University Press.
33 G. Menz (2009), The Political Economy of Managed Migration: Nonstate Actors, Europeaniza-
tion, and the Politics of Designing Migration Policies, Oxford University Press p. 31.
34 S. Castles, n. 7; A. Ellermann (2014), ‘Do Policy Legacies Matter? Past and Present Guest 
Worker Recruitment in Germany’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41.
35 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing 
Economic Migration, Brussels, p. 3.
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highlighted in an interview, employers take the view that ‘if someone 
in this field comes up then we hire them, not because we need a job, but 
because if we don’t hire them General Electric will, and these people are 
like gold dust’. The hegemony of the belief in innovation-induced growth 
and competitiveness in contemporary capitalist economies and states thus 
gets imprinted on migrant admission schemes.36
As set out in the introduction to this collection, the categorisation of a 
person as a ‘low-skilled’ migrant gives them little chance of entering the EU 
legally as a worker, and has direct effects on their labour market position if 
they enter via other schemes (e.g. students, family members, asylum seekers), 
or come as undocumented workers. While economic utility considerations 
do not feature prominently in the three countries’ generic regulation for 
low-skilled worker admissions37, the reality of informal cheap migrant labour 
suggests high economic utility of these workers in practice. Some have 
suggested this to be a ‘malign neglect’38 within migrant admission regimes, 
arguing that the illegalisation of migrant workers through restrictive policy-
making serves hidden policy objectives of practically increasing the utility 
of cheap labour.39 Indeed, the classif ication of someone as a ‘low-skilled’ 
migrant worker with less legal entry options than their higher-skilled counter 
parts, and less rights attached to the status, is itself shown to contribute 
to the ‘fashioning of precarious workers’.40 Scholars have, of course, also 
36 P.G. Cerny (2006), ‘Restructuring the State in a Globalizing World: Capital Accumulation, 
Tangled Hierarchies and the Search for a New Spatio-Temporal Fix’, Review of International 
Political Economy, 13; P.G. Cerny (2010), ‘The Competition State Today: From “Raison d’État” to 
“Raison Du Monde”’, Policy Studies, 31; B. Jessop’s notion of a ‘Schumpeterian workfare post-
national regime’ depicts the role of the ‘capitalist state’ as one of securing the key conditions 
under which valorisation of capital and the reproduction of labour are possible. See B. Jessop 
(2002), The Future of the Capitalist State, Polity.
37 Of course, regulations like the EU’s Seasonal Workers Directive create entry channels 
where the utility of low-skilled labour is off icially acknowledged but these are regulated in 
highly conf ined manners and usually come with temporary residence and fewer rights than 
higher-skilled entry schemes; E. Carmel and R. Paul (2013), ‘Complex Stratif ication: Understanding 
European Union Governance of Migrant Rights’, Regions and Cohesion, 3.
38 M. Samers (2010), ‘Strange Castle Walls and Courtyards: The Political Economy of Undocu-
mented Migration and Undeclared Employment’, in G. Menz and A. Caviedes (eds.), Labour 
migration in Europe, Palgrave MacMillan.
39 cf. A. Morice (1996), ‘Précarisation de L’économie et Clandestinité: Une Politique Délibérée’, 
Plein Droit, 31; A. Morice and S. Potot (2010), ‘De l’Ouvrier Immigré au Travailleur sans Papiers. 
Les Étrangers dans la Modernisation du Salariat’, in A. Morice and S. Potot (eds.), Travailleurs 
étrangers entre émancipation et servitude, Édition Karthala.
40 B. Anderson (2010), ‘Migration, Immigration Controls and the Fashioning of Precarious 
Workers’, Work, Employment & Society, 24.
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traced ways in which ‘illegal’ or semi-legal positions can be negotiated in 
practice, mainly through proving economic utility and moral decency41, 
but potentially also by mobilising around notions of labour exploitation.42
Structurally Embedding Low-skilled Labour Demands as a Matter of 
EU Free Movement
What of low-skilled migrant jobs in the dominant imaginary of the knowl-
edge economy? It is certainly widely acknowledged that lower-skilled 
workers are economically useful by f illing important shortages in host 
labour markets43, even if they are not usually framed as ‘desired’ in policy 
discourse and meet much less benevolent admission schemes than their 
higher-skilled counterparts. For example, British food businesses are known 
to rely on a constant supply of f lexible migrant workers willing to work for 
‘the lowest possible wages and [in] poor working conditions’ in the attempt 
to keep food prices low, all while often facing much uncertain seasonal 
supply chains and consumer demands.44
Yet, unlike in the global competition for high-skilled ‘gold dust’ workers, 
policymakers assume that lower-skilled labour is in abundant supply in 
domestic and European labour markets and therefore does not need to be 
imported from third countries: ‘they [European workers] do amply fill the 
gaps that would otherwise need to be filled by a greater number of residents 
and by non-European workers’ in the view of a British policymaker in 2011, 
talking before Brexit. The structural conditions that facilitate the ‘compos-
sibility’ of such a rationale are shaped by the EU’s free movement regime. 
Where Europeans are concerned, individuals who would have counted as 
‘foreign workers’ from a traditional, nation-state perspective, and could 
41 S. Chauvin and B. Garcés-Mascareñas (2014), ‘Becoming Less Illegal: Deservingness Frames 
and Undocumented Migrant Incorporation’, Sociology Compass, 8; S. Chauvin, B. Garcés-
Mascareñas, and A. Kraler (2013), ‘Working for Legality: Employment and Migrant Regularization 
in Europe’, International Migration, 51.
42 P. Barron, A. Bory, S. Chauvin, N. Jounin, and L. Tourette (2016), ‘State Categories and Labour 
Protest: Migrant Workers and the Fight for Legal Status in France’, Work, Employment and Society, 
30.
43 cf. B. Anderson, n. 40; B. Anderson, n. 20; R. Paul, Limits of the Competition State: The Cultural 
Political Economy of European Labour Migration Policies, n. 21; M. Ruhs and B. Anderson (2010), 
‘Semi-Compliance and Illegality in Migrant Labour Markets: An Analysis of Migrants, Employers 
and the State in the UK’, Population, Space and Place, 16.
44 A. Geddes and S. Scott (2010), ‘UK Food Businesses’ Reliance on Low-Wage Migrant Labour: 
A Case of Choice or Constraint?’ in M. Ruhs and B. Anderson (eds.), Who needs migrant workers? 
Labour shortages, immigration, and public policy, Oxford University Press.
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have been selected, rejected, or expelled on the terms and conditions set 
out in national regulations, can no longer be treated as aliens in national 
legislation.45
A border-drawing analysis indicates that the EU free movement regime 
serves as a selective structural point of reference that helps to justify restric-
tive admission policies for low-skilled labour from outside the EU. The 
selectivity of this legal condition becomes obvious when we highlight that 
the availability of EU workers is no criterion for exclusion from admission 
of third-country nationals who are high-skilled migrant workers, domestic 
graduates, or intra-corporate transferees.46 The legal implications of an 
EU-wide labour market in which national regulators cannot discriminate 
other EU nationals, has provisionally constrained the applicability of the 
usual labour and welfare protection strategies for third-country nation-
als. It is important to note that some of them had enjoyed easier, or even 
privileged, access before, for example through guest-worker agreements 
(e.g. Turks in Germany) or postcolonial links (Maghrebins in France, New 
Commonwealth citizens in Britain). Therefore, some observers discuss 
EU free movement as a replacement of historical migration patterns with 
ethnicised stratif ication effects.47
Yet, recent developments around Brexit clearly indicate that to treat 
non-EU migrants as legally secondary to EU free movers is highly contested 
and unstable over time. Unexpectedly high mobility, and its perceived 
adverse effects, were at the centre of a recent policy U-turn from liberal 
recruitment under New Labour to limiting net migration overall from 2010 
onwards, under Conservative-led administrations in the United Kingdom.48 
The government’s inability to restrict free movement directed regulatory 
45 More detailed review of the mobility regime in E. Carmel and R. Paul (2013), ‘Migration, 
Mobility and Rights Regulation in the EU’, Policy Studies, 32; cf. D. Kostakopoulou (2007), 
‘European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future’, European Law Journal, 13; and M.S. Houwerzijl 
and A. Schrauwen in this volume.
46 I speak of ‘strategic contextualization’ to explain the selective use of EU free movement in 
policies directed at non-EU migrant workers: R. Paul (2013), ‘Strategic Contextualisation: Free 
Movement, Labour Migration Policies and the Governance of Foreign Workers in Europe’, Policy 
Studies, 32.
47 cf. P. Hansen (2000), ‘“European Citizenship”, or Where Neo-Liberalism Meets Ethno-
Culturalism’, European Societies, 2; P. Hansen and S. B. Hager (2010), The Politics of European 
Citizenship: Deepening Contradictions in Social Rights and Migration Policy, Berghahn; L. McDowell 
(2009), ‘Old and New European Economic Migrants: Whiteness and Managed Migration Policies’, 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35.
48 R. Paul, Negotiating Varieties of Capitalism?, n. 31.
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repercussions mostly to non-EU foreign workers.49 Interestingly, most legal 
changes to admission routes kept the basic classif ication by skill levels intact 
and curtailed routes by simply recalibrating skill requirements within the 
points-based system. For example, while New Labour had defined ‘skilled’ 
workers in tier 2 as those with school-leaving certif icates and included 
192 occupations on the shortage list in 2008, David Cameron’s administra-
tion raised the skill requirements to professional diploma level in 2011 (121 
occupations) and to graduate level in 2013 (89 occupations).50 As a result, 
options for ‘low-skilled’ workers to enter Britain through the shortage route 
diminished without any migrants lowering their qualif ication level. More 
recently, of course, EU free movement itself became a major battlef ield in 
the Brexit vote51 and delegitimised the previously hegemonic – at least under 
New Labour – construal and construction of EU mobile workers as useful, 
f lexible labour supply, on low-skilled British job markets.
5 Conclusion
This chapter took issue with the taking for granted of legal distinctions of 
migrants in dominant political science research with their foci on the ‘gap’ 
between (tough) migrant regulation and its (lax) enforcement. Instead, 
I outlined border-drawing as a framework for (1) critically interrogating 
the ways in which regulation classif ies migrants into various categories 
of ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’, usually with highly differential sets of rights, and (2) 
exploring the normative underbelly and strategically selective institutional 
embedding of such distinctions.
The border-drawing lens alerts the analyst that the contemporary positive 
framing of high-skilled workers as economically desirable should not be easily 
taken for granted, even if it seems to be normalised in several contemporary 
studies and consultancy reports.52 Rather, such positive meanings – and, by 
49 R. Ford, W. Jennings, and W. Somerville (2015), ‘Public Opinion, Responsiveness and Con-
straint: Britain’s Three Immigration Policy Regimes’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 
41.
50 Migration Advisory Committee (2013), Immigration and the British Labour Market: The Role 
of the Migration Advisory Committee.
51 J. Portes (2016), ‘Immigration, Free Movement and the EU Referendum’, National Institute 
Economic Review, 236; D. Wincott (2017), ‘Brexit dilemmas: New opportunities and tough choices 
in unsettled times’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19.
52 L. Cerna (2013), ‘Understanding the Diversity of EU Migration Policy in Practice: The Im-
plementation of the Blue Card Initiative’, Policy Studies, 34; OECD (2011), ‘Global Governance 
and the Regulation of Migration Flows’, Development Centre Studies (Organisation for Economic 
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implication, the often negative framing of low-skilled migrant workers and 
the rather restrictive regulation of their entry in EU Member States – are 
selectively inscribed in regulation with the political intention of structuring 
the social world around selective norms of ‘economic desirability’. Clas-
sif ications emerge at specif ic moments in time and in specif ic places and 
are structurally embedded in hegemonic ideas about capitalism. Both the 
diminishing legal acceptance of low-skilled migrant workers as economically 
utile, from the so-called guest-worker period towards the contemporary 
‘knowledge-based economy’, and the role of the EU free movement regime 
in structuring responses to still economically extant low-skilled labour 
demands, highlight the power of such selective structuration. By classifying 
‘low-skilled’ migrant workers as abundantly available on EU labour markets, 
regulation also disadvantages the position of non-EU migrant worker resi-
dents, some of who have long-standing links to the ‘host’ country, and may 
thus wield ethnicised stratif ication effects. However, as Brexit has shown, 
such political structuration may also backlash when voters are unwilling to 
accept EU free movers’ rights to f ill low-wage job gaps and define the feared 
‘other’ on socio-political or cultural – rather than economic – grounds.53 
At the same time, restrictive regulation contributes to the ‘fashioning’ of 
exploitable labour market positions for migrant workers in low-skilled jobs 
and might also lend these disadvantaged legal positions to strategies of 
victimization (as discussed in some of this volume’s contributions).
Overall, classifying migrant workers as economically less desired, and 
granting them fewer legal entry options and fewer rights, in a structural 
environment where they are economically still utile (and potentially more so 
with a less secure legal status), implies wide-ranging and non-straightforward 
political ordering effects. It is by exposing these effects that the border-
drawing perspective can contribute more intriguing accounts of regulation 
than a conventional focus on explaining unauthorised border crossing or 
visa overstaying. To analyse the position of low-skilled and/or low-waged 
migrant workers in European labour markets critically, I suggest, we require 
careful unpacking of (a) legal categories as constructs, (b) the markers of 
classif ication which distinguish on category from one another (as well as 
Co-operation and Development 2011); M. Ruhs, n. 32; P. Zaletel (2006), ‘Competing for the 
Highly Skilled Migrants: Implications for the EU Common Approach on Temporary Economic 
Migration’, European Law Journal, 12.
53 My f ieldwork unearthed plenty of puzzling and amusing anecdotes in which citizens of 
the UK with Jamaican and other New Commonwealth heritage wondered why the British 
government decided to bring in Eastern Europeans who ‘don’t even play cricket!’. Cf. R. Paul, 
The political economy of border-drawing, n. 1, Chapter 6.
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from different classif ication regimes across time and space), (c) the struc-
tural conditions in which markers of distinction are selected and come to 
operate, and (d) the variable eligibility conditions and rights attached to 
different categories of migrant. Just like in Scott’s famous account of state 
governance through cadastral maps, city plans, and scientif ic foresting, 
categories of migrants are thus understood as ‘abridged maps’ of the social 
world that ‘enable much of the reality they depict to be remade’54 through 
state regulation.
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Section 2
Access to the Labour Market for EU Citizens and 
Third-country Nationals

3 From Competing to Aligned Narratives 
on Posted and Other Mobile Workers 
within the EU?
Mijke Houwerzijl and Annette Schrauwen
Abstract
The Treaty provisions on the free movement of workers provide rights 
to workers to move to, and accept work in other Member States, and to 
be treated as equal to ‘national workers’. The enabling aspects of these 
provisions offer people a feeling of what it means to be an EU worker and 
allows them to determine freely how they are going to make a living. 
Clearly, the narrative of free movement of workers prevents that the focus 
is on the needs of the employer alone. In contrast, the posting of workers 
falls under the heading of EU free movement of services, and puts workers 
in a position of commodities or ‘tools’ with which service providers may 
provide their services in another Member State. It induces a narrative 
that puts the focus f irst and foremost on the economic interests of the 
employers, in their positions as temporary cross-border service providers.
Focusing on the position of mobile workers in particular in low-wage 
sectors, this chapter sketches and juxtaposes the respective historical 
evolution of the narratives on posted and ‘migrant’ EU workers, while dis-
playing their differing legal impact on workers’ rights. This is accompanied 
by a look into the most recent developments in the posting of workers saga. 
What we assess is whether the pending proposal for ‘targeted revision’ of the 
Posted Workers Directive (PWD) substantially diminishes the differences 
between the two narratives. Does it broaden its perspective to the needs of 
workers next to those of employers? How would that relate to the framing 
that posted workers do not enter the labour market of the host state?
Keywords: posted workers directive, narratives posted and ‘migrant’ EU 
workers, revision PWD
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Migrant Workers. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018  
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1 Introduction
In the historic narrative of EU free movement of workers, free movement 
rights were initially conceived in terms of the eff icient exchange of the 
production factor labour, soon followed by a conception in terms of indi-
vidual freedom that allowed workers to improve their living and working 
conditions and to improve their social advancement. The Treaty provisions 
on the free movement of workers provide rights to workers to move to, and 
accept work in another Member State and to be treated as equal to ‘national 
workers’. The enabling aspects of these provisions form a species of social 
imagination that allows people to determine how they are going to live their 
lives. The narrative of free movement of workers prevents that the focus is 
on the needs of the employer alone.
In contrast, the posting of workers falls under the heading of EU free 
movement of services, and puts workers in a position of commodities or 
‘tools’ with which service providers may provide their services in another 
Member State. The posting mechanism involves workers being temporarily 
employed in a ‘host’ Member State other than that where they normally 
work, while being taxed in and contributing to the social security system of 
the ‘sending’ Member State. Since the posting of workers takes place in the 
framework of the provision of services and not in the employee’s capacity 
as a worker in his or her own right, it induces a narrative that puts the focus 
f irst and foremost on the needs of employers, in their position as temporary 
cross-border service provider.
Below, we will give an account of the historical evolution of the two 
contrasting narratives. The initial decision of the Court of Justice of the 
EU (hereafter CJEU or Court) in March 1990 in the case Rush Portuguesa,1 
that posted workers were covered by the services provisions in the TFEU 
instead of the provisions on free movement of workers, was crucial. The 
main question that will be addressed throughout this chapter is whether 
the pending proposal for ‘targeted revision’ of the Posted Workers Directive 
(hereafter PWD) substantially diminishes the differences between the two 
narratives. Does it broaden its perspective to the needs of workers next 
to those of employers? How would that relate to the framing that posted 
workers do not enter the labour market of the host state?
The structure of this chapter is as follows: It starts by introducing several 
concepts stemming from discourse analysis that it loosely employs for the 
comparison of the respective narratives under free movement of workers 
1 Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa Lda v Off ice national d’immigration [1990] ECR I-1417.
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and services as constructed by the CJEU. It will then sketch the (evolving) 
position of the ‘mobile’ worker under both narratives and identify which 
elements currently included in the narrative on posted workers are modified 
by the proposal for revision. Afterwards, it will turn to the revision process 
of the PWD in order to assess possibilities to ‘upgrade’ the narrative on 
posted workers. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks.
2 Framing, Narratives, and their Limitations
In Worlds between Words, Mark van Ostaijen shows the signif icance of 
discourses to understand institutional action and policy-making.2 His 
study reveals that the outcome of a discursive struggle determines whether 
mobility or migration is seen as ‘problem’, ‘solution’, ‘a return from the 
past’, or as ‘hope for the future’.3 Hence, it determines the starting point for 
institutional (in)action. This chapter borrows from his study the idea that the 
discursive perspective allows an insight into ‘how actors create consistency 
and credibility to articulate legitimate claims’.4 For example, the Court can 
be seen as an important actor in legitimising the current EU legal framework 
in which posted workers are situated, starting with its landmark ruling in 
Rush Portuguesa. Though the concepts ‘frame’ and ‘framework’ suggest a 
static concept by which subjects and issues are addressed, framing is more of 
a political process. The present chapter borrows the approach to framing as 
‘how specific language and concepts are used (naming), how involved groups 
are defined (classifying) and how a causal story with prescriptive solutions 
is constructed (narrating)’, from Van Ostaijen.5 The authors of this chapter 
propose that discursive framing also influences legal categorisations and 
the legal framework. For instance, the statement of the Court that posted 
workers ‘do not enter the labour market’ of the host state influences the 
relative weight accorded to the protection of their rights in the development 
of further legal framework.
However, before looking at the respective narratives, one caveat must be 
made. It would go beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a thorough 
and balanced analysis of the ‘full picture’ of issues attached to cross-border 
2 M.M.A.C van Ostaijen (2017), ‘Worlds between Words: the politics of intra-European movement 
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(posted) labour mobility within the EU. Instead, the narratives reconstructed 
in this chapter are underpinned by a selection of remarkable judgments 
and other legal ‘highlights’, such as specif ic considerations or provisions of 
a Regulation or Directive, only.6 The selection made was inspired by the 
focus of this book on the challenges to create a decent labour market for 
low-waged work, involving mobile posted or migrant workers. In the EU, such 
challenges relate mainly to the movement of labour from ‘low-wage’ countries 
to ‘high-wage’ countries, in sectors such as agriculture, construction, road 
transport, and care, where companies are under high competitive pressure 
to ‘search for ever cheaper labour’. In our view, a decent labour market in 
such sectors can only be achieved in a sustainable manner if the ‘mission 
statement’ of the ILO, that labour is not (merely) a commodity, is taken 
seriously for all (local, migrant, and posted) workers involved.
This limited approach helps to focus on the major elements in the nar-
rative and makes a comparison possible. However, we acknowledge that it 
overemphasizes the position of low-waged mobile workers ‘vis-à-vis’ other 
mobile workers within the EU. Nevertheless, the political discourse in the 
last decade justif ies such a selective approach. The (perceived threat of) 
social dumping, ‘welfare tourism’, and examples of abusive exploitation 
associated with cross-border labour mobility within the EU have provided 
a source of political tension. Currently, there is a f ierce and ongoing debate 
about the costs and benefits of free labour mobility across the EU. In the 
United Kingdom, this debate played a crucial role in the victory for the 
advocates of ‘taking back control over national borders’. In many other 
host countries, politicians blame ‘Europe’ for the undercutting of local 
workers and/or easy access to social welfare benef its. The scapegoating 
of Polish workers by the Dutch right wing PVV opening a hotline in the 
Netherlands in 2012 was a radical example of it.7 Therefore, it is submitted 
that it is also in the interest of frontier workers with standard contracts, 
of high-wage international football players, of highly skilled professionals 
who work ‘all over the globe’ and all other mobile workers with relatively 
‘secure’ and decent working conditions, to strive for a ‘stronger framework 
6 This means that the following issues will not be dealt with: the different types of posted 
workers, the position of international truck drivers, the exact scope of remuneration (such as 
the inclusion or exclusion of allowances, reimbursements for travel costs in the def inition), 
the applicability of all or only general applicable collective agreements, the link between the 
PWD and Private International Law (PIL), as well as the link with regulations concerning the 
coordination of social security systems.
7 This provoked a European Parliament resolution of 15 March 2012 on discriminatory Internet 
sites and government reactions (2012/2554(RSP).
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for posting in the EU, contributing to a fairer and deeper Single Market’,8 
and to make ‘the free movement of people to be based on rules that are clear, 
fair for everybody and enforced on the ground’.9 Analysing and juxtaposing 
the narratives on free movement of workers and posting of workers from 
that angle brings out (or refreshes our collective memory of) interesting 
differences that could serve as an impetus for further steps to enhance the 
current legal framework.
3 ‘Free movement of workers’: An Almost Fully Consistent 
Narrative of Enabling Personal Development and Social 
Advancement for Workers
In one of the earlier cases on the free movement of workers and Article 45 
TFEU [then 48 EEC], Commission v France, the Court interpreted the provi-
sion as entailing ‘the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality, 
whatever be its nature or extent, between workers of the Member States 
as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and 
employment.’10 What makes this judgment remarkable is that the Court 
added that the effect of nondiscrimination is not only enhancing the free 
choice to work in another EU country and being treated equally as national 
workers. It also has the effect of ‘guaranteeing to the State’s own nationals 
that they shall not suffer the unfavourable consequences which could result 
from the offer to, or acceptance by, nationals of other Member States, of 
conditions of employment or remuneration less advantageous than those 
obtained under national law, since such acceptance is prohibited.’11
One could see this as framing the free movement of workers in func-
tions of both the individual freedom to decide to take up employment in 
another Member State, and of a level playing f ield where remuneration and 
employment conditions cannot be used as means to displace local workers 
(often referred to as ‘social dumping’). The individual freedom to take up 
employment anywhere in the EU on the condition of equal treatment, is 
8 European Commission (2016), Revision of the Posting of Workers Directive-frequently asked 
questions, Strasbourg. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-467_en.htm.
9 EU Observer (20 July 2016), ‘Eastern EU states lose battle on workers’ pay’, Brussels. Available 
at: https://euobserver.com/economic/134433.
10 Case 167-73, Commission v France (French merchant seamen), [1974] ECR 359, para. 44. 
Italics added by the authors.
11 Ibidem, para. 45. See also C. Barnard (2014) ‘Free movement of natural persons’, in: C. Barnard 
and S. Peers (eds.), European Union Law, OUP p. 359.
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mentioned very often by the Court in subsequent cases on free movement 
of workers,12 whereas the guarantee that nationals of host States shall not 
suffer the negative consequences of free movement of workers is not.13 Still, 
it is interesting to note that the Court has also stressed this ‘dual rationale’ 
of the nondiscrimination principle in relation to other subjects.14
The Court’s narrative partly equals that of Regulation (EEC)1612/68 on 
free movement of workers, now replaced by Regulation (EU) 492/2011. The 
preamble of the Regulation explicitly mentions ‘social advancement’ of 
the worker as one of the aims of free movement of workers. Furthermore, 
the Regulation has as its principal aim in the words of the Court, to ensure 
that ‘in each Member State workers from the other Member States receive 
treatment which is not discriminatory by comparison with that of national 
workers by providing for the systematic application of the rule of national 
treatment as far as all conditions of employment and work are concerned.’15 
By granting entitlement to EU nationals to access the labour markets of the 
other Member States, these provisions are meant to be the main source (the 
‘cornerstone’) of EU labour movement to another Member State. Pursu-
ant to Article 7(4) of the Regulation, EU nationals who move as workers 
to another Member State are entitled to equal treatment with national 
workers as regards remuneration, dismissal, and other labour conditions 
in law laid down in collective or individual agreement, or any other col-
lective regulation; and, should they become unemployed, reinstatement 
or reemployment, access to training in vocational schools and retraining 
centres, and the same social and tax advantages, whether or not attached 
to the contract of employment,16 the extension of which to workers from 
other Member States seems ‘suitable to facilitate their mobility within the 
12 For a recent example, see Case C-566/15, Konrad Erzberger, ECLI:EU:2017:562, para. 33.
13 However, A-G Lenz explicitly relied on para. 45 of the French merchant seamen judgment in 
his opinion in the case 237/83 Prodest, [1984] ECR 3153, para 4. See in more detail, M.S. Houwerzijl 
(2005), De Detacheringrichtlijn’(PhD thesis), Deventer: Kluwer, pp. 64-66; and M. Houwerzijl 
(2014), ‘Regime shopping across (blurring) boundaries’ in S. Evju (ed.), Regulating Transnational 
Labour in Europe: The quandaries of multilevel governance. Oslo: Skriftserie nr. 196.
14 See Case 43/75, Defrenne II [1976] ECR 455, paras. 10-15, on equal treatment of men and 
women. A link was made to Art. 117 (now Art. 151 TFEU) on ‘common action to ensure social 
progress and seek the constant improvement of living and working conditions’. See also the 
remark of A-G Dutheillet de Lamothe in Defrenne I (Case 80/70 [1971] ECR 445) about Art. 119 
(now 141 TFEU) ‘creating an obstacle to any attempt at “social dumping” by means of the use of 
female labour less well paid than male labour’.
15 Case 110/79, Una Coonen v. Insurance officer, [1980] ECR 1445, para. 6.
16 Regulation 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers 
within the Community, OJ English special edition 1968 II-475; Case 32-75, Anita Cristine v Société 
nationale de chemins de fer français, [1975] ECR 1085, para. 13.
FroM coMpeting to aligned narrativeS on poSted and otHer Mobile workerS 87
Community’.17 The preamble of the Regulation presents free movement of 
workers as ‘a fundamental right for workers and their families’, which, in the 
Court’s view, is a ‘general aff irmation of the right of all workers to pursue 
the activity of their choice’ within the Union, and could be ‘an effective 
means of improving their living conditions’.18
On the other hand, the Court’s statement that local workers shall not 
suffer the unfavourable consequences of unequal treatment of incoming 
workers, deviates somewhat from Regulation 1612/68. The latter provided 
for possible measures in cases in which Member States would undergo or 
foresee disturbances of their labour market, which may seriously threaten 
the standard of living or the level of employment in a region or industry. 
In such a case, Member States could stop the information on vacancies 
(the machinery for vacancy clearance), but they were not allowed to limit 
access to employment. However, this provision, recognising that local work-
ers in a certain industry or region might need some protection from free 
movement in specif ic cases, was never used and subsequently abolished 
in Regulation 492/2011.19
The Court’s discourse on equal treatment as (always) protecting local 
workers from unfair competition became more seriously contested by the 
discourse used towards free movement of workers in the context of the 
Greek accession (and in the context of subsequent accessions with countries 
poorer than the existing Member States). The Accession Treaty included 
transitional provisions on free movement of workers allowing all Member 
States, including Greece, to impose work permits for a seven-year period.20 
A joint declaration was added to the Accession Treaty that said that ‘[T]he 
enlargement of the Community could give rise to certain diff iculties for the 
social situation in one or more Member States as regards the application of 
the provisions relating to the free movement of workers.’ In fact, the nine 
Member States feared that Greek workers would try to escape the high 
unemployment level in Greece, leading to an influx of ‘cheap’ Greek labour.21
The Court, in this respect ‘overruled’ by the Accession Treaty, had to 
acknowledge the fear of the Member States that a right to equal treatment in 
17 Case 65/81, Franzesco and Letizia Reina v. Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg [1982] ECR 
33, para. 12.
18 Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] ECR 1035, para. 14 and 15.
19 Art. 20 of Regulation 1612/68. 
20 Act concerning the conditions of Accession of the Hellenic Republic and the adjustments 
to the Treaties, OJ EU of 19.11.1979, L291/17, articles 45-48. 
21 Available at: https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/61a2a7a5-39a9-4b06-91f8-
69ae77b41515/publishable_en.pdf. 
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itself would not be enough to make sure local workers will not suffer unfavour-
able consequences from free movement. However, when it had to answer a 
preliminary question concerning these transitional provisions, it declared that 
the provision ‘is to prevent disturbance of the labour market both in Greece 
and in the other Member States as a result of immediate and substantial 
movements of workers following accession’22 and that, as such, it must be 
interpreted restrictively. Hence, it stuck to the narrative that equal treat-
ment will, in principle, protect local workers from unfair competition, except 
in post-accession periods. Outside the context of accession, the Court has 
explicitly dismissed the argument that an increasing number of unemployed 
local workers in a specific sector would allow a Member State to prevent or 
hinder access of EU citizens and their family members to work in that sector.23
To sum up: the Court’s narrative on free movement of workers is quite 
positive. It is beneficial for moving workers, who can improve their living 
conditions or obtain social advancement. Except for post-accession periods, 
it is not assessed as negative for the local workers, who are protected against 
unfair competition on remuneration or working conditions and social 
benefits via the principle of equal treatment.
We may wonder whether the choice for Brexit challenges this (last part 
of the) narrative. While on the one hand upholding f irmly the stance that 
‘freedom of movement is non-negotiable as long as one is Member of the 
EU or if Britain wants access to the single market’,24 the European Com-
mission states that it has also ‘learnt from Britain’s vote to leave the EU that 
many Europeans fear globalisation and want the EU to provide more social 
protection in the internal market’.25 As one of the outcomes of this ‘learning 
process’, the Commission, in March 2016, launched a proposal to achieve 
a ‘stronger framework for posting in the EU, contributing to a fairer and 
deeper Single Market’.26 However, there are no formal plans to reform the 
22 Case 77/82, Anastasia Peskeloglou [1983] ECR 1086, para. 12.
23 Case 131/85, Emir Gül v. Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf, [1986] ECR 1583, para. 6 and 17; Case 9/88, 
Lopes da Veiga, [1989] ECR 2989, para 10. A similar restrictive approach is visible in the judgments 
on Vicoplus (joined cases C-307-309/09 [2011, ECR I-453), Essent (C-91/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2206), and 
Martin Meat (C-586/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:405). See for an explanation in particular A-G Bot, Opinion 
in Essent, paras. 102-110, 114, ECLI:EU:C:2014:312. See on Vicoplus, Houwerzijl (2014), n. 14, pp. 118-124.
24 See Donald Tusk (5 July 2016), ‘Freedom of movement is non-negotiable if Britain wants 
access to single market’, The Independent. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
uk/politics/donald-tusk-says-access-to-the-single-market-means-britain-must-accept-eu-four-
freedoms-a7120191.html.
25 EU Observer (20 July 2016), n. 10. Available at: https://euobserver.com/economic/134433.
26 European Commission (2016) n. 9. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
16-467_en.htm.
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current ‘acquis’ on free movement of workers, even though the 2016 ‘new 
settlement’ deal struck between the Council and the UK to ‘prevent’ Brexit 
included a safeguard mechanism acknowledging Member States’ competence 
to limit ‘f low of workers’ and their access to social benefits in a host state.27 
Apparently, lessons from Brexit do not (yet) include further questions on 
the narrative of free movement of workers. It is true that Directive 2014/5428 
was adopted with an aim to ensure better information about free movement 
rights and responsibilities, and to combat circumvention of those rules. 
Although a topical reminder that the right of freedom of movement for 
workers requires ensuring equality of treatment in fact and in law,29 it does 
not substantially change the positive narrative that nondiscrimination 
renders free movement beneficial for the moving worker and prevents, in 
principle, negative consequences for the local workers.
In order to understand why creating decent labour conditions for posted 
workers is one of the objectives in the Commission’s strategy to create a 
deeper and fairer internal market, whereas reforming free movement of 
workers is not,30 we now turn to the narrative on that form of cross-border 
labour mobility within the EU.
4 ‘Posting of workers’: A Switch of Narrative towards a Focus 
on Service Provision
This section illustrates how posted workers were eventually caught in the 
narrative on free provision of services. As early judgments of the Court of 
Justice in the cases Manpower and Van der Vecht31show, employee posting 
was already a phenomenon in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the cases of 
Webb and Seco, the Court acknowledged that service providers could provide 
manpower or bring (non-national or non-EU) workers to do the job, and that 
Member States could apply their legislation or collective labour agreements 
27 European Council Conclusions (19 February 2016), EUCO 1/16, Annex I section D and Annex 
VI.
28 Directive 2014/54/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on 
measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of 
movement for workers, OJEU of 30.4.2014, L 128/8. See also Section 6 below.
29 Recital 6 Regulation 492/2011.
30 Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/internal-market_en.
31 Case 19/67, Van der Vecht [1967] ECR 345 and Case 35/70, Manpower [1970] ECR 1251. At 
stake was the practice of hiring (temporary agency) workers from a country with a ‘cheaper’ 
social security scheme, with the sole purpose of posting them to a Member State with a more 
expensive social security regime, which was, at that time, labeled abusive and ‘social dumping’.
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relating to minimum wages to workers within their territory, no matter in 
which Member State the employer is established.32 However, the disputes 
in Webb and Seco were about difference in treatment of the employers as 
service providers, and the Court did not rule on the applicability of the 
Treaty provisions of either free movement of workers or free movement of 
services on the employees.
Nevertheless, one can find in the obiter dictum in Webb that the employees 
may ‘in certain circumstances be covered by the provisions of the free 
movement of workers’, but that it does not prevent ‘undertakings of that 
nature which employ such workers from being undertakings engaged in 
the provision of services’. This consideration seems to reflect the original 
narrative on posting of workers, laid down in secondary legislation of the 
1960s on the ambit of the freedom to provide services, wherein the following 
standard sentence, referring to the free movement of workers, used to 
be included in the Preamble: ‘Whereas the position of paid employees 
accompanying a person providing services or acting on his behalf will be 
governed by the provisions laid down in pursuance of Articles 48 and 49 
of the Treaty (now Articles 45 and 46 TFEU)’.33
In those days, as a main rule, it was stipulated that all workers, whether 
permanently or temporarily moving to another Member State, fell under 
the free movement of workers. Hence, all forms of workers’ mobility of EU 
nationals were lumped together under the free movement of workers.34 
Nonetheless, it was also acknowledged from the very beginning that the 
law on the free provision of services may interfere with the law on the free 
movement of workers.35 To make sure that a cross-border posted worker 
would not be denied the right to reside temporarily (not exceeding a year) in 
the host Member State, a special provision was laid down in Article 6(3) of 
Directive 68/360/EEC, based on the free movement of workers. Undeniably, 
in this original approach, the status of the employing company – as cross-
border service provider – was separated from the status of the posted worker.
32 Case 279/80, Criminal proceedings against Alfred John Webb [1981] ECR 3305; Joined case 62 
and 63/81, SECO v EVI, [1982] ECR 223, para 14. 
33 Cited from old Council Directive 64/429/EEC (now repealed). For an overview of the other 
(old) Directives that contain this sentence, see Houwerzijl (2005/2014), n. 14, respectively p. 35, 
p. 102.
34 Evidenced by the texts and scope of old Regulations 1612/68, Regulation 1408/71, and old 
Directive 68/360. See Houwerzijl (2005/2014), n. 14, respectively pp. 31-32, pp. 102-103.
35 See D. Vignes (1961), ‘Le droit d’établissement et les services dans la C.E.E.’ Annuaire Français 
de Droit International, 7 pp. 674-675; U. Everling (1963), Das Niederlassungsrecht im Gemeinsamen 
Markt, Verlag Franz Vahlen Berlin 1963 pp. 72-73.
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In its landmark judgment Rush Portuguesa, the Court abandoned the 
original narrative. It ruled that the situation of employees travelling with 
their employer to another Member State in order to carry out works on a 
temporary basis would fall under the scope of free movement of services. 
The Court’s decision postdates the accession of Portugal. Rush Portuguesa, a 
Portuguese undertaking, had won a contract in France and wanted to carry 
out the work with its Portuguese workers. Under the transitional provisions 
of the Accession Treaty with Portugal, the provisions of free movement of 
workers did not apply to the Portuguese staff. The French authorities notified 
Rush Portuguesa of a decision to pay a f ine for employing foreign workers 
in breach of the provisions of the French Labour Code. In proceedings for 
annulment of the decision of the French authorities, the undertaking argued 
that it was not the provisions of free movement of workers, but those of free 
movement of services that applied, and therefore its workers could not be 
hindered or prohibited from working in France. In answer to the preliminary 
questions of the referring judge, the CJEU decided not to apply the provisions 
of free movement of workers to posted workers, with the key argument that 
they did not enter the labour market of the host Member State.
Cleary, the context of the post-accession transition provisions played a 
major role in that decision.36 Under the transitional regime, the only way to 
bring the posted workers under the scope of EU law was to relocate them to 
the f ield of free movement of services. However, this had two consequences 
for the further narrative of posted workers. First, the argument that posted 
workers do not enter the labour market of the host state had to be made to 
show why, from a substantive point of view, it was justif ied to exclude them 
from the transitional provisions on the free movement of workers. Secondly, 
the free movement rights of posted workers had to be reformulated as 
deriving from that of the service provider: imposing conditions of obtaining a 
work permit for posted workers ‘on the person (i.e. the employer in the sending 
state) providing services in another Member State discriminates against that 
person in relation to his competitors established in the host country […], and 
moreover affects his ability to provide the service.’37 The Court added in an 
obiter dictum that Member States may extend their mandatory labour law 
and collective labour agreements to posted workers, apparently to comfort 
36 Indeed, the Court indicates that the transitional provisions in the Act of Accession are 
justif ied by a risk that the employment market of the host state might be disrupted when 
Portuguese workers and their family members seek access to the employment market of other 
Member States. In Case 9/88, Lopes da Veiga v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, n. 24, predating Rush 
Portuguesa, the Court was more blunt. See para. 10.
37 Rush Portuguesa, para. 12. Italics added by the authors.
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France and possibly other host states that admission under free movement 
of services will not lead to a massive influx of workers under the guise of 
service provision, nor create social dumping.38 However, this consideration 
does not imply that posted workers have a right to equal treatment, only 
that Member States may extend domestic labour law provisions to them.39
The decision in Rush Portuguesa set the tone for framing the further case 
law on posted workers.40 In Vander Elst,41 a Belgian employer carried out 
works in France with his Moroccan employees, and disputed the obligation 
to pay fees for work permits to the French authorities with the argument 
that the Moroccan workers had already been issued with work permits 
in Belgium. The Court agreed and ruled that the obligation restricted the 
freedom to provide services. In its ruling, the Court implicitly sharpened the 
distinction between the narrative on free movement of workers and that on 
posted workers with three arguments. The first argument responds to the 
ratio of the French system of work permits, notably the regulation of access 
to the labour market of non-EU workers. The Court states that workers ‘do 
not in any way seek access to the labour market’ of the host state.42 This 
rationale behind the ‘status aparte’ of posted workers is underpinned by 
the notions that they only work ‘temporarily’ or ‘for a limited period’ in the 
host state. The second argument is that EU law ‘does not preclude Member 
States from extending their legislation, or collective labour agreements 
entered into by both sides of industry relating to minimum wages’ to posted 
workers.43 Apparently, only the coverage by the minimum wage level in the 
host state is enough to protect posted workers and fair competition. The 
third argument is connected to the second, and relies on the ‘underlying’ 
applicability of the labour law of the country where the posted worker 
normally carries out his work: the application of that law ‘in any event 
excludes any substantial risk of workers being exploited, or, of competition 
between undertakings being distorted.’44
38 See L. Gormley (1992), ‘Freedom of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services: Workers 
and Services Distinguished,’ European Law Review, 17(1) p. 63 and p. 66. 
39 See also S. Evju (2010), ‘Revisiting the Posted Workers Directive: Conflict of Laws and Laws 
in Contrast’, CYELS, 12 p. 151 and p. 164.
40 Ibidem. See also, C. Barnard (2009), ‘Internal market v. labour market: a brief history’, in 
M. de Vos (ed.), European Union Internal Market and Labour law: Friends or Foes, Intersentia.
41 Case C-43/93, Vander Elst v. Office des Migrations Internationales, [1994] ECR I-3818.
42 Idem, para. 21.
43 Idem, para. 23.
44 Idem, para. 25. In VanderElst, the Court refers to the applicable law of the country of 
establishment of employer, but from a private international law perspective (currently in the 
Rome I Regulation 593/2008), which is not elaborated upon in this Chapter, it depends on the 
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As is well-known, it was the landmark judgment in the case Rush Portu-
guesa that paved the way for the legal base of the PWD.45 In the f irst half 
of the 1990s, in the context of the social dimension of the Delors’ project 
‘Europe 1992’, the proposal for a Directive on the Posting of Workers was 
launched.46 In order to promote a true single market, a framework of rules 
for posted workers would have to be created to avoid unfair competition. The 
proposal led to a six-year period of f ierce debates in European Parliament 
and Council.47 The debates focussed in particular on the extent to which 
host Member States must be allowed, or should be required, to apply their 
mandatory wage provisions and other working conditions to workers posted 
to their territory. Another issue concerned the legal basis of the Directive, 
which was found in the Treaty provisions establishing the freedom to provide 
services.48 From a political point of view, the undoubted merit of this legal 
basis is that it facilitated a qualif ied majority vote. Without this, the PWD 
proposal would probably have stranded.49 Still, from a legal point of view, the 
worrying implication of the choice of (only) this legal base is that it suggests 
that the PWD is purely intended to facilitate the cross-border provision of 
services. That it also serves to protect employees and to create a level playing 
f ield (and no unfair competition) is by no means evident from its legal base.
individual situation of the posted worker whether the law of ‘the (common) country of origin’ 
applies or the law of another country. The main connecting factor is supposed to be ‘the habitual 
country of work’. See A. van Hoek and M. Houwerzijl (2016), ‘Where do EU mobile workers 
belong, according to Rome I and the (E)PWD’, in H. Verschueren (ed.), Residence, employment 
and social rights of mobile persons: on how EU law defines where they belong, Intersentia; see also 
A. van Hoek (2018), ‘Re-Embedding the Transnational Employment Relationship: A Tale about 
the Limitations of (EU) Law?’, Common Market Law Review 55, no. 2, 449-87. Available at: https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2886430.
45 See R. Zahn (2017), ‘Revision of the Posted Workers Directive: a Europeanisation Perspective’, 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2017 5, p. 5. See also M.S. Houwerzijl (2014), n. 14. 
While Evju traces a much longer and more complex background to the Directive, he considers 
the decision in Rush Portuguesa a ‘booster’ for the PWD in S. Evju (2010), n. 40, p. 154.
46 The f irst documents on what would become the PWD referred to the Community Charter for 
social fundamental rights of workers, see COM (89)568. See, for an extensive historical account, 
M. S. Houwerzijl (2005), n. 14, p. 85. Also see J. Cremers, J. E. Dølvik, and G. Bosch, (2007-6) ‘Posting 
of workers in the single market: attempts to prevent social dumping and regime competition in 
the EU’, Industrial Relations Journal, pp. 524-541 and S. Evju (2010), n. 40, p. 160.
47 See, for instance, OJ 15, C 166/123.6.95, no. 4-464/204 and no. 4-464/206.
48 Articles 57 (2) and 66 EC [now 53(1) and 62 TFEU].
49 See, about the political circumstances of the early 1990s (in which the British Conservative 
Government tried to veto almost everything that had to do with social policy) that influenced 
the political fate of the posting directive, M. Biagi (1998), ‘The “Posted Workers’ EU Directive”’, 
in R. Blanpain (ed.), The Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations in the European Union, p. 175.
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To sum up, it may be noted that the framing of the status of posted workers 
by both the Court and the legislature was probably highly influenced by 
the political and legal ‘momentum’. The services provisions in the Treaty 
conveniently allowed the Court to bring posted workers from new Member 
States under the scope of EU law in a situation in which free movement of 
workers was subjected to transitional provisions. The services provisions also 
conveniently allowed the legislature a qualif ied majority voting, necessary 
to adopt the PWD. However, the result seems far from satisfactory with 
regard to the protection of both posted and local workers: (Re)Framing 
posted workers under the free movement of services deprived posted work-
ers with EU citizenship of their self-standing right to free movement in 
their capacities as workers. The services narrative contains no reference 
to improvement of living conditions nor to social advancement of posted 
workers. Protection only goes as far as ‘core host labour standards’ and 
exclusion of exploitation. Neither does this narrative pay much attention 
to possible displacement of local workers, as it puts the emphasis on fair 
competition between undertakings/service providers and consequently 
on equality of treatment between undertakings, omitting any reference to 
equality of treatment between posted and local workers.
5 Interpretation of the PWD: Strengthening the Narrative 
Based on Service Provision
As stated in its recital 5, the PWD means to reconcile the exercise of 
companies’ fundamental freedom to provide cross-border services under 
Article 56 TFEU, on the one hand, with the need to ensure a climate of fair 
competition and respect for the rights of workers, on the other. However, 
in Rüffert,50 the Court seems to have created a priority between the three 
goals, emphasising that the objective of the Directive is ‘in particular to 
bring about the freedom to provide services’.51 Although f itting well with 
the legal basis of the PWD,52 this emphasis of its exclusive falling within the 
scope of free movement of services, clearly deviates from how the European 
50 Case C-346/06, Rüffert [2008] ECR I-1989, para 36.
51 Evju (2010), n. 40, pp. 169-170.
52 See also S. Reynolds (2016), ‘Explaining the constitutional drivers behind a perceived judicial 
preference for free movement over fundamental rights’, CMLRev. 3 p. 643.
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Commission originally presented the proposal for the PWD as part of the 
development of a social dimension of the internal market.53
In order to achieve its aims, the PWD coordinates Member States’ leg-
islation in a way that it provides a core of mandatory rules on minimum 
protection with which employers who post workers to the Member State, 
in which the service is to be provided, must comply in the host country. 
This is laid down in Article 3 of the PWD. Article 3(1) states that Member 
States are to ensure that undertakings falling within the scope of the PWD 
guarantee workers posted to their territory, the terms and conditions of 
employment laid down by mandatory law, including collective agreements 
that have been declared universally applicable insofar as they concern the 
construction sector referred to in the Annex of the PWD. These ‘host state 
standards’ concern the duration of the work; rest periods and holidays; 
minimum rates of pay; health, safety, and hygiene at work; the conditions 
of hiring out workers; protective measures for pregnant women, for women 
who recently gave birth, for young people and children; and equality of 
treatment between men and women. Hence, Article 3(1) PWD determines 
the nature of the labour standards that must be applied in the host state, 
but not the substance of these standards.
However, this material scope of the PWD got a strict interpretation by the 
CJEU in the triptych Laval, Commission v. Luxemburg, and Rüffert cases.54 
According to Article 3(10) f irst indent of the PWD, the host Member States 
may add public policy provisions on other subjects than those explicitly 
listed in art. 3(1) PWD. This was part of the delicate political compromise 
needed to get the PWD adopted. In Commission v Luxembourg, the Court 
has chosen a restrictive interpretation of this provision, by cutting back 
the margin of appreciation Member States have in def ining what is to be 
understood under public policy. The CJEU has pointed out that the concept of 
public policy, f irstly, comes into play where a genuine and sufficiently serious 
threat affects one of the fundamental interests of society and, secondly, 
since it is a justif ication for a derogation from a fundamental principle of 
the Treaty, that it must be narrowly construed.
In Laval, the main focus of the Court’s judgment was whether the col-
lective action, in the form of a blockade taken by trade unions in this case, 
was compatible with the EU rules on the freedom to provide services. The 
CJEU ruled that the ‘right to take collective action for the protection of the 
53 See references in n. 46.
54 Case C-341/05, Laval [2007] ECR I-11767; Case C-319/06, Commission v. Luxemburg [2008] 
ECR I-4323; Case C-346/06, Rüffert [2008] ECR I-1989.
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workers of the host state against possible social dumping may constitute an 
overriding reason of public interest’, which could justify an infringement 
of free movement of services. However, in this case, it did not, since the 
prevailing Swedish collectively bargained labour standards were deemed to 
be not ‘suff iciently precise and accessible’ for the foreign service provider to 
know its obligations in advance. Hence, the Court did not accept the method 
of implementation of the PWD in Sweden, where the applicable rates of 
(minimum) pay were negotiated on a case by case basis through the social 
partners, without being supplemented by legislation providing for universal 
applicability. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the PWD does not 
allow the host Member State to make the provision of services in its territory 
conditional on the observance of terms and conditions of employment that 
go beyond the mandatory rules for minimum protection, as laid down in 
Art. 3(1) PWD. It is this consideration that the phrase often used in literature, 
the ‘floor’ of minimum labour conditions in the host state has (also) become 
‘a ceiling’ stems from.55 Clearly, the Court considers the PWD to be about 
protection of workers only in a secondary sense, noting that the minimum 
protection in force, in the host state, enables the posted workers ‘to enjoy 
better terms and conditions of employment in the host member state’.56 
This phrase is a far cry from the ‘improvement of life conditions and social 
advancement’ in the narrative on free movement of workers.
The judgments of the Court fueled intense scholarly and public debate.57 
Moreover, the European Commission had changed its initial approach to 
the PWD as well,58 as became clear in the debate on the then draft Services 
Directive.59 The controversies surrounding the Services Directive, back then 
commonly referred to in the popular press as the ‘Bolkestein Directive’,60 
together with the EU’s enlargement with Middle and Eastern European 
countries, have played an important role in drawing attention to the limited 
impact of the social dimension of the PWD.61 Instead, the narrative that 
55 S. Evju (2010), n. 40, p. 177.
56 Laval para. 76 and 77.
57 The ‘Laval-quartet’ gave rise to numerous conferences among scholars and policymakers 
and led to a ‘tsunami’ of (working) papers and articles in Academic journals. See also many 
ETUC press releases and reports on the aftermath of this case law.
58 J. Cremers, J. E. Dølvik, and G. Bosch, (2007), n. 47, pp. 538-539. 
59 See, for instance, 14.02.2006 Commissioner Charlie McCreevy’s Statement on the Services 
Directive at the European Parliament Plenary session of February 2006; SPEECH/06/84. 
60 Bolkestein was the name of the responsible Commissioner at the time. In France, however, 
the draft Services Directive was nicknamed Frankenstein Directive in the popular press.
61 See, for an acknowledgement of the ‘integration fatigue’ and ‘(single) market fatigue’ in the 
old Member States in western Europe due to e.g. the enlargements, M. Monti (May 2010), A new 
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posting of workers was in particular to bring about the freedom to provide 
services was reinforced.
At the same time, the language remained such that posted workers 
were deemed (1) to not enter the labour market of the host state, (2) to 
not compete with local workers because of the application of a set of core 
host labour standards, and, (3) to be protected against exploitation by the 
labour rules applicable to their employment contract with their employer 
in the ‘sending’ state.
6 Acknowledgement that Protection against Exploitation is 
Largely ‘a fairy tale’
The bursts in this predominant narrative on the PWD started with its third 
limb, which was contested and eventually declared f ictitious around 2011. 
By that time, studies had convincingly shown that there is, in practice, a 
huge lack of control, monitoring, and cooperation among Member States, 
and that enforcement of minimum terms and conditions of employment 
is poor, e.g. on wages, working time, and costs of housing and transport.62 
Anecdotal evidence from media has been confirmed and elaborated upon 
by academic and policy research. Studies of Wagner and Berntsen based 
on interviews with e.g. foreign workers situated at the building sites of the 
European Central Bank in Germany and the ‘Eemshaven’ in the Netherlands, 
as well as in workplaces in the meat sector and the supermarket distribution 
centres, clearly show exploitative practices in combination with the fact 
that cross-border mobile workers concerned, most often, do not even know 
their legal status.63
strategy for the single market, at the service of Europe’s economy and society, Retrieved from: 
http//:ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_f inal_10_05_2010_en.pdf. 
62 See A.A.H. van Hoek and M.S. Houwerzijl (2011), Comparative Study on the legal aspects of 
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services in the European Union, Report 
to the European Commission; J. Cremers (2011), ‘In search of cheap labour in Europe’, CLR studies 
6; J. Cremers (2011), In Search of Cheap Labour in Europe: Working and living conditions of posted 
workers, Brussels: CLR/EFBWW/International Books.
63 L.E. Berntsen (2015), Agency of labour in a flexible pan-European labour market: A qualitative 
study of migrant practices and trade union strategies in the Netherlands Groningen (PhD Thesis) 
Groningen: University of Groningen, SOM research school; and I. Wagner (2015), Posted Work 
and Deterritorialization in the European Union: A study of the German Construction and Meat 
Industry, (PhD Thesis) Groningen: University of Groningen, SOM research school. See also A. 
van Hoek (2017), n. 45 and literature cited there.
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It is interesting to note that these f indings about the ‘real’ situation of low-
waged mobile workers within the EU, indicate that the effective application 
and enforcement of workers’ rights under the narrative on free movement 
of workers, is also far from guaranteed. Especially in the area of provision of 
manpower, the problem of combating illegal activities is encountered. These 
forms of abuse are not specif ic to posting. The illegal intermediaries may 
be established both in the country of recruitment (leading to posting) or in 
the county of work (leading to free movement of workers). Several reported 
cases of abuse concerned migrant workers or (bogus) self-employed.64 These 
cases involve social dumping in its purest form – with no respect for either 
the protective system of the ‘sending’ country or that of the host country. In 
the f ield of free movement of workers, the EU legislator adopted Directive 
2014/54 to enhance effective enforcement.65 To remedy the monitoring and 
enforcement lacunae under the posting of workers narrative, a proposal 
for the ‘Posting of Workers Enforcement Directive’ (PWED) was launched 
in 2012 and – after initial f ierce resistance of ‘sending countries’ – adopted 
on 15 May 2014.66 Its name acknowledges that the PWD did not guarantee 
in practice any protection against abusive and exploitative practices.67
The PWED can be seen as only a minor shift in the narrative on posted 
workers. It did not change anything to the second dimension of the narrative: 
posted workers are still only guaranteed a core of substantive minimum 
rights in the host state.68 Regarding the f irst dimension, Article 4 of the 
PWED provides some ‘ammunition’ to attack the presumption that posted 
workers do not have access to the labour market of the host state. The 
provision lists elements that can be used by labour inspectorates and other 
stakeholders to check whether a posting is genuine in that respect, and 
64 See Van Hoek and Houwerzijl, n. 63, pp. 50-60. More recently, the European Agency on 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2015) called for ‘zero tolerance for severe forms of labour exploitation’ 
in its report on Severe Labour Exploitation: Workers Moving within or into the European Union, 
States’ Obligations and Victims’ Rights, Brussels. 
65 See also above, n. 30.
66 COM (2012) 131, emphasis added by the authors. The proposal was adopted as Directive 
2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement 
of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through 
the Internal Market Information System (‘the IMI Regulation’) OJ L159/11 of 28.5.2014.
67 However, the ‘tools’ provided for combating abuse in the PWED do not seem to be very 
powerful.
68 Although the Court seems to have broadened the interpretation of the concept of ‘mini-
mum rates of pay’ in Art. 3(1) PWD in its Judgment on Case 396/13 (Sähköalojen ammattiliitto 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:86) and with the Judgment in C-115/14 (Regiopost ECLI:EU:C:2015:760) the judg-
ment in Rüffert was (de facto) ‘softened’.
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whether the employer of the posted worker is really established in the 
‘sending’ country, instead of being a so-called letterbox company or empty 
shelf, purely established to enable posting of workers from a country with 
low wages, taxes, and social security contributions.69 At the same time, the 
‘status aparte’ of posted workers versus workers using the free movement of 
workers regime, was emphasized by recital two of the PWED, which states: 
‘It is necessary for the purpose of the posting of workers to distinguish this 
freedom from the free movement of workers’.70
7 The Targeted Revision Proposal: Towards a New Narrative 
on the Balance of Rights in the PWD?
Contestation of the narrative on posted workers did not stop with the adop-
tion of the PWED. In March 2016, the Commission launched a proposal for a 
targeted revision of the PWD.71 According to the explanatory memorandum, 
the main aims for the revision are ensuring the smooth functioning of 
the single market and stopping ‘unfair competition’ on wage costs and 
working conditions, reflected in the mantra ‘same pay for the same work 
in the same place’. This mantra clearly contests the second dimension of 
the narrative on posted workers as not competing with local workers due 
to the application of minimum protection provisions of the host state. How 
can this be explained?
According to Martin Ruhs, migrant rights cannot ‘be comprehensively 
analysed and debated without a discussion of the role and interests of the 
state in granting, as well as restricting, migrant rights.’72 The validity of this 
statement becomes particularly clear in the process which set the targeted 
revision process in motion. In a letter of Ministers from seven countries 
69 See extensively on this phenomenon and how to combat it: M. Houwerzijl, E. Traversa, and F. 
Henneaux (December 2016), A hunters game: How policy can change to spot and sink letterbox-type 
practices, Brussels, commissioned by the ETUC. 
70 This recital reads in full: ‘The freedom to provide services includes the right of undertakings to 
provide services in another Member State, to which they may post their own workers temporarily 
in order to provide those services there. It is necessary for the purpose of the posting of workers to 
distinguish this freedom from the free movement of workers, which gives every citizen the right 
to move freely to another Member State to work and reside there for that purpose and protects 
them against discrimination as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of 
work and employment in comparison to nationals of that Member State’ (emphasis added).
71 COM (2016) 128 f inal of 8 March 2016.
72 Martin Ruhs (2013), The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labour Migration, Princeton 
University Press, ebook, p. 23.
100 Mijke Houwerzijl and annet te ScHrauwen 
from Northwest Europe, a revision of the PWD was pleaded according to 
the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work in the same place’.73 In their letter 
to the Commission, the host states make clear that they are worried about 
unfair competition: ‘[…] currently employers of posted workers may enjoy 
an unfair advantage vis-à-vis employers in the host country’.74 However, 
they not only focus on equality of treatment between undertakings, but 
consider the position of the workers as well: ‘In our view, fair competition 
is important to both cross-border workers and cross-border employers, as 
well as regular workers and employers in the host Member States.’75 They 
seem to suggest, similar to the narrative on free movement of workers, that 
equal treatment protects local workers (and companies alike) from unfair 
competition on remuneration or working conditions. Also, they signal that, 
in some cases, services provided by posted workers have transformed into 
services of semipermanent nature with a real and lasting presence on the 
domestic labour market. Thereby, these countries at least partially, and 
implicitly, contest the f irst dimension of the narrative that posted workers 
do not enter the labour market of the host state.
However, others still stick f irmly to the said two dimensions of the nar-
rative. In a letter of Ministers from nine countries, mainly from Middle and 
Eastern Europe, it was argued that it is too early to revise the PWD since 
the implementation period of the PWED was only f inished in June 2016. 
These Ministers want to wait and see what the impact of the PWED will 
be. Furthermore, they argue that ‘the alignment of wages across Member 
States should come as a consequence of further economic development 
and not from the Union’s legislative action.’76 This is a nice way of saying 
that they feel their undertakings should be able to compete on wages until 
the difference in wage costs has decreased. Hence, the sending states stick 
mainly to (their reading of) the services narrative by expressing the concern 
‘that the principle of equal pay for equal work in the same place may be 
incompatible with the single market, as pay rate differences constitute 
one legitimate element of competitive advantage for service providers’.77 
The proposal itself was also attacked: fourteen parliamentary chambers 




76 Communication from the Commission on the proposal for a Directive amending the Posting 
of Workers Directive, with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with Protocol 
No2, COM(2016)505 f inal of 20.7.2016, at 4.2.1.
77 Idem, under 3.1.
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from eleven Member States have drawn the yellow card, most of them, 
apparently, because they feel the proposed amendments go against the idea 
of an internal market and competitiveness.78 However, the Commission 
has decided to maintain the proposal as it is.
The proposal for targeted revision of the PWD distances itself from the 
narrative as developed thus far in several ways. First of all, the minimum 
wage guarantee is deemed no longer enough to protect a level playing f ield, 
and it is replaced by a guarantee of equal remuneration, so all elements of 
remuneration that are mandatory apply to both local and posted workers.79 
These elements include thirteenth month allowances, travel expenses, or 
compensation for work during public holidays or night work. Secondly, the 
proposal contains the provision that whenever the anticipated or effective 
period of posting exceeds 24 months, posted workers will be protected by 
at least the compulsory labour law rules of the host state.80 However, the 
proposal of the French president Macron in June 2017 to halve the legal 
limit to twelve months,81 has been endorsed in the Council meeting of 
23 October 2017.82 Remarkably, such an introduction of a temporal limit 
to posting clearly abandons the current rationale behind the PWD that all 
posted workers would only work ‘temporarily’ or ‘for a limited period’ in the 
host state. Hence, this is an implicit recognition that, after a certain defined 
period of time, posted workers do enter the labour market of the host state.83
One might conclude that important elements of the narrative on posted 
workers, as belonging in the category of free movement of services, are 
78 Thomas Weber (14 May 2016), ‘Third time’s a charm? National Parliaments form bloc 
against posted workers directive,’ Leiden Law Blog, available at http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/
third-times-a-charm-national-parliaments-form-bloc-against-posted-workers-directive. 
79 COM (2016) 128 f inal, art. 1(2) of the proposed Directive, amending art. 3 of the PWD. The 
explicit exclusion of supplementary occupational retirement pension schemes remains.
80 Idem, art. 1(1) of the proposed Directive, adding art. 2a to the PWD.
81 See e.g. http://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/macrons-proposals-wreak-
havoc-on-posted-worker-negotiations/ and https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/
news/france-seeks-last-minute-support-for-posted-workers-bill/.
82 With a possibility for a six-month extension in exceptional cases. Proceedings of EPSCO 
Council meeting, Interinstitutional File: 2016/0070 (COD), Brussels 24 October 2017.
83 More explicitly, the proposed recital 8, p. 4, reads: ‘Posting is of a temporary nature and 
the posted worker usually returns to the country of origin after the completion of the work for 
which he has been posted. However, in view of the long duration of certain postings, and in 
acknowledgment of the link between the labour market of the host country and the workers posted 
for such long periods, it is necessary to provide that, in case of posting lasting for periods longer 
than twelve months, host countries should ensure that undertakings posting workers to their 
territory guarantee an additional set of terms and conditions that are mandatorily applicable 
to workers in the Member State where the work is carried out’ (emphasis added by the authors). 
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gradually erased from that narrative. Nevertheless, the initial decision of 
the Court in Rush Portuguesa that posted workers fall (only) within the 
scope of the services provisions still stands. In the explanatory memoran-
dum accompanying the proposal for a targeted revision, the Commission 
argues that, because this is a revision, the legal basis must be identical 
to that of the PWD, hence the free movement of services provisions 53(1) 
and 62 TFEU. It is questionable whether the fact that this is a revision, is 
in itself conclusive for the exclusive use of the free movement of services 
provisions as legal basis.84 According to an opinion of the Committee on 
legal affairs of the European Parliament in June 2017, adding a legal basis is 
possible.85 In an examination of the measures that Article 46 TFEU allows 
the Union to adopt, on the free movement of workers and on facilitating 
the functioning of a common labour market, the Committee concludes 
that these do not correspond with the aim and content of the proposal. 
In order for this article to be applicable as legal basis, a wholly different 
piece of legislation would have to be envisaged. However, the Committee 
has opined that Article 153 TFEU, providing the EU with (shared) com-
petences in the f ield of social rights should be added as legal basis, if the 
European Parliament wants to reinforce emphasis on the social protection 
of posted workers. In its adopted report, the Committee on Employment 
and Social Affairs of the European Parliament has indeed proposed to do 
so.86 Unfortunately, the – at the time of f inalising this Chapter – recent 
compromise reached in the so-called trilogues,87 does not include the 
broadening of the legal basis of the PWD.88 Therefore, we can expect the 
84 See: C-271/94 (Edicom [1996] ECR I-1689) or 242/87 (Erasmus [1989] ECR 1425), and, in 
general, R.H. Van Ooik (1999), De keuze der rechtsgrondslag voor besluiten van de Europese Unie 
(PhD Thesis), Kluwer pp. 101-102. Still, DG Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion leads the 
process of revision, not DG Internal Market.
85 Available at: http://w w w.europarl .europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-604.710+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN. 
86 See adopted report with amendments, Rapporteurs: Elisabeth Morin-Chartier, Agnes 
Jongerius, A8-0319/2017, Brussels 19 October 2017. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/committees/en/empl/draft-reports.html?ufolderComCode=EMPL&ufolderLegId=8&ufold
erId=05991&linkedDocument=true&urefProcYear=&urefProcNum=&urefProcCode=. 
87 Interinstitutional negotiations between the European Parliament, the Council, and the 
Commission. See for an overview of the issues that were on the table EU Observer (25 October 
2017), ‘EU posted workers face hurdles’, Brussels, https://euobserver.com/social/139625.
88 See Joint Statement on the Posting of Workers Directive and Fact sheet – Towards fair labour 
mobility: Revision of EU posting of workers rules (1 March 2018). Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/
social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=471&newsId=9062&furtherNews=yes . At the time of writing 
this Chapter the legislative text was not yet published at the European Commission’s website. 
The provisional agreement still needed to be conf irmed by EU member states’ permanent 
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Court to keep interpreting a revised PWD f irst and foremost in the light 
of free movement of services.89
8 To Conclude: What about the Workers?
The (political compromises on the) proposed revision of the PWD would 
clearly bring the narrative on posted workers more in line with the Court’s 
narrative on free movement of workers. Indeed, it acknowledges that equal 
treatment between workers prevents unfair competition, which is an im-
portant step in the right direction. However, there is no reference made in 
the adjusted narrative on posting of workers that acknowledges potential 
beneficial aspects of this form of free movement for moving posted workers 
in their own right, notably to improve their living conditions or to obtain 
social advancement. It is indeed questionable whether this would be achiev-
able without amending the legal basis of the PWD with a provision based 
on the free movement of workers, which would imply an acknowledgement 
that (at least many low-waged) posted workers do enter the labour market 
of the host state.90
Interestingly, recent empirical research has indicated that posted 
workers themselves do (sometimes) feel that moving as a posted worker 
allows them ‘to improve their position and the future of their children 
in terms of socio-economic status, education and care,’ even if they have 
to accept unequal remuneration, compared to local workers of the host 
state, or if they have to comply with poor working or housing conditions.91 
This stance, sometimes boldly phrased as ‘the point of view of the posted 
worker from post-communist states’, has also been defended from a 
representatives (COREPER) and adopted in the European Parliament’s Employment and Social 
Affairs Committee. Meanwhile, the revised directive has been off icially approved by Parliament 
and Council on 28 June 2018 (see: PE 18 2018 REV 1).
89 Nevertheless, in recent case law the Court has paid a bit more attention to the social protec-
tion of workers of service providers, see Case C-115/14, Regiopost GmbH & Co. KG v. Stadt Landau 
in der Pfalz, ECLI:EU:C:2015:760 and Case C-396/13, Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry v Elektrobudowa 
Spolka Akcyjna ECLI:EU:C:2015:86.
90 See Section 7 above for the negative opinion of the Committee on legal affairs of the European 
Parliament on adding a legal base based on Article 46 TFEU. 
91 M. van Ostaijen, U. Reeger, and K. Zelano (2017), ‘The commodif ication of mobile workers 
in Europe – a comparative perspective on capital and labour in Austria, the Netherlands and 
Sweden’, Comparative Migration Studies 5(6) p. 17. See also Berntsen, n. 64, above. On the other 
hand, there is also ample research that indicates dissatisfaction of the workers involved with 
abusive and exploitative working conditions.
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normative point of view. In particular, while acknowledging that social 
dumping and ‘a race to the bottom’ may occur in situations of posting, 
Kukovec and Leczykiewicz argue that these disadvantages, which (in 
their view) mainly go against the interests of the wealthier ‘central’ 
Member States and their workers, are outweighed by the interests of the 
workers from the new, ‘peripheral’ Member States to use their one and 
only comparative advantage – the possibility to compete on the basis of 
lower labour costs.92
Remarkable in this respect, is the statement of Leczykiewicz that 
‘employment opportunities on the Swedish and Finnish market in no way 
‘belong’ to Swedish and Finnish workers.’93 In relation to the posting of 
workers narrative, her argument sits uneasily with the legal f iction that 
posted workers do not have access to the labour market of the host state 
and (therefore?) cannot be deemed job seekers (and hence not migrant 
workers in the meaning of Art. 45 TFEU). In the opinion of Leczykiewicz, 
the Finnish and Swedish workers would no longer be legitimised to defend 
their system against underbidding by outsiders. Such a radical form of 
‘transnational solidarity’ by allowing workers to compete on wage levels – 
and hence give them a right to ‘self-exploitation’ – runs counter to goals and 
underpinnings of labour law, enshrined in the free movement of workers 
narrative.94 Acceptance of such self-commodif ication might, in the long 
run, not be sustainable, once the worker from the ‘new’ Member State 
stays for a longer period in the host Member State, and actually becomes 
more embedded in this state (by starting a family life, hiring or buying a 
house, having an accident, needing medical help, etc.). Moreover, as noted 
by Bernaciak, although in the short-term, posted workers may profit from 
dumping strategies, in the long run, dumping practices not only lead to the 
erosion of employment protection systems in the host states, but might also 
hinder the gradual improvement of wages and working conditions in the 
poorer sending countries.95
92 See D. Leczykiewicz (2015), ‘Conceptualizing conflict between the economic and social in 
EU law after Viking and Laval’, in M. Freedland and J. Prassl (eds.), EU law in the Member States: 
Viking, Laval and beyond, Oxford, Hart Publishing; and D. Kukoveck (2014), ‘Hierarchies as law’, 
Columbia Journal of International Law, 21 p. 142. See also A. Somek (2011),‘The social question in 
a transnational context’, LSE ‘Europe in question’ Discussion Paper 39, p. 31.
93 See D. Leczykiewicz (2015), n. 92 p. 21 under footnote 48, emphasis added by the authors. 
94 And also in the EU Charter of fundamental rights (chapter on solidary). 
95 See Magdalena Bernaciak (2012), ‘Social Dumping? Political catchphrase or threat to labour 
standards’ , WP 2012/06, p. 26.
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The main point to stress, from the perspective we have chosen in this 
chapter, is that the posting of workers narrative is not about workers compet-
ing on wage levels, but about service providers competing (unfairly) on wage 
levels and employment conditions of their employees. In our view, the most 
legally coherent and socially sustainable way to ‘upgrade’ the narrative on 
posted ‘low-waged’ workers, would be to acknowledge posted EU workers as 
self-standing beneficiaries of free movement of workers rights, who deserve 
to be protected by the prohibition of discrimination based on nationality as 
much as any person who falls under the scope of EU law.96 As a second best, 
a revised PWD, based on ‘equal pay for equal work at the same location’, 
may be assessed as an important step in the right direction, in particular 
in combination with other improvements such as a def ined time limit of 
twelve months.97 If effectively applied and enforced, this may lead to a loss 
of interest in ‘posting as a cheap business model’ because that would not be 
so lucrative anymore. Ideally, such a development would go hand in hand 
with hiring cross-border workers directly in the host state, based on the 
‘superior narrative’ of the free movement of workers, and/or with bringing 
more jobs to the worker instead of workers to the jobs, both in (what are 
currently known as) ‘host states’ and ‘sending states’.
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Abstract
This chapter focusses on the proliferation of human resource manage-
ment practices: What makes HRM decide to adopt certain practices? The 
recruitment processes are analysed against the background of the EU 
regulatory framework with regard to the use of migrant labour. Specif ic 
for the EU context are three forms of regulation, related to the free 
movement of workers, the freedom to provide services, and the freedom of 
establishment. Furthermore, we take into account the economic context 
(of relative or absolute labour shortages on local/sectoral labour markets). 
In this contribution, we recognise that intermediaries have (partially) 
built their business models on labour arbitrage (a notion that will be 
explored in the next sections), among other things through strategically 
choosing the countries where they register their businesses. The main 
features in this process of eff iciency seeking, are temporary employment 
agencies with an international focus, and consultancy f irms that advise 
businesses on tax or regulatory arbitrage.
Keywords: human resource management, EU mobility regulation, 
intermediaries, human resource management
Introduction
Free movement of workers belongs to the core principles of the European 
Union, although the intra-European mobility of labour migrants has come 
under pressure in recent years. Cross-border mobility and recruitment of 
Rijken, Conny and Tesseltje de Lange (eds): Towards a Decent Labour Market for Low Waged 
Migrant Workers. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018  
doi: 10.5117/9789462987555_crem
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workers from abroad are often motivated by employers with arguments of 
labour shortages, but also with reasons of costs and employment protection, 
which tend to be lower for migrant workers. The cost differences mainly 
stem from differences in the regulatory regime in the f ields of corporate law, 
labour law, and social security law. In our research, we found evidence that 
many f irms adopt recruitment practices, and start using migrant labour, 
based on these reasons.
Theoretically, this chapter focusses on the proliferation of human resource 
management practices: What makes HRM decide to adopt certain practices? 
The recruitment processes are analysed against the background of the EU 
regulatory framework with regard to the use of migrant labour. Specif ic for 
the EU context are three forms of regulation, related to the free movement of 
workers, the freedom to provide services, and the freedom of establishment. 
Furthermore, this chapter takes into account the economic context (of 
relative or absolute labour shortages on local/sectoral labour markets). In 
this contribution, we recognise that intermediaries have (partially) built 
their business models on labour arbitrage (a notion that will be explored 
in the next sections), among other things through strategically choosing 
the country where they register their businesses. The main features in this 
process of eff iciency-seeking, are temporary employment agencies with an 
international focus and consultancy f irms that advise businesses on tax 
or regulatory arbitrage.
The current situation creates an ideal environment for fraudulent (or 
at least questionable) cross-border business activities. The overlapping or 
vaguely defined legal categories encourage arbitrage practices. Even if these 
practices are not illegal, we depart from the normative stance that these 
practices deprive workers from the wider principles that f it in a policy of 
rights-based migration and labour mobility. The practices described in this 
chapter deviate from this normative stance, and, by doing so, endanger the 
genuine free movement of workers in Europe.
This Chapter is structured as follows. We start with the mapping of 
the EU regulatory frame, relevant for the practice of free movement and 
arbitrage. The next section discusses cost-saving models and mechanisms 
and their impact on the Dutch labour market. The following section 
looks at the role of management and the influence of intermediaries on 
the decisions to ‘arbitrage’. The f inal part contains our conclusions and 
recommendations.
labour arbitrage on european labour markets 111
The EU Regulatory Frame
The 1957 Rome Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
contained several provisions connected to the notion of labour mobility: 
citizens should gain from free movement. The Treaty ensured free movement 
of workers.1 This freedom meant, in particular, that workers who were 
nationals of one Member State had the right to go to another Member 
State to seek employment and to work there. The Treaty underpinned 
and guaranteed the residence, labour, and equal treatment rights of these 
mobile workers. The creation of the EU internal market, accompanied by 
the dismantling of internal frontiers, placed the mobility of workers and 
the freedom to provide services with mobile workers even more in the 
centre of the socioeconomic approach of the EU institutions.2 This led to a 
regulatory frame that serves as a building block for the workers’ mobility. 
Three policy areas can be distinguished with an impact on the promoted 
mobility:
a policies in the f ield of the freedom of establishment;
b policies related to the freedom to provide services;
c social policies, notably in the f ield of labour and contract law, pay and 
working conditions, and social security.3
The promotion of this mobility remains high on the agenda, even though 
the European Commission, in its analysis of the functioning of the internal 
market, has reported several times that the expectations of the mid 1980s 
about mobility in Europe have not been realised.
The establishment of a company or subsidiary in the EU is covered by 
the freedom of establishment, as enshrined in Article 49 of the Treaty on 
1 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Rome, 1957, Articles 48 to 51.
2 J. Cremers (2012), ‘Free movement of workers and rights that can be derived’, FMW: Online 
Journal on free movement of workers within the European Union, 4 pp. 26-32.
3 The coordination of the national social security became one of the f irst pillars of the European 
Community legislation in this area (Council of the European Economic Community, Regulation 
[EEC] No. 3 of 25 September 1958, OJ No. 30, 16.12.1958. Brussels). The coordination rules are based 
on the principle that persons moving within the EU are subject to the social security scheme of 
only one Member State. The starting point in the f ield of working conditions and labour law was 
that mobile workers would fall under the application of the so-called lex loci laboris principle. 
This meant that the regulations of the country where the work was carried out would apply. 
The so-called posting of workers became an exception to this principle, motivated by the fact 
that workers that provided services (under the subordination of their posting company in the 
home country) would only temporarily stay in another Member State.
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the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).4 In general, setting up a 
company in a foreign constituency is facilitated by that provision. Companies 
benefit from the internal market principles that guarantee both the right 
of establishment and the freedom to provide services, cf. Articles 54 and 
62 TFEU. Corporate entities are creatures of national law and the rules 
for setting up companies vary signif icantly among Member States.5 Some 
Member States apply the so-called real seat theory; i.e. the law governing a 
company is determined by the place where the central administration and 
substantial activities of that company are located. This requires companies 
having their operational headquarters within a given Member State to 
be established under the laws of that state. Other Member States follow 
the incorporation theory, which favours party autonomy in the choice of 
corporate law. Hence, under such law, companies may have their ‘real seat’ 
in a Member State different from the state of incorporation, which also 
implies that they may have a mere artif icial entity in the incorporation 
country.6 Companies can thus install a considerable part of their legal 
frameworks in another country without pursuing any real activities there. 
Based on the freedom of establishment and the free provision of services, 
these national entities are free to move around and get market access in 
other Member States. Conflicting or contradictory legal provisions in labour 
law and company law can be used by companies, which create artif icial 
arrangements for the purpose of evading statutory and other obligations 
in the country of activity.
The freedom to provide services gained much support in the course of the 
development of the European Union. As the relationship was underscored 
between the working conditions of workers involved in temporary cross-
border activities and the free provision of services, problems emerged. In 
successive cases, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) judged 
that it is not up to EU Member States to def ine unilaterally the notion of 
public policy or to impose all mandatory provisions of pay and working 
4 European Union (2010). Consolidated Treaties. Treaty on European Union – Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
Luxembourg.
5 National laws also determine the way business registers are organised and the legal value 
of entries. The EU Council of Ministers has so far refused to work towards a central business 
register. A less far-reaching alternative is developed in Directive 2012/17/EU, which establishes 
a system of interconnection of business registers. It is currently being implemented and will 
be operational by the end of 2017.
6 J. Cremers (2018), Letterbox companies and regime shopping in Europe. Policy Brief ETUI, 
Brussels, forthcoming.
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conditions on suppliers of services established in another country.7 Ac-
cording to this interpretation, EU Member States have no unilateral right 
to decide on the mandatory rules applicable within their territory, even if 
these mandatory rules would guarantee better provisions for the workers 
concerned. Measures that are likely to limit the freedom of establishment 
or the freedom to provide services are not per se incompatible with EU 
law, but have to be justif ied by overriding reasons of public interest and 
cannot be discriminatory against foreign EU service providers or companies. 
Restrictions must be appropriate to attain the objective pursued, and cannot 
go beyond what is necessary. The overriding reasons of public interests, 
considered by the court, are mostly limited to the prevention of abusive tax 
practices, for instance in case of ‘wholly artif icial arrangements intended 
to escape the domestic tax normally payable’.8 On the other hand, the CJEU 
has ruled that host states may not refuse recognition of the legal capacity 
of a company incorporated under the law of another Member State, even 
if that company does not pursue any economic activity in the latter state.9 
This initiated a process of regulatory arbitrage in the EU.10 In this context, 
we def ine regulatory arbitrage as a practice whereby f irms explore (and 
benef it from) loopholes and conflicts in regulatory systems in order to 
bypass or avoid unfavourable regulation.
7 Judgments related to the free provision of services (Rüffert C-346/06 in 2008, Commission 
v. Luxembourg C-319/06 in 2008) created a situation whereby foreign service providers do not 
have to comply with imperative provisions of national law that have to be respected by domestic 
service providers. The Luxembourg case, for instance, centred around mandatory provisions 
applicable to all workers on the country’s territory, irrespective of their nationality, including 
those temporarily posted. Luxembourg required a written (labour) contract for all employees, 
whether they were national or foreign citizens. The Court ruled that these national mandatory 
regulations beyond the list of minimum provisions ‘may be regarded as a restriction on the 
free provision of services’, and are not ‘crucial for the protection of the political, social and 
economic order’. It can be argued that this contradicts the legislative intention of the PWD, 
which states explicitly (Article 3.10) that the Directive’s application ‘shall not preclude’ Member 
States applying ‘to national undertakings and to the undertakings of other States, on a basis of 
equality of treatment […] terms and conditions of employment [on issues other than minimum 
standards] in the case of public policy provisions’. See: J. Cremers (2013), ´Free provision of 
services and cross-border labour recruitment ,́ Policy Studies, 34(2) pp. 201-220. 
8 European Court Reports 2008, I-02875ECLI:EU:C:2008:239
9 E. Wymeersch (2003), The transfer of the company’s seat in European Company Law, Financial 
Law Institute. Gent University. 
10 M. Gelter (1 April 2010), ‘Tilting the Balance between Capital and Labour? The Effects of 
Regulatory Arbitrage in European Corporate Law on Employees’, Fordham International Law 
Journal, 33, Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1595067; ECGI – Law Working Paper 
No. 157/2010.
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The free movement principles in the European Union affect the respect 
for the well-balanced regulatory framework for social policy, including 
social security and labour standards that exist in EU Member States. This 
regulatory framework was and is characterised by a mixture of labour 
legislation and collective bargaining, partly resulting from national litigation 
and case law. Soon after the introduction of the internal market, collisions 
emerged between the economic reasoning in the EU and the social policy 
covering labour standards and equal treatment of workers. The emphasis on 
the primacy of economic freedoms, vigorously promoted by EU institutions, 
negatively affected the application of national social security rules and work-
ing conditions of workers. The recruitment of a foreign workforce brought 
with it the risks of undermining or evading existing social standards with 
the aim to gain a competitive advantage, while the relocation of production 
and the competition waged in the sphere of taxation and social security 
created new tensions between regions. The freedom of establishment created 
an industry of incubators able to deliver ready-made companies whose sole 
purpose was to circumvent national regulations, labour standards, and 
social security obligations.11 Eff iciency-seeking, so far mainly used in the 
f iscal area, also became mainstream in the social f ield.
Cost-saving Models and Mechanisms
In an analysis of the work of the labour inspectorate related to the respect for 
and compliance with the applicable Dutch regulations of pay and working 
conditions in cross-border recruitment practices, several mechanisms 
that have come into vogue in recent decennia could be traced.12 Although 
the sample in this study was based on f iles and cases in which there was 
already a suspicion of breaches, and the outcome is thus not representative 
of the overall development, the research gave important proxy evidence of 
the tendencies on the Dutch labour market. Moreover, the analysed f iles 
testify to more than simple loopholes and inconsistencies in legislation. The 
report reveals that these loopholes, combined with a lack of coherence in 
the overall policy, and the absence of collaboration between the different 
11 For an overview of relevant sources, see: K. Kall and N. Lillie (2017), Protection of Posted 
Workers in the European Union: Findings and Policy Recommendations based on existing research. 
University of Jyväskylä. 
12 J. Cremers (2017), Drie jaar ervaring met intensievere cao-naleving: Een analyse van de 
nalevingsdossiers n.a.v. het Sociaal Akkoord 2013. Tilburg: Tilburg Law School.
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policy areas, lead to ‘creative’ forms of labour recruitment and hiring of 
workers, very often to the detriment of the recruited workers.
These methods have been the subject of several studies referred to by 
different names, ranging from ‘regulatory competition’ to ‘regime-shopping’, 
‘social engineering’, or ‘social dumping’.13 One of the main characteristics 
is that several of the methods are not necessarily unlawful; they twist 
the law and are found in the margins of the applicable regulatory frame. 
Other methods prof it from loopholes and contradictions in that frame. 
Some methods are lawful, although they are morally blameworthy, other 
methods are against the law, but because of the complexity of the legisla-
tive framework and the absence of straightforward redress mechanisms, 
diff icult to tackle. Some methods can be traced by the enforcement and 
compliance authorities, but effective and dissuasive sanctions (especially in 
a transnational context) are nonexistent. Most of the methods are planned, 
well-organised, and set up with business consultants who will explain to you 
that everything is perfectly legal. The methods consist of well-established 
and well-designed business models that have been thought of with all the 
legal details; this leads to competition based on wage costs, and to distortion 
of competition with genuine companies who actually comply with the legal 
and conventional frame.
The compliance evaluation distinguishes cost-saving models in four areas: 
savings on direct wage costs, saving on indirect wage costs and employers’ 
contributions, savings on social security contributions, and f iscal savings 
(income tax, turnover tax, corporate income tax). The analysis of the inspec-
tion reports describes the existence of f ive different, partly intertwined, 
circumvention mechanisms that serve in the search for cheap labour:
a fraudulent contracting/pay-rolling;
b chains of subcontracting;
c the use of foreign legal entities;
d the provisions of services with posted workers;
e regime-shopping in the f ield of social security and taxation.
One of the common denominators of all analysed mechanisms is the use 
of outsourced labour on projects and workplaces. This takes the form of 
a subcontracted workforce, hired and leased workers, external recruit-
ment, agency work, and posting of workers (and self-employed persons). 
Pretended contracting, based on the provision of services, can blur the labour 
13 M. Bernaciak (2015), Market Expansion and Social Dumping in Europe. Brussels: ETUI/
Routledge.
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relationship of the involved workers. The externalisation often takes the form 
of the recruitment of a foreign workforce through establishments abroad (in 
many cases initiated by Dutch user f irms or headquarters). The introduction 
of a foreign legal entity in a subcontracting chain complicates the control and 
enforcement. It can lead to delays and even to defeat. Investigation of facts 
and verif ication of data in a foreign constituency depends on transnational 
cooperation and mutual assistance.
The Impact on the Labour Market
The question is how does this development affects the labour market? 
In general, agreement among researchers exists that, in the years before 
the crisis (the period 1999-2008), no evidence can be found of large-scale 
substitution or direct displacement of residents after the arrival of foreign 
labour, staying for the long term.14 The increased arrival of labour migrants 
from Central and East European countries, by contrast, had a positive effect 
on domestic employment.15 Ultimately, the influx of labour migrants had a 
(slight) downward effect on the average wage level and caused substitution 
to a limited degree of the workforce already present. This effect was limited 
to the lowest wage levels and completely absent in the higher levels. For the 
lowest-wage earners, a high share of labour migrants in a sector and region 
entailed a negative downward pressure on their wages. But, in overall terms, 
the supply of foreign workers supplemented the inland supply.
However, some evidence can be found that this changed after the onset of 
the f inancial and economic crisis.16 In the period 2009-2015, labour migra-
tion from Western European countries decreased, whilst migration from 
Eastern Europe did not change. In the agricultural, the manufacturing, the 
construction, the retail, and the transport sectors, the total employment of 
Dutch workers decreased with dozens of percentages, combined with an 
increase of foreign labour. In these sectors, the search for cheap labour was 
combined with an ongoing process of flexibilisation of labour relations. The 
jobs were most often shifted from direct labour to temporary and flexible 
contracts. The cost reduction was achieved through the recruitment of 
14 SEO (2011), De economische impact van arbeidsmigratie: verdringingseffecten 1999-2008, 
Amsterdam.
15 D. Dustmann (2008), The Labour Market Impact of Immigration, Centre for Research and 
Analysis of Migration, University College London.
16 SEO (2014), Grensoverschrijdend aanbod van personeel, Amsterdam.
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labour migrants who accept lower wages and high flexibility. This type of 
substitution mainly took place in labour-intensive jobs with standardised 
work, with a calculation and a competition based on price, not on quality, and 
in situations in which language skills are neither essential, nor important. 
The recruitment of labour migrants, as several sources indicate, thus further 
facilitates the externalisation and f lexibilisation of the labour market.17 
Since f ixed-term contracts have a short duration and they terminate at no 
cost, they provide f irms with scope for wage adjustment.
How does this relate to the current situation with repeated notif ications 
of labour shortages? Analysis of labour market shortages in the Netherlands 
focus mainly on absolute shortages (no labour supply available). The relative 
shortage in terms of the labour (or employment) volume of jobs that are 
diff icult to fulf il given the offered conditions (pay, working conditions, 
OSH) cannot be found in employment statistics and prognosis. According 
to an EU survey (published in 2016) 40% of the interviewed employers were 
confronted with recruitment problems. Around half of the cases belonged in 
the category of real qualif ication shortages, and one third of the cases were 
related to a remuneration that was too low. Unattractive working conditions, 
combined with atypical working time, poor career perspectives, and a lack 
of training facilities, explain why it is often diff icult to f ind the right person, 
especially if no permanent job is in sight. There are clear indications that 
this relative type of labour shortage has been encountered in recent years 
with the recruitment of labour migrants. Longitudinal analysis reveals that 
a large majority of labour migrants from CEE countries in the Netherlands 
keep working in temporary jobs and contracts, which are low-paid and in 
precarious occupations, despite several years of service.18 Local Dutch 
surveys among employers engaging foreign labour, provide further evidence. 
In local communities with a high registration of CEE workers, this survey 
investigated the motives for employers to recruit foreign workers (mainly 
through agencies).19 Employers praised the labour migrants for their work 
ethic, commitment, and flexibility. Migrants are willing to accept arduous 
work, irregular working times, and long working days. Labour migrants 
carry out seasonal work and cater to peaks in agriculture, horticulture, and 
manufacturing. The motives of employers are induced by a combination of 
17 D. Raess and B. Burgoon (2015), Flexible Work and Immigration in Europe. British Journal 
of Industrial Relations. SEO (2014), Grensoverschrijdend aanbod van personeel, Amsterdam.
18 A. Strockmeijer (2017), ´´Mobiliteit binnen de perken,́  Tijdschrift voor Arbeidsvraagstukken, 
33(2), Amsterdam: Boom.
19 J. Cremers and A. Strockmeijer (2017), De inzet van arbeidsmigranten in Zeewolde, Tilburg 
Law School.
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frictions and relative shortages on the labour market: the search for cheap 
labour, hard work, f lexibility, and an offer that Dutch workers will not 
accept. The involved employers are well aware of the fact that their offer is 
not attractive. Without labour migrants, the wheel stops turning.
Cross-border Hiring and Sourcing
A substantial part of labour migration is driven by the behaviour of employ-
ers, who actively search for workers from abroad in order to deal with labour 
shortages at home, but also to cut back on wages and other labour costs. 
‘The central feature of demand-driven systems is that “the initiative for the 
migration comes from the employer”’.20 In the local surveys, mentioned 
beyond, both reasons for wanting to hire migrant workers are mentioned 
regularly. A straightforward analysis of the different factors underlying 
the decision to hire migrant workers include a mix of institutional factors, 
economic circumstances, and the match (or lack thereof) between employers’ 
demands and employee skills and requirements.21 In this paragraph, we 
include the possibility that these decisions are also influenced by a process 
that can neutrally be described as management learning, but could also 
be characterised as copycat behaviour by employers. We assume that HR 
practices are copied from other organisations and also actively propagated 
by consultants and labour market intermediaries.
Intermediaries on the labour market make active use of loopholes and 
gaps in the legislation that among other things:
pave the way for companies and intermediaries who can easily and at 
low cost be established as a legal entity in a foreign country, can quickly 
disappear across the border, go bankrupt and re-set up again from the 
beginning. This has also led to an industry of business consultants who 
can explain how perfectly legitimate such practices are. It is therefore 
imperative to strengthen the legal framework and to eliminate the gaps 
and imperfections in the legislation in a coherent and integral manner. 
This requires a thorough analysis in line with internal market regulation, 
20 C. Finotelli and H. Kolb (2017), ‘“The Good, the Bad and the Ugly” Reconsidered: A Comparison 
of German, Canadian and Spanish Labour Migration Policies’, Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis: Research and Practice, 19(1) pp. 72-86.
21 See, for an overview: M. Ruhs and B. Anderson (eds.) (2010), Who Needs Migrant Workers? 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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not only in the interests of the employees concerned but also in the 
interests of bona f ide companies and consumers.22
What is the rationale behind the practices that we have examined in the 
previous sections? Different views exist about the proliferation and adoption 
of management practices on the continuum between fully rational and 
decidedly emotional behaviour.23 Managers can be hypothesised to make 
decisions on adopting new HR management practices with a combination of 
the views below: this is a multidimensional approach to this type of decision-
making. Alternatively, managers could choose between the different views 
below, based on the context for the decision: this is a contingent approach 
to this type of decision-making. Empirical research with concern to the role 
that these different views play in adopting management practices indeed 
suggests that the choice is influenced by the context and by a combination 
of different views.24
– rational view: adopt, because these practices work or promise to do so;
– psychodynamic view: adopt, because it ‘feels good’ to adopt, preventing 
the anxiety associated with doing nothing;
– dramaturgical view (rhetoric): adopt, because somebody (gurus, consult-
ants) tells you that it is a good idea to adopt;
– political view: adopt, because the powerful (Anglo-Saxon business 
community, multinational f irms, business schools) tell you that it is a 
good practice to adopt;
– cultural view: adopt, because the practices f it the cultural characteristics 
of your organisation (e.g. Hofstede dimensions);
– institutional view: adopt for symbolic reasons (seeking peer and share-
holder legitimacy).
When we apply these different views on the specif ic topic of HRM practices 
and the possibilities for using migrant labour, the decision problem for 
organisations can be visualised by the stylized decision tree in Figure 1 below.
22 J. Cremers (2016), ‘Economic freedoms and labour standards in the European Union’, Transfer: 
European Review of Labour and Research, 22(2) pp. 149-162.
23 A. Sturdy (2004), ´The adoption of management ideas and practices theoretical perspectives 
and possibilities,́  Management Learning, 35(2) pp. 155-179.
24 E. Daniel, A. Myers, and K. Dixon (2012), ‘Adoption rationales of new management practices’, 
Journal of Business Research, 65(3) pp. 371-380.A.I. Rautiainen (2009), ‘The interrelations of 
decision-making rationales around BSC adoptions in Finnish municipalities’, International 
Journal of Productivity and Performance Management, 58(8) pp. 787-802.
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The model of labour demand decision-making illustrates that there are 
ample opportunities for organisations to articulate part of their supply in 
terms of specif ic demand for migrant labour, either through direct hires 
(possibly at subsidiaries abroad) or through different forms of sourcing 
(e.g. through temporary work agencies, hereafter TWA). The model shows 
that agencies and other intermediaries have an incentive to ‘influence’ the 
decision-making of organisations in this respect, namely in order to increase 
their ‘part of the pie’ of labour demand. The different stages in the process 
during which HR business consultants can influence decisions are easy to 
identify. It identif ies the many degrees of freedom that organisations have 
to translate ‘work to do’ into ‘labour demand’ and also the many degrees of 
freedom to locate that labour demand in foreign jurisdictions.
Similar to this approach, and very critical with respect to hiring migrant 
workers, Gordon (2017) states that:
employers’ recruitment of would-be migrants from other countries, unlike 
their use of undocumented workers already in the United States, creates 
a transnational network of labour intermediaries – the ‘human supply 
chain’ – whose operation undermines the rule of law in the workplace, 
benef itting U.S. companies by reducing labour costs while creating 
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distributional harms for U.S. workers, and placing temporary migrant 
workers in situations of severe subordination. It identif ies the human 
supply chain as a key structure of the global economy, a close analogue to 
the more familiar product supply chains through which U.S. companies 
manufacture products abroad.25
With this simple decision framework, it is possible to hypothesise a role 
for either business consultants or labour market intermediaries to give 
advice at different stages of the decision process. We will assume that these 
intermediaries act in their own interest and that organisations are likely to 
listen to the advice given to them for reasons of both a rational view (lower 
costs) and other factors, which involve managerial anxiety, political and peer 
pressures that are a combination of the other possible views on adopting 
(new) managerial practices.
The Role of Intermediaries in Practice
Both TWAs and business consultancy f irms that provide HR management 
advice are examples of so-called Advanced Business Services (ABS) at the 
labour market. It is argued ‘that ABS, as a complex, hold considerable power, 
which they exercise in a large measure by operating legal, accounting and 
f inancial vehicles designed partly to escape the control of governmental or 
intergovernmental organisations through the use of offshore jurisdictions’.26 
It seems fair to assume that the intermediaries and consultants focus on 
the cost benef its of regulatory (labour) arbitrage and are less inclined to 
‘sell’ decent labour market arrangements. Berntsen has described these 
practices for TWAs:
Firms employing foreign workers in host countries strategically situate 
themselves in particular regulatory regimes or industries. In the Neth-
erlands, for example, the benef its applicable to posted workers in the 
construction sector are more extensive than in the metal sector, allowing 
for cost savings when f irms post workers under the conditions for the 
metal industry. TWAs can choose between situating themselves in the 
host country and employing the foreign workers under TWA contracts, or 
25 J. Gordon (2017), ‘Regulating the Human Supply Chain’, Iowa Law Review, 102(2).
26 D. Wojcik (2012), ‘Where governance fails: Advanced business services and the offshore 
world’, Progress in Human Geography, 37(3) pp. 330-347. 
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posting the TWA workers from the home country, or even a third country 
in which social security contributions are lower. With the f irst option, 
employment conditions have to be regulated in line with the host-country 
framework; in the second and third option, there will be a combination 
of host- and sending-country regulations.27
Furthermore, it is documented in the management literature that big con-
sultancy f irms play an important role in the propagation of HRM practices. 
In general, it is argued that business consultants ‘create and disseminate 
ideas’ about management innovation and have ‘persuasive power’ in do-
ing so.28 More specif ically, McKinsey & Co. played an important role in 
spreading the influential concept of the ‘war for talent’ in the HR f ield.29 
Other researchers have found ‘that texts from management consultants and 
mainly American business school academics have diffused extensively into 
the important setting of English healthcare organisations.’30 Offshoring, in 
particular, could also be regarded as a mere ‘management fad’. Even a large 
consultancy f irm argued that business should and would be weighing pros 
and cons of offshoring more carefully.31
The process described above started with big consultancy f irms advising 
multinational corporations that already had offshore subsidiaries, mainly for 
‘tax arbitrage’ purposes. The aforementioned ABS organisations have thereby 
‘taught’ businesses to evade government regulation in general. A SOMO 
report concludes ‘There is obviously a web of consultancy f irms, sometimes 
related in ownership but rather a network of business management tax 
advisory f irms that specialise in creating and managing letterboxes […]’.32 
27 L.E. Berntsen (2015), ́ Agency of labour in a flexible pan-European labour market: A qualitative 
study of migrant practices and trade union strategies in the Netherlands,́  Jyväskylä studies in 
education, psychology and social research, 0075-4625 p. 526.
28 E. Abrahamson (1991), ‘Managerial fads and fashions: The diffusion and rejection of innova-
tions’, Academy of management review, 16(3) pp. 586-612. A. Alharbi and A. Mamman (2015), ‘Why 
Human Resource Management Innovations have many Versions not in Theory but in Practice’, 
International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 5(11) pp. 214-229.
29 J. O’Mahoney and A. Sturdy (2016), ´Power and the diffusion of management ideas: The case 
of McKinsey & Co., Management Learning, 47(3) pp. 247-265.
30 E. Ferlie (2016), ‘The political economy of management knowledge: management texts in 
English healthcare organisations’, Public Administration, 94(1) pp. 185-203.
31 Deloitte Consulting (April 2005), Calling A Change in the Outsourcing Market: The Realities 
for the World’s Largest Organizations.
32 McGauran (2016), The impact of letterbox-type practices on labour rights and public revenue, 
Brussels: SOMO/ETUC. The report identif ies different employment relationships used for social 
dumping, all of which involve artif icial arrangements with no material activities in the country 
of registration, established with the sole purpose to recruit workers for working abroad. 
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The use is no longer restricted to large multinational corporations, but 
has evolved into a ‘general purpose technology’ management innovation, 
also available to small- and medium-sized companies (SMEs) without a 
preexisting international presence. SMEs in Europe are advised to relocate 
their administrative seat to another jurisdiction (Cyprus, Lichtenstein), for 
the sole reason that it will give them a competitive advantage in reducing 
their wage bill.
Our f ield work and analyses of the work of the labour inspectorate reveal 
that organisations have several options for hiring migrant labour. The 
setting up of a foreign subsidiary, or cooperating with an existing one that 
is nothing more than an empty shell, provides the opportunity to evade 
labour standards, social security, and taxation regulations. These subsidiaries 
are called ‘mailbox’ or ‘letterbox’ companies or, in legal terms: ‘artif icial 
arrangements’.33 The regulatory framework related to the phenomenon 
of artif icial arrangements is stretched over various national and EU policy 
areas, with noncoherent, contradictory, or even conflicting rules in company, 
labour, and contract law; internal market regulations; tax rulings; and social 
security legislation. As a result, many loopholes for labour arbitrage can be 
identif ied. Furthermore, the fragmented nature of both regulation and its 
enforcement makes it diff icult to monitor and combat abusive practices.34
In the labour and social security policy areas, this notion was f irst sig-
nalled in the 1990s in the international transport sector. It was based on 
33 Most def initions of letterbox companies refer to tax evasion by a business that establishes 
its domicile in a tax-friendly country with just an address, while conducting its commercial 
activities in other countries. The European Commission states that ‘letterbox subsidiaries’ are 
artif icial arrangements established in countries solely to qualify for a softer tax regime and cut 
their bill. European Commission (2013), MEMO, Questions and Answers on the Parent Subsidiary 
Directive. Linkage with the free provision of services led to a def inition beyond taxation. The EC 
refers in a Communication on smart regulation to legislative loopholes; ‘letterbox companies are 
companies which have been set up with the purpose of benef itting from legislative loopholes 
while not themselves providing any service to clients’. European Commission (2013), Smart 
regulation – Responding to the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises.
34 ‘For trade unions and (understaffed) enforcement authorities it is diff icult to trace and 
combat the situations; the f luidity in the cross-border context with f irms often disappearing 
across borders or going bankrupt, complicate their efforts to enforce (and execute) local labour 
standards. And in the relatively few cases where trade unions and host state institutions do 
succeed in reaching the workers, they experience enormous practical diff iculties in establishing 
exactly which conditions (should) apply to a specif ic individual employment relationship, 
because the rules are so complicated in cross-border situations.’ M. Houwerzijl (2016), ´Letterbox 
strategies to suppress wages & labour standards: About the deliberate use of rules on determining 
applicable labour law and company law ‘in search of cheap labour’, in A hunters game: how policy 
can change to spot and sink letterbox-type practices. Brussels: ETUC.
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dubious practices and problems caused by letterbox companies, which only 
had addresses in the country of establishment and all activities offshored 
to a different jurisdiction, often combined with ‘bogus self-employment’ 
among drivers and circumvention of statutory pay and working time 
standards.35 The phenomenon became associated with a ‘cheap labour 
business model’: letterbox companies that operate in a cross-border context 
and pick and choose the social security and labour standards regime that 
is the least regulated and the most prof itable. Ownership and employer 
liabilities are obscured or blurred by using proxy owners or strawmen. 
These entities take advantage of limited inspection competences and a 
lack of transnational enforcement mechanisms to deprive workers of their 
wages and contributions. In practice, the cross-border recruitment, through 
artif icial arrangements, prevents states from reinforcing employment and 
labour standards.
The divergence of conflict rules, the legal complexity, and loopholes 
hamper effective application of the law and therefore favour unreliable 
actors. This situation undermines legal certainty about the law governing the 
operations of companies, and may work both to the detriment of bona f ide 
cross-border establishment and provision of services, and to the detriment 
of effective monitoring and enforcement of the rules. In all this uncertainty 
and complexity, one thing is certain: the current situation creates an ideal 
environment for mala f ide cross-border business activities.
Concluding Part and Outlook
In this chapter, we have documented recent studies that shed light on 
the impact of artif icial recruitment arrangements on compliance with 
and respect for labour standards and social security obligations. Due to 
the primacy of freedom of establishment, and with the deregulation of 
company law dominating the EU internal market, there is a serious tension 
in the enforcement of labour standards, social security, and tax laws. The 
introduction of free movement in the European Union created an attractive 
open market for businesses, whilst the respect for the well-balanced national 
social regulatory framework became subordinated to the promotion of 
competition and mobility.
35 J. Cremers (2011), In search of cheap labour in Europe: working and living conditions of posted 
workers, Brussels: i-books/CLR-Studies.
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By the late 1980s, the f irst indications of the practice of bypassing the 
applicable rules through the use of foreign labour-only subcontractors led 
to questions related to the role of cross-border labour recruitment. A matrix 
of complex, semilegal, or outright unlawful employment arrangements 
emerged, involving foreign corporate entities with questionable substance in 
the country of establishment. Through these channels, the basic principle of 
lex loci laboris eroded. The consequences in cross-border situations included 
regime-shopping, social dumping, and the threat of the unequal treatment 
of workers. For undertakings, it meant a distortion of competition and a race 
to the bottom, as the level playing f ield was vanishing. The free provision of 
services, combined with the deregulation of company law and the freedom 
of establishment, created a situation whereby service providers from abroad 
could circumvent mandatory rules that are imperative provisions of national 
law, and which have to be respected by domestic service providers. The 
primacy given to competition and deregulation created a climate in favour 
of labour arbitrage.
This puts the advocates of free movement inside the EU in a dilemma: 
the poor regulation of the recruitment of foreign labour creates tensions 
in the local market. Abuses build a breeding ground for strong anti-Europe 
sentiments (e.g. Brexit). Cross-border recruitment is channelled through 
constructs established in other constituencies. The possibility for host 
countries to verify the legality of the construct is very limited. Circumvention 
practices related to artif icial legal entities, acting in the frame of the freedom 
of establishment, can only come to an end through policies that lie partly 
outside the social domain, such as national and European re-regulation of 
company law.
Employers have a strong and legitimate interest in the recruitment of 
foreign labour, as do agencies and other intermediaries. It would be logical 
for the management side to take a strong stand in favour of a coherent and 
consistent labour mobility regulation, based on decent workers’ rights 
and equal treatment, and developed in the framework of national and EU 
social dialogue. Free movement of workers might only stay upright in the 
EU if grounded on the principle of equal treatment in the territory where 
the work is performed.
Bibliography
Abrahamson, E. (1991), ‘Managerial fads and fashions: The diffusion and rejection 
of innovations’, Academy of management review, 16(3) pp. 586-612.
126 Jan Cremers and ronald dekker 
Alharbi, A. and A. Mamman (2015), ‘Why Human Resource Management Innova-
tions have many Versions not in Theory but in Practice’, International Journal 
of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 5(11) pp. 214-229.
Bernaciak, M. (2015), Market Expansion and Social Dumping in Europe, Brussels: 
ETUI/Routledge.
Berntsen, L.E. (2015), ‘Agency of labour in a f lexible pan-European labour market: 
A qualitative study of migrant practices and trade union strategies in the 
Netherlands’, Jyväskylä studies in education, psychology and social research 
526, academic dissertation, Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 172 p.
Cremers, J. (2011), In search of cheap labour in Europe: working and living conditions 
of posted workers, Brussels: i-books/CLR-Studies.
Cremers, J. (2012), ‘Free movement of workers and rights that can be derived’, 
FMW: Online Journal on free movement of workers within the European Union, 
4 pp. 26-32.
Cremers, J. (2013), ‘Free provision of services and cross-border labour recruitment’, 
Policy Studies, 34(2) pp. 201-220.
Cremers, J. (2016), ‘Economic freedoms and labour standards in the European 
Union’, Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 22(2) pp. 149-162.
Cremers, J. (2017), Drie jaar ervaring met intensievere cao-naleving: Een analyse van 
de nalevingsdossiers n.a.v. het Sociaal Akkoord 2013. Tilburg: Tilburg Law School.
Cremers, J. (2018), Letterbox companies and regime shopping in Europe. Policy Brief 
ETUI, Brussels (forthcoming).
Cremers, J. and A. Strockmeijer (2017), De inzet van arbeidsmigranten in Zeewolde, 
Tilburg Law School.
Daniel, E.; A. Myers; and K. Dixon (2012), ‘Adoption rationales of new management 
practices’, Journal of Business Research, 65(3) pp. 371-380.
Deloitte Consulting (April 2005), Calling A Change in the Outsourcing Market: The 
Realities for the World’s Largest Organizations.
Dustmann, D. (2008), The Labour Market Impact of Immigration, Centre for Research 
and Analysis of Migration, University College London.
Ferlie, E. (2016), ‘The political economy of management knowledge: manage-
ment texts in English healthcare organisations’, Public Administration, 94(1) 
pp. 185-203.
Finotelli, C. and H. Kolb (2017), ‘“The Good, the Bad and the Ugly” Reconsidered: 
A Comparison of German, Canadian and Spanish Labour Migration Policies’, 
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 19(1) pp. 72-86.
Gelter, M. (1 April 2010), ‘Tilting the Balance between Capital and Labour? The 
Effects of Regulatory Arbitrage in European Corporate Law on Employees’, 
Fordham International Law Journal, 33 pp. 790-875.
labour arbitrage on european labour markets 127
Gordon, J. (2017), ‘Regulating the Human Supply Chain’, Iowa Law Review, 102(2) 
pp. 445-504.
Kall, K. and N. Lillie (2017), Protection of Posted Workers in the European Union: 
Findings and Policy Recommendations based on existing research. University 
of Jyväskylä.
McGauran K. (2016), The impact of letterbox-type practices on labour rights and 
public revenue, Brussels: SOMO/ETUC.
O’Mahoney, J. and A. Sturdy (2016), ‘Power and the diffusion of management ideas: 
The case of McKinsey & Co’, Management Learning, 47(3) pp. 247-265.
Raess, D. and B. Burgoon (2015), ´Flexible Work and Immigration in Europe,́  British 
Journal of Industrial Relations.
Rautiainen, A.I. (2009), ‘The interrelations of decision-making rationales around 
BSC adoptions in Finnish municipalities’, International Journal of Productivity 
and Performance Management, 58(8) pp. 787-802.
Ruhs, M. and B. Anderson, eds. (2010), Who Needs Migrant Workers? Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
SEO (2011), De economische impact van arbeidsmigratie: verdringingseffecten 1999-
2008, Amsterdam: SEO Economisch Onderzoek
SEO (2014), Grensoverschrijdend aanbod van personeel, Amsterdam: SEO Economisch 
Onderzoek.
Strockmeijer, A. (2017), ‘Mobiliteit binnen de perken’, Tijdschrift voor Arbeidsvraa-
gstukken, 33(2) Amsterdam: Boom, pp. 384-400.
Sturdy, A. (2004), ‘The adoption of management ideas and practices theoretical 
perspectives and possibilities’, Management Learning, 35(2) pp. 155-179.
Wojcik, D. (2012), ‘Where governance fails: Advanced business services and the 
offshore world’, Progress in Human Geography, 37(3) pp.330-347.
Wymeersch, E. (2003), ‘The transfer of the company’s seat in European Company 
Law’, Financial Law Institute, Gent University.
About the Authors
Jan Cremers is a researcher at the Tilburg Law School, Department of Social 
Law and Social Policy.
Ronald Dekker is a labour economist and researcher at Tilburg University.





This contribution analyses the regime of the Seasonal Workers Directive 
(SWD) in order to determine whether it grants adequate safeguards to 
seasonal workers. Zoeteweij defends the argument, however, that the 
Directive itself and the (state of) implementation by the EU Member 
States only confirms the legal subordination of unskilled or low-skilled 
labour migrants on the European labour market, and that the observed 
reluctance on the side of the Member States with regard to the transposi-
tion of the Directive serves to underpin this argument. The focus of the 
contribution is on the progress in the implementation of the Directive; 
special attention is given to the implementation in Italy and Spain. Finally, 
the contribution concludes by taking stock of the changes in the legal 
position of seasonal workers, and by formulating a prognosis of what can 
be expected of the Directive.
Keywords: seasonal workers directive, implementation, subordination 
low-skilled workers, seasonal workers rights
1 Introduction
The Seasonal Workers Directive, providing minimum standards on the 
conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals (TCN) for the purpose 
of employment as seasonal workers, should have been implemented by the 
Member States bound by it until September 2016.1 Implementation of the 
1 Directive 2014/36/EU of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country 
nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers, OJ2014 L94/375.
Rijken, Conny and Tesseltje de Lange (eds): Towards a Decent Labour Market for Low Waged 
Migrant Workers. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018  
doi: 10.5117/9789462987555_zoet
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Directive’s standards is to ensure decent working and living conditions for 
seasonal workers by setting out fair and transparent rules for admission 
and stay, and by def ining the rights of seasonal workers in order to ensure 
decent working conditions.2 This contribution analyses the regime as per 
the Directive in order to determine whether it indeed grants adequate 
safeguards to seasonal workers. This contribution defends the argument, 
however, that the Directive itself and the (state of) implementation by the 
EU Member States only confirms the legal subordination of unskilled or 
low-skilled labour migrants on the European labour market, and that the 
observed reluctance on the side of the Member States with regard to the 
transposition of the Directive serves to underpin this argument.
The argument in this contribution is built up as follows. It will briefly 
discuss the historical background of the Directive, which is followed by an 
analysis of some of the rights that are provided for – or rights that are lacking 
– in the Directive. The focus of the contribution subsequently shifts to the 
progress in the implementation of the Directive; special attention is given to 
the implementation in Italy and Spain as the agricultural sector in these two 
Member States depends to a large extent on seasonal workers. Finally, the 
contribution concludes by taking stock of the changes in the legal position 
of seasonal workers, and by formulating a prognosis of what can be expected 
of the Directive now that the deadline for its implementation has expired.
2 Background
The aim of the EU’s migration policy is to ensure the eff icient management 
of migration f lows and the fair treatment of TCNs legally residing in the 
Member States.3 The f irst proposal for a Directive on the conditions of entry 
and stay of TCNs for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed 
economic activities was presented by the Commission in 2001.4 This pro-
posed Directive would have established a general regime treating all labour 
migrants equally.5 However, due to a lack of support for the proposal in the 
2 Seasonal Workers Directive, Preamble, under 7.
3 Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU. 
4 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed 
economic activities, COM (2001) 386 f inal. 
5 C. Costello (2016), ‘EU migration and asylum law: A labour law perspective’, in A. Bogg, C. 
Costello, and A.C.L. Davies (Eds.), Research Handbook on EU Labour Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
p. 312.
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Council, the Commission withdrew the proposal in 2005. Consequently, the 
Commission decided it would approach the issue of TCN workforce sector 
by sector, proposing Directives that would introduce different regimes for 
each and every category of TCN workers in the EU.
It was not until 2010, after Directives on the entry and stay (and employ-
ment) of students, trainees, volunteers, researchers, and highly qualif ied 
workers had been adopted with unanimity in the Council, and after the 
adoption of legislative measures with regard to migration was made easier 
due to the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, that the Commission proposed the intro-
duction of legislation harmonising Member States’ legislation on unskilled 
migration.6 Even then, the proposal was the subject of long and diff icult 
negotiations in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, as 
its discussion took place during a period of economic crisis in some of the 
Member States, and an increased scepticism to migration in almost all.7 The 
adoption of the Directive in 2014 in itself may therefore already be regarded 
as an accomplishment.8
Be that as it may, it is through the substance and effective implementation 
of the Directive that its effect on the improvement of the working and 
living conditions for seasonal workers9 should be assessed. Therefore, 
the following paragraphs will critically analyse the potential improvement 
brought about by the Directive with regard to the situation of seasonal 
workers on the labour markets of the Member States of the EU.
3 Rights and Temporariness: Which Way Does the Scale Tip?
The Directive, in its version as adopted in February 2014, regulates a number 
of issues related to the entry and stay of unskilled or low-skilled TCN migrant 
workers to carry out an activity dependent on the passing of the seasons. 
6 G. Menz (2015), ‘Framing the matter differently: the political dynamics of European Union 
labour migration policymaking’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 28(4) p. 558.
7 R. Cholewinski (2015), ‘Migration for Employment’, in Plender (Ed.), Issues in International 
Migration Law, Brill, p. 67; also L. Hayes, T. Novitz, and P.H. Olsson (2013), ‘Migrant workers and 
collective bargaining: institutional isomorphism and legitimacy in a resocialised Europe’, in 
N. Countouris and M. Freedland (Eds.), Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis, CUP, p. 461; also 
M. Jesse (2016), The Civic Citizens of Europe: The Legal Potential for Immigrant Integration in the 
EU, Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom, Brill, p. 165. 
8 C. Costello and M. Freedland (2016), ‘Seasonal Workers and Intra-corporate Transferees 
in EU law’, in J. Howe and R. Owens (Eds.), Temporary Labour Migration in the Global era – The 
Regulatory Challenges, Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 54. 
9 Preamble to the Seasonal Workers Directive, under 7.
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In a nutshell, the Directive seeks to cater to the Member States’ f luctuating 
but persistent demand for low-skilled migrant labour force, without giving 
the labour migrants falling within its scope the prospective of integration 
and long-term residence in the host Member State. The solution to this 
equation is thus sought in the promotion of temporary and circular migra-
tion. The Directive can therefore be regarded as the schoolbook example 
of migration law that transforms people into economic inputs who depart 
when their labour is no longer necessary.10 This is understandable and even 
laudable from an economic point of view. Some even argue that it is also 
in the interest of (potential) unskilled labour migrants that the catalogue 
of rights granted to them stays at a minimum as an increase in their rights 
could come at the price of a more restrictive admission policy of the hosting 
countries. Advocates of this view put forward that, as long as certain basic 
rights are granted, a number of specif ic rights of migrant workers can be 
temporarily restricted in order to give more unskilled workers the chance 
to migrate legally to higher-income countries.11 It is apparently in this spirit 
that the Seasonal Workers Directive was drafted. As is often the case with 
legislation that serves economic purposes, it takes less heed of the possible 
negative effects of the legislation on the persons involved, effects that, in 
the case of the Directive, are reinforced by the uncertainty of temporary 
employment and short-term residence.12 Compared to the original 2010 draft 
proposal for the Directive, the text of the Directive that resulted from the 
intervention of the Parliament and international actors such as the ILO13 
does provide the seasonal worker with a more comprehensive catalogue of 
rights. However, are the substance and the weight of these rights enough 
to guarantee labour migrants decent work,14 in line with the aims of the 
Directive as listed in its preamble? That question is the starting point of 
the following analysis of the Directive. In order to be able to focus on the 
rights regime in as much detail as possible, this contribution will focus on 
10 C. Cauvergne and S. Marsden (2014), ‘The Ideology of Temporary Labour Migration in the 
Post-Global Era’, Citizenship studies, 18(2) p. 232.
11 M. Ruhs (2013), The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labour Migration, Princeton 
University Press, pp. 190-191. 
12 J. Howe and R. Owens, Temporary Labour Migration in the Global Era, p. 23.
13 ILO technical comments on the Proposal for a EU Directive on seasonal employment of 
migrant workers. Avaliable at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-
geneva/---ilo-brussels/documents/genericdocument/wcms_168539.pdf. 
14 During the UN General Assembly in 2015, decent work and the four pillars of the ILO’s 
Decent Work Agenda – promoting jobs and enterprise, guaranteeing rights at work, extending 
social protection, and promoting social dialogue (with gender as a crosscutting theme) – became 
integral elements of the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
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the substantial provisions in the directive rather than those on admission, 
procedure, and authorisation. Therefore, the following aspects are addressed: 
equal treatment, family rights, dependency on employer, and enforceability.
Equal Treatment
The Directive’s central provision determining the rights of the seasonal 
worker as migrant and as employee can be found in Article 23. This article 
provides that, in principle, the seasonal worker is entitled to equal treat-
ment with nationals of the host Member State. The European Parliament’s 
introduction of this provision at a later stage in the legislative procedure, 
and the extension of the scope of this article to cover terms of employment 
and the right to strike, can indeed be regarded as an accomplishment.15 
The article allows Member States to make exceptions from the principle 
of equal treatment. Exceptions may be made with regard to social security 
benefits,16 such as sickness benefits, maternity benefits, benefits in respect 
of accidents at work, unemployment benef its, and family benef its.17 It is, 
however, questionable whether Member States implementing laws creat-
ing unequal treatment with regard to social security is in line with EU 
and international law in this regard. The ECtHR has repeatedly ruled that 
difference of treatment with regard to social security, based exclusively 
on the ground of nationality, is only possible if justif ied by very weighty 
reasons.18 Relevant ILO Conventions further limit Member States’ discretion, 
even though these Conventions are presently only binding on a very small 
number of them.19 The content of the right to equal treatment under the 
Seasonal Workers Directive therefore certainly does not guarantee that 
their treatment will be equivalent to the treatment of nationals – or, for 
that matter, to the treatment of other, more ‘economically valuable’.20 TCN 
15 A. Lazarowicz (28 March 2014), A success story for the EU and seasonal workers’rights without 
reinventing the wheel, EPC Policy Brief, p. 3.
16 Seasonal Workers Directive, Article 23(1)(d).
17 The complete list of social security benef its with regard to which Member States may make 
an exception to the principle of equal treatment can be found in Article 3 of Regulation 883/2004 
on the coordination of social security systems.
18 ECtHR, Gaygusuz v. Austria, Application no. 17371/90, para. 42; also ECtHR, Andrejeva v. 
Latvia, Application no. 55707/00, para. 87. 
19 ILO Convention No. 118 on Equality of Treatment (Social Security). 
20 Though, legally speaking, it is not possible to establish the value of a person and compare 
it to the value of another person, economically speaking, the value of a person as a production 
factor can be determined by looking at the supply and demand for this particular person as 
a production factor. As the EU aggregate of the demand for third-country national seasonal 
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labour migrants that fall under the regime of the Single Permit Directiv21 
or the Blue Card Directive.22
Family Rights
When taking a closer look at the legal regime established by the Seasonal 
Workers Directive, and especially when comparing this regime with other EU 
acts regulating labour migration into the EU, the lack of the right to family 
reunif ication stands out immediately.23 This aspect of the Seasonal Work-
ers Directive especially bears resemblance to guest worker programmes, 
implemented throughout Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, which left a bitter 
aftertaste for all parties involved. Not only did the families involved suffer 
from prolonged periods in which their family life was disrupted, but the 
States hosting the guest workers were also faced with the unanticipated 
effect of an increased irregular (or at least undesired) migration.24 With 
the adoption of the Seasonal Workers Directive, the EU may have entered 
into the same vicious circle. Considering that the aim of the Directive is to 
foster a circular movement of labour force, it does not offer the prospect of 
integration and settlement in the host Member State to the labour migrant– 
even though the Directive allows Member States to implement schemes 
that foresee a more stable residence for third-country nationals that fall 
within the scope of the Directive.25 It does not come as a surprise that 
the Directive does not provide for family reunif ication. Furthermore, as 
seasonal workers are excluded from the scope of the Long Term Residents 
workers is much lower than the global supply for seasonal workers, the value of the seasonal 
worker is considerably lower than the economic value of a highly skilled blue card holder. 
21 K. Groenendijk (2014), ‘Which Way Forward with Migration and Employment in the EU?’, in 
S. Carrera, E. Guild, and K. Eisele (eds.), Rethinking the Attractiveness of EU Labour Immigration 
Policies, Comparative perspectives on the EU, the US, Canada and beyond, CEPS, pp. 95 and 96. 
Where he compares the content of the right to equal treatment under the Seasonal Workers 
Directive to that as provided by Article 12 of Directive 2011/98/EU on a single application procedure 
for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member 
State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State 
(‘Single Permit Directive’).
22 Council Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualif ied employment, OJ 2002, L155/17.
23 Preamble of the Seasonal Workers Directive, under 46.
24 Though opinions may vary with regard to whether family members joining the guest worker 
migrated irregularly or regularly, it is a fact that their presence alongside the guest worker was 
not intended; see, for the Dutch example, Bonjour (2009), Grens en Gezin, Aksant, pp. 51 ff.
25 See Article 14(1) of the Seasonal Workers Directive; also see under paragraph IV ‘implementa-
tion’ the example of the implementation of the Directive in Italy. 
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Directive,26 they do not have another legal venue to obtain this right as long 
as their stay in the EU is regulated by the Seasonal Workers Directive.27 At 
the same time, however, the Directive provides that Member States may 
allow seasonal workers to stay and work on their territories for periods of 
up to nine months per calendar year, and, if the implementing national 
legislation so provides, subsequent return for periods up to nine months 
per calendar year for the purpose of seasonal work.28 Thus, third-country 
nationals whose economic situation in their country of usual residence is 
dire enough to apply for seasonal work in countries far away, and who want 
to stay and work for as long as possible in order to earn back the money 
invested in f inding employment and travelling to the EU before being 
able to make remittances,29 are thus forced into illegality, or into illegally 
bringing their families along.30
The Protection Gap and Dependency on the Employer
Apart from the substantive rights regime of the Directive, there are other 
aspects that corroborate the disadvantageous position of the seasonal 
worker on the EU labour market. As the obligation to facilitate reentry of a 
26 Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are 
long-term residents, Article 3(2)(e).
27 Article 14(1) of the Seasonal Workers Directive enables Member States to issue a residence 
permit under national or Union law for purposes other than seasonal work. 
28 Article 16 of the Seasonal Workers Directive.
29 This is especially the case for those migrants that have to travel long distances to the host 
Member State; they usually incur higher initiation costs than those coming from neighbouring 
countries, and for migrants that have made other costs related to the application for a work and 
residence permit, and therefore also take longer to generate a net f inancial gain that is high 
enough to make the whole exercise worthwhile. Ruhs, The potential of temporary migration 
programmes in future international migration policy, A paper prepared for the Policy Analysis 
and Research Programme of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM.org), 
p. 13. Also, International migration and development, Report of the UN Secretary General (2013, 
(A/71/296)), op cit., para. 113. Since the EU’s Seasonal Workers Directive makes the third-country 
national applicant to a large extent dependent on the employer, this increases the danger of 
employers being tempted to sell visas and work permits, as is known to have been a widespread 
problem under a number of temporary migration programmes before. There is no reason why 
this would be different under the current scheme as devised by the Directive. 
30 Wessendorf describes the impact of the Swiss seasonal workers legislation on the Ital-
ian seasonal workers population in Switzerland in the 1960s and 1970s as ‘diff icult and often 
traumatic’, as she documents the fact that 15000 Italian children were illegally brought along 
by their seasonal workers parents in the 1970s. S. Wessendorf, ´State-imposed Translocalism 
and the Dream of Returning: Italian Migrants in Switzerland ,́ in L. Baldassar and D. Gabaccia 
(eds.), Intimacy and Italian Migration: Gender and Domestic Lives in a Mobile World, p. 159. 
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seasonal worker only applies to Member States that have already admitted 
this person as seasonal worker before, the seasonal worker’s freedom to 
choose seasonal employment in other parts of the EU labour market is 
curtailed.31 In the current version of the Directive, in case a seasonal worker 
employed in one Member State would like to take up seasonal employment 
in another Member State, the worker will have to start the whole application 
procedure from scratch, without being able to rely on the facilitated reentry. 
In line with the principle of mutual recognition characterising the EU legal 
order, the Directive could have provided for the establishment of a database 
of seasonal workers that have already entered, stayed, and left one of the 
Member States of the European Union, entitling them to facilitated entry in 
another Member States on the same conditions that would have applied if 
they would have requested reentry in the Member State that had previously 
hosted them. As it is now, the principle of mutual recognition and, as a result, 
the EU market perspective is missing in the Seasonal Workers Directive.
During their stay in a Member State, seasonal workers’ freedom to move 
between employers is limited.32 Additionally, considering the length (or, 
rather, the shortness) of the stay of the seasonal worker in the host Member 
State, and the fact that proof of accommodation is one of the requirements 
for admission as a seasonal worker for stays exceeding 90 days,33 the seasonal 
worker will most likely be dependent on the employer for accommodation 
too. Though Article 20 of the Directive provides for minimum standards 
with regard to accommodation arranged by the employer, terms used in 
this Article such as ‘excessive rent’ and ‘equivalent document’ leave the 
Member States and the employers broad discretion.
The dependency of the seasonal worker on the employer also has its 
consequences for the enforceability of the Directive’s standards, which is 
also one of the concerns voiced in the European Parliament. Dependence 
results in a low incentive on the side of the worker to complain in case 
of the employer’s noncompliance with the standards of the Directive, let 
alone to f ile a lawsuit against the employer.34 For it is only natural that 
employees who are dependent on their employers for residence as well 
31 Seasonal Workers Directive, Article 16. 
32 Article 15(6) of the Seasonal Workers Directive allows Member States to refuse an extension 
of the stay for the purpose of seasonal work when the vacancy in question could be f illed by 
nationals ofthe Member State concerned or by other Union citizens, or by third-country nationals 
lawfully residing in the Member State.
33 Article 6(1)(c) of the Seasonal Workers Directive.
34 J. Fudge and P.H. Olsson (2014), ‘The EU Seasonal Workers Directive: When Immigration 
Controls Meet Labour Rights’, European Journal of Migration and Law, 16 p. 465.
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as work permits will think twice before ventilating any discontent with 
the working conditions, as this could lead to (the employer threatening 
with) a severing of the employment relationship.35 For this reason, the 
Directive obliges Member States to establish mechanisms that enable 
seasonal workers to lodge complaints through relevant third parties that 
have a legitimate interest in ensuring compliance with the Directive, such 
as Unions; these third parties should be authorised to act on behalf of or 
in support of seasonal workers.36 It is therefore up to the worker to lodge a 
complaint, after which the third party can come into action. However, the 
fact that seasonal workers are usually recruited from countries with less 
protective labour standards already leads the assumption that they will 
be prepared, or even willing, to work under conditions that are below the 
legal standards in the host country. This so-called ‘dual frame of reference’ 
of migrant workers describes situations in which the conditions in the host 
country are evaluated on the basis of the conditions and legal framework 
existing in the home country of the migrant worker. The conditions in the 
home country often being perceived as (far) worse than those in the host 
country, the migrant workers are sometimes relatively satisf ied with the 
conditions they f ind in the host country, even if these are below the legal 
standards.37 Generalising, one could therefore say that (temporary) seasonal 
workers are less likely to raise issues about wages and other conditions 
relating to their employment,38 and that the effective protection of seasonal 
workers under the Directive depends mostly on Member State monitoring, 
assessment, and inspections.39 In light of the surplus of seasonal workers 
in relation to the aggregated EU demand, a surplus that will continue to 
exist despite unequal treatment or even exploitation of seasonal workers, 
the costs that the effective implementation of such protection measures 
bring along with them make it highly improbable that Member States will 
be in a hurry to comply with these particular provisions of the Directive. 
This would not be a f irst, as the Member States’ lack of gusto for an effective 
implementation of Union legislation protecting vulnerable migrants seems 
35 C. Rijken (2015), ‘Legal Approaches to Combating the Exploitation of Third-Country National 
Seasonal Workers’, The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
31 no. 4, p. 449.
36 Seasonal Workers Directive, Article 25.
37 See, for instance, R. Waldinger, and M. Lichter, How the Other Half Works: Immigration and 
the Social Organisation of Labor, University of California Press, p. 40.
38 J. Howe and R. Owens, ‘Temporary Labour Migration in the Global Era’, in J. Howe and R. 
Owens (Eds.), Temporary Labour Migration in the Global era: The Regulatory Challenges, p. 9.
39 These issues are regulated in Article 24 of the Seasonal Workers Directive.
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to be a recurrent, and worrying, pattern.40 The following section reviews the 
progress that Member States have made with regard to the implementation 
of the Directive.
4 Implementation by Member States
As mentioned above, the deadline for the implementation of the Seasonal 
Workers Directive expired in September 2016. Without implementation in 
national legislation, the Directive will remain a paper tiger as it does not 
provide the seasonal worker with directly enforceable rights. Many of the 
rights and norms need to be given shape and teeth by implementation in 
national legislation. For this reason, no def initive conclusions can yet be 
drawn with regard to the implications of the Seasonal Workers Directive 
in practice.41 What is more, assessment of an effective transposition of 
the Directive depends, as it always does in similar situations, on Member 
States’ reporting and outsourced studies the implementation of which 
requires more time than just one year.42 So far, the European Commis-
sion’s European Migration Network (EMN) reported that only f ive Member 
State have introduced amendments to the national law on the entry and 
stay of TCN migrant workers to ensure alignment with the provisions of 
the Seasonal Workers Directive. These Member States are Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Italy, and Luxembourg.43 The same report noticed that 
Spain and France have retained legislation that was already deemed by 
these Member States to be in line with the Directive. With regard to three 
other Member States, the report noticed that advanced plans to implement 
the Directive were in place, but that, as yet, the legislation in these Member 
States was not aligned with the Directive. We can therefore conclude that 
implementation of the Directive in the remaining f ifteen Member States 
that are bound by it44 is not even underway yet or at a preliminary stage.
40 UN Human Rights Council, 23rd session, 24 April 2013, Agenda item 3, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Francois Crepeau, Regional study: management of 
the external borders of the European Union and its impact on the human rights of migrants, p. 18.
41 The research leading to this contribution was carried out in the summer of 2017.
42 See also E. Collett (March 2015), ´The Development of EU policy on immigration and asylum 
– rethinking coordination and leadership ,́ Migration Policy Institute Policy Brief Series, 8 p. 8. 
43 European Migration Network (2016), Annual Report on Migration and Asylum, pp. 38-39.
44 Denmark, Ireland, and the UK are not bound by the Directive, according to its Preamble 
under 54 and 55. 
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Though studies of Member States’ compliance with EU law show that, on 
the whole, the statistics on transposition of Directives by Member States 
have improved over the last decades, there are still considerable differences 
between the compliance rates pertaining to the legislation in the various EU 
policy areas,45 with noncompliance ranging from no implementation or late 
implementation of a directive to incorrect implementation of a directive. 
The Commission proudly claims that, with regard to so-called ‘Single Market 
Directives’, noncompliance has fallen from almost 7% in 1997 to below 1% at 
present in most of the Member States.46 A possible explanation given by the 
Commission for this high compliance rate is a strong political commitment 
in the Member States, as observed by the Commission. Considering the 
contentious character of legislation regulating the entry and stay of TCNs, the 
persisting lack of timely implementation of Directives related to migration 
demonstrated again by the f ifteen Member States that do not yet have 
(communicated) plans to implement the Seasonal Workers Directive should 
not come as a surprise.47 Even for those Member States that have reported 
an alignment of their national law with the Seasonal Workers Directive, it 
remains questionable whether this particular section of the national law 
is complied with in practice. In the following, two case studies illustrate 
how ostensible implementation does not have to equal compliance with the 
standards of the Directive. As data with regard to the transposition of the 
Directive are only available with regard to a small number of Member States, 
the choice for the discussion of implementing measures is very limited. 
Italy and Spain are selected as case studies because they are two of the few 
Member States that have reported alignment of the national law with the 
Directive, and because exploitation of migrant workers in the agricultural 
sector is reported to be notorious in these countries.48
45 R. Thomson, R. Torenvlied, and J. Arregui (2007), ´The Paradox of Compliance: Infringements 
and Delays in transposing European Union Directives ,́ British Journal of Political Science, 37(4) 
p. 706. This article explains the differences in compliance with Directives across the EU and across 
policies, and found that Member States are less likely to comply with Directives they disagree 
with, or that do not f it their national policies. Falkner et al. have implemented a more general 
study with regard to the implementation of EU Directives, see G. Falkner et al. (2005), Complying 
with Europe: EU Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States, Cambridge University Press.
46 Available at: www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_govern 
ance_ tool/transposition/index_en.html. 
47 S. Peers et al. (Eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary): Second Revised 
Edition, Volume 2: EU Immigration Law, p. 24. 
48 See, for example, A. Corrado, C. de Castro, and D. Perrotta (2017), Cheap food, cheap labour, 
high profits: agriculture and mobility in the Mediterranean, in Migration and Agriculture. Mobility 
and change in the Mediterranean area, Routledge; F.S. Caruso and S. Corrado (2015), Migrazioni 
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Case Studies of Implementation
Italy
To start with Italy, the Italian legislator adopted a new Decree just a month 
after the expiration of the deadline for implementation of the Seasonal 
Workers Directive, transposing the Directive into national law. Decree 
n. 203 of 29 October 201649 entered into force on 24 November 2016 and 
was clarif ied by a circular letter issued by the Ministry of Labour and 
Immigration in December 2016. According to the Decree and the circular 
letter, seasonal workers in the agricultural and tourism sectors can benefit 
from its provisions, which enable the seasonal worker, among other things, 
to switch from a seasonal workers permit to a regular employment resi-
dent permit, and foresees the issuance of permits that allow the seasonal 
workers to return to Italy for seasonal work in consecutive years, without 
requiring the seasonal worker to return to the same employer.50 It also 
prohibits the automatic deduction of the costs for accommodation, if 
provided by the employer, from the wages of the seasonal worker, and 
even provides for a cap on costs for the accommodation of the seasonal 
worker.51 The Decree therefore seems to provide for standards that are 
above the relevant minimum requirements in the Directive. Unfortunately, 
however, enforcement of similar protective measures has previously failed 
dramatically in Italy. Instances of (institutionalised) labour exploitation 
are often known to the authorities, but these authorities either lack the 
will or the power to intervene.52 It is not seen as a priority for the policy or 
public institutions, and the adoption of more protective measures alone, 
without stepping up enforcement, will not improve the position of the 
migrant workers in Italy.53
e lavoro agricolo: un confronto tra Italia e Spagna in tempi di crisi, in Colucci and Gallo, Tempo 
di cambiare, Rapporto sulle migrazioni interne in Italia, pp. 55-74; and Amnesty International 
(2012), Exploited labour Migrant workers in Italy’s agricultural sector.
49 Decreto Legislativo 29 October 2016, n. 203; Attuazione della direttiva 2014/36/UE sulle 
condizioni di ingresso e di soggiorno dei cittadini di Paesi terzi per motivi di impiego in qualita’ 
di lavoratori stagionali, Gazzetta Uff iciale n.262, 9 November 2016. 
50 Art. 1(11) of the Decree.
51 Art. 1(3) of the Decree.
52 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Severe labour exploitation: workers 
moving within or into the European Union – States’ obligations and victims’ rights, p. 54.
53 Amnesty International, Exploited labour Migrant workers in Italy’s agricultural sector, pp. 32 
and 33.
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Spain
With regard to the transposition of the Directive, as mentioned above, Spain 
reported that national legislation in place was deemed to be in line with the 
Directive’s standards. Issues of compliance could be raised, not only with 
regard to the adoption of adequate national legislation implementing the 
Seasonal Workers Directive, and with regard to the enforcement of such 
measures, but also with regard to more favourable provisions of bilateral or 
multilateral agreements to be adopted by or already in place between one 
or more member States and one or more third countries. Such agreements 
are, according to Article 4 of the Directive, not affected by the provisions 
of the Directive. When taking a closer look at the relevant Spanish national 
legislation, it seems that it provides for favourable labour migration arrange-
ments that could benefit from Article 4 of the Directive. These arrangements 
for the recruitment and employment of seasonal workers from Morocco in 
Spain date back more than just a few years.54 Only one aspect of this legisla-
tion will be mentioned here: the Spanish-Moroccan arrangements. These 
arrangements are known to have allowed for guest worker programmes that 
featured as one of the recruitment conditions the sex of the guest worker 
(in this case female), or parenthood of minor children: Women applying 
for participation in the programme were required to produce documents 
indicating the ages of their children.55 The compatibility of such arrange-
ments for the recruitment and employment of seasonal workers with the 
Directive and with EU law on gender equality56 is therefore questionable.
Article 4 (2) of the Directive provides that, despite the Directive being 
applicable without prejudice to more favourable provisions of Union law or 
unilateral or bilateral treaties between the EU and/or its Member States on 
the one side, and a third country on the other side,57 Member States still have 
the right to adopt or retain more favourable provisions for third-country 
nationals to whom it applies in respect of Articles 18, 19, 20, 23, and 25. The 
Article, read against the background of this one Spanish example, serves to 
54 Z. Ibáñez, M. Acebillo, and M. León (2015), Voluntary, involuntary and programmed circular 
migration in Spain: the case of Moroccan workers in the berry-producing region of Huelva (Spain), 
Institut de Govern i Polítiques Públiques, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, p. 16.
55 S. Mannon, P. Petrzelka, C.M. Glass, and C. Radel, ‘Keeping Them in Their Place: Migrant 
Women Workers in Spain’s Straw-berry Industry’, International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture 
and Food, 19(1) p. 98.
56 Articles 2 and 3(3) of the TEU; Articles 8 and 10 of TFEU; Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; Gender Equality Directive 2006/54/EC on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women 
in matters of employment and occupation, 2006 OJ L204/23.
57 Article 4(1) of the Seasonal Workers Directive.
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show that, in order to assess the compatibility of Member States’ legislation 
transposing the Directive into national law with the Directive and other 
relevant EU law, analysing implementation of legislation alone will not 
suff ice. Next to that, all bilateral and multilateral arrangements covering 
the entry, stay, and employment of third-country nationals for the purpose 
of seasonal employment in an EU Member State should be scrutinised on a 
rolling basis – a herculean task indeed, especially considering the Member 
States’ perceived lack of interest in this particular piece of legislation. Yet, 
it is the only way in which the EU can show that it takes the protection of 
vulnerable temporary labour migrants on the EU labour market seriously, 
lest it wants the Seasonal Workers Directive to share the same fate as the 
Employers Sanctions Directive, discussed by Berntsen and De Lange in 
this volume.
5 Analysis and Conclusions
This relatively short analysis of several aspects of the EU’s Seasonal Workers 
Directive allows for preliminar58 conclusions to be drawn with regard to the 
potential of the Directive to ameliorate the position of TCN seasonal workers 
on the labour market of the EU Member States bound by the Directive.
Equal Treatment, but Not Quite
The Seasonal Workers Directive, as one of the EU’s legislative measures 
regulating labour migration into the EU Member States, provides minimum 
standards with regard to the entry, stay, and employment of TCNs for the 
purpose of seasonal employment in the EU. That it is intended to be mostly 
a migration management tool is clear from the narrow legal basis of the 
Directive in Article 79(2) of the TFEU – whereas considering the impact of 
the Directive and the other labour migration directives on the labour market 
alone, broadening this legal basis by including the EU’s social policy would 
not only have increased the legitimacy of the Directive, but would have also 
guaranteed the involvement of social partners as provided by Article 154 
TFEU.59 Such an involvement could have resulted in a regime that provides 
58 Preliminary, as concrete results of the adoption, implementation, and application of the 
Directive are not yet available.
59 Costello, ‘EU migration and asylum law: A labour law perspective’, in Bogg, Costello, and 
Davies (Eds.), Research Handbook on EU Labour Law, p. 313.
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for a better and more effective protection for labour migrants than the 
minimum standards of measures like the Seasonal Workers Directive. By 
choosing instead to base the Directive solely on EU competences with regard 
to the regulation of migration of TCNs further undermines the EU’s social 
and migration management policies, and contributes to the stigmatisation of 
the seasonal worker as a potential irregular whose situation needs regulation 
instead of a migrant worker who is entitled to decent work. As things stand 
now, despite the introduction of Article 23 to the Directive, it is clear that 
the rights and obligations pertaining to the status of seasonal worker under 
the Seasonal Workers Directive create a legal regime that is not on a par 
with that related to EU citizen workers, or indeed to other TCN workers on 
the EU labour market.60 This inequality does not only negatively affect TCN 
seasonal workers, but will also have a negative effect on the local labour 
force in the long run.61
This inequality, created by the cardinal wish of the legislator to benefit 
from temporary workers without giving too many benefits in return, and 
thus by obstructing the integration of seasonal workers and compelling 
seasonal workers to leave when their work is done, make the Directive prone 
to attract criticism and legal scrutiny. Taking into account that, according 
to Article 15(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, ‘Nationals of 
third countries who are authorised to work in the territories of the Member 
States are entitled to working conditions equivalent to those of citizens of 
the Union’, and that, furthermore, Article 21 of the same Charter prohibits 
‘Any discrimination based on any ground’ within the scope of application 
of the Treaties, the Directive in its current form might not have survived the 
scrutiny of the Court of Justice, if an action for annulment would have been 
brought before it. In the present situation, the Court can only be called on to 
assess the validity or interpretation of the Directive through a Member State 
court’s request for a preliminary ruling. This could be the case when, based 
60 C. Costello and M. Freedland, Migrants at work: Immigration and Vulnerability in Labour 
Law. The same authors come to a somewhat more nuanced conclusion in their contribution 
entitled Seasonal Workers and Intra-corporate transferees in EU Law, in which they compare the 
regime of the Seasonal Workers Directive to that of the Intra-corporate Transferee Directive; 
see J. Howe, R. Owens, et al. (Eds.), (fn. 9), p. 63.
61 A. Goldman, ‘Assessing Employment Policies from an Organic Perspective: the Needed 
Transition from Job Security and Job Welfare to Personal Security and Welfare’, in R. Blanpain and 
M. Weiss (Eds.), Changing Industrial Relations & Modernisation of Labour Law, Liber Amicorum in 
Honour of Professor Marco Biagi, p. 168. Where Goldman f inds that migrant workers’ enforceable 
minimum working conditions and rights in the host country protect not only the migrants but 
also prevent a race to the bottom for domestic workers who are competing for the same work 
opportunities. 
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on Member States’ implementation measures of the Directive, questions are 
raised regarding the validity or interpretation of the Directive.
As regards the transposition of the Directive, however, this contribution 
also shows that most of the Member States have yet to report their (proposed) 
implementation measures, or their preexisting national legislation that 
(supposedly) complies with the Directive. This leads to the conclusion that 
implementing legislation is not in place in most of the Member States bound 
by the Directive, despite the fact that the deadline for implementation 
already expired in September 2016. Adopting national legislation regulating 
the entry, stay, and working conditions of unskilled or low-skilled labour 
migrants does not seem to be a priority for the national legislator.
Implementation and Enforcement: Law that Remains in the Books
The implementation and enforcement of the Directive leads to a number of 
issues.62 First of all, Directives are typically not directly effective and their 
enforcement depends on (correct) transposition into national law.63 The 
previous paragraphs have shown that correct implementation of the Seasonal 
Workers Directives is presently problematic. Second, in case of incorrect or 
incomplete implementation by the Member States, the provisions of these 
Directives are enforceable only in the vertical relation of the individual TCN 
against the state, and not against another individual such as the employer. 
Even against the state, the TCN’s case is weak, as the directives’ provisions are 
often unclear and leave substantial leeway to the Member States as already 
mentioned before. In such cases, knowledgeable judges or active legal counsel-
lors could improve the position of the seasonal workers by f iling a request 
for a preliminary ruling. Finally, even correct transposition of the Directive, 
which will also entail the State ensuring that effective mechanisms through 
which seasonal workers may lodge complaints against their employers are put 
in place,64 does not solve the problem of the precariousness and dependency 
of the situation that a circular migrant with no particularly coveted set of 
skills is in with regard to the effective enforcement of his or her rights.65
62 A. Kocharov (2011), ‘Regulation that Def ies Gravity: Policy, Economics and Law of Legal 
Immigration in Europe’, European Journal of Legal Studies, 4(2) p. 33.
63 E. Thomann and F. Sager (2017), ‘Toward a better understanding of implementation perfor-
mance in the EU multilevel system’, Journal of European Public Policy, 24(9).
64 Article 25 of the Seasonal Workers Directive.
65 C. Costello (2016), ‘EU migration and asylum law: A labour law perspective’, in A. Bogg, C. 
Costello, and A.C.L. Davies (Eds.), Research Handbook on EU Labour Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
pp. 325 and 332. 
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For the time being, therefore, one can only conclude that it is highly improb-
able that the adoption of the Directive in 2014 has contributed to a substantive 
improvement of the position of the TCN seasonal workers in the EU Member 
States. Once more, or perhaps now more than ever, seasonal workers depend 
on the vigilance and activism of unions, legal counsellors, and the judiciary to 
enjoy the protection they need, the decent work they are entitled to,66 and the 
rights they deserve as persons on equal footing with their EU and TCN peers.
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6 Towards Protection of Vulnerable 
Labour Migrants in Sweden
The Case of the Thai Berry Pickers
Petra Herzfeld Olsson
Abstract
This chapter illustrates how the scandals that followed the 2008 reform 
prompted the authorities and the trade union movement to adopt a – fairly 
successful – coordinated approach to prevent further exploitation of a 
particularly vulnerable group of migrant workers – seasonal migrant berry 
pickers from third countries. The result illustrates that, because labour 
migration gives rise to specif ic challenges in efforts to enforce domestic 
labour standards, the stakeholders responsible for the enforcement of 
these rights must resort to alternative methods, not used for domestic 
workers. Olsson also shows that well-targeted immigration control 
measures, in combination with other activities, can play an important 
role in strengthening the position of migrant workers.
Keywords: seasonal workers, trade unions, targeted immigration control 
measures, berry pickers
1 Introduction
Seasonal work is not considered to be particularly attractive for domestic 
workers in Western economies.1 Nevertheless, production in need of seasonal 
1 International Labour Organization (2010), International Labour Migration. A rights-based 
approach’, Geneva p. 85; COM (2010), 379, Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment, pp. 2-3.
Rijken, Conny and Tesseltje de Lange (eds): Towards a Decent Labour Market for Low Waged 
Migrant Workers. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018  
doi: 10.5117/9789462987555_olss
150 Petra Herzfeld OlssOn 
work continues to take place.2 Often, this is made possible through an 
influx of workers through seasonal labour migration schemes.3 A seasonal 
migrant worker is commonly understood as ‘a migrant worker whose work 
by its character is dependent on seasonal conditions, and is performed 
only during part of the year’.4 In Sweden, one quarter of all third-country 
national5 labour migrants, admitted to the Swedish labour market, are 
seasonal workers who come to pick berries.6 Their work is similar in many 
respects to the agricultural work carried out by seasonal migrant workers 
around Europe7 – it is short-term, physically challenging, and sometimes 
dangerous and isolated –, but their environment is a bit different.8 Instead 
of working at farms and greenhouses, they pick wild berries that grow in 
the remote forests in the northern parts of Sweden.
The Swedish labour migration regime was reformed in 2008. The new 
system is described as the most open labour migration regime within the 
OECD.9 Through this reform, any employer, irrespective of branch, can 
recruit workers from third countries. The reform turned people’s attention 
to the berry-picking industry and opened the door for new, sometimes 
unscrupulous players.10 A number of scandals came to light, instances 
in which berry pickers were left with no remuneration and huge debts.11 
There were even suggestions that some of these workers might be victims 
of traff icking and so-called ‘modern slavery’.12
2 COM (2010), n 1, pp. 2-3.
3 ILO, n 1, pp. 29, 85. 
4 ILO, n 1, p. 29.
5 ‘Third-country national’ in this context means non-Nordic, non-EEA, or non- Swiss citizens.
6 Statistics published by the Swedish Migration Agency for the years 2016 and 2017. Available 
at: https://www.migrationsverket.se/Om-Migrationsverket/Statistik/Arbetstagare---de-storsta-
yrkesgrupperna.html.
7 ILO, n 1, p. 85; J. Hunt (2014), ‘Making the CAP Fit: Responding to the Exploitation of Migrant 
Agricultural Workers in the EU’ The International Journal of Comparative Labour law and 
Industrial Relations, 30(2) pp. 132, 135; See also the judgment from the European Court of Human 
Rights, Affaire Chowdury et Autres c. Grèce (requiete 21884/15) 30 March 2017 para. 139, in which 
a number of strawberry pickers in Greece were victims of forced labour.
8 C. Woolfson, P. Herzfeld Olsson, and C. Thörnqvist (2012), ‘Forced Labour and Migrant Berry 
Pickers in Sweden’ The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
28(2) pp. 147, 152.
9 OECD (2011) Recruiting Immigrant Workers: Sweden 2011, OECD, p. 32.
10 C. Woolfson et al., n. 8, p. 152.
11 Ibid p. 153; LO (2013) Fusk och utnyttjande – om avregleringen av arbetskraftsinvandringen, 
Landsorganisationen i Sverige.
12 L. Vogazides and C. Hedberg (2014), ‘Människohandel för tvångsarbete och exploatering av 
arbetskraft i Sverige: Exempel från restaurang och bärbranscherna’, ADSTRINGO, pp. 69-70.
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In some jurisdictions, the approach adopted to handling the exploitation 
of seasonal migrant workers in the agricultural sector has been to shift 
priorities ‘from securing decent working conditions for agricultural workers, 
given their especial vulnerability, to combatting irregular migration, forced 
labour, and human traff icking’.13 The dangers involved in shifting from 
an ‘employment’ agenda to an ‘immigration control’ agenda, in an effort to 
protect particularly vulnerable labour migrant groups, has been highlighted, 
because, ultimately, it may turn out to be damaging to the interests of the 
majority of workers in this category.14
In this chapter, I will illustrate how the scandals that followed the 2008 
reform prompted the authorities and the trade union movement to adopt 
a – fairly successful – coordinated approach to prevent further exploita-
tion of this particularly vulnerable group of migrant workers – seasonal 
migrant berry pickers from third countries. The result illustrates – as has 
been described elsewhere – that, because labour migration gives rise to 
specif ic challenges in efforts to enforce domestic labour standards, the 
stakeholders responsible for the enforcement of these rights must resort to 
alternative methods, not used for domestic workers. The chapter also shows 
that well-targeted immigration control measures, in combination with 
other activities, can play an important role in strengthening the position 
of migrant workers.
The chapter is organised as follows. In section two, the Swedish labour 
migration regime is presented. In section three, the coordinated measures 
taken to prevent further exploitation of the berry pickers are discussed; 
f irst, measures categorised as immigration control will be dealt with, 
followed by the innovative trade union strategies adopted. In section 
four, the role of other stakeholders in promoting decent conditions for the 
berry pickers is touched upon. In section f ive, some remaining challenges 
are discussed, and, f inally, in section six, the chapter ends with some 
conclusions.
13 A.C.L. Davies (2014), ‘Migrant Workers in Agriculture – A Legal Perspective’, in C. Costello 
and M. Freedland (eds.), Migrants at Work, Oxford University Press, p. 79. 
14 A.C.L. Davies, n. 13, p. 79; B. Anderson (2010), ‘Migration, Immigration Controls and the 
Fashioning of Precarious Workers, Work, employment and society, 24(2) p. 301; J. Fudge (2012), 
‘Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment – The Paradox of International Rights 
for Migrant Workers,’ Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journal, 34 p. 96.
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2 The Rules on Immigration for Seasonal Work: The 2008 
Reform15
Before the 2008 reform, the entry into Sweden of all groups of labour migrants 
depended mainly on the outcome of labour market tests carried out by the 
labour market authorities, together with the trade unions.16 A permit was 
available specif ically for seasonal work.17 The wild berry-picking industry, 
to some extent, operated outside that regime. Berry pickers could stay up to 
three months on tourist visas and pick wild berries without a work permit.18 
One intention behind the 2008 reform was to establish a labour migration 
system that would apply in the same manner to all labour migrant groups, 
including seasonal berry pickers. Thus, the specific work permit for seasonal 
work was eliminated.19
To enter Sweden, a third-country national needs a Schengen visa or a 
national visa.20 Stays longer than 90 days, as a main rule, require a residence 
permit.21 All third-country nationals who work in Sweden must have a 
work permit. This applies both if the third-country national is employed 
in Sweden or continues to be employed by a foreign employer and is posted 
to Sweden.22
This labour migration scheme is purely driven by employer demand. 
No labour market tests are conducted, no skill preferences based in law or 
quotas apply, and the system is open to all sectors of the labour market.23 
15 This section of the text is based on a similar section by this author in (2017) ‘The shortcomings 
of equal treatment for labour migrants’ in K. Ahlberg and N. Bruun (eds.), The New Foundations 
of Labour Law, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main.
16 OECD, n. 9, p. 57.
17 Ibid p. 58. 
18 C. Calleman and P. Herzfeld Olsson (2015), ‘Inledning’ in C. Calleman and P. Herzfeld Olsson 
(eds.), Arbetskraft från hela världen – hur blev det med 2008 års reform? DELMI, 9 pp. 13-14. 
19 Legislative Bill 2007/08:147, p. 34.
20 Aliens Act 2005:716 ch 2 sec 3. A number of exceptions apply, for example, for citizens in 
EEA countries, Aliens Act 2005:716 ch 2 sec 8a. Citizens from the countries mentioned in this 
list need a visa to enter Sweden. Available at: http://www.government.se/government-policy/
migration/list-of-foreign-citizens-who-require-visa-for-entry-into-sweden. 
21 Aliens Act 2005:716, ch. 2 sec. 5. Exceptions apply, for example, to citizens in Denmark, 
Norway, Iceland, and Finland, citizens of EEA countries, and for those with a visa for longer 
than three months, Aliens Act (2005:716) ch. 2 sec. 8b.
22 Aliens Act 2005:716 ch. 2 sec 7. Exceptions apply for citizens in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
and Norway, as well as EES citizens, Ch. 2 sec. 8c Aliens Act and for specif ic categories, Aliens 
Ordinance 2006:97 ch. 5 secs. 1 and 2.
23 However, the employers must respect the principle of European Union preference. In reality, 
that only means that the vacancy must have been published on the websites of the Swedish 
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Individual employers decide whether they need to recruit workers from 
third countries, but it is the migrant worker who applies for the work permit. 
For a successful application, the migrant worker needs to receive an offer 
of employment. To ensure that migrant workers do not replace domestic 
workers, the terms of employment offered must be similar to those enjoyed 
by domestic workers.24 The law therefore prescribes that the worker must 
be offered a wage, insurance, and other terms of employment that are 
not worse than those laid down in the relevant collective agreements, or 
provided for by custom in the occupation or industry.25
The Migration Agency makes decisions on work and residence permits. 
The Agency has designed a form – the Offer of employment – that must be 
f illed in and accompany the application for a work permit.26 In the Offer of 
employment form, the parties must declare whether the employer is bound 
by a collective agreement, and, in that case, identify the trade union party. 
It must also specify the wage, working time, applicable insurances, kind of 
employment (indefinite or temporary), and the period of employment. The 
combined effect of wage and working time is also important to fulf il the 
last legal requirement for being granted a work permit. Migrant workers 
must be able to support themselves, meaning that their total income must 
be higher than the level for social assistance for maintenance (around 
1300 euros per month).27
Trade unions are given a specif ic role in the application procedure. The 
relevant trade union shall be given an opportunity to verify whether the 
terms laid down in the offer of employment are in accordance with the 
collective agreements or custom.28 The trade unions are given this task as 
they are familiar with the content of the collective agreements.29 However, 
they are not obliged to give their opinion, and the Migration Agency is not 
bound to follow the opinion given. Some trade unions refrain from giving 
Public Employment Service and the European Employment Services for at least ten days. If that 
is done, the employer is free to offer the job to anyone, Legislative Bill 2007/08:147 p. 36 and 
Legislative Bill 2013/14:227 p. 8. This requirement does not apply to posted workers, however. 
24 Legislative Bill 2007/08:147, p. 27. 
25 Aliens Act 2005:716, ch. 6 sec. 2.
26 Available at: https://www.migrationsverket.se/download/18.5e83388f141c129ba6312e
ab/1485556063715/anst_erbj_232011_sv.pdf.
27 Aliens Act 2005:716 ch. 6 sec. 2; MIGR 2015:11 (Case law from the Migration Court).
28 Aliens Ordinance 2006:97, ch. 5 sec. 7a. Available at: http://www.migrationsverket.se/dow
nload/18.5e83388f141c129ba6312b76/1485556063117/233011+Fackligt+yttrande.pdf 
29 Legislative Bill 2013/14:227 p. 20.
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opinions if the employer is not bound by a collective agreement.30 The argu-
ment in such cases is that the trade unions do not have the means to control 
whether the offered conditions are in fact applied if there is no collective 
agreement.31 In those cases, the Migration Agency must independently 
verify whether the offered terms are suff icient.
All work permits are temporary. They are granted for the duration of the 
employment offered, but for a maximum of two years. Work permits may 
be extended an unlimited number of times, however, the total period may 
only exceed four years, in exceptional cases.32 For each extension a new 
offer of employment is required from an employer. After having worked 
legally in Sweden for a total of four years within a seven-year period, the 
migrant worker may be granted a permanent residence permit.33 In 2016, 
1784 foreigners were granted a permanent residence on that ground.34
The work permit is tied to a specif ic employer and to a specif ic type of 
work (occupation) for the f irst two years, but thereafter it is tied only to a 
specif ic type of work.35 If migrant workers want to change employer or 
type of work, they must apply for a new work permit. That can be done 
from within Sweden as long as the previous residence permit is still valid.
The work permit and/or residence permit may be revoked if the employ-
ment has ceased, and until December 2017 should be revoked if the working 
conditions applied did not fulf il the requirements of the law; this might 
mean, for example, that the wage is lower than the wage provided for in the 
relevant collective agreement. This latter rule was criticised as being rigid, 
leading to unjust results. Hence, in December 2017 a change entered into 
force making it possible for the employer to correct mistakes a posteriori 
and avoid a revocation of the work permit.36 In case the employment has 
still not begun four months after arrival of the migrant worker, the permit 
will be revoked. To ensure that migrant workers are not too dependent on 
the employers, they can stay in Sweden for three or four months to search 
for a new job if they lose the job to which the work permit is connected.37
30 See, for example, statements by the biggest white-collar trade union UNIONEN. Available 
at: https://www.unionen.se/rad-och-stod/yttrande-arbetstillstand.
31 The blue-collar trade union for hotel and restaurant workers. Available at: https://www.
svd.se/hrf-kraver-kollektivavtal-for-att-ge-arbetstillstand
32 Aliens Act 2005:716, ch. 6 sec. 2a.
33 Aliens Act 2005:716, ch. 5 sec. 5.
34 E-mail from the statistical department at the Migration Agency (26 September 2017).
35 Aliens Act 2005:716, ch. 6 sec. 2a.
36 Aliens Act 2005:716, ch. 7 secs. 3 and 7e. Legislative Bill 2016/17:2012.
37 Aliens Act 2005:716 ch. 7 secs. 3 and 7e. 
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These rules apply in their entirety to the seasonal berry pickers who 
are the focus of this chapter, as well as to all other labour migrant groups. 
Normally, the Thai berry pickers only stay two or three months in Sweden, 
which means that some provisions are less relevant to them. For example, 
the short stays make it very diff icult for the berry pickers to ever fulf il the 
conditions for a permanent residence permit.
3 A Coordinated Effort to Prevent Abuse in the Berry-
picking Sector
3.1 Introduction
After the 2008 labour migration reform was put into force, reports came 
to light of grave misconduct and abuse of berry pickers.38 Since 2014, the 
situation has improved. The change is connected to a fairly coordinated effort 
to prevent further abuse. Before explaining the measures taken, however, 
we shall provide a short introduction to the berry-picking industry in order 
to clarify the mechanisms involved.
3.2 The Berry-picking Sector
In Sweden, the Right of Public Access applies.39 This means that everyone has 
a right to access the countryside and freely pick the available wild growing 
berries, such as blueberries, lingonberries, and cloudberries.40 Swedish 
people have always picked berries for their household needs, and, to a certain 
extent, for commercial purposes.41 During the past four decades, however, 
the berry-picking scene has changed character and it has developed into an 
international industry.42 Blueberries are rich in antioxidants and are now 
38 Woolfson et al., n. 8, p. 148; K. Krifors (2017), ‘Managing Migrant Workers – moral economies 
of temporary labour in the Swedish IT and wild berry industries,’ Linköping Studies in Arts and 
Sciences No. 717 Linköping, p. 79. 
39 The instrument of government 1974:152, ch. 2 sec. 15. 
40 Swedish Environment Protection Agency. Available at: http://www.swedishepa.se/Enjoying-
nature/The-Right-of-Public-Access/This-is-allowed/Picking-f lowers-berries-mushrooms-etc/.
41 L. Jonsson and R. Uddstål (2002), En beskrivning av den svenska skogsbärsbranschen, Sveriges 
Lantbruksuniversitet, p. 12. 
42 On this theme, see: C. Hedberg (2015), ‘Thailändska bärplockare – hushållsstrategier på 
en global arbetsmarknad’, in C Calleman and P. Herzfeld Olsson (eds.), Arbetskraft från hela 
världen, DELMI, p. 119; Krifors, n. 38. 
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used in the pharmaceutical and beauty industries in Asia.43 Additionally, 
most of the berries are currently picked by seasonal labour migrants from 
Thailand.44
The Thai berry pickers, for tax-related reasons, are employed by temporary 
work agencies in Thailand.45 The berry pickers employed by these agencies 
are exempted from paying taxes in Sweden;46 nevertheless, the Swedish 
berry companies play a crucial role in this system.47 ‘They order’ a specif ic 
number of berry pickers from the Thai temporary work agencies; a contract is 
drawn up between the temporary work agency and the Swedish berry picking 
company,48 and the Thai berry pickers deliver the berries picked to the 
Swedish berry company.49 It is also this Swedish berry-picking company that 
offers the employment in Sweden in the work permit application process, 
and that takes care of all the practical arrangements in Sweden, such as 
transport and accommodation.50 The Swedish berry-picking companies 
sell the berries to merchants, wholesalers, or retailers who take the berries 
to the world market.51
3.3 Increased Immigration Control
After the problematic berry-picking season of 2009, the government and 
the Migration Agency realised that additional measures had to be taken 
to prevent further abuse of this group of migrant workers. It turned out 
that the new rules had not been properly implemented in relation to the 
berry pickers. This is partly explained by the lack of a useful comparator 
regarding the offered wage, something to which we shall return in the next 
section. Hence, the Migration Agency took responsibility for the application 
43 Hedberg, n. 42, p. 119; M. Wingborg (2016), ’En alltmer osäker bransch – om villkoren för 
utländska bärplockare 2016 , Arena Idé, p. 26. 
44 M. Wingborg (2016), n. 43, p. 11.
45 Ibid. 
46 Act (1991:586) on particular income tax, sec. 6 1a, b; See also Hedberg, n. 43, p. 124; M. 
Wingborg (2016), n. 43, p. 18. 
47 Hedberg, n. 42, pp. 126-127.
48 M. Wingborg (2015), ’Så var säsongen för utländska bärplockare 2015’, Arena idé, p. 8.
49 Hedberg, n. 42, p. 123; M. Wingborg (2016), n. 43, p. 16.
50 Migration Agency Website. Available at: https://www.migrationsverket.se/English/Other-
operators-English/Employers/Special-rules-for-certain-occupations-and-citizens-of-certain-
countries/Berry-pickers/When-you-are-employing-or-engaging-berry-pickers.html. 
51 Hedberg, n. 42, p. 123. 
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process from the embassies in the countries concerned.52 However, new 
scandals took place in 2010, involving unreliable employers and insufficiently 
informed berry pickers. The latter often did not know what kind of work 
they would do and were not ready for the hard work expected from them. In 
2011, the Swedish Migration Agency therefore introduced targeted controls 
of the berry pickers’ employers or of the Swedish berry companies hiring 
the berry pickers. Thus, since 2011, before an application for a work permit 
can be approved, the entity offering the labour migrant employment has to 
provide the Migration Agency with additional guarantees, such as:
– A guarantee that wages will be paid despite poor availability of berries, 
or to berry pickers not skilled enough to pick the required amounts. 
The Migration Agency normally requires a bank guarantee.
– Proof that the berry pickers have been informed about the kind of work 
they are supposed to do, the working conditions, the Right of Public 
Access, and Swedish road safety rules (they have to drive to the different 
spots where the berries grow).
– Foreign temporary work agencies must have a representative present 
in Sweden and register a branch there.53
The new controls had some effect, and the 2012 season was fairly calm. 
However, in 2013, new problems occurred. A number of berry pickers were 
denied any wages at all and left with debts.54 Subsequently, employer 
monitoring was carried out even more thoroughly and, during the 2014 
season, four out of sixteen Swedish berry-picking companies were denied 
the right to bring berry pickers into Sweden through foreign temporary work 
agencies.55 Now, the employers/companies hiring berry pickers must show 
that they are able to organise transport, room, board, and other practical 
matters in a manner that is customary for the industry. Additionally, all costs 
that the person employed or hired is liable for, must also be made clear.56
52 M. Wingborg (2011), ’Mors lilla Olle – så exploateras asiatiska bärplockare i de svenska 
skogarna’, Swedwatch rapport 41, p. 26. Available at: http://www.jureka.net/jureka/read.
asp?NewsId=8548
53 M. Wingborg (2011), ’Mors lilla Olle – så exploateras asiatiska bärplockare i de svenska 
skogarna’, Swedwatch rapport 41, p. 27. Available at: http://www.jureka.net/jureka/read.
asp?NewsId=8548).
54 M. Wingborg (2014), ’Villkoren för utländska bärplockare säsongen 2014’, Arena Idé, pp. 12 
and 14.
55 Ibid p. 10.
56 Available at: https://www.migrationsverket.se/English/Other-operators-English/Employers/
Special-rules-for-certain-occupations-and-citizens-of-certain-countries/Berry-pickers.html. 
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The increased checks on employers and companies hiring migrant 
workers, before work permits are approved, seems to have been effective. 
During recent seasons, no scandals have been reported. This indicates that 
immigration control measures targeting the reliability of employers before 
arrival can be an important component of a sustainable labour migration 
system. However, these measures would have been rather pointless, if not 
accompanied by trade union efforts. These efforts will be the focus of the 
next section. First, a short overview of the Swedish labour law model is 
needed to understand the context in which the trade unions operate.
3.4 Innovative Trade Union Strategies
3.4.1 The Role of Trade Unions and Collective Agreements in the Swedish 
Labour Market
Collective agreements are the most important sources of norms regulating 
wages and employment conditions in Swedish law. In 2014, 85 per cent of 
the labour force in the private sector was covered by collective agreements 
and 64 per cent were members of a trade union.57 This is explained by 
the high level of employer organisation. Organised employers employed 
89 per cent of the labour force in 2014.58 An employer who is a member 
of an employment organisation is automatically bound by the collective 
agreements that this organisation has concluded. The terms of the collective 
agreement have to be applied to all relevant workers employed by the 
employer, regardless of their trade union membership. However, there is 
no mechanism for extending the binding force of collective agreements to 
others in a sector, different than the signatory parties and their members, 
and thus to give the collective agreement erga omnes effect.59 At the same 
time, working hours, employment protection and occupational health 
and safety is also protected by statutory regulation. A crucial feature 
of the Swedish system, however, is the absence of legislative provisions 
on minimum wages – a fact that promotes the conclusion of collective 
agreements.
57 Medlingsinstitutet (2017), Avtalsrörelsen och lönebildningen 2016, Medlingsinstitutets årsbok, 
Medlingsinstitutet, pp. 216 and 222.
58 Ibid.
59 K. Ahlberg and N. Bruun (2005), ‘Sweden: Transition through Collective Bargaining’ in 
T. Blanke, R. Blainpain, and E. Rose (eds.), Collective Bargaining and Wages in Comparative 
Perspective: Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, Kluwer Law 
International, p. 122.
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Collective autonomy and nonintervention by the state are essential 
features of the regulation of wages and working conditions in the Swedish 
labour market.60 This is also true when it comes to the responsibility for 
monitoring that the employment conditions laid down in law and col-
lective agreements are applied. This responsibility, with the exception 
of the monitoring function of the Work Environment Authority, is borne 
alone by the parties to the collective agreement, the trade union, and the 
employer organisation or employer. The local trade union’s representatives 
play a crucial role in this process. They often carry out monitoring and 
take the main responsibility for ensuring that the rights and obligations 
in a collective agreement are upheld at the work site. If the conditions are 
not met, the trade union can demand damages in the Labour Court.61 The 
Work Environment Authority monitors the application of occupational 
health and safety provisions, and, if not dealt with in a collective agreement, 
working time provisions.
3.4.2 Appointing a Responsible Trade Union
In the Swedish system, it is obviously diff icult to uphold decent work-
ing standards in a sector without the involvement of a trade union. This 
partly explains the failed enforcement of the 2008 reform in relation to the 
seasonal berry pickers in the 2009 season. At that point, no trade union 
had taken on the responsibility to organise berry pickers, or conclude 
collective agreements applicable to them. The government claimed that 
bad employment conditions for berry pickers had to be solved mainly by 
the mechanisms available within the Swedish labour law model.62 Thus, 
the trade union movement had to act. In 2009, the Swedish blue-collar 
trade union confederation LO decided that the Swedish Municipal Workers 
Trade Union (Kommunal) should be allocated responsibility for the berry 
pickers.63 They had previously organised seasonal workers working in the 
agricultural and forest sectors.
3.4.3 Towards a Suitable Collective Agreement
When a responsible trade union was appointed, it was easy to decide which 
collective agreement should be applied. The collective agreement that 
60 Ibid.
61 T. Sigeman and E. Sjödin (2017), Arbetsrätten- en översikt, 7th ed., Wolters Kluwer, p. 109. 
62 Svar till riksdagsfråga 2011/12:177 Billström Bärplockare och arbetskraftsinvandring; Svar 
på riksdagsfråga 2011/12:766 till Hillevi Engström.
63 Wingborg (2011), n. 53, p. 28.
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Kommunal had with the Federation of Swedish Forest and Agricultural Employ-
ers was chosen for berry pickers employed directly by Swedish companies, 
as some were at that time. For those employed by foreign temporary work 
agencies, the LO collective agreement for temporary work agencies would 
apply.64 Through this decision, a minimum wage level was set and the berry 
pickers were supposed to be guaranteed that level regardless of how many 
berries they picked. During the 2017 season, their guaranteed minimum 
wage was around 2100 euros per month before taxes.65
The Thai companies are asked to sign the collective agreement for 
temporary work agencies, and they normally do. However, this collective 
agreement is developed with other, more regular sectors in mind; it is 
diff icult to make it effective in a sector with so few organised workers. 
For instance, the right to get access to the work site and check the working 
conditions normally depends on whether the trade union has any members 
on the site. Thus, an agreement adapted to the specif ic circumstances 
was needed.66 In 2014, a new, additional collective agreement was drafted 
to be concluded with foreign companies temporarily active in Sweden. 
Kommunal nowadays only gives opinions on an application for a work 
permit if the employer, the Thai temporary work agency, has signed this 
specif ic collective agreement.67
This additional agreement gives Kommunal the tools needed to monitor 
whether the conditions laid down in the main collective agreement are 
adhered to. It stipulates that the Codetermination Act should apply in 
full even if Kommunal has no members at the work site. According to the 
Codetermination Act, the trade union has a right to initiate consultations 
with the employer. The employer is also obliged to keep the trade union 
informed about developments in the company and any changes that take 
place.68 ‘The trade union is given a right, through the collective agreement, 
to inspect working time and the occupational health and safety situation, 
through visits to the workplace, regardless of whether there are members 
working there or not. The employers are also obliged to hand over wage 
lists, picking lists, working time schedules, and other documents demanded 
by the local trade union. The local trade union, in this case Kommunals 
regionally based representatives, shall also be given signed employment 
64 Woolfson et al., n. 8, p. 170.
65 The f igures for 2017 come from an interview with a local Kommunal trade union representa-
tive on 7 June 2017. 
66 Wingborg (2011), n. 53, p. 7. 
67 The collective agreement (Kollektivavtal, Utländska företag, Häng, Fora).
68 Codetermination Act 1976:580, secs. 10, 11, 12, 13, 19. 
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evidence and employment contracts and monthly compilations of the 
number of workers and wages paid.69
Another important aspect clarif ied in the specif ic collective agreement 
is what wage deductions are permitted. According to the agreement, the 
employer is responsible for paying costs related to transport from accom-
modation to the work site, protective clothing, gloves, and hand-based tools 
that facilitate the picking. Costs for these things must never be deducted 
from wages. The employer may, however, deduct compensation for food 
and accommodation of normal standard at cost price.70
Through these provisions, it is possible for Kommunal to detect inconsist-
encies with the collective agreement at an early stage and solve problems in 
Sweden. Hence, the new collective agreement stipulates that, if the parties 
to the collective agreement cannot solve a dispute themselves, then the 
dispute shall be referred to a Swedish court: all disputes regarding the 
interpretation and application of the collective agreement shall be solved 
by applying Swedish law.71 This provision is of great importance. It would 
obviously be much more diff icult for the Swedish trade union to uphold the 
rights laid down in the collective agreement if disputes were to be solved 
by Thai courts.
3.4.4 Membership Challenges
A challenge many trade unions face in their work to promote fair working 
conditions for labour migrants is that the latter are often reluctant to 
become members of a trade union. In the statutes of most trade unions, 
one prerequisite for representing a worker or promoting their employment 
rights, is that they are a trade union member. This is also the case for 
Kommunal.72 The reluctance to become a trade union member can be 
based on economic reasons – it is expensive to become a trade union 
member, and, on fears of reprisals and bad experiences from trade union 
activities back home.73 Very few of the Thai berry pickers are members of 
Kommunal. To solve the problem of representation, Kommunal introduced 
a new, less expensive membership in 2016 for temporary labour migrants 
69 Collective Agreement, n. 68.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Stadgar, Stadgar antagna vid Svenska kommunalarbetareförbundets kongress 2016, § 2 
Förbundets ändamål, mom 2 Uppgift.
73 S. Eriksson (2016), Säsongsarbetaren från tredje land i dag och i framtiden, Examensarbete 
i civilrätt särskilt arbetsrätt, Juridiska institutionen Uppsala universitet, p. 33.
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with f ixed-term employment.74 The idea was that the local trade union 
off icials should campaign for this membership during the season of 
2017.75 The Thai berry pickers, however, were not interested and none 
took advantage of this new membership. Thus, the membership challenge 
remains unresolved.76
4 Other Public and Private Stakeholders
Other stakeholders have also played important roles in the effort to 
establish decent working and living conditions in this sector. The mu-
nicipalities are responsible for ensuring that the accommodation provided 
fulf ils the legal requirements regarding, for example, health and safety 
and f ire protection. They have the authority to make inspections of the 
accommodations provided to the migrant workers to this end. When 
shortcomings are detected, the inspector can choose to issue a pure 
injunction, combine the injunction with a f ine, or issue a ban.77 In 2016, 
the municipalities detected a number of shortcomings regarding the berry 
pickers’ accommodation.78
Private stakeholders have also been active in promoting decent treat-
ment of the migrant berry pickers. Many companies in the food retail 
industry have, for example, used a specif ic Social Audit.79 This code, like 
certif ications, is an instrument of soft law, and enforcement is safeguarded 
through dialogue. One of the biggest retail companies conducts social 
inspections to verify that activities fulf il the requirements of the code.80 
Another group of companies use the KRAV certif ication system, which 
mainly concerns ecological sustainability but also includes social require-
ments for the berry-picking sector. This certif ication is shown on products 
74 Statutes adopted 2016. Stadgar antagna vid Svenska kommunalarbetarförbundets kongress 
2016, § 4 mom 4 temporary membership. 
75 Telephone interview with Jörgen Gustavsson Kommunal on 7 April 2017. 
76 E-mail from Jörgen Gustavsson Kommunal, 10 March 2017.
77 See, for example, how the municipalities should organise their work in the report Miljösam-
verkan i Västerbotten, Slutrapport Tillfälliga externa boenden 2014-2015. Available at: http://
extra.lansstyrelsen.se/miljosamverkan/SiteCollectionDocuments/Publikationer/2015/2015-
tillfalliga-externa-boenden.pdf. 
78 Wingborg (2016), n. 43, p. 14. 
79 Ibid pp. 3-21.
80 Ibid.
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sold in Sweden.81 Formal enforcement of these instruments, however, is 
weak.82
5 Remaining Challenges
The coordinated activities by the Migration Agency and Kommunal have 
been rather successful. The unscrupulous actors have been driven out of 
this regulated system but have found other arenas not covered by these 
rules; some of them deal with free berry pickers.83
Many of these free pickers are European nationals using their right to 
free movement as EU citizens when entering Sweden.84 They are described 
as ‘free pickers’ as they are not off icially employed by anyone. They pick 
their berries as independent actors and sell them directly to the buyers. 
Currently, it seems that the worst problems with regard to extremely poor 
living conditions and low income are related to this group. As they are not 
‘workers’ and many do not need a visa or work permit to enter Sweden, 
it is a challenge for the Swedish authorities and trade unions to improve 
their situation. This group’s situation has been discussed elsewhere by 
others.85 The chapters by Schrauwen and Houwerzijl as well as by Cremers 
and Dekker in this volume also shed light on dilemmas surrounding free 
movement within the EU.
Some challenges, however, also remain in relation to the Thai berry 
pickers and the regulated system. The berry pickers normally take loans to 
pay for their tickets, visas, and other costs related to the journey to Sweden. 
Those costs correspond to approximately one month’s minimum wage. On 
top of that, they have costs for accommodation and food while working 
in Sweden. The collective agreement stipulates that the berry pickers will 
earn the guaranteed wage level if they pick berries up to a certain value. 
If they pick berries above the minimum requirement, they will earn more 
81 M. Wingborg (2015), n. 48, p. 10. More about KRAV available at: http://www.krav.se/english. 
82 M. Wingborg (2013), ’Bärbranschen tar krafttag för bättre villkor I blåbärsskogen’, Swedwatch 
rapport 60, pp. 7-8.
83 See Section 3.2.
84 Consolidated version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (2012) OJ 
C326/56-57, Arts 20-21. 
85 M. Wingborg (2016), n. 43, pp. 23 and 32. N. Mesic (2016), ‘Paradoxes of European free move-
ment in times of austerity: The role of social movement actors in framing the plight of Roma 
berry pickers in Sweden’ International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 36(5/6) pp. 289-303; 
C. Woolfson and N. Mesic (2015), ‘Roma pickers in Sweden: Economic crisis and new contingents 
of austerity’ Transfer. European Review of Labour Research, 21(1) pp. 37-50.
164 Petra Herzfeld OlssOn 
money. This means that their chances to earn more money depend on the 
market price of the berries. This price changes from year to year. In recent 
years, the price has gone down substantially, from two euros to one. The 
availability of picked berries on the international market has increased 
due to increased berry-picking activities in the Baltic states, Russia, and 
Ukraine. The low price has made it more diff icult to recruit the Thai berry 
pickers.86 Another factor that affects the price is the level of antioxidants, 
which can change from year to year and from region to region, and is 
impossible to foresee. As already mentioned, most of the blueberries are 
sold to the pharmaceutical industry in Asia due to the high amounts of 
antioxidants.87 Thus, it is diff icult to foresee the price six months ahead, 
which is normally when the berry pickers apply for the work permits. The 
allocation of risks involved in this unpredictability is unsatisfactory, and 
should be fairer in order to ensure that the pickers at least are debt-free 
when they get home.88
Another issue not yet discussed in this chapter is the fact that the berry 
pickers work very long hours.89 It is not unusual for a working day to last 
twelve to f ifteen hours. Reports indicate that the berry pickers themselves 
do not feel exploited, as they would like to earn as much money as possible 
when they are in Sweden. From their perspective, the travel to Sweden is 
part of a sustainable household strategy.90 Kommunal also seems to f ind it 
challenging to enforce that the working time provisions in the collective 
agreement are strictly upheld.91 It is unclear whether the sector would survive 
a strict application of the working time requirements. On the other hand, 
it is, of course, quite strange that this particular sector can operate freely 
outside the legal framework.
A somewhat different challenge is based on other grounds. The open 
Swedish labour migration system is not uncontroversial. In 2017, the Swedish 
Minister of Industry and the chairman of LO argued for a reinstatement of 
the labour market tests in Swedish labour migration law.92 Their argument is 
86 M. Wingborg (2016), n. 43, pp. 15, 25.
87 Ibid p. 26. 
88 Hedberg, n. 42, p. 145. M. Wingborg (2016), n. 43, p. 29.
89 Hedberg, n. 42, p. 133; The report on the 2016 season from the local trade union: Kommunal 
Mellersta Norrland, Skogsbärsverksamhet 2016 under perioden juni till oktober. 
90 Hedberg, n. 42, pp. 133-134.
91 Kommunal Mellersta Norrland, n. 90.
92 DN DEBATT, Damberg & Thorwaldsson, Vi vill ha nya regler for arbetskraftsinvandring. 
Available at: http://www.dn.se/debatt/vi-vill-ha-nya-regler-for-arbetskraftsinvandring/.
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that we must save easy jobs, like berry picking, for newly arrived refugees.93 
It is still unclear how and whether the labour migration regime will change, 
but a proposed change in the tax regulations could, if adopted, make it less 
attractive for the Thai berry pickers to come to Sweden.94
6 Conclusions
It is clear that the story about the berry pickers in the Swedish forests 
confirms research that claims that the exploitation of labour migrants can 
be explained by the actual regulation of a specif ic labour market. Fudge 
and Tham have stressed ‘the signif icance of labour regulation in shaping 
the quality and conditions of work’ in a sector ‘and in creating a sector-
specif ic demand for “low-skilled” migrant labour’.95 Before 2009, the sector 
was shaped by a combination of the lack of trade union interest in these 
workers and favourable tax provisions for employees of foreign temporary 
work agencies. When new labour migration provisions were adopted, new 
preconditions evolved, including both new challenges and opportunities. 
However, step by step, the preconditions for exploitation were removed. 
The Swedish trade union movement has taken on this sector and adjusted 
its working methods to its specif ic circumstances. This, in combination 
with increased targeted immigration control by the authorities, meaning, 
in this case, preventive inspection of the employers, has led to a positive 
result. The last major abuse involving Thai berry pickers was reported in 
2013.96 The coordinated efforts have been successful, but still challenges 
remain and the system is not uncontroversial. The proposed tax regulation 
amendment will, and is maybe also intended to, make it less attractive for 
the Thai berry pickers to come to Sweden. In that case, the berry-picking 
industry will be left with domestic workers and free pickers. It is not obvious 
that the Swedish berry-picking industry will survive such a shift.
93 Ibid.
94 Swedish Tax Authorities, Skatteverket, beskattning och betalning av skatt vid tillfälligt 
arbete i Sverige, Dnr 202 253985 17/13.
95 J. Fudge and J.-C. Tham (2018) ‘Dishing Up Migrant Workers for the Canadian Food Services 
Sector: Labour Law and the Demand for Migrant Workers’, Comparative Labour Law and Policy 
Journal, 39 (1) p. 1. See also M. Ruhs and B. Anderson (2008), ‘Migrant Workers: Who Needs 
Them? A Framework for Analysis of Staff Shortages, Immigration and Public Policy’ in Ruhs 
and Anderson (eds.), Who needs migrant workers?, Oxford University Press p. 46. 
96 M. Wingborg (2016), n. 43, p. 28.
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7 Asylum Seekers’ Limited Right to 
Work in the Netherlands
Tesseltje de Lange1
Abstract
This chapter considers the rights of asylum seekers to work in the EU and 
the Netherlands. The chapter maps EU and Dutch regulation on labour 
market access for asylum seekers as it stands and – with regard to the Dutch 
regulation – what arguments were put forward in its making. Building on 
the report ‘Van azc naar een baan’, De Lange argues that the removal of 
practical impediments to formal employment will limit the attractiveness of 
the informal labour market, likely to provide less decent work. The chapter 
concludes that the limited right to work and the obligations of asylum 
seekers to contribute financially to their reception once income is acquired 
does not help prepare them for their eventual f inancial independence.
Keywords: asylum seekers, labour market access, Reception Conditions 
Directive 2013/33/EU, f inancial contribution to reception.
1 Introduction
Europe, including the Netherlands, received a large number of asylum 
seekers in 2015 and early 2016.2 74635 requests for asylum were submitted 
1 Tesseltje de Lange is assistant professor Administrative and Migration Law at the Law 
Faculty of the University of Amsterdam and was senior researcher at Tilburg University. This 
chapter builds on a research report written in 2017 together with Elles Besselsen, Soumaya 
Rahouti, and Conny Rijken: Van azc naar een baan. De Nederlandse regelgeving over en praktijk 
van arbeidsmarktintegratie van vluchtelingen, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
2 For the purposes of this study, application of the term ‘refugee’ is not limited to migrants 
who have been recognised as such by a state in accordance with the Convention on Refugees. 
‘Refugees’ refers collectively to asylum seekers (migrants who have requested asylum) and 
Rijken, Conny and Tesseltje de Lange (eds): Towards a Decent Labour Market for Low Waged 
Migrant Workers. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018  
doi: 10.5117/9789462987555_lang
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in the Netherlands over a two-year period, 54% of requests were granted. 
In early 2016, more than 44000 people were housed in asylum seekers’ 
reception centres, whereas, in early 2017, the number was down to 25485.3 
The decrease in new asylum seekers is due to the so-called EU-Turkey deal, 
which effectively sealed the border between Turkey and Greece. A rapid 
reduction in the processing time for asylum applications ensued, which 
means that an asylum seeker now has little time to settle in, and possibly 
to look for work, while awaiting the outcome of the evaluation procedure.
This chapter considers the rights of asylum seekers who are awaiting 
the outcome of the evaluation of their asylum claim to work in the EU 
and, more specif ically, in the Netherlands. The chapter is based on the 
report Van azc naar een baan (From asylum seekers reception centre into 
a job) that we presented in spring 2017.4 The research for this report was 
conducted over a six-month period starting in September 2016.5 Although 
the numbers of asylum applicants have gone down since the EU-Turkey deal, 
there are at least two reasons to examine the right to work during the asylum 
procedure in a book discussing decent labour markets and migrant labour. 
First, Northern Europe could at any time be faced with a renewed influx 
of asylum seekers. As the economy is on the rise and labour shortages are 
increasing, asylum seekers may easily f ind their way into readily available, 
possibly precarious jobs. The need for workers to f ill labour shortages was 
indeed one of the reasons for Germany’s welcoming attitude towards the 
refugees. The second reason to discuss asylum seekers’ access to the labour 
market is that a legal framework that allows for asylum seekers to work in 
the formal economy gives them a head start at their successful economic 
integration in case their application is evaluated positively. Or working will 
have at least given them a meaningful way to pass their time while awaiting 
the outcome of the procedure, possibly acquiring skills useful once forced to 
return. On the other hand, a lack of labour market access is found to delay 
and possibly obstruct future labour market participation. Examining the 
holders of asylum status (migrants who have been granted temporary residence based on an 
asylum request). 
3 COA, Personen in de opvang uitgesplitst naar leeftijd en land van herkomst. Available at:https://
www.coa.nl/nl/over-coa/cijfers-en-jaarverslagen.
4 T. de Lange, E. Besselsen, S. Rahouti, and C. Rijken (2017), Van azc naar een baan. De Neder-
landse regelgeving over en praktijk van arbeidsmarktintegratie van vluchtelingen, Universiteit 
van Amsterdam. Thanks to University of Amsterdam student assistant Andrew Faughan for 
translating. The research was funded with a research grant from Instituut Gak.
5 The research was based on legal analysis of legislation and case law and interviews and 
focus groups with, amongst others, migrants with a refugee status. 
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right to work of asylum seekers thus illuminates how host states are caught 
in a balancing act between interests such as providing jobs for the native 
workforce and keeping existing welfare arrangements in place on the one 
hand and, on the other hand, the legal obligations towards the quality of 
a ‘decent’ reception of asylum seekers and integration of those who have 
been offered protection. First, this chapter maps EU and Dutch regulation 
on labour market access for asylum seekers as it stands and – with regard to 
Dutch regulations – what arguments were put forward in its making. This 
section is followed by a discussion of the obligations of asylum seekers to 
contribute f inancially to their reception once income is acquired. The f inal 
section presents some conclusions and discussion.
2 Right to Work During the Asylum Procedure
Per article 15 of the EU Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33/EU6, Member 
States shall ensure that applicants have access to the labour market no later 
than nine months from the date when the application for international 
protection was lodged. Member States shall decide the conditions for grant-
ing access to the labour market for the applicant, in accordance with their 
national law. Member states must ensure that applicants have effective access 
to the labour market – access in a purely legal sense without practical access 
will not suffice. Member States may give priority to Union citizens and legally 
resident third-country nationals in accordance with their own labour market 
policies. The Netherlands has chosen not to restrict access based on labour 
market needs so this restriction is not discussed any further. According to 
article 15 section 3 of the Receptions Conditions Directive, access to the 
labour market shall not be withdrawn during appeals procedures in the 
admission procedure, if the appeal has suspensive effect, until such time 
as a negative decision on the appeal is notif ied.
Member states are free to decide how the Directive is to be implemented 
in national law. This explains why an asylum seeker in Sweden may work 
immediately upon f iling an application, in Germany after three months, in 
Belgium after four months, and in the Netherlands only after six months.7 
6 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 lays 
down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection [2013] OJ L 180.
7 M. den Heijer, J. Rijpma, and T. Spijkerboer (2016), ‘Coercion, prohibition, and great expecta-
tions: The continuing failure of the Common European Asylum System’, CMLR 53(3) p. 609; 
European Commission (2016), An economic Take on the refugee crisis, Institutional paper 033 
p. 21.
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The preamble names two goals why access to the labour market is part of 
the Reception Conditions Directive: in order to promote the self-sufficiency 
of applicants and to limit wide discrepancies between Member States. To 
achieve these goals, it is essential to provide clear rules for the applicants’ 
access to the labour market (preamble 23). The standards for the reception 
of applicants also have to suff ice to ensure them a dignified standard of 
living and comparable living conditions in all Member States should be 
implemented for asylum seekers.
The relevant Dutch legal framework is the Foreign Nationals Employment 
Act (Wet arbeid vreemdelingen, or WAV), which came into force in 1995 and 
regulates migrants’ access to the Dutch labour market. This act is not restricted 
to labour migration, but also applies to migrants for whom work is not the 
primary purpose of the stay, as may be the case with asylum seekers and family 
migrants. The WAV is also aimed at preventing unfair labour competition 
caused by the illegal hiring of migrants.8 According to article 2 of the WAV – its 
key section –, employers not in possession of a work permit for persons from 
outside the European Economic Area are forbidden from hiring migrants.
The Minister of Social Affairs and Employment has delegated implementa-
tion of the WAV to the administration of the Employee Insurance Agency (Uit-
voeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen, or UWV). The UWV is therefore 
responsible for implementation of the WAV as well as for issuing work permits 
for persons from outside the European Economic Area. Before a permit is 
issued, the so-called priority workforce must be taken into consideration; 
if anybody already available on the Dutch labour market is able to perform 
the job, the UWV will not issue a permit, since doing so could potentially 
cause displacement in the labour market. The UWV also applies the WAV to 
‘employers’ that have not concluded an employment contract.9 Therefore, it 
makes no difference whether the ‘employer’ holds authority over and pays 
a wage to the individual performing the work – the usual indicators of the 
existence of an employment contract under Dutch labour law. In terms of the 
WAV, the fact that the employer has the migrant carry out work is sufficient 
grounds to assume that the former is, in fact, an employer.10 The term ‘work’ 
is also broadly defined – the prohibition on employment unless a permit is 
issued also comes into play if a migrant runs a business or does volunteer 
8 See, in this volume: L. Berntsen and T. de Lange (2018), ‘Employer sanctions: instrument of 
labour market regulation, migration control and worker protection?’; A. Klap and T. de Lange 
(2008), ‘Marktordening via het werkgeversbegrip van de Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen’, SMA p. 390. 
9 Art. 1 sub b sub 1 WAV.
10 See L. Berntsen and T. de Lange (2018).
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work. Many exceptions apply, such as the unfettered access to the Dutch 
labour market enjoyed by Union citizens, and the rules that apply specifically 
to highly skilled migrants, academic scholars, performers, and Asian chefs.11
Note must be taken of the fact that, prior to the WAV coming into force in 
1995, asylum seekers were not allowed to work, nor was there a specific policy 
for granting work permits to employ them. However, a work permit could be 
granted for the employment of an asylum seeker if no priority workforce was 
available, or if humanitarian reasons so dictated.12 Whether the work permit 
would be granted was a balancing act between the interest of the asylum 
seeker to be employed and the State’s interest in protecting the national labour 
market. At the time, the Dutch ministry of Justice, responsible for deciding on 
asylum applications, used to object to asylum seekers working because this 
would result in integration, which may stand in the way of return later on. They 
also argued that there was the risk of raised expectations [of legal residence] if 
the asylum seeker were permitted to work. Besides, allowing asylum seekers 
to work may have a pull-effect on others. After time passed (more like after 
three years than six months), the balance shifted to the humanitarian reasons 
pro-labour market access.13 This individual balancing shifted to a full exclusion 
of asylum seekers in 1995, a rigid stance that was aborted soon after and would 
have obviously been precluded under current EU law.14
The Dutch regulation of the access to the labour market for asylum seekers 
can be divided into three stages: the f irst six months; after six months; and 
the period thereafter, when the access is again denied.
2.1 Employment During the First Six Months of the Asylum 
Procedure
During the f irst six months in an asylum seekers centre, asylum seekers are 
not permitted to perform paid work, even if their abilities are in demand on 
the Dutch job market. This is a result of the inflexible categories specif ied 
by the Aliens Act and the WAV: a migrant may either f ile an asylum request 
or apply for a ‘regular’ residence permit as a migrant worker or student – but 
11 T. de Lange, H. Oosterom, and P. Krop (2016), ‘Arbeidsmigratie’, in K. Zwaan, Nederlands 
Migratierecht, Boom Juridisch.
12 Chapter B.11.1, section 4.2.1.d of the Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines (Vreemdelin-
gencirculaire 1982), Available at: http://cmr.jur.ru.nl/cmr/.
13 Parliamentary Documents II, 1990/1991, 19637, 76, p. 2. Also an editor’s note: ‘Werkvergunning 
asielzoekers’ (1991) Migrantenrecht 2, pp. 39-40.
14 J. Klaver & E. Tromp (2003), Asielzoekers en werk. Evaluatie van de mogelijkheden van betaald 
werken in het kader van de Wet arbeid vreemdelingen, Regioplan, p. 8.
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not both. Once an asylum request has been f iled, it is no longer possible to 
f ile for a regular residence permit (a single permit for work and residence 
under EU Directive 2011/98) since the asylum seeker will not have been 
issued a proper visa before arriving in the Netherlands.
This can sometimes prove burdensome. For example, Doctors without 
Borders sought a workaround when it requested permission for its doctors, 
who had fled to the Netherlands and applied for asylum, to work. For them 
to be able to receive a status as a migrant worker (instead of asylum seeker), 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) had to waive the visa 
requirement, which it refused to do, although it could have chosen to do 
so.15 However, even if the IND had waived that requirement, access to the 
job market is the domain of the UWV. Regulations based on the WAV would 
need to be amended to give the UWV the discretionary power to issue 
work permits during the f irst six months of an asylum procedure.16 While 
current regulations allow migrant workers and highly skilled migrants to be 
recruited abroad and come to the Netherlands to work in f ields experiencing 
labour shortages, (promising) asylum seekers already present, awaiting the 
outcome of their procedures, cannot be hired for those same jobs. If they 
would have applied for work permits and long-term visas this would have 
been very time consuming, if successful at all.
So, since 1995, asylum seekers have had to wait six months before they 
can be employed. There have been repeated calls to allow asylum seekers 
to work sooner than six months into the procedure. Already in 2000, the 
Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid) attempted to convince the 
government to drop its objections to granting asylum seekers broader access 
to the jobs market17:
Paid labour provides asylum seekers with something to f ill their days, 
provides them with an income, allows them to maintain their skills, 
and should in theory make them better able to stand on their own two 
feet once the asylum procedure has drawn to a close, whether in the 
Netherlands or elsewhere. The current common perception is that a 
majority of asylum seekers cannot f ind work.18
15 Interview UWV. See also Art. 16 f irst para., sub a Aliens Act. 
16 Art. 8 f irst para., sub e WAV is currently phrased in the imperative. The optional exception 
provided in art. 9 WAV should be able to be applied to asylum seekers.
17 Stichting van de Arbeid, Recommendation letter (SA 0007896/HA, 2000).
18 Ibid.
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As far as we know, no research has been performed to support the claim that 
earlier labour market access, as is the practice in some other EU countries, 
serves to attract an increasing number of asylum applicants.19 The argument 
should not, thus, serve to legitimise the decision to refrain from easing 
the requirements governing access to the jobs market during the asylum 
procedure.
Even before 1995, the choice not to give asylum seekers access to the 
labour market was under attack. In WRR’s 1989 report ‘Allochtonenbeleid’ 
(ethnic minorities policy), it was proposed that asylum seekers be allowed 
to work as early as two months after submitting an asylum application, 
subject to certain conditions. The WRR emphasized that it was in everyone’s 
best interest that newcomers integrate as quickly as possible into Dutch 
society.20 They should therefore be allowed to work, if necessary, in specially 
designed work projects. The two-month waiting period would discourage 
de facto labour migration, allaying fears that the proposal, if implemented, 
would only serve to encourage asylum applications. The WRR furthermore 
speculated that the proposal would spare asylum seekers from boredom and 
allow them to provide for their own income, which would, in turn, decrease 
government expenses. The government in power at the time did not wish 
to grant work permits automatically and held to its policy of granting them 
sparingly. It was argued that21, if asylum seekers were allowed to integrate 
too well, it would prove diff icult to repatriate them later on if an asylum 
application was ultimately denied.
In 2014, the Dutch Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs published 
a report ‘Lost time’ pleading for more opportunities to work during this 
initial period.22 In 2015 a joint policy brief ‘No time to waste’ issued by 
three prominent institutions23 amongst them the Dutch Scientif ic Council 
for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 
WRR) also called for expedited labour market access. Policy attention has 
19 For instance, in Belgium, asylum seekers have labour market access after four months into 
the application procedure. In 2016, only 3.6% of those eligible for labour market participation 
actually worked. N. Lambrecht, M. De Vos, and I. Van de Cloot (2016), Arbeidsmarkt integratie 
van vluchtelingen: de klok tikt, Itinera.
20 WRR (1989), Allochtonen beleid, report to the government.
21 Parliamentary Documents II, 1990/1991, 19637, p. 76.
22 ACVZ (2013), Verloren Tijd. 
23 WRR, WODC, and SCP (2015), Geen tijd verliezen: van opvang naar integratie van asielmi-
granten, Policy Brief 4.
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been targeted at stimulating voluntary work by asylum seekers instead.24 
The waiting time of six months has remained.
2.2 Inclusion after Six Months and Exclusion Again after Six 
Months of Work
So, only after the first six months of the asylum procedure in the Netherlands 
have passed, is the asylum seeker is allowed to work – as long as the employer 
has obtained a work permit from the UWV.25 The main requirement for a 
work permit is that the asylum seeker must still be entitled to the facili-
ties provided by the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers 
(Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers, or COA). The WAV explicitly states 
that the reason for allowing migrants to work is to improve the quality 
of their stay during the asylum procedure. The work permit procedure is 
simplif ied, no labour market test applies, there is no need to work enough 
hours to sustain oneself, and, if general sectoral quota are in place, these 
do not apply in the case of the employment of asylum seekers. The limits 
are set in subordinate legislation, requiring the job is performed under 
market-conforming conditions and not for more than 24 weeks.26 There are 
no sectoral restrictions, but for jobs as an artist, musician, on a movie set, 
or as a technician supporting artists or musicians, the maximum duration 
is fourteen weeks.
The limited duration of the employment is justif ied by the government 
for two reasons. First, because of the national welfare arrangements that 
become available after the passing of time. Working more than 24 weeks out 
of 39 weeks would lead to an entitlement to unemployment benefits. One 
condition for receiving unemployment benef its is the availability on the 
labour market and the use of – at the time – state-led employment services. 
According to the Dutch government: ‘an unemployment benefit claim does 
not match with the stage in the asylum claim evaluation procedure in which 
no f inal decision has been taken on legal residence or return.’27 The other 
reason is because, according to the Dutch government, the prospect of 
24 T. de Lange (2018), ‘Vrijwilligerswerk door vreemdelingen: klem tussen botsende beleids-
velden’, in: Nieuwe wegen voor vluchtelingen in Nederland, AUP: Amsterdam; zie ook Bakker, 
L. e.a. (2018). Vrijwilligerswerk: stimulans voor tijdige participatie en integratie? Monitor- en 
evaluatieonderzoek vrijwilligerswerk door asielzoekers en statushouders die in de opvang verblijven, 
Signif icant voor het Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. Barneveld.
25 Art. 8 para. 2 WAV. 
26 Art. 2a Besluit uitvoering WAV.
27 Parliamentary Documents II, 1999/2000, 26800 VI, 53, pp. 2-3. 
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unrestricted employment would act as a magnet for (bogus) refugees. The 
Netherlands is the only country in the EU that limits the length of labour 
market access once access is granted.28 The Dutch 24-week rule might very 
well be a violation of article 15 paragraph 3 of the Reception Conditions 
Directive, which states that access to the labour market, once granted, shall 
not be withdrawn during (appeals) procedures.29 Furthermore, the Directive 
does not allow for asylum procedures to last longer than six months. As of 
late 2015, only 605 people had been waiting for more than a half year.30 in 
the f irst eleven months of that year, the UWV issued 51 (and denied 33) work 
permits to asylum seekers whose procedures had passed the six-month mark. 
Applications, either f irst-time or extensions, were denied because either 
or both the COA and IND had failed to state a reason for the length of the 
procedure, because wages below the legal minimum had been offered, or 
because the 24-week work limit had already been reached.31
2.3 Testing the Waters
At the time of writing, a test case was brought before the Dutch District Court 
of Haarlem, to determine whether the 24-week rule violates European Union 
law.32 From the case f ile, we can report as follows. It is the case of Ahmad, 
an Iraqi, who has been waiting for more than six months for a decision on 
his application for asylum. He is 30 years old, and trained as a welder and 
construction worker. With the help of his attorney, he has found a position 
at a f irm devoted to helping unemployed construction workers get back to 
work. The labour contract offered is for twelve months. A request was f iled 
for a work permit valid for twelve months and, failing that, for 24 weeks. 
The UWV indeed issued a 24-week permit. When it was pointed out that 
the 24-week permit was in violation of European law, the UWV answered: 
‘The regulation quite specif ically states that an asylum seeker may work no 
more than 24 weeks.’ The ‘regulation’ referred to by the UWV is, of course, 
the Dutch regulation; the European Reception Condition Directive was not 
28 European Commission (2016), An economic Take on the refugee crisis (Institutional paper 
033) p. 23.
29 T. de Lange and C. Rijken (12 January 2016), ‘Asielzoeker kan eerder aan de slag’, Opinie 
Volkskrant, Amsterdam. 
30 More recent data on the number of months it takes to process applications is not readily 
available to the public.
31 Correspondence with the UWV, 1 November 2016.
32 A hearing was scheduled at the end of November 2017, so, unfortunately, the results of the 
procedure could not be reported here.
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mentioned by the UWV. The attorney f iled an objection on behalf of both 
Ahmad and his employer.
In its ruling on the objection, and in direct response to the complaint that 
European law had been violated, the UWV acknowledged the EU Reception 
Conditions Directive, stating that adequate access to the job market had 
been provided, but that it nonetheless lacked the discretionary power to 
deviate from current regulations. This ruling was then taken to the court. 
While awaiting the court’s hearing, Ahmad’s asylum application was denied 
in f inal. The Court decided to dismiss the case on formal grounds (due to 
lack of procedural interest).33 It thus remains uncertain if EU law precludes 
the Dutch limited labour market access of only 24 weeks.
3 Income Acquired Is to Pay for Reception
Next, we will discuss what comes of the income acquired by the asylum 
seeker. Article 17 of the Reception Conditions Directive states that Member 
States shall ensure that material reception conditions provide an adequate 
standard of living for applicants, which guarantees their subsistence and 
protects their physical and mental health. Member States may require 
applicants to cover or contribute to the cost of material reception and 
health care if they have suff icient resources, for example, if they have been 
working for a reasonable period of time. The Netherlands provides asylum 
seekers with a material means of existence, but seeks reimbursement once 
an asylum seeker starts to earn income, per the Asylum Seekers Provisions 
Regulations 2005 (Regeling verstrekkingen asielzoekers 2005, or Rva) and the 
Asylum Seekers Personal Contribution Regulations 2008 (Regeling Eigen 
bijdrage Asielzoekers 2008, or Reba).
Under the Rva, asylum seekers are provided with housing and a general 
allowance. Other expenses, such as travel, can be reimbursed. If asylum seek-
ers have income, they are expected to help defray the expenses of room and 
board while at the asylum reception centre.34 The Dutch regulation does not 
take into account whether the income is steady or merely occasional, thus, it 
leaves little discretion to the COA.35 The COA cannot formally deviate from 
the requirement to recover that income. However, article 17 of the Reception 
33 District Court Haarlem, case no. 17/5350, 22 February 2018 (not published). 
34 Article 3b Reba and article 3a Reba.
35 Per article 20 of the Rva, in conjunction with article 5 of the Reba, an asylum seeker who 
enjoys any income whatsoever must reimburse housing expenses and the allowance.
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Conditions Directive could be construed to mean that it is only possible to 
require asylum seekers to contribute to their own room and board if they 
have worked for a reasonable length of time.36 Occasional income, such as 
income earned when participating in a workplace reintegration project, 
would not incur an obligation to surrender earnings, making participation 
in such a programme more appealing to asylum seekers. In this respect, 
Dutch regulation appears to conflict with the Directive.
The following examples show that the income an employed asylum seeker 
living in an asylum reception centre can expect to keep after reimbursing the 
COA is determined by the number of dependent family members. Asylum 
seekers with dependent family members are allowed to keep such a small 
portion of their earnings that it has been reported that they often just refuse 
employment.37 The regulation discourages asylum seekers from accepting 
job offers – the earnings they are allowed to keep do not make it worth 
their while. The following three examples are extrapolated from previously 
mentioned Ahmad’s monthly salary; 25 percent of earned income, with a 
maximum of € 196, is exempt.38







€ 1,463.48 25% of salary
(max. € 196) exempt
meals – € 252.48 = 58.31 x 4.33
room – € 216.50 = 50 x 4.33
Total reimbursement to Coa – € 468.98
net income € 994.50
In Figure 1, we see that Ahmad, single and with no dependents, is allowed 
to keep € 994.50 of his monthly earnings, which makes it worth his while 
to hold a job. He contributes € 216.50 monthly for his room and € 252.48 
for meals. The COA pays for his health insurance. Travel expenses might 
prove prohibitive if not reimbursed.
36 Art. 17 para 4 Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33.
37 A. Stoffelen (11 November 2016), ‘Asielzoekers weigeren werk door eigen bijdrage opvang,’ 
Volkskrant, Amsterdam. 
38 Article 5, para 3 and 4 Reba.
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€ 1,463.48 25% of salary
(max. € 196) exempt
meals – € 710.12 44.70 x 4.33 x2 = 387.10
37.30 x 4.33 x2 = 323.02







net income € 320, 36
source: based on examples provided by the Coa
In Figure 2, we see that, if Ahmad has a wife and two children, he is only 
allowed to keep € 320.36 of his monthly full-time salary. The monthly 
contribution for a family of four is € 433 for room and € 710.12 for meals. 
The family would not receive child benef its, but would receive an extra 
allowance for the children. Travel expenses could have a negative effect on 
the net income, but, if his wife also has a job, no additional contributions 
are required.
The COA is not always able to recover the amounts due.39 Within six 
weeks of receiving a pay slip, the COA issues a decision specifying the 
amount of the personal contribution, but, by that time, the money has often 
already been remitted to family left behind in the country of origin – for 
their support or perhaps to pay the travel expenses to be incurred by family 
reunif ication. The COA collected € 178,000 in 2014 and € 109,000 in 2015 in 
personal contributions from asylum seekers housed in an asylum seekers 
reception centre.40 No data is available that explains the decline, but it could 
be due to the greater number of residence permit holders moving on from 
an reception centre to be housed by a municipality, because fewer asylum 
seekers and residence permit holders have work, or simply because there 
are fewer personnel available to recover the amounts due.
39 Interview and correspondence with the COA.
40 The COA’s f inancial accounts for 2015 is available at: https://www.coa.nl/. 
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In the course of our research, it became clear that asylum seekers do 
not object to covering a portion of the expenses incurred for their room 
and meals, or (partially) paying back allowances. They did, however, often 
complain that it was diff icult to save for an education or for the purchase 
of the equipment they might need – e.g., a laptop, tools, work clothes – to 
establish f inancial independence, especially if they were only able to f ind 
occasional work. The administrative burden faced by an employer requesting 
a work permit for perhaps only a few days’ work, and by asylum seekers who 
have to report their income to the COA only to end up with scant f inancial 
gain, remains a major obstacle on the path to f inding work while in the 
reception centre. This encourages undeclared work – or work for less than 
the minimum wage – in violation of the Foreign Nationals Employment Act. 
The high personal contributions to the COA end up discouraging asylum 
seekers from taking work, especially those with large families. We have 
heard stories of asylum seekers (and resident permit holders still housed in 
an asylum reception centre) turning down job offers because they cannot 
keep most of their earnings, have to do too much paperwork, must cover 
their own travel expenses, or because there is little to no chance of being 
transferred to an asylum seekers reception centre nearer to the job they 
have been offered.
Finally, it must be noted that the fact that, in some cases, it hardly pays 
to work is not a problem unique to asylum seekers and residence permit 
holders. It affects everyone working in the Netherlands at or near minimum 
wage who compares his or her meagre earnings to the (welfare) benef its 
and allowances he or she could otherwise claim.
4 Asylum Seekers at Work: Not Without Risks
The debate on whether to expand or restrict access to the job market 
frequently overlooks the fact that certain asylum seekers are particularly 
vulnerable to exploitation. They are generally unaware of Dutch labour law 
and may struggle to pay back debts accumulated during their journey.41 This 
makes them more likely to accept work for lower wages than are considered 
appropriate in the Netherlands, and subject to worse working conditions. 
41 J. O’Connell Davidson (2013), ‘Troubling freedom: migration, debt, and modern slavery’, 
Migration Studies, 2 pp. 176-195; H. Lewis and L. Waite (2015), ‘Asylum, Immigration Restrictions 
and Exploitation: Hyper-precarity as a lens for understanding and tackling forced labour’, 
Anti-Trafficking Review, 5 pp. 49-67.
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Cognizant of such risks, the European Commission recommends that 
Member States should not keep asylum seekers waiting for more than six 
months before granting them access to the job market.42 During our research 
period, we became aware of only one such incident: in 2016, a laundry in 
Zaandam was shut down following allegations that asylum seekers were 
being exploited.43 The asylum seekers were initially housed in an reception 
centre, but bedding and a provisional kitchen observed during a workplace 
inspection indicated that they were actually living at the laundry. The asylum 
seekers had been promised an hourly wage of ten euros, but it was reported 
that they were actually paid 4.50 euros, and occasionally nothing.44 Early 
2018 the laundry shop owner was convicted for labour exploitation equaling 
traff icking of the asylum seekers.45 We were also informed that the COA 
refuses requests from businesses to ‘hand over’ asylum seekers when the 
business is seeking labourers, if it seems unlikely that labour regulations 
will be observed properly. Reports of abuse and exploitation since the recent 
influx of asylum seekers to the Netherlands are, however, too anecdotal to 
warrant any conclusions.
5 Discussion
An eff icient asylum procedure is a precondition for successful economic 
integration, but, if the procedure drags on for too long, the time spent waiting 
should be put to good use – hanging around in an asylum seekers’ residence 
centre can be detrimental to one’s health. It is the current common f inding 
that speedy access to the job market encourages the social integration of 
those allowed to stay, and helps prepare those who must repatriate for the 
inevitable.46 Asylum seekers are not allowed to work during the f irst six 
42 L. Slingenberg (2014), ‘Asylum seekers’ access to employment: Tensions with human rights 
obligations in the recast of the directive on reception conditions for asylum seekers’, in C. 
Matera and A. Taylor (eds.), The Common European Asylum System and Human rights: enhancing 
protection in times of emergencies, Cleer Working Papers p. 96.
43 The COA reports suspected exploitation to the IND’s Expertise Centre for Human Traff icking 
and Human Smuggling (Expertisecentrum Mensenhandel en Mensensmokkel).
44 Arrests made in connection with the exploitation of refugees, news bulletin issued by the In-
spectorate of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 10 November 2016. In another incident, 
an asylum seeker was hired to work without pay in a bar and grill. Available at: http://www.nhnieu-
ws.nl/nieuws/196626/grillroom-en-steakhouse-dicht-na-ontdekking-syrische-asielzoekers.
45 District Court Amsterdam, 22 March 2018, case nr. 13/845229-16, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2018:1637.
46 WRR, WODC, and SCP (2015), Geen tijd verliezen: van opvang naar integratie van asielmi-
granten, Policy Brief 4 .
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months of the asylum procedure but, as of 2017, few need to wait that long. 
It has been argued that, in the interest of their speedy integration, asylum 
seekers should be allowed to support themselves with paid employment 
if a decision takes longer than two months. Research has not revealed any 
heightened risk of displacement on the job market stemming from abuse of 
the asylum procedure. Nonetheless, any potential risk could be alleviated by 
granting staggered access to the job market. Our f irst recommendation in 
Van azc naar een baan thus laid out how staggered access to the job market 
could be implemented. Potential employers may apply for a work permit 
once an asylum seeker’s application procedure extends beyond, for instance, 
two months. In this early stage, possibly the permit will only be granted if 
it does not displace priority workforce on the job market. The job market 
assessment may be dispensed with if a salary has been offered above the 
standard wage level that applies to highly skilled workers. Next, all asylum 
seekers should be allowed to work if the procedure exceeds four months, 
provided a work permit has been issued, but no longer subject to assessment 
of the job market. The 24-week limit on work in any six-month period is an 
unnecessary impediment to the integration of migrants on the job market, 
and is most likely in violation of the Reception Conditions Directive. We 
therefore recommend that the 24-week limit should be eliminated, in spite 
of the risk that rights to unemployment benefits could accrue. Unemploy-
ment benefits could be converted into ‘repatriation compensation’ in the 
event that an asylum application is denied. If asylum is granted, insurance 
premiums end up in the appropriate social insurance fund.
The mandatory contributions for room and board dictated by the Rva and 
the Reba tend to discourage asylum seekers and residence permit holders 
living in an asylum reception centre from seeking paid work. The COA is 
currently not allowed to deviate from the stipulations of the Reba. This is 
also in violation of the Reception Conditions Directive, article 17 para 4, 
which states that Member States may require applicants to contribute to the 
cost of the material reception conditions if they have suff icient resources, 
for example, if they have been working for a reasonable period of time. The 
Reba, however, requires asylum seekers who enjoy any income whatsoever 
to surrender it, no matter how long they have worked. Especially for asylum 
seekers with families, this arrangement makes work less attractive. Delays 
in settling amounts connected to implementation of the Reba occasionally 
cause asylum seekers to leave the reception centre still carrying debts to 
the COA. This makes them vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. Therefore, 
we recommend that the Reba should be amended to allow the COA greater 
discretion in deciding, pursuant to the Reception Conditions Directive, 
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whether to require a personal contribution taken from wages earned. This 
will make it more f inancially worthwhile for asylum seekers to engage in 
paid work while residing in an reception centre, and will help prepare them 
for their eventual f inancial independence.
Financial gain is not the only driving force behind a desire to work. Both 
asylum seekers and the bureaucracy need to commit to making it possible 
to engage in – formal – paid labour. The Reception Conditions Directive, 
however, obliges the Netherlands to take it a step further and grant effective 
access to the job market. In our report Van azc naar een baan, we thus 
recommend to remove the practical impediments to employment as we 
feel this will also limit the attractiveness of the informal labour market, 
likely to provide less decent work.
Bibliography
Bakker, L., Bekkers, R., Reitsma, R., Sederel, C., Smets, P., & Younes, Y. (2018), 
Vrijwilligerswerk: stimulans voor tijdige participatie en integratie? Monitor- en 
evaluatieonderzoek vrijwilligerswerk door asielzoekers en statushouders die in 
de opvang verblijven, Signif icant, Barneveld, voor het Ministerie van Sociale 
Zaken en Werkgelegenheid.
Berntsen, L. and T. de Lange (2018), ‘Employer sanctions: instrument of labour 
market regulation, migration control ánd worker protection?’ in C. Rijken and 
T. de Lange (2018), Towards a Decent Labour Market for Low Waged Migrant 
Workers, Amsterdam University Press.
COA, Personen in de opvang uitgesplitst naar leeftijd en land van herkomst. Available 
at: https://www.coa.nl/nl/over-coa/cijfers-en-jaarverslagen.
European Commission (2016), An economic Take on the refugee crisis, Institutional 
paper 033.
Heijer, M. den; J. Rijpma; and T. Spijkerboer (2016), ‘Coercion, prohibition, and 
great expectations: The continuing failure of the Common European Asylum 
System’, CMLR, 53 pp. 607-642.
Klap, A. and T. de Lange (2008), ‘Marktordening via het werkgeversbegrip van de 
Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen’, Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, pp. 390-396.
Klaver, J. and E. Tromp (2003), Asielzoekers en werk. Evaluatie van de mogelijkheden 
van betaald werken in het kader van de Wet arbeid vreemdelingen, Regioplan.
Lambrecht, N.; M. de Vos; and I. Van de Cloot (2016), Arbeidsmarkt integratie van 
vluchtelingen: de klok tikt, Itinera.
Lange, T. de (2018), ‘Vrijwilligerswerk door vreemdelingen: klem tussen botsende be-
leidsvelden’, in: Nieuwe wegen voor vluchtelingen in Nederland, AUP: Amsterdam.
asylum seekers’ limiTed righT To Work in The neTherlands 185
Lange, T. de; E. Besselsen; S. Rahouti; and C. Rijken (2017), Van azc naar een baan. 
De Nederlandse regelgeving over en praktijk van arbeidsmarktintegratie van 
vluchtelingen, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
Lange, T. de; H. Oostrom; and P. Krop (2016), ‘Arbeidsmigratie’, in K. Zwaan ed., 
Nederlands Migratierecht, Boom Juridische Uitgevers.
Lange, T. de and C. Rijken (12 January 2016), ‘Asielzoeker kan eerder aan de slag’, 
Opinie Volkskrant.
Lewis, H. and L. Waite (2015), ‘Asylum, Immigration Restrictions and Exploitation: 
Hyper-precarity as a lens for understanding and tackling forced labour’, Anti-
Trafficking Review, 5 pp. 49-67.
Migrantenrecht (1991) ‘Werkvergunning asielzoekers’, Migrantenrecht 2, pp. 39-40.
O’Connell Davidson, J. (2013), ‘Troubling freedom: migration, debt, and modern 
slavery’, Migration Studies, 2 pp. 176-195.
Slingenberg, L. (2014), ‘Asylum seekers’ access to employment: Tensions with 
human rights obligations in the recast of the directive on reception conditions 
for asylum seekers’, in C. Matera and A. Taylor (eds.), The Common European 
Asylum System and Human rights: enhancing protection in times of emergencies, 
CLEER Working Papers, p. 96.
Stichting van de Arbeid, Recommendation letter (SA 0007896/HA, 2000).
Stoffelen, A. (11 November 2016), ‘Asielzoekers weigeren werk door eigen bijdrage 
opvang’, Volkskrant.
WRR, WODC, and SCP (2015), Geen tijd verliezen: van opvang naar integratie van 
asielmigranten, Policy Brief 4.
About the Author
Tesseltje de Lange is assistant professor Administrative and Migration 
Law at the Law Faculty of the University of Amsterdam and was senior 





8 When Bad Labour Conditions Become 
Exploitation
Lessons Learnt from the Chowdury Case
Conny Rijken
Abstract
This chapter explains how exploitation is related to practices of slav-
ery, forced and compulsory labour, and traff icking in human beings. 
Understanding the different types and levels of abuse of workers and 
how such practices are legally qualif ied help to distinguish between bad 
labour conditions and exploitation. Rijken pays special attention to the 
recent case of Chowdury et al., vs Greece in which the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) clarif ied some aspects related to forced labour 
but left others untouched. Based on the concepts of consent, coercion, and 
vulnerability, Rijken provides a framework that can be used to determine 
when a situation is qualif ied as exploitation.
Keywords: labour exploitation, forced labour, Chowdury case, slavery, 
human traff icking
Introduction
Decent work can turn into bad labour and bad labour can degenerate into 
labour exploitation. A situation of labour exploitation is not static, nor 
are bad labour and decent work. Migrant workers, especially those at the 
low end of the labour market, are more prone to end up in a situation of 
exploitation caused by a complex array of (interrelated) factors, such as 
labour market demands for flexibility and migration opportunities, which 
Rijken, Conny and Tesseltje de Lange (eds): Towards a Decent Labour Market for Low Waged 
Migrant Workers. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018  
doi: 10.5117/9789462987555_rijk
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f lourish in today’s globalised world.1 When migrant workers are in the 
host country for only a limited period of time, it is more diff icult for them 
to become familiar with their (labour) rights, to execute these rights, and 
they have fewer chances to be subjected to control by monitoring bodies.2 
Because of a lack of job opportunities and dire economic situations in their 
home countries, migrants may be willing to try their chances in another 
country, even under bad working conditions. These factors increase their 
vulnerability to be exploited. Apart from this more or less voluntary entry 
into exploitative working conditions, the exploitation of a person can also 
imply explicit involuntariness, pressure, and even force. The term ‘exploita-
tion’ is easily used to point at practices in which labour laws are violated. 
In legal terms, however, it is not clear when bad labour practices qualify 
as exploitation.3 On both national and international levels, academics, 
legislators, and practitioners struggle to clarify this term. In some countries, 
exploitation of persons, as such, is a criminal offence, while, in many other 
countries, exploitation is seen as the negative outcome or intent of the crime 
of human traff icking. Whether and how exploitation is related to practices 
of slavery, forced and compulsory labour, and traff icking in human beings 
still needs further scrutiny. This chapter aims to contribute to this process 
and will explain the different types and levels of abuse of workers and 
how such practices are legally qualif ied. It argues that exploitation is an 
overarching term including different forms of abuse in labour situations 
and a practice at the very end of the continuum of decent work, bad labour 
conditions, and exploitation. It will pay special attention to the recent 
case of Chowdury et al., vs Greece, in which the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) clarif ied some aspects of the discussion but left others 
untouched. Another important development at the international level is 
the adoption of the protocol to the Convention on forced and compulsory 
labour adopted by the ILO in 2014. The added value of this protocol will also 
be addressed in this chapter. First, the legal definition of labour exploitation 
1 B. Anderson and J. O’Connell Davidson (2003), Trafficking – A Demand Led Problem? A Multi 
Country Pilot Study, International Organisation for Migration; A. van den Anker and I. van Liempt 
(eds.) (2012), Human Rights and Migration. Trafficking for Forced Labour, Palgrave Macmillan; 
H. F. Chang (2008), ‘The Economics of International Labour Migration and the Case for Global 
Distributive Justice in Liberal Political Theory’, Cornell International Law Journal, p. 1.
2 D. Mccann and J. Fudge (June 2017), ‘Unacceptable forms of work: A multidimensional mode’, 
in International Labour Review, 156(2) pp.147-184.
3 European Agency on Fundamental Rights (FRA) published its report (2015) Severe Labour 
Exploitation: Workers Moving within or into the European Union, States’ Obligations and Victims’ 
Rights. 
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will be explored, followed by a discussion of the Chowdury case. The chapter 
continues with the factors that determine the dividing line between bad 
labour conditions and exploitation. The reasons to distinguish between 
these two are: f irst, because practices of exploitation are a criminal offence 
in most jurisdictions, which implies competences for law enforcement 
authorities. Bad labour conditions are most often considered violations of 
labour law. Second, because exploitation is the detrimental outcome or the 
very aim of human traff icking and combating it implies specif ic obligations 
to protect its victims and to prevent the phenomenon.
Labour Exploitation: Forced Labour, Slavery, and Servitude
The term (labour) exploitation is often used, but rarely def ined.4 In some 
countries, a mere violation of labour rights is considered exploitation, 
whereas, in other countries, only cases of severe violation qualify as such, 
albeit without further def ining such severity.5 Questions as to whether or 
not coercion is a constitutive element of exploitation and whether or not 
exploitation exists or can exist if the worker has ‘consented’ to the long 
working hours or low pay, are addressed differently in different jurisdictions.6 
What conduct or circumstances constitute exploitation is not consistently 
understood and is dependent on how situations are framed in national 
legislation.7 A lack of criteria for determining the existence of exploitation 
further contributes to this conceptual indistinctness.
Labour exploitation can be the objectionable outcome of the traff icking 
process and, therefore, is often related to human traff icking.8 In order 
4 UNODC issue paper (2015), The Concept of ‘Exploitation’ in the Trafficking in Persons Protocol, 
pp. 24-26.
5 International Labour Organization (2009), Forced Labour and Human Trafficking. Casebook 
of Court Decisions. Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour.
6 V. Ottonelli and T. Torresi (2013), ‘When is Migration Voluntary?’, International Migration 
Review, 47 pp. 783-813; J.G. Pope (2010), ‘A Free Labor Approach to Human Traff icking’, University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review, 158 pp. 1849-1875; R. Steinfeld (2009), Coercion/Consent in Labour, 
Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, Working Paper No. 66, University of Oxford; M. Szulecka 
(2012), ‘The Rights to be Exploited: Vietnamese Workers in Poland’, in C. van den Anker and I. van 
Liempt (eds.), Human Rights and Migration. Trafficking for Forced Labour, Palgrave Macmillan.
7 B. Anderson (2010), ‘Migration, immigration controls and the fashioning of precarious 
workers’, Work, Employment and Society, 24(2) pp. 300-317; J. O´Connell Davidson (2013), ‘Troubling 
freedom: migration, debt, and modern slavery’, Migration Studies, pp. 1-20. 
8 Article 3 of the Traff icking Protocol def ines human traff icking as: the recruitment, trans-
portation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or 
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position 
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to identify the dividing line between bad labour conditions and labour 
exploitation, it is not only relevant to elucidate terminological ambiguity, 
but it also helps to clarify in which situations the anti-traff icking legal 
framework (including provisions on protection of victims) can be triggered.
The term ‘labour exploitation’ regained attention when it was included 
in the def inition on human traff icking in the Traff icking Protocol to the 
UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime in 2000.9 Traff icking in 
human beings has long been associated with sexual exploitation and forced 
prostitution, but the Traff icking Protocol brought labour exploitation under 
the human traff icking umbrella. Without going into the nitty gritty of the 
def inition of human traff icking,10 exploitation in the Traff icking Protocol 
has not been defined, but is instead described in Article 3(2):
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitu-
tion of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal 
of organs.
Hence, Article 3 only lists a number of situations, which, ‘in any case’, must 
be considered exploitation. It does not, however, indicate what factors 
determine ‘exploitation’. As mentioned, forced labour or services, servitude, 
slavery, or practices similar to slavery are phenomena that fall within the 
scope of labour exploitation and we have to look into long-standing conven-
tions addressing these topics to understand their content.11
Forced labour has been defined in the 29 ILO convention as: ‘all work or 
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty 
of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benef its to achieve the consent of a 
person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall 
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs.
9 Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Traff icking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 15 November 2000 
UN Doc. A/RES/55/25.
10 J.A. Chuang (2014), ‘Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Traff icking Law’, The 
American Journal of International Law, 108 pp. 609-649; J. Allain (2008-2009), ‘The Def inition of 
Slavery in International Law’, Howard Law Journal, 52 pp. 258-261. Also see various contributions 
in special issue, Anti-Trafficking Review (2015), issue 4 .
11 Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory labour (ILO no. 29) 39 UNTS 55, 1930; P 029 
Protocol of 2014 to the forced labour convention, 1930; Slavery Convention of 1926, 25 September 
1926, 60 LNTS 253. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 7 September 1956, 226 UNTS 3.
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and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily’.12 The ILO 
later explained that preventing people from leaving their jobs also equals to 
forced labour and, furthermore, that what commenced as a voluntary situa-
tion can later turn into a situation of forced labour.13 In 2014, this convention 
was supplemented with a protocol attempting to explain the link between 
human traff icking and forced labour. The protocol reaff irms the definition 
of the 1930 Convention and states that ‘therefore the measures referred to 
in this Protocol shall include specif ic action against traff icking in persons 
for the purposes of forced or compulsory labour’. This, however, does not 
elucidate how the connection between traff icking and forced labour must 
be understood, but it seems to imply that forced labour is a possible outcome 
of human traff icking, whereas, previously, human traff icking was seen by 
the ILO as a form of forced labour. It furthermore aims to establish similar 
protection for victims of forced labour as for victims of human traff icking. 
The protocol addresses three elements: prevention, protection of victims, 
and compensation to victims. According to the protocol, forced labour 
should be combatted by using criminal law, public law, and labour law.
Slavery is defined in the 1926 Slavery Convention as: ‘the status or condi-
tion of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right 
of ownership are exercised’.14
Nowadays, the possibility to exercise legal ownership over a person has 
been abolished throughout the world. Still, factual ownership, people behav-
ing as if they have ownership over another person e.g. by selling that person 
to someone else, still exists and is criminalised worldwide, and is qualif ied 
as (modern) slavery, human traff icking, or another serious offence.15 The 
recent CNN reports about the selling of migrants in camps in Libya are proof 
of these practices.16 Interestingly, the Slavery Convention distinguished 
between slavery and the slave trade. The slave trade was defined as:
all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with 
intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a 
slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale 
or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, 
and, in general, every act of trade or transport in slaves.
12 ILO Convention 29, 1930. 
13 ILO Working Paper Forced Labour: Definition, Indicators and Measurement, 2004.
14 Article 1(1), Slavery Convention of 1926, (25 September 1926), 60 LNTS 253.
15 J. Allain (2009), ‘R v Tang: Clarifying the Def inition of ‘Slavery’ in International Law’, 
Melbourne Journal of International Law, 10(1).
16 Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/specials/africa/libya-slave-auctions. 
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Similar to the earlier distinction made between human traff icking and 
exploitation in prostitution in the 1949 Convention17, the exploitative 
practices (slavery and exploitation in prostitution) are the outcomes of the 
recruitment process (slave trade and human traff icking). With the adoption 
of the Traff icking Protocol, not only was exploitation in prostitution, other 
forms of sexual exploitation, and exploitation in labour merged into one 
definition, but the clear distinction between the recruitment process or the 
movement and actual exploitation was done away with. In the additional 
protocol to the Slavery Convention, the following practices were identif ied 
as practices similar to slavery: debt bondage, serfdom, forced marriage, 
women inheritance, and child exploitation.
Servitude is not defined in a separate treaty, but is prohibited, for instance, 
in Article 4 of the ECHR. In the case law of the EctHR, servitude is described 
as: a ‘particularly serious form of denial of freedom’, which includes, ‘in 
addition to the obligation to perform certain services for others […] the 
obligation for the “serf” to live on another person’s property and the impos-
sibility of altering his condition’.18 As such, servitude is a practice between 
forced labour and slavery.
Exploitation explained
Understanding exploitation has led to important academic debates. In the 
context of human traff icking, Chuang criticises the traff icking def inition 
because ‘forced labour is recast as traff icking’ and ‘all traff icking is labelled 
as slavery’, which, in her view, creates an ‘exploitation creep’. She explains 
the debate on whether or not all forms of forced labour must be consid-
ered human traff icking rather than only those situations of forced labour 
preceded by an act as def ined in the traff icking def inition, ‘recruitments, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons’. By turning the 
focus on forced labour and qualifying it as human traff icking, the expertise 
of human rights lawyers and labour rights lawyers, rather than merely 
criminal law lawyers, were naturally exerted to combat human traff icking. 
More recently, the term of ‘modern slavery’ has been used to replace the term 
human traff icking.19 This is at odds with the human traff icking definition, 
17 Article 1, Convention for the Suppression of the Traff ic in Persons and of the Exploitation 
of the Prostitution of Others, 1949. 
18 Case of Siliadin v. France, Application no. 73316/01, 26 July 2005 para 123.
19 J. Allain and K. Bales (2012), ‘Slavery and Its Def inition’, Global Dialogue, 14(2). 
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which considers slavery and practices similar to slavery as examples of the 
exploitative purpose of human traff icking. Additionally, it seems overly 
dramatised to qualify less severe forms of traff icking as modern slavery. 
Furthermore, as we have seen above, slavery in the 1926 Convention is 
narrowly def ined, and, even with the extended understanding of modern 
slavery as the factual exercise of ownership rather than a legal one, the 
concept of human traff icking must be understood to be broader than 
(modern) slavery.20 For the crime of traff icking to exist, three elements 
must be present, namely an act of recruitment, a means (e.g. force, abuse 
of position of vulnerability, or deception), and an aim of exploitation. It 
cannot merely be reduced to only the third element, e.g. slavery as a form 
of exploitation.21
Chuang further argues that ‘existing labour and migration frameworks 
have proven inadequate to the task of protecting those at the bottom of the 
global labour hierarchy’, which she considers a core task of in anti-trafficking 
law and policy regimes. She concludes by saying that;
traff icking is often labour migration gone horribly wrong and that it is at 
least partly due to the combination of tightened border controls, which 
have created a growing market for clandestine migration services, and 
lax labour laws, which permit employers and recruiters to coercively 
exploit their workers with impunity.22
Thus, the situation of labour exploitation must not be looked at in isolation 
but in the broader context of structural market dynamics and practices, 
labour policies, and migration policies that shape workers’ vulnerability. For 
this reason, many scholars advocate a combined approach to traff icking as 
well as to labour exploitation of which a labour approach is a part.23
Labour exploitation not only takes place in a migratory setting, but also 
occurs in domestic situations. Nevertheless, the examples in this volume 
show that migrant workers and especially undocumented migrants and 
migrant workers in f lexible contracts and at the low and of the labour 
market are more vulnerable to exploitative practices.
20 Chuang, J. A. (2014), ‘Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Traff icking Law’, The 
American Journal of International Law, 108 pp. 624-625.
21 Chuang (2014), pp. 631-632.
22 Chuang (2014), p. 639.
23 D. Mccann and J. Fudge (June 2017), ‘Unacceptable forms of work: A multidimensional 
model’, International Labour Review, 156(2), pp. 147-184; J.G. Pope (2010), ‘A Free Labor Approach 
to Human Traff icking’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 158 pp. 1849-1875.
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To elucidate the elements of exploitation and related phenomena further, 
we now turn to discuss the recent case Chowdury and others v. Greece of 
March 2017 of the ECtHR.24
The Case of Chowdury
Manolada Region in Greece is well-known for its agriculture. Farmers make 
use of migrant workers who often do not possess residency or work permits 
(hereafter referred to as undocumented workers) for harvesting the fruits 
and vegetables. The case of Chowdury started in April 2013 when a group of 
150 undocumented Bangladeshi workers were shot at when they protested 
because they were not being paid the salary they were promised, or were 
not paid at all. Over 30 workers were severely injured during the shooting. 
The workers had to work and live under abhorrent circumstances; they 
worked twelve hours a day in the f ields watched by armed guards, they 
were promised 22 euros a day, but the salaries were not paid. They lived in 
sheds without toilets or running water. The case was brought before the 
national court, which acquitted the employers for human traff icking. The 
migrant workers were not completely powerless and deprived of freedom of 
movement and therefore the case could not qualify as human traff icking, 
according to the Greek court. The Greek court convicted the employers to 
pay the victims 43 euros each, for causing grievous bodily harm caused by 
the shootings, and for the unlawful use of f irearms. Disappointed by the 
outcome at the national level, 42 Bangladeshi workers f iled a case against 
Greece at the ECtHR for violation of the positive obligations under Article 4 
ECHR, containing a prohibition of slavery, forced labour, and servitude. 
The migrants claimed they had been subjected to forced labour and hu-
man traff icking. The Court held Greece liable for violating Article 4(2), the 
prohibition of forced labour, and noted that the applicants’ situation was 
one of human traff icking and forced labour, and that Greece failed in its 
positive obligations to prevent and investigate the situation as well as to 
protect the victims.
The Chowdury case is considered a landmark case because of the reason-
ing of the Court to qualify the situation as one of forced labour and human 
traff icking and because, by using the ‘disproportionate burden’ test, it helps 
24 Affaire Chowdury et autres c. Grèce, Requête no 21884/15, 30 March 2017. 
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us to distinguish between bad labour conditions and forced labour. The 
importance of the case will be discussed in seven points.
First, in para. 123, the Court held that restrictions upon freedom of move-
ment cannot be a necessary element (a condition sine qua non) for qualifying 
a situation as forced labour (and as human traff icking). It responded to the 
Greek government that argued that this case is not a case of forced labour 
nor human traff icking because the migrant workers had the opportunity to 
leave, go out and go shopping when they were not at work. If such freedom 
and movement were also restricted, it could have amounted to situations 
of servitude or slavery.
Second, the Court considers the fact that applicants are undocumented 
migrants relevant to determine their position of vulnerability, especially 
because of the threats from the employer should they refuse to cooperate. 
The employer told the workers that they would not be paid or that they would 
be killed if they did not continue to work for him (para. 98). In addition, the 
Court took into account the fact that the workers felt obliged to continue 
to work, knowing that, if they stopped working, they would not receive 
the wages owed to them, especially considering that they had no other 
means of subsistence (paras. 95 and 97). In case of abuse of such a position 
of vulnerability, it cannot be claimed that the workers offered themselves 
voluntarily (para. 96). The absence of voluntariness in accepting a job is 
a requirement of forced labour under the ILO Convention 29 as we have 
seen above.
This ties into the third interesting aspect of the case, namely that the 
Court reconfirms that prior consent is not an obstacle to define a situation 
of forced labour. The Greek authorities considered that the workers had 
consented to the working conditions, as they had been informed of the 
conditions at the point of recruitment. The ECtHR, however, concluded that, 
given the circumstances of this case and especially the abuse of power and 
the position of vulnerability (i.e. undocumented migrants, risk of expulsion), 
deprived the prior consent from its meaning.
96. The Court further considers that where an employer abuses his power 
or takes advantage of the vulnerability of his workers in order to exploit 
them, they do not offer themselves for work voluntarily. The prior consent 
of the victim is not suff icient to exclude the characterisation of work as 
forced labour.
This is very much in line with how consent is understood in the context 
of human traff icking. In case any of the means listed in the traff icking 
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definition are used, the consent given to the situation is irrelevant.25 Two 
NGOs, PICUM and AIRE Centre, in their joint intervention letter in the 
Chowdury case, consider an assessment of the level of ‘control’ exercised by 
the employer over the victim, the nature of the menace and the severity of 
the penalty, to be an essential element in defining forced labour. According 
to them, factors that are relevant for such assessment include violence, 
restriction of movement, debt bondage, withholding of wages, retention 
of passports, and threat of denunciation to authorities.26 Thus, the level of 
control is often determined by a form of coercion.
A fourth contribution of the Chowdury case is the fact that it clarif ied the 
‘disproportionate burden’ test ( fardeau disproportionné, para. 91) originally 
introduced in Van der Mussele v. Belgium.27 This test attempts to distinguish 
forced or compulsory labour in the context of forced labour and forced or 
compulsory labour in the context of one’s position or duties in an ordinary 
work situation. Para. 37 of the van der Mussele case states:
This could be so in the case of a service required in order to gain access to 
a given profession, if the service imposed a burden which was so excessive 
or disproportionate to the advantages attached to the future exercise 
of that profession, that the service could not be treated as having been 
voluntarily accepted beforehand.
Thus, if the service or work required (in the case of Van der Mussele in order 
to become an advocate) is excessive or disproportionate compared to the 
advantages it generates, it must be considered as not voluntarily accepted 
and (if other elements are fulf illed) constitutes forced labour. Labour that 
is in the ‘general interest, social solidarity and what is in the normal or 
ordinary course of affairs’ and is not unreasonable or disproportionate 
cannot be considered as forced labour (para. 38-39 van der Mussele). In 
other words, it tries to def ine when a person is subjected to an ‘excessive 
and disproportionate burden’, justifying the qualif ication of forced labour. 
In Chowdury, the Court notes that, for such assessment, all circumstances 
25 Article 3(b) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traff icking in Persons Especially 
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime.
26 Submission for intervenors, The AIRE Centre (Advice for Individual Rights in Europe) and 
Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), Application No. 
21884/15, para 6. ILO Report, Human Traff icking and Forced Labour Exploitation Guidance for 
Legislation and Law Enforcement (2005) pp. 20-21.
27 ECtHR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium, Application No. 8919/80, 23 November 1983.
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of the case need to be taken into account.28 Therefore, the fact that migrants 
were undocumented, ran the risk of not being paid at all when leaving, and 
the risk of being arrested and deported contributed to their vulnerability 
and were taken into account by the court (para. 95-96).
Fifth, the court tries to explain the relation between forced labour and 
human traff icking but complicates a conceptual divide by referring to the 
concept of exploitation. Although it strengthens the relevance of the defining 
forced labour, servitude, and slavery as prohibited in Article 4 ECHR, this 
case does not further add to the relation between these concepts nor to 
how the concept of ‘exploitation’ f its in, as Stoyanova rightly pointed out 
in her blog post on this case.29
Sixth, this case points out that the obligations to protect and assist 
traff icking victims also apply to those who have been subjected to forced 
labour. Here, the Court follows its line of reasoning initiated in Rantsev, in 
which the Court decided that human traff icking falls within the scope of 
Article 4 ECHR.30 Furthermore, it is also in line with the protocol to the 
Forced Labour Convention that requires the equal treatment of victims of 
traff icking and forced labour.
Seventh, and, logically, in light of Article 2 ECHR, the obligations following 
from the ECHR including the positive obligations to protect, also apply to 
undocumented migrants present on the territory of a State and not only to 
those legally residing in a country.
Bad Labour Conditions and Exploitation
So far, we have discussed concepts and practices that are clear examples of 
exploitation: forced labour, slavery, modern slavery, and human traff icking. 
It is, however, more challenging to take a look at those situations that are 
less obviously qualif ied as exploitation. Such situations arise, for instance, 
when no force or coercion is used, when the labour migrant has consented 
to the low salary, horrible living conditions, and excessive working hours. 
Labour exploitation is an overarching term and can be situated at the 
very end of the continuum of decent work, bad labour conditions, and 
28 Very much in line with D. McCann and J. Fudge (June 2017), ‘Unacceptable forms of work: 
A multidimensional model’, International Labour Review, 156(2), pp.147-184.
29 V. Stoyanova, Irregular Migrants and the Prohibition of Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour & 
Human Trafficking under Article 4 of the ECHR, blog post available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/
author/vladislavastoyanova/ 
30 ECtHR, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Application no. 25965/04, 7 January 2010. 
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exploitation (including forced labour and human traff icking).31 Decent work 
can turn into bad labour conditions and bad labour conditions sometimes 
degenerate into exploitation. But when do violations of labour law qualify 
as labour exploitation? Consent, control (or coercion), and vulnerability are 
three relevant factors that can be distilled from the Chowdury case. Below, 
we will further explore these elements of consent, vulnerability, and control 
(or coercion) to distinguish between bad labour conditions and labour 
exploitation. The case of Chowdury made clear that consent is irrelevant in 
a case in which a person’s situation of vulnerability is abused. It furthermore 
made explicit that restricting liberty to move can exist both in physical and 
psychological restriction. Chowdury, made clear that we need to consider 
the situation as a whole and assess every case individually.32 Furthermore, if 
circumstances imply an excessive or disproportionate burden for accessing 
a job, it must be considered forced labour. Logically, this equally applies 
during the execution of a job or when leaving a job. The next question, then, 
is when are circumstances excessive or disproportionate?
This question on excessive or disproportionate circumstances ties into 
more philosophical debates about exploitation. Wertheimer, for instance, 
considers a situation in which unfair advantage is taken of another person 
as exploitation.33 Goodin takes a vulnerability approach and argues that a 
person’s vulnerability creates obligations vis a vis the vulnerable person. He 
considers (unusual) advantage-taking behaviour over a vulnerable person 
to be decisive for the qualif ication of exploitation.34 Sample,35 critiquing 
Wertheimer and Goodin, uses the criteria of degrading (disrespectful or 
harmful treatment) to qualify a situation of exploitation because this better 
reflects the moral wrongness of the exploitation, an aspect she considers 
to be absent in the theories of Wertheimer and Goodin. Though worded 
differently, what is key in all three theories is the taking advantage of a 
person for one’s own benef it and to the detriment of the other person; 
either by taking unfair advantage, by abusing someone’s vulnerability, or 
by degrading treatment.
31 K. Skrivankova (November 2010), Between Decent Work and Forced Labour: Examining the 
Continuum of Exploitation, paper for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, available at: https://www.
jrf.org.uk/. 
32 D. Mccann and J. Fudge (June 2017), ‘Unacceptable forms of work: A multidimensional 
model’, International Labour Review, 156(2), pp. 147-184.
33 A. Wertheimer (1996), Exploitation, Princeton University Press, p. 10.
34 R. Goodin (1985), Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities, 
University of Chicago Press. 
35 R.J. Sample (2003), Exploitation. What It Is and Why It’s Wrong, Rowman & Littlef ield, p. 56.
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Control (Including Coercion) as a Condition to Exploitation
As we have learned from the Chowdury case, control can be both physi-
cal control and psychological control. This is also reflected in the means 
included in the traff icking protocol, which includes force and coercion, but 
also abuse of power or position of vulnerability, deception, and fraud. In 
fact, the way control is exercised is not predetermined and can be any act. 
It is the effect of such an act on the freedom of the person that determines 
whether it can be considered unfair. In line with Bales and Allain, the 
exercise of control by a person over another person, because the other person 
f inds him or herself in a position of vulnerability, is relevant to qualifying 
a situation as exploitative. Control, as well, is a subjective element since it 
depends on the level of resistance one is able to create, which determines 
the vulnerability of the affected person (see below).36 With more severe 
forms of control such as violence and coercion, it is reasonable that the 
person cannot resist the pressure. This, however, might be more diff icult 
to understand in case the control is more subtle, for instance, in case of 
deception or abuse of vulnerability.
What, in such cases, can be expected from the person in terms of resist-
ance? Although labour standards in a country are helpful, this question 
cannot be answered in general terms. The position of vulnerability, personal 
circumstances, the social location, and the social context are all relevant.37 
Thus, although the element of control the employer has over the worker 
(including coercion) is an important factor, it needs to be assessed in conjunc-
tion with other elements of vulnerability and the broader circumstances of 
the specif ic case. Consequently, a situation can be qualif ied as exploitation 
even if a person has consented to e.g. exploitative conditions. In such a case, 
the level of control over the worker might distract consent from its effect, or 
nullify consent. In the case of Chowdury, the initial consent and the ability 
to leave the workplace does not hamper the conclusion that this was a case 
of forced labour and human traff icking.
The Role of Consent in Defining Exploitation
Following the above, the existence of consent is not a burden for qualifying 
a situation as exploitation. Translated to the situation of migrant workers, 
36 J. Allain and K. Bales (2012), ‘Slavery and Its Def inition’, Global Dialogue, 14(2). 
37 D. McCann and J. Fudge (June 2017), ‘Unacceptable forms of work: A multidimensional 
model’, International Labour Review, 156(2), pp.
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this observation is highly relevant because, due to a lack of information and 
often dire economic situations in the home country, migrant workers are 
often prepared to accept working conditions and payment that are far below 
the standard in the host country, but nonetheless can be beneficial for the 
migrant worker. As mentioned above, consent is irrelevant when means 
(forms of coercion) are used in the process of forced labour and human 
traff icking.38 In other cases in which consent was given, objective indicators 
are needed to determine whether a situation is exploitative, regardless of 
the consent given.39 Such objective indicators can be found in regulations 
on compulsory wages, labour conditions, working hours, etc. The level of 
coercion used can be taken into account when determining the severity 
of a case. Still, the question remains what the level of deviation from the 
standard, or minimum rule, is needed to justify the exploitation label. Again, 
this question needs to be answered taking into account all circumstances 
of the case, and depends on the national situation and legislation. The ILO 
indicators for traff icking for the purpose of labour exploitation are helpful 
to objectify criteria and include e.g. low or no salary, excessive working 
hours, bad living and working conditions, absence of contract.40 Further 
translation to the national levels is needed for a concrete assessment.
The Role of Vulnerability in Defining Exploitation
According to the Travaux préparatoires to the Traff icking Protocol, the 
state of vulnerability ‘is understood as referring to any situation in which 
the person involved has no real or acceptable alternative but to submit to 
the abuse involved’.41 This circular reasoning is not very helpful in defining 
vulnerability. Vulnerability is not a static concept, and the impact of this 
concept largely depends on the position of the person at risk of exploitation. 
Gallagher, in her position paper for the UNODC, distinguished between 
38 Article 3(b) of the Palermo Protocol states: (b) The consent of a victim of traff icking in persons 
to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where 
any of the means set forth in sub paragraph (a) have been used; UNODC Issue Paper (2014), The 
role of ´consent´ in the trafficking in persons protocol, p. 7.
39 C. Rijken (2015), ‘Legal Approaches to Combating the Exploitation of Third-Country National 
Seasonal Workers’, The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
31(4) pp. 431-452.
40 ILO Operational indicators for traff icking in human beings, available at: http://www.ilo.
org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_105023.
pdf 
41 A.T. Gallagher (2011), The International Law Making of Human Trafficking, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 32.
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intrinsic factors linked to the victim, such as age, illness, gender, and poverty, 
on the one hand, and control factors such as isolation, dependency, and 
irregular legal status created by the exploiter, on the other hand.42 Elsewhere, 
we suggested to distinguish between internal factors, external factors, and 
triggers or situational factors.43 Vulnerability can consist of more objective 
elements that represent the external factors, such as poverty, lack of educa-
tion, and irregular legal status. But not all persons in such a vulnerable 
situation end up being exploited. The individual circumstances and state 
of mind – the internal factors – are relevant in creating a heightened risk of 
vulnerability. There are individualised factors that make people more or less 
vulnerable, such as an adventurous and thrill-seeking nature, dependence, 
and level of intelligence. These internal factors elucidate why, in similar 
circumstances, person A is vulnerable for exploitative practices while person 
B is not. Triggers or situational circumstances can also cause vulnerable 
people to become subject to abuse, for instance, if a potential migrant worker 
is out of a job in his or her home country and the child of the worker is in 
need of expensive medical treatment, or the addiction of a spouse causes 
debts and consequently an acute need for money. It is a combination of these 
three groups of factors that can cause a toxic mix in which persons become 
vulnerable to exploitation. The abuse of a situation of vulnerability refers 
to the act of the exploiter and cannot be justif ied by the motivations of a 
person to put himself or herself in the position of vulnerability. For instance, 
in the Dutch Chinese Restaurant case, the traff icking victims, who were 
undocumented, had asked to work in the Chinese Restaurant.44 The abuse 
that was made of their vulnerable status as undocumented could not be 
justif ied by the fact that they had offered themselves voluntarily, nor by 
the fact that they had consented to work for eleven to fourteen hours a day 
for a monthly income of €450 to €800, to having only f ive days off a month, 
and to sharing bedrooms.
For Hill as well as for Goodin, exploitation and vulnerability are inex-
tricably bound. Reducing ones vulnerability diminishes the risk of being 
exploited. They recognise that vulnerability is a precondition to exploitation 
and is def ined by Hill as “a disposition of personality or circumstance of 
42 UNODC Issue Paper (2012), Abuse of a Position of Vulnerability and other “Means” within the 
Definition of Trafficking in Persons, Vienna. 
43 L. van Waas, C. Rijken, M. Gramatikov, and D. Brennan (2015), Researching the nexus between 
statelessness and human trafficking. The Example of Thailand, Wolf Legal Publishers, pp. 98-107, 
159-163. 
44 LJN: BI7099, Supreme Court, 08/03895
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life that serve to hamper the rational-emotive process”.45 Put differently, 
all exploited persons are vulnerable in one way or another. However, this 
does not mean that all vulnerable people are exploited, as was explained 
above, nor does it mean that vulnerable people are unable to make rational 
decisions. Poverty or political oppression, for instance, can be qualif ied as 
vulnerability factors relevant to exploitation only if being poor or oppressed 
creates some internal psychological disability affecting the person’s capacity 
to make a decision. Merely qualifying one’s vulnerability as relevant for 
exploitation, without the abuse thereof, would have the effect of victimising 
people who should not be victimised.46
Conclusion
The question of when bad labour conditions turn into exploitation cannot 
be answered in general terms. This chapter, however, identif ied three key 
factors that play a role in defining the tipping point between the two. These 
key factors are control (including coercion) over the worker, vulnerability, 
and consent. Coercion is not a constitutive element for exploitation, but, 
in a situation in which coercion has been used, exploitation is more easily 
established. In the same vein, the absence of consent also is not a prereq-
uisite for exploitation. In a consensual situation, objectif ied criteria can 
serve as assessment tools for the existence of exploitation, which has to be 
determined on a case by case basis and by taking into account all aspects 
relevant to the specif ic situation.
Having a better understanding of the continuum between bad labour 
conditions and exploitation and recognising the tipping points and key 
elements, is a prerequisite for f ighting both bad labour conditions and 
exploitation. The former are more effectively addressed with enforcement of 
labour standards, while the latter are also to be combatted under criminal 
law and the protection mechanisms offered to victims of exploitation and 
traff icking. The question left unanswered in this chapter is whether or not 
such mechanisms should also be made available for those who have been 
subjected to bad labour conditions. At the EU level, and specif ically in the 
45 J.L. Hill (1994), ‘Exploitation’, Cornell Law Review, 79 p. 686.
46 UNODC Issue paper (2012), Abuse of position of vulnerability and other “means” within the 
definition of trafficking in persons, 9, pp. 84-86; J. L. Pérez (2015), ‘A criminological reading of the 
concept of vulnerability: A case study of Brazilian traff icking victims’, Social and Legal Studies, 
25(1) pp. 23-42.
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employers sanction directive47 and the seasonal workers directive,48 some 
indications can be found to answer this question in the aff irmative.
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9 Employer Sanctions
Instrument of Labour Market Regulation, Migration 
Control, and Worker Protection?
Lisa Berntsen and Tesseltje de Lange1
Abstract
This chapter focusses on employer sanctions and examines the func-
tioning of sanctions as a policy tool for migration control. Bernsten and 
De Lange challenge the idea that employer sanctions, as executed in 
the Netherlands, are a tool for migration control and analyse the extent 
to which they are tools for labour market regulation and/or a tool for 
migrant worker protection. This chapter is based on extensive case 
f ile research at the Dutch labour inspectorate combined with selected 
Dutch case law to illustrate how little is known about the effectivity of 
employer sanctions as measures of migration controls to deter, expose, 
and curb irregular migration; to protect local business and workers 
from unfair competition; and to f ight the exploitation of workers.
Keywords: employer sanctions directive, labour inspectorate, case law 
analysis, implementation
1 Introduction
‘A key pull factor for illegal immigration into the EU is the possibility of 
obtaining work in the EU without the required legal status. Action against 
illegal immigration and illegal stay should therefore include measures to 
counter that pull factor.’2 This is the opening statement of the EU Employer 
1 We would like to acknowledge Institute Gak for funding this research and to thank Joanne 
van der Leun for comments on an earlier version of this chapter.
2 Preamble 2 of Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
18 June 2009providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers 
Rijken, Conny and Tesseltje de Lange (eds): Towards a Decent Labour Market for Low Waged 
Migrant Workers. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018  
doi: 10.5117/9789462987555_bern
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Sanctions Directive: a clear attack on illegal employment with the aim 
to control migration. This chapter focusses on these employer sanctions 
and examines the functioning of sanctions as a policy tool for migration 
control. We challenge the idea that employer sanctions, as executed in 
the Netherlands, are a tool for migration control and analyse the extent to 
which they are tools for labour market regulation and/or a tool for migrant 
worker protection. The way in which employer sanctions are executed in the 
Netherlands appears to prioritise labour market regulation over irregular 
migration control. This is, for instance, apparent from the government’s 
reasoning behind its enforcement approach regarding illegal employment, 
and is reflected in the lack of any mention of illegal migration in the Dutch 
labour inspectorate’s last three annual reports.3 This chapter is based on 
extensive case f ile research at the Dutch labour inspectorate combined 
with selected Dutch case law to illustrate how little is known about the 
effectiveness of employer sanctions as measures of migration controls to 
deter, expose, and curb irregular migration; to protect local business and 
workers from unfair competition; and to f ight the exploitation of workers.4
Sanctions as policy instrument are often criticised. First of all, there are 
doubts about the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument of migration 
control. The introduction or strengthening of sanctions has not led to a 
noticeable decrease in the number of irregular migrants.5,6 In its evaluation 
of the aforementioned EU Directive, the European Commission concluded: 
‘Following transposition of Directive 2009/52/EC, all Member States prohibit 
the employment of irregular migrants and impose f inancial, administrative 
or criminal sanctions on their employers. However, the severity of the 
of illegally staying third-country nationals [2009] OJ L-168/24, p. 3.
3 When the government changed to administrative instead of criminal sanctions for illegal 
employment in 2005, four reasons for this tougher approach to illegal employment were given: 
1) to curb substitution for the legal labour supply; 2) to stop violation of employment norms and 
standards and the exploitation of irregular migrant workers; 3) to end unfair competition; and 
4) to discourage prolonged irregular stay. Parliamentary Documents II 2003/04, 29523, p. 3.
4 A. Bloch et al. (2015), ’Employer sanctions: The impact of workplace raids and f ines on 
undocumented migrants and ethnic enclave’ CSP 35(1); T. de Lange (2011), ‘De verborgen schat 
van artikel 23 WAV’, Journaal Vreemdelingenrecht 1(4). 
5 By irregular migrants, we mean third-country nationals without a valid Dutch residence permit.
6 See, for instance, the reports from the Clandestino project (http://irregular-migration.net) 
and the Dutch country report specif ically: J. van der Leun and M. Ilies (2008), ‘Undocumented 
migration: counting the uncountable. Data and trends across Europe’ in the Netherlands country 
report, Clandestino Project. Also: European Commission (22 May 2014), ‘Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 
2009/52/EC of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against 
employers of illegally staying third country nationals’, COM(2014), 286 f inal.
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sanctions as determined by law varies considerably between Member States. 
This raises concerns whether sanctions can always be effective, proportion-
ate or dissuasive and will therefore have to be further assessed.’ Even when 
sanctions are severe, as in the Dutch case, we question their effectiveness 
as an instrument of migration control.7 Second, Klap and De Lange have 
argued that the employer sanction in the Netherlands is an instrument of 
labour market regulation, rather than one of migration control.8 A failure 
to comply may not just lead to f inancial penalties, it can also result in the 
exclusion of employers from the labour market, taking away their right to 
hire migrant workers legally. Third, tying in to the previous point, studies 
on the impact of sanctions have shown that it may increase workers’ vulner-
ability and push them into more exploitative working arrangements.9 This 
led Bacon to conclude that workers – rather than employers – have paid the 
price for the enforcement of employer sanctions.10 Fourth, the obligation of 
authorities to ensure that irregular workers can actually recover outstanding 
remuneration is hardly ever met in actual practice.11
This chapter starts off with a description of employer sanctions as a 
policy instrument in EU and Dutch law. Section 3 presents new data on 
inspections performed by the Dutch labour inspectorate that may lead to 
employer sanctions, and on illegal employment in the Netherlands. The 
next three sections discuss employer sanctions as a tool for labour market 
7 Sanctions are not always issued promptly after a workplace inspection. By law, they should 
be issued within f ive years after a violation takes place, art. 5:45 Dutch General Administrative 
Law Act (GALA). However, as soon as a formal report of violation has been communicated to 
the offender, the government has 13 weeks to decide on the f ine, art. 5:51 GALA. 
8 A. Klap and T. de Lange (2008), ‘Marktordening via het werkgeversbegrip van de Wet Arbeid 
Vreemdelingen’, SMA. 
9 M. LeVoy and S. Craenen (2007), ‘Undocumented Migrants in the Workplace: A Rights-Based 
Approach’, available at https://heimatkunde.boell.de/2007/11/18/undocumented-migrants-workplace-
rights-based-approach; Migrants’ Rights Network (MRN) (2009), Irregular migrants: the urgent 
need for a new approach; P. Dwyer, H. Lewis, L. Scullion, and L. Waite (2011), ‘Forced Labour and UK 
Immigration Policy: Status Matters?’ Joseph Rowntree Foundation, University of Salford; J. van der 
Leun and R. Kloosterman (2006), ‘Going underground: Immigration policy changes and shifts in 
modes of provision of undocumented immigrants in the Netherlands’, Tijdschrift voor Economische 
en Sociale Geografie 97(1); A. Bloch et al. (2015), ’Employer sanctions: The impact of workplace raids 
and fines on undocumented migrants and ethnic enclave’, CSP 35(1). 
10 D. Bacon (2008), Illegal People: How Globalization Creates Migration and Criminalizes 
Immigrants, Beacon Press, p. 6.
11 T. de Lange (2011), ‘The privatization of control over labour migration in the Netherlands: in 
whose interest?’ European Journal of Migration and Law, 13(2); European Commission (22 May 
2014), ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of Directive 2009/52/EC of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions 
and measures against employers of illegally staying third country nationals’, COM (2014), 286 final. 
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regulation, as a tool for migration control, and the role of the Inspectorate in 
protecting irregular workers, rounding off with the conclusion in Section 7.
2 Legal Structure of Employer Sanctions
In the literature, employer sanctions have been justif ied as a policy instru-
ment in the f ight against illegal employment as 1) a labour market regulation 
mechanism intended to protect local businesses and national workers by 
eliminating unfair competition from cheap labour, and to collect otherwise 
missed tax revenues in order to maintain the viability of the welfare state; 2) 
an instrument of migration control that aims to reduce the pull factors that 
draw the migrants who enter irregularly, and to deter prolonged irregular 
residence; and 3) since the transposition of the EU Employer Sanctions 
2009/52/EC (hereafter ESD) directive, as a mechanism to protect migrant 
workers from exploitative employment conditions.12
2.1 Employer Sanctions in Europe
The ESD is based on art. 79 Sections 1 and 2 c) of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the EU (the former article 63.3.b of Title IV of the EC Treaty on Visas, 
Asylum, Immigration and Other Policies Related to the Free Movement of 
Persons). The Treaty text obliges the EU to develop measures aimed at ‘the 
prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration’. 
Carrera and Guild have problematised this legal basis of the ESD: ‘While the 
paramount goal is “taking action against illegal immigration”, the principal 
focus is employment and working conditions. One must ask, therefore, 
whether the current legal basis really is the most appropriate one.’13 The ESD 
provides for sanctions against employers of illegally resident third-country 
nationals.14 The ESD sets minimum standards, meaning that the Member 
States are free to impose stricter obligations on employers. Third-country 
nationals (TCN, meaning non-EU nationals) that legally reside in a Member 
State fall outside the scope of the Directive, regardless of whether they 
12 See A. Bloch et al. (2015), ’Employer sanctions: The impact of workplace raids and f ines on 
undocumented migrants and ethnic enclave’, CSP 35(1); P.J. Krop (2014), De handhaving van het 
verbod op illegale tewerkstelling. De verhouding tussen strafrechtelijke en bestuursrechtelijke 
handhaving in de Werkgeverssanctierichtlijn, Nederland en Duitsland, Boom Juridische uitgevers.
13 S. Carrera and E. Guild (2007), ‘An EU Framework on Sanctions Against Employers of Irregular 
Immigrants: Some Reflections on the Scope, Features & Added Value’, CEPS Policy Brief, p. 140.
14 Art. 3 ESD.
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are allowed to work.15 The Directive is without prejudice to national law 
prohibiting the employment of legally resident TCN who work in breach of 
their residence status.16
Employer sanctions are exemplary of a governance shift: a shift of re-
sponsibility from the public to the private sphere making employers liable 
for migration status checks.17 Member States should oblige an employer to 
check the TCN’s residence permit or other authorisation for stay prior to 
employment and to keep a copy of those documents for at least the duration 
of the employment.18 According to the Directive, the employer should face 
f inancial sanctions, meaning a f inancial penalty (penal or administra-
tive) and be forced to pay the costs of repatriation, if a return procedure 
is carried out. It is up to the Member States to set the level of f ines, which 
is why these vary from Member State to Member State.19 In addition, the 
Member States may use other sanctions, such as exclusion from entitlements 
(such as EU subsidies) or public contracts, or recovery of public benef its. 
Another sanction mentioned is the temporary or permanent closure of 
the establishments that have been used to commit the infringement, or 
temporary or permanent withdrawal of a license to conduct the business 
activity in question, if justif ied by the gravity of the infringement.20 Where 
the employer is a subcontractor, and this would also be the case for agency 
work, Member States shall ensure that the contractor of which the employer 
is a direct subcontractor may, in addition to or in place of the employer, be 
liable to pay the f inancial sanction and any back payments to the migrant 
worker.21 Although the Directive mentions only one subcontractor, in 
practice, there can be a chain of subcontractors, if national law provides 
for chain liability. Finally, the sanctions should be of a criminal law nature 
if the infringement is committed intentionally and either continues or is 
persistently repeated; if it involves a signif icant number of illegally staying 
TCNs; if it is accompanied by particularly exploitative working conditions; if 
15 Preamble 5 ESD. 
16 Preamble 5 ESD.
17 T. de Lange (2011), ‘The Privatization of Control over Labour Migration in the Netherlands: In 
Whose Interest?’, European Journal of Migration and Law, 13(2); J. van der Leun (2006), ‘Excluding 
illegal migrants in The Netherlands: Between national policies and local implementation’ West 
European Politics 29(2); W.J. Nicholls (2015), ‘Policing Immigrants as Politicizing Immigration: The 
Paradox of Border Enforcement’, ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies 14(2). 
18 Art. 4 ESD.
19 A. Sommarribas, R. Petry, and B. Nienaber (2017), Illegal employment of third-country nationals 
in the European Union (EMN Synthesis Report 2017).
20 Art. 7, para. 1(a-d) ESD.
21 Art. 8 ESD.
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it is committed while knowing the TCN is a victim of traff icking in human 
beings; or if the infringement concerns the illegal employment of a minor.22
While employer sanctions punish employers for illegal employment, the 
ESD also includes provisions that protect the rights of migrants at work, despite 
their legal status. According to the ESD, the employer should be required to pay 
any outstanding remuneration, taxes, and social security contributions.23 This 
back pay includes the difference between what they were paid and the legal 
minimum wage, or its equivalent in actual practice. The Member States should 
also ensure that the worker can actually recover outstanding remuneration.24 
The Directive does not include an obligation to impose a financial sanction on 
the employer for undercutting the minimum wage (if applicable) or failing to 
meet tax obligations, as that would go beyond the scope of migration control.
2.2 Dutch Sanctions on Illegal Employment
According to the Dutch Foreign Nationals Employment Act (Wet Arbeid 
Vreemdelingen, WAV), an employer is prohibited from employing a migrant 
(EU or TCN) without a work permit or a single permit for work and residence 
under Directive 2011/98/EU. Illegal employment in the Dutch context can 
include both legal and illegally resident TCNs. A TCN can have (temporary) 
legal residence in the Netherlands and not be allowed to work without a 
work permit. This is, for instance, the case for TCNs with a tourist visa, 
TCN students,25 or TCNs with a residence permit for another EU Member 
State.26 The prohibition has many exceptions, inter alia for EU nationals 
using their free movement rights. The scope of the prohibition includes EU 
nationals who are not yet eligible for free movement rights pursuant to the 
transitional measures after accession to the EU by their Member State.27 
Although a large share of employer sanctions cases in the Netherlands 
22 Art. 9 ESD. 
23 Art. 6 ESD. The logic of back pay as an instrument of migration control was also central in 
the Case C-311/13 Tümer [2014], published with annotation by C.A. Groenendijk & T. de Lange 
(2015) in Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht 2015/2. 
24 Art.13 ESD.
25 On students, see T. de Lange (2015), ‘Third-Country National Students and Trainees in the 
EU: Caught between Learning and Work’, IJCLIR 31(4).
26 On illegal employment of TCN from other Member States, see L. Della Torre and T. de Lange 
(2017), ‘The “Importance of Staying Put”: Third Country Nationals’ Limited Intra-EU Mobility 
Rights’, JEMS DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2017.1401920. 
27 Schrauwen & Houwerzijl and Cremers & Dekker discuss internal EU migration in this volume.
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concern EU nationals during these transitional periods, our focus in this 
chapter is on employer sanctions related to illegally staying TCNs.28
As of 1 July 2016, employer sanctions are raised by 50 per cent if the 
violation concerns an illegally staying TCN.29 The standard sanction of 
2000 euros for the illegal employment of a domestic worker by a natural 
person is, for instance, raised by 50 per cent if the worker is an illegally 
staying TCN. On the other hand, employer sanctions can be reduced by 25, 
50, or 75 per cent, depending on the nature and degree of the violation, the 
degree of culpability, and proportionality.30 A sanction can be reduced by 
50 per cent if the employer can establish that the employment was marginal 
and incidental (employment of limited duration and size), was unpaid, or 
that the work only took place once31 – if, for instance, someone’s brother, 
while visiting on a tourist visa, lends a hand unpacking restaurant supplies.32
Figure 1  Standardized sanctions for illegal employment
Offender Standard sanction (in €)
natural person, who has a migrant perform a domestic or 
personal service
2,000
natural person, who has a migrant perform labour for him/her 
in the fulfilment of official, professional or business duties
4,000
public Benefit organisation, that has a migrant perform 
labour for its benefit although the labour did not take place 
within the sphere of business
4,000
Legal person that has a migrant perform labour for its benefit 
in the fulfilment of official, professional or business duties
6,000
other legal entities 8,000
source: Staatscourant 14 july 2016, nr. 3704333
28 From 2010-2014, Bulgarians and Romanians were the main nationalities encountered 
illegally working by the Dutch labour inspectorate. In 2012 and 2013, half of the f ine reports 
concerned illegal employment of Bulgarians and Romanians, in 2010, 2011, and 2014 this was one 
third. Inspectorate SZW (labour inspectorate), Annual report 2012; Inspectorate SZW (labour 
inspectorate), Annual report 2013; Inspectorate SZW (labour inspectorate), Annual report 2014. 
29 Art. 2 Beleidsregel boeteoplegging WAV 2016.
30 Art. 10 Beleidsregel boeteoplegging WAV 2016. 
31 Decree of the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment on the adoption of the Beleidsregel 
boeteoplegging WAV 2016. Stcrt. 2010, 37043, explanatory memorandum.
32 District Court Utrecht 22 November 2007, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2007:BB9096.
33 Decree of the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment on the adoption of the Beleidsregel 
boeteoplegging WAV 2016. Stcrt. 2010, 37043.
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Sanctions target employers – not the individuals whose work activities are 
illegal. In the Netherlands, neither illegal stay nor illegal work are considered 
a (criminal) offense of the TCN. Even if the migrant is staying illegally, the 
work contract is binding and, since 1995, therefore, prior to the implementa-
tion of the ESD, a provision on illegally staying TCN’s entitlement to six 
months back pay has been included in Dutch legislation, in article 23 WAV.34
3 The Labour Inspectorate’s Reports
This chapter draws on case f ile research conducted at the Dutch labour 
inspectorate, known as the Inspection of Social Affairs and Employment 
(Inspectie Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid). The empirical study comprises 
an analysis of all f iles closed in 2014 that concerned violation of the WAV.35 
These f iles contain so-called f ine reports drawn up when a labour inspector 
is of the opinion that an employer has violated the WAV. The f ine reports 
contain information on the labour inspectors’ observations at the workplace. 
The f ine reports do not contain information on the imposed employer sanc-
tions. Employer sanctions are determined by another division of the labour 
inspectorate. The majority of f ine reports do, however, result in employer 
sanctions being imposed36, although they can later be overturned in court.37
The empirical study covers 1179 f ine reports in 803 case f iles.38 The f ine 
reports were systematically analysed making use of a checklist to retrieve 
34 T. de Lange (2011), ‘De verborgen schat van artikel 23 WAV’, Journaal Vreemdelingenrecht 
1(4); T. de Lange (2018), ‘Blurring the public/private law divide in checks of migrants’ right to 
work in the Netherlands’ in B. Ryan (ed.), Migration and Employment Law, Hart Publishing, 
forthcoming.
35 Our sample included only f ine reports that involved the employment of a TCN worker 
without a valid work permit (violation of art. 2 WAV). Other violations, such as a failure to 
provide notif ication of the employment of a TCN (violation of art. 2a WAV) were excluded. 
36 9 per cent of f ine reports in 2016 were not followed up with an employer sanction because 
of lack of evidence or lack of culpability. Inspectorate SZW (labour inspectorate), Annual report 
2016, p. 61. 
37 During the period from 2011 through 2014, the inspectorate noted an increase in objection 
and appeal procedures after the imposition of WAV sanctions. In 2011, objections to f ines were 
lodged in 37 per cent of cases, increasing to 55 per cent in 2014. In 2011, 6 per cent of cases led to 
appeals procedures, increasing to 30 per cent in 2014. While this tendency toward legal escalation 
has been on the rise for the enforcement of other labour laws as well, the increase is highest for 
WAV cases. Inspectorate SZW (labour inspectorate), Annual report 2014, p. 18. 
38 If there are multiple employers involved (because of subcontracting or temporary agency 
work), there are multiple f ine reports included in a case f ile. Fine reports are drawn up for each 
employer in the chain of contractors.
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information on the illegally employed migrants encountered by the labour 
inspectorate. We recorded, among other things, the nationality and gender of 
the migrant, the type of workplace, job function, duration of employment39, 
the means of entering the Netherlands, (previous) residence permit, current 
residence status, nationality of the employer, whether or not there was 
a familial relationship with the employer, whether there was any police 
involvement during/after the workplace inspection, whether a check on 
minimum wage and holiday payment had been performed, and if a related 
f ine report had been drawn up.40 Wage information and working hours 
were recorded if mentioned in the reports, but that was not often the case.41
In our case f ile study of the year 2014, we counted 756 illegally employed 
TCNs. While the ESD only applies to illegal employment of illegally staying 
TCNs, the Dutch legislation on employer sanctions applies to the illegal 
employment of TCNs regardless of residence status, as well as to EU nationals 
during transitional periods after accession, as we discussed in the previous 
section. The legal residence status of a migrant encountered by the Inspector-
ate is not always clear from the information in the f ine reports. However, 
we tried to extract the migrant status from the information at our disposal. 
We found that 44 per cent of the 756 illegally employed TCNs (n = 332) were 
illegally resident42; 39 per cent (n = 292) were legally resident, but working 
in violation of the conditions of their residence permit; 11 per cent (n = 86) 
were involved in a legal procedure and therefore non-deportable; and, in 6 
per cent of the cases (n = 46), we were unable to determine the legal status 
of the migrant. In the following, we analyse the working conditions of the 
332 illegally staying TCNs.
39 Wherever possible, we used the statement from the case f ile given by the TCN involved, 
unless someone else (an employer or a witness) indicated that the TCN had worked for the 
employer for a longer period of time. 
40 It must, however, be noted that not all information needed for our checklist could be retrieved 
from every case f ile. 
41 In the subsequent analysis, we counted all retrieved data items using statistical software. 
42 This number may have been higher. Of the 756 illegally employed migrants, 112 migrants had 
a residence permit issued by Italy or Spain. When the f ine report mentioned that the migrant 
had resided for more than three months in the Netherlands, the migration status was coded as 
irregular in our analysis. In many cases, there is either no information available on the duration 
of stay in the Netherlands, or the migrant indicated that his or her stay in the Netherlands was 
for less than three months. The latter may, however, be inaccurate. There are indications that 
migrants sometimes use (an application for) a residence permit as a jumping-off point for further 
intra-EU migration (see Dela Torre and De Lange, 2017). Of the 76 migrants with an Italian or 
Spanish (application for a) residence permit, whose migration status was coded as legal in our 
analysis, fully one-third indicated that it just so happened to be the f irst day they were working 
at that workplace when the labour inspectorate encountered them.
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3.1 Illegal Employment of Illegally Staying TCN in the Netherlands
Compared to other EU Member States, the shadow economy in the Neth-
erlands is considered to be relatively small; 9 per cent compared to the 18 
per cent average in the EU.43 Nonetheless, the number of sanctions issued 
in the Netherlands for the illegal employment of both legal and illegally 
resident migrants is among the highest when compared to other EU Member 
States: in 2014, 1084 sanctions were issued, and, in 2015, 981.44 Still, given 
the estimated number of irregular migrants in the Netherlands of around 
35000,45 the detection of a mere 332 irregularly staying TCNs by the labour 
inspectorate in 2014 indicates an overall low risk of getting caught for the 
illegal employment of irregular migrants.
The workplace inspections are informed by the risk analysis performed 
by the Inspectorate, which is in turn based on information gathered during 
previous inspections, information and knowledge obtained from other 
government bodies, research reports, and the expertise of the labour inspec-
tors themselves. Sectors considered to be especially at risk of falling prey 
to illegal employment practices are the labour intensive, low-skilled jobs 
at the bottom of the labour market, and sectors where demand for flexible 
labour is high. The sectors considered to be at risk for illegal employment are 
inter alia construction, retail, the catering industry, temporary employment 
agencies, agriculture and horticulture, the metal industry, cleaning (with 
specif ic focus on fast-food restaurants and hotels), transportation and 
logistics.46 This focus is also reflected in the WAV f ine reports. The main 
type of businesses where illegally staying TCNs were detected in 2014 was the 
restaurant sector (n = 108). This was followed by market stalls (n = 29), hair 
43 F. Schneider (2015), ‘Size and Development of the Shadow Economy of 31 European and f ive 
other OECD Countries from 2003 to 2015: Different Developments’, JSME 3(4).
44 A. Sommarribas, R. Petry, and B. Nienaber (2017), Illegal employment of third-country nation-
als in the European Union (EMN Synthesis Report), p. 14. These sanctions apply to the illegal 
employment of both TCNs with and without legal residence as well as to the illegal employment 
of EU nationals working during the transitional period after EU accession. Sanctions across the 
Member States vary in terms of whether they are f inancial, administrative, or criminal in nature, 
and are therefore not precisely comparable. The number of sanctions imposed is about the same 
in Belgium, and the only country with a higher number of sanctions imposed is France. It must 
be noted that the number of illegally staying TCNs in both France (2311 in 2014) and Belgium 
(769 in 2014) is higher than the 332 counted during our case f ile study of 2014. 
45 These are the most recent estimates on the number of irregularly staying TCNs in the 
Netherlands, see P. van der Heijden, M. Cruyff, and G. van Gils (2015), Schattingen illegaal in 
Nederland verblijvende vreemdelingen 2012-2013, Utrecht. 
46 Inspectorate SZW (labour inspectorate) (2014), Meerjarenplan 2015-2018.
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salons (n = 20), and cleaning (n = 18).47 The main nationalities encountered 
by the Inspectorate were from China (19 per cent), India (8 per cent), Turkey 
(8 per cent), Egypt (7 per cent), Morocco (6 per cent), Ghana (5 per cent), 
Indonesia (5 per cent), Philippines (5 per cent), Pakistan (4 per cent), Iraq 
(4 per cent), Russia (3 per cent), Brazil (3 per cent), Ukraine (2 per cent), 
Afghanistan (2 per cent), and Surinam (2 per cent), with the remaining 
18 per cent from other countries. In addition, the majority of the detected 
migrants were male (84 per cent). Chinese migrants were predominantly 
represented in the restaurant sector (n = 41), and all migrants encountered 
working at Chinese restaurants (n = 27) were Chinese nationals. Also, 12 of 
the 15 migrants employed in beauty and/or massage salons were Chinese.
We also examined the actual work activities performed by the migrants 
who were detected by the Inspectorate. Sometimes, migrants are found 
cleaning at a café, for example.48 Cleaning (n = 73) and food preparation (n 
= 64) were the main activities performed.49 While Egyptian migrants were 
the second largest nationality group (n = 13) found working in restaurants, 
only two of them were actually preparing food. In general, almost half of the 
Egyptian migrants were involved in cleaning activities. Almost 60 per cent of 
the encountered Ghanaian migrants were involved in cleaning activities (n = 
10), and so were f ive of the ten Brazilians and six of the sixteen Indonesians.
In 20 per cent of the cases, there is no information in the f ine reports on 
the length of time the migrant had been working at the specif ic workplace. 
In the event a migrant denies being at work and is only there to lend a hand, 
there is no information on the (alleged) duration of employment. Of all the 
illegally staying TCNs encountered during the workplace inspections in 
2014, 17 per cent (n = 55 migrants) stated that it was their f irst day working 
there. A third of the migrants mentioned that they had worked there for 
one week or less. The information provided by the migrants themselves 
on the duration of their employment is thus probably not always reliable.
47 Followed by shipping (n = 14), massage and/or beauty salons (n = 14), retail (n = 12), construc-
tion (n = 11), wholesale (n = 10), bakery (n = 9), car repair (n = 8), agriculture (n = 7), au pair/
babysitting (n = 7), hospitality (n = 6), temporary employment agency (n = 6), butcher (n = 5), 
domestic work (n = 4), laundry mat (n = 4), and other (n = 40).
48 We need to mention here that migrants sometimes state to the inspectors who run into 
them that they are not working at that workplace. When this was the case, we noted down the 
description that the inspector of the work activities observed the migrant performing during 
the workplace inspection.
49 These are followed by handyman/small-scale construction work (n = 26), sales at market 
stalls (n = 26), hairdresser (n = 20), employment on a ship (n = 16), masseur (n = 12), and sales in 
general (n = 12).
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4 Sanctions as a Tool for Labour Market Regulation?
Employment in the ESD is ‘the exercise of activities covering whatever 
form of labour or work regulated under national law of in accordance with 
established practice for or under the direction and/or supervision of an 
employer.’ In the preamble (7), one reads that the definition of employment 
should encompass its constituent elements, namely activities that are or 
ought to be remunerated. The def inition of ‘employer’ in Dutch legislation 
is broader, namely: anyone, a company, natural person, or governmental 
organisation, having a migrant perform a job – however marginal the job – 
irrespective of an employment contract or remuneration. It is even irrelevant 
if the so-called employers are aware that they are enabling a migrant to 
perform this job on their behalf.50 This is odd, because awareness of the 
infraction is usually part of, or is at least assumed to be, an essential element 
of an infraction. This broad definition of the term ‘employer’ was adopted 
in order to deal with situations with multiple employers (in the event of 
agency work or subcontracting) and to f ight bogus self-employment.51 
The wide def inition was initially challenged: it would be disastrous for 
business because it was not just an instrument of labour market regulation 
but of market regulation in general.52 Some courts felt that externalised 
migration control could not include an obligation for all consumers and 
business partners, when they use services provided in the marketplace, to 
verify at all times that these services do not, at any point, enable a migrant 
worker to be employed illegally. Ultimately, the case law indicates that 
this cannot be expected of consumers, but that, in a business-to-business 
relationship, there is an obligation to inspect for compliance with the WAV. 
This has resulted in the development of a private workplace inspection 
industry, a certif ication industry, and has created a market for legal advice 
on contractual liability in the event of noncompliance, especially geared to 
bigger projects that often involve intra-EU labour.53
50 The def inition reads: ´an employer in the sense of the WAV is the [legal or natural] person 
who in fulf ilment of off icial, professional or business duties has another person do labour for 
him, and the natural person who has another person perform household or personal duties for 
him.́
51 Parliamentary Documents II 1993/94, 23574, 3, p. 13.
52 A. Klap and T. de Lange (2008), ‘Marktordening via het werkgeversbegrip van de Wet Arbeid 
Vreemdelingen’, SMA.
53 T. de Lange (2011), ‘The Privatization of Control over Labour Migration in the Netherlands: 
In Whose Interest?’ European Journal of Migration and Law, 13(2).
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So, which employers and which labour market sectors come under 
scrutiny as far as illegally employed, illegally staying TCNs are concerned? 
The Inspectorate works in a programme-based manner, targeting activities 
in areas that are considered at risk for unfair, unhealthy, or unsafe working 
conditions.54 In most of the case f iles we examined, the reason for the 
workplace inspection was not recorded in the f ine report (63 per cent). 
In 17 per cent of cases, the f ine report was written up following a police 
investigation (the f ine report is, in this case, usually based on the off icial 
report of police f indings). In nine cases (3 per cent), the reason given was 
an anonymous tip.55 In eight cases (2 per cent), the reason was a statement 
by the labour inspector that someone with a foreign (non-European) ap-
pearance had been observed working.56 According to the Inspectorate, 
giving this as a reason for a workplace inspection is not in line with the 
policy and instructions of the Inspectorate. The Dutch Council of State, 
the highest administrative court, ruled that gathering evidence during a 
workplace inspection that was held based on the foreign appearance of the 
worker resulted in unlawfully gathered evidence and was in violation of the 
nondiscrimination clause in the Dutch constitution.57 In f ive cases, suspicion 
of human smuggling was the reason given for the workplace inspection. 
This involved four Indonesian domestic workers and one Brazilian national 
employed by an agency offering erotic services.
Our case f ile analysis shows that the illegally staying TCNs encountered 
by the labour inspectorate are mostly employed in smaller-sized business 
establishments, with more than half of the migrants working at places 
with fewer than f ive employees, and more than 80 per cent at a workplace 
where fewer than ten people are employed. In more than 60 per cent of 
cases, the migrant is the only person at the workplace found by the labour 
inspectorate to be employed without a work permit, and, in more than 80 
per cent of cases, only one or two are found. In 40 per cent of cases, the 
employer is a Dutch national. In 25 per cent of cases (n = 85), the employer 
54 Inspectorate SZW (labour inspectorate) (2014), Meerjarenplan 2015-2018, p. 4. 
55 The anonymous tip involved three migrants from Morocco (working in a bakery, a hair 
salon, and a riding stable), two from Turkey (one working in construction and the other at a 
laundromat), one from Afghanistan (working in a fast food restaurant), one from China (working 
in a Chinese restaurant), one from Egypt (working in a fast food restaurant), one from Indonesia 
(working as a painter), and one from Pakistan (working in a restaurant). 
56 This involved four construction workers (three from India, one from the Philippines), a 
migrant from Burkina Faso (working at a market stall), a migrant from Ethiopia (who was clean-
ing), a migrant from Ghana (doing chores at a church), and a migrant from Guinea (meatpacking). 
57 Dutch Council of State 3 June 2015, ECLI:NL:RVS:2015:1723.
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has a non-Dutch nationality. The majority of these non-Dutch employers 
have a non-EU nationality. In 17 per cent, the employer has dual nationality 
(including Dutch), and, in 17 per cent, the employer has Dutch nationality 
and was born in a non-EU country. The case f iles reveal that more than 
half of Turkish, Moroccan, and Egyptian migrants are employed in the 
ethnic economy.58, 59 Combining this data, it appears that small migrant 
entrepreneurs are frequently subject to inspections, and, if they have indeed 
violated the WAV, are frequently f ined.60
Targeting ethnic entrepreneurs might seem logical given the Inspector-
ate’s policy of concentrating its resources where the chance of discovering 
violations is greatest, but it does result in employer sanctions regulating 
small ethnic markets (and not the labour market as a whole). The high f ines 
can put smaller-sized business owners in a f inancially precarious position. 
They may not have the money to pay the f ine, either pushing them into 
bankruptcy or forcing them to take out a loan. Case law shows that employers 
are offered an opportunity to pay the f ine in instalments and, in case of 
f inancial incapacity, the f ine may be lowered. Until recently, the option of 
lowering the f ine for this reason was only considered if the f ine was greater 
than € 6000 – still a lot of money for a private person or a small business.61
The number of cases detected by the labour inspectorate involving the 
illegal employment of EU nationals and TCNs with or without a residence 
permit is steadily decreasing: In 2014, 1567 illegally employed migrants 
were detected; in 2015, 863; and, in 2016, 675 migrants were detected. Part 
of the decrease can be ascribed to the fact that labour market restrictions 
for Bulgarian and Romanian nationals were lifted as of 1 January 2014. The 
58 15 of the 21 Moroccans identif ied in the f ine reports 2014 were employed by a Moroccan 
employer (Moroccan nationality or born in Morocco); 20 of the 29 Turkish migrants were 
employed by a Turkish employer; and 14 of the 22 Egyptian migrants worked for Egyptians.
59 On the ethnic economy in the Netherlands, see R. Kloosterman, J. van der Leun, and J. Rath 
(1999), ‘Mixed em-beddedness:(in) formal economic activities and immigrant businesses in the 
Netherlands’, IJURR 23(2).
60 While the labour inspectorate does not currently have any specif ic policy targeting migrant 
entrepreneurs or businesses in the ethnic economy, it did in 2007 and 2008. A specif ic programme 
was set up to inspect retailers of non-Western produce, and sanctions were issued in 20 per cent 
of the inspected workplaces. See labour inspectorate (2008), Projectverslag Inspectie naleving WAV 
en WML in de sector Detailhandel voor niet Westerse producten, The Hague. The Inspectorate SZW 
reports their inspections online < https://www.inspectieresultatenszw.nl/ > accessed 15 October 
2017. Although a systematic analysis of the more recent inspection data was not performed, the 
names of the inspected employers suggest these are often migrant entrepreneurs, for instance, 
in the hospitality sector.
61 Dutch Council of State 16 August 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:2174.
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information shared by the labour inspectorate does not, however, reveal 
whether the illegal employment of illegally staying TCNs is also decreasing.
5 Employer Sanctions as an Instrument of Migration 
Control?
The imposition of employer sanctions in the Netherlands appears to be 
focussed primarily on labour market regulation rather than on migration 
control. The migration status of a migrant who is working illegally (meaning 
without a valid work permit) in the Netherlands is irrelevant for imposing 
a sanction. Since June 2016, however, sanctions are increased in the event 
that the illegal employment involves a migrant without a residence permit. 
As this is the f irst time an explicit link has been made between illegal 
residence and employer sanctions, it could be considered a move towards 
using sanctions as an instrument of migration control.
Theoretically, formal separation is observed between the Dutch labour 
inspectorate and police or migration enforcement during workplace inspec-
tions. In practice, it is not so clear whether this is truly the case, especially 
when migrant workers are involved; police off icers often accompany labour 
inspectors on workplace visits.62 If a migrant is unable to identify him or 
herself during a workplace inspection and the police are not already there, 
labour inspectors notify them of the situation. Specif ically, the department 
of Identif ication and Traff icking in Human Beings of the Aliens Police is 
alerted, for identif ication purposes and to take the migrant into custody if 
he or she is found to be staying in the country illegally. If that is the case, 
the same department of the Aliens Police contacts the INS (Immigration 
and Naturalisation Service) to arrange for deportation.
Our case f ile research shows that the degree of police involvement during 
or after workplace inspections cannot always easily be determined. In 29 
per cent of the f ine reports f iled in 2014, there is no information available 
indicating whether police were present and involved during the workplace 
inspection, whether they were called in afterwards, or whether the migrant 
was later handed over to the police. In 57 per cent of cases involving migrants 
found to be working in Rotterdam, there is no information at all on police 
involvement available in the f iles. In Amsterdam and The Hague, this is 
the case in, respectively, 31 and 22 per cent of cases. Sometimes, migrant 
62 PICUM (2015), Employers’ sanctions: impacts on undocumented migrant workers’ rights in 
four EU countries (Position paper). 
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workers are merely sent on their way by labour inspectors. This is what 
happens to those who are found to be working illegally, but nonetheless 
have legal residence. However, the same treatment is sometimes given to 
illegally staying TCNs if, for instance, the (aliens) police is not able to come 
to pick up the migrant right away. Of course, illegally staying TCNs have 
also been known to try to outrun labour inspectors as soon as they have 
been spotted in the workplace. In our case f ile research, we encountered 19 
incidences of this strategy being used by possibly illegally staying TCNs to 
avoid being identif ied as workers by labour inspectors.63 It is also possible 
that an employer may have already successfully prevented TCNs from 
f inding employment prior to a labour inspection meant to ferret out il-
legally employed and illegally staying migrants, but the extent to which 
employer diligence contributes to stemming the flow of irregular migration 
into the EU is unknown. Moreover, when TCNs are detained, this does not 
inevitably mean they will also be forced to leave the EU.64 Since the case 
f iles on deportation have not been linked up with the case f iles on illegal 
employment of illegally staying TCNs, it is not possible to assess the direct 
impact of employer sanctions as a migration control instrument. There 
are, however, indications that the deterrent effect of sanctions limits job 
opportunities for illegally staying TCNs.65
Employers are expected to check a TCN’s status to see if they are al-
lowed to work. Illegally staying migrants are unlikely to be able to show any 
documentation at all, or might present someone else’s documents. This is 
why employers are obliged to check the documents presented thoroughly. 
The person presenting the document could be a so-called lookalike – the 
employer should check, for instance, whether the worker actually resembles 
the photograph on the document and whether the signature is legible and 
63 A. Bloch et al. (2015), ’Employer sanctions: The impact of workplace raids and f ines on 
undocumented migrants and ethnic enclave’, CSP, 35(1), provides some other examples of the 
strategies illegally residing migrant workers employ to avoid detection in the UK, for instance, 
by choosing safer working environments (building sites rather than restaurants, because of 
worker mobility) or safer working hours (working at night). 
64 In general, about 30 per cent of the migrants held in detention in 2016 were not deported. 
This percentage decreased in 2016 for the f irst time since 2012. In 2015, about 40 per cent of the 
migrants held in detention were not deported. Ministry of Security and Justice (2017), Rapportage 
Vreemdelingenketen – periode januari-december 2016, p. 40. 
65 L. Berntsen, T. de Lange and C. Rijken (2018), De sociaal-economische en rechtspositie van 
ongedocumenteerde migranten in Nederland (AUP forthcoming); J. van der Leun and R. Klooster-
man (2006), ‘Going underground: Immigration policy changes and shifts in modes of provision 
of undocumented immigrants in the Netherlands’, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale 
Geografie 97(1). 
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comparable. An employer must furthermore endeavour to ascertain whether 
the document is valid and genuine, not expired, and that there are no typos 
or missing information. When in doubt, the employer is advised to contact 
the police. Also, it is suggested that employers use a magnifying glass or a UV 
lamp to check documents, and to read up on or take a course in the practice 
of checking documents. Small entrepreneurs are not likely to invest in the 
materials or know-how for checking documents. The number of falsif ied 
documents and lookalike cases encountered by labour inspectors appears to 
be negligible: in nine cases in 2014, there was some suspicion that documents 
had been falsif ied; in ten cases, it was suspected that a migrant had been 
working after presenting ‘lookalike’ documentation. The limited number 
of cases perhaps suggests that employer sanctions have been effective at 
reducing the illegal employment of illegally staying TCNs, or it may merely 
indicate that illegal employment has gone even further underground – where 
employers do not even bother to ask migrants for documentation, and/or 
illegally staying TCNs are not detected.
Employers’ obliviousness to the fact that a migrant was staying ille-
gally has been a key element in much of the case law. At f irst, the labour 
inspectorate was adamant in holding fully responsible any employer who 
did not use a UV lamp, or who failed to contact the police in cases where 
the labour inspectorate itself (with the help of the police) discovered that 
a document was a fake and that the person using it was not allowed to 
work in the Netherlands. This meant that, even if there was no reason 
to doubt that a document was genuine, for instance a passport issued by 
another EU country – and that, consequently, the migrant presenting it was 
permitted to work – the employer would be f ined. In our case f ile research, 
we found that around 20 per cent of illegally staying TCNs encountered by 
the Inspectorate had a residence permit from another EU Member State 
that was no longer valid.66 Italy, Belgium, and Spain were the main ‘transit’ 
countries. The Council of State found that an employer who had followed all 
suggestions – diligently checked the documents presented, had well-trained 
staff that observed effective internal procedures – could not be held liable 
for the illegal employment of a migrant using a forged document that was 
not recognisable as such.67 This is, however, an administrative burden 
66 In almost half the cases examined during our case f ile research, we were unable to extract 
information from the f ine reports on migration routes, previous residence permits, or previous 
whereabouts.
67 The policy guidelines on employer sanctions, however, suggest mitigation of the sanction by 
50% rather than not holding the employer liable at all. Decree of the Minister of Social Affairs 
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that larger companies may be able to bear, but smaller businesses and 
private individuals generally cannot. Similar in consequence to the broad 
def inition given to the term ‘employer’, these administrative obligations 
may result in a tendency not to hire migrants at all – those staying legally 
and illegally alike.68
Employer sanctions probably have only limited effect as an instrument 
of migration control, although their deterrent effect may limit employment 
opportunities for illegally staying TCNs. Shifting the burden of migration 
control duties to private actors, and the resulting administrative burden for 
employers, may have a spillover effect; to avoid all risk, even legally staying 
migrants might end up being less frequently recruited. Further research 
will be needed on this, however.
6 Protection of Illegally Staying TCNs’ Workers’ Rights
As shown in Section 2 of this chapter, there are specif ic provisions in the 
ESD regarding the protection of migrant workers’ rights: the availability and 
accessibility of complaint mechanisms, and the recuperation of outstanding 
wages.69 While article 23 of the WAV has, since 1995, provided for the possible 
recuperation of six months back pay in the event of illegal employment, no 
additional provisions have been implemented to ensure the actual recupera-
tion of outstanding wages.70 To fulf il the ESD requirement of making the 
recuperation of outstanding wages accessible to illegally staying TCNs, 
the Netherlands provides funding to the NGO Fairwork, which informs 
migrants of their workers’ rights and assists them in wage recuperation 
procedures.71 However, there is, to our knowledge, only one case in which 
a formerly illegally staying TCN successfully sued for six months back pay.72 
and Employment on the adoption of the Beleidsregel boeteoplegging WAV 2017, Stcrt. 2017, 37085, 
explanatory memorandum, p. 11.
68 For migrant entrepreneurs who are active in the ethnic economy, not hiring employees 
from their ethnic community may be problematic, see R. Kloosterman, J. van der Leun, and J. 
Rath (1999), ‘Mixed embeddedness: (in)formal economic activities and immigrant businesses 
in the Netherlands’, IJURR 23(2). 
69 Art. 6 and 13 ESD. 
70 T. de Lange (2011), ‘De verborgen schat van artikel 23 WAV’ Journaal Vreemdelingenrecht 1(4).
71 A. Sommarribas, R. Petry, and B. Nienaber (2017), Illegal employment of third-country nationals 
in the European Union, EMN Synthesis Report. 
72 There may have been others, but those disputes would probably have been settled out of 
court, and therefore would not have contributed to the case law. The migrant in this case was 
assisted in his wage claim by the Dutch NGO Fairwork. 
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Migration lawyers may be unaware of their clients’ labour rights, just as 
labour law practitioners may not be aware of this legal instrument hidden 
away in a migration law, thereby limiting irregular migrants’ options for 
legal redress.73
In 80 per cent of the 2014 f ine reports involving the illegal employment of 
migrants without residence papers, there was no information included on 
remuneration or the hours worked by the migrant. When that information 
was included, it often appeared that the level of remuneration was below 
the Dutch minimum wage. Moreover, in almost 40 per cent of cases, the 
Inspectorate, besides checking for violations of the WAV, also checked 
for violations of the Dutch Minimum Wage Act (WML). This nonetheless 
resulted in a WML f ine report being f iled only in three cases,74 possibly 
indicating that illegally staying TCNs can hope to receive little support from 
the labour inspectorate in claiming their workers’ rights. The Inspectorate 
indicated, however, that the department of Investigations of the labour 
inspectorate receives around 200 reports of labour exploitation each year. 
Whether a particular case had been flagged as an incidence of potential 
labour exploitation was, however, not linked to or recorded in the f ine 
reports we studied. Underpayment, nonpayment, underthetable payments 
in general, and excessive working hours, can all be indicators of labour 
exploitation.
According to lobby organisations such as PICUM (Platform for Interna-
tional Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants) and FRA (Fundamental 
Rights Agency), there should in practice be a clear ‘(f ire)wall’ established 
between the mechanisms for accessing labour protection (through the 
labour inspectorate or through trade unions) and the migration law enforce-
ment authorities, such as the (aliens) police. Requiring labour inspectors to 
report illegally staying TCNs to the migration/aliens police may infringe on 
migrants’ access to their fundamental and workers’ rights.75 As indicated 
in the previous section, the distinction between the competences of labour 
73 M. Freedland and C. Costello (2014), ‘Migrant Work and the Division of Labour’ in C. Costello 
and M. Freedland (eds.), Migrants at Work: Immigration and Vulnerability in Labour Law, OUP.
74 Since 2016, the labour inspectorate’s enforcement focus has increasingly concentrated on 
f ighting underpayment (enforcement of the Dutch minimum wage and holiday allowance act, 
WML), while also checking for violations of the WAV (as well as the Working Times Act, ATW, 
and the Intermediaries Act, WAADI). This has resulted in fewer cases being concluded in 2016, 
although in more f ine reports involving the WML Act. Inspectorate SZW (labour inspectorate) 
(2016), Annual report, p. 8. 
75 PICUM (2015), Employers’ sanctions: impacts on undocumented migrant workers’ rights 
in four EU countries, Position paper; I. de Sancho Alonso (2007), ‘Access to labour rights for 
undocumented workers’, CEPS Policy Brief, p. 140.
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inspectors and police off icers during a workplace inspection may be lost 
on illegally staying TCNs, which infringes their access to effective remedy 
for the recovery of outstanding wages. The Netherlands is, however, not a 
case in point on this matter. The focus of state interventions in other EU 
Member States, but also in Australia and the United States, has been on 
sanctions and the enforcement of immigration law at the expense of the 
enforcement of employment law remedies for illegally staying migrant 
workers.76 In so-called ‘sanctuary cities’ in the US, local authorities attempt 
to counter this tendency by limiting their engagement with immigration 
enforcement.77 Several studies have shown that stricter state controls have 
had limited benef icial effect on employment practices, but instead tend 
to drive informal job opportunities further underground, where working 
conditions for irregular migrants are worse.78
7 Conclusion
Although the Dutch government’s stance with regard to illegal employment 
might seem tough, the execution of employer sanctions would, in fact, appear 
to prioritise labour market regulation and, to a lesser extent, migration 
control. This is echoed in the labour inspectorate’s priorities; the case f iles 
from 2014 do not indicate that much attention is paid to the actual employ-
ment conditions of illegally staying TCN workers.79 Nevertheless, a recent 
policy change that favours differentiated employer sanctions depending 
76 Laurie Berg illustrates this development through her analysis of temporary migrant labour 
cases in Australia: L. Berg (2016), Migrant rights at work: Law’s precariousness at the intersection 
of immigration and labour, Routledge. 
77 Immigration Policy Center and L. Tramonte (2011), Debunking the myth of “sanctuary cities”: 
Community policing policies protect American communities, Special report; S. Chauvin and B. 
Garcés-Mascareñas (2012). ‘Beyond Informal Citizenship: The New Moral Economy of Migrant 
Illegality’, IPS 6.
78 A. Bloch et al. (2015), ’Employer sanctions: The impact of workplace raids and f ines on 
undocumented migrants and ethnic enclave’, CSP 35(1); J. van der Leun and R. Kloosterman 
(2006), ‘Going underground: Immigration policy changes and shifts in modes of provision of 
undocumented immigrants in the Netherlands’, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 
97(1).
79 We do need to mention, however, that the Dutch labour inspectorate changed its enforcement 
approach in 2016, gravitating towards a more integral focus on all labour laws. This entails, 
in practice, that, when a migrant is found to be working without a (valid) work permit, the 
inspectors also check whether the working conditions are in line with Dutch minimum wage 
standards. This calls for an update of the case f ile research on workplace inspections that took 
place after the policy change to assess its impact on irregular migrant workers’ rights. 
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on the residence status of the migrant worker(s), however, indicates fresh 
interest in controlling migration with employer sanctions.
Whereas the Dutch labour inspectorate has traditionally played the 
role of labour market regulator, in effect protecting the national labour 
market from illegal employment, its resort to the instrument of employer 
sanctions has expanded its scope to encompass migration control as well. 
By imposing employer sanctions, however, the duty to enforce migration 
policy has shifted to employers and private individuals. Besides enforce-
ment, the labour inspectorate plays a dual role in the sense that it is also 
responsible for protecting all workers in the Netherlands, regardless of their 
legal status, against exploitative working conditions. According to EU and 
Dutch law, irregular migrant workers are entitled to back pay, and to the 
same minimum wage and working standards as workers with legal status 
and permission to work. Member States should make sure that irregular 
migrants have access to adequate complaint mechanisms and are thus able 
to claim outstanding wages. In the Netherlands, although this has, to a 
certain extent, been made available to and attainable for irregular migrants 
via migrant support organisations, trade unions, and/or legal advisors, there 
is certainly room for improvement.
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Silence seems to have fallen yet again on the fate of those who, though 
most of the time signif icantly contributing to European States’ econo-
mies, are presumed invisible by those same States’ governments and 
administrations. The Swiss stance towards undocumented migrants has, 
for quite some time, mirrored the European one of – at best –isolation 
and indifference. Yet, it is precisely from Switzerland that a new attempt 
to promote the regularisation of Sans-Papiers has very recently arisen. 
Coming from a Cantonal government, this operation resembles the 
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for other European countries.
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Introduction
If migration represents, generally speaking, a ‘challenge to the Nation State’, 
all the more so can be said about irregular (economic) migration:1 those who 
enter and take residence within the State in breach of its migration provisions 
openly defy its control over its borders and its population, with the risk of 
increasing social discontent and eventually creating political instability.2 It 
is common knowledge that, in trying to reassert their sovereignty over their 
national territories, States have enacted ever more restrictive immigration 
policies over the years, but not all the measures that States have taken to 
address irregular migration are ‘exclusionary’ in nature. In some cases, States 
have decided to adjust to, rather than f ight against, undocumented people, 
or Sans-Papiers. The tools that they primarily use to do so are regularisation 
programs, i.e. ‘broad legal shifts through which a group of people without 
immigration status or a legal right to remain are granted that right’, and 
regularisation mechanisms, which, on the contrary, operate on a case-by-case 
basis.3 Such measures were, in fact, quite broadly used between the mid-1990s 
and the f irst years of the 21st century: the practice of Southern European 
1 S. Schech (2013), ‘Rescaling sovereignty?’, Griffith Law Review, 22, pp.758-803. ‘Irregular 
migrant’ is used here to describe people who migrate without established travel arrangements 
(IOM World Migration Report 2008) and/or who do not have the legal status to allow them to 
live permanently in the country of destination (Nyers, 2010). Using this term does not make any 
presumptions about the legitimacy of the migrant’s reasons for migrating.
2 S. Joppke (1998), Challenge to the Nation-State, Oxford: Oxford University Press; See also 
S. Blinder and B. Allen (2016), UK Public Opinion toward immigration: overall attitudes and 
Level of Concern. Retrieved from: http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2016/04/Brief ing-Public_Opinion_Immigration_Attitudes_Concern.pdf. According 
to the study, 34% of the respondents picked ‘immigration’ as the most important issue facing 
the nation. The think tank Chatham House carried out a survey according to which: ‘overall, 
an average of 55% [of interviewees] agreed that all further migration from mainly Muslim 
countries should be stopped’. Results and further comments available online at: https://www.
chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/what-do-europeans-think-about-muslim-immigration.
3 D. Dauvergne (2008), Making people illegal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 139. On 
regularisations, see, among others: P. de Bruycker (2000), Les regularisations des étrangers illégaux 
dans l’Union Européenne/Regularisations of illegal immigrants the European Union. Brussells: 
Bruyant; J. Apap, P. de Bruycker, and C. Schmitter (2000), ‘Regularisations of Illegal Aliens in the 
European Union. Summary Report of a Comparative Study,’ European Journal of Migration and Law, 
pp. 263-308; A. Levinson (2005), The Regularisation of Unauthorized Migrants: Literature Survey 
and Country Case Studies, Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, retrieved from: https://
www.compas.ox.ac.uk/media/ER-2005-Regularisation_Unauthorized_Literature.pdf; D. Papad-
emetriou (2005), The regularisation option in managing illegal migration more effectively: a Com-
parative Perspective, MPI policy brief, retrieved form: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/
regularization-option-managing-illegal-migration-more-effectively-comparative-perspective.
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States (Italy, Greece, and Spain) to enchain one ‘one-shot’ general amnesty 
after the other had even sparked the dismay of some of their Northern 
European counterparts.4 The use of these tools (especially large regularisa-
tion programs) began to decrease after the ‘moral panic’ that followed 
the 9/11 attacks on American soil, and practically came to an end with the 
economic crisis of 2008, which brought along increased discontent towards 
economic migration.5 While in 2007 the Council of Europe maintained that 
‘if it is not possible to return [irregular migrants] then Member States should 
consider the option of regularising their situation’, in 2008, the Council of 
the European Union specified that Member States should refrain from using 
‘generalised amnesties’, rather preferring ‘case-by-case’ regularisations.6 In 
addition, while in 2009 the European Commission suggested that European 
guidelines for the implementation of regularisations should be set, together 
with common standards on irremovable irregular immigrants, neither of the 
two points was mentioned in the f inal version of the Stockholm Programme, 
endorsed at the end of that same year.7
4 The frequent use of amnesties by Southern European States had caused some frictions with 
Northern European States, generally more reluctant to use broad regularisation programmes. 
In this sense, see: C. Finotelli and J. Arango (2011), ‘Regularisation of unauthorised immigrants 
in Italy and Spain: determinants and effects’, Documents d’Analisi Geografica, 57, pp. 494-515. 
Some European countries clearly withdrew from regularisations in other Member States. After 
the 2002 Italian regularisation, representatives of certain Member States attempted to exclude 
regularised immigrants from the categories encompassed by the European directive on long-term 
residents from third countries. Furthermore, in 2005, both the German and Dutch governments 
sharply criticised the decision by the Spanish government to carry out a mass regularisation 
of irregular immigrants. The same government was also blamed for not having informed its 
fellow EU Member States about the process in an adequate time frame. In particular, German 
and Dutch criticism was fueled by a widespread fear that regularised immigrants in Spain would 
invade other EU Member States, attracted by their generous welfare systems.
5 S. Hauptman (2013), The Criminalization of Immigration. Post 9/11 Moral Panic, El Paso: LFB 
Scholarly Publishing LLC.
6 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (6 July 2007), Regularisation Programmes 
for irregular migrants, Report, Doc. 11350, and Council of the European Union (24 September 
2008), European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, 13440/08, Brussels. Many studies were also 
commissioned on the topic. Apart from the known Clandestino Project (European Com-
mission, ‘Clandestino Project Final Report’, 2009, available at: http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/
media_147171_en.pdf), see also: Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly and J. Greenway 
(2007), Regularisation programmes for irregular migrants, available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/4b9fac519.pdf; ICMPD (2009), ‘Regine – Regularisations in Europe. Final Report’, Vienna, 
Austria, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/immigration/docs/studies/
regine_report_january_2009_en.pdf.
7 European Commission (10 June 2009), Communication on an Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice serving the citizen: Wider freedom in a safer environment, COM (2009) 262, Brussels. For 
an analysis of these texts, see: E. Guild and S. Carrera (August 2009), Towards the Next Phase 
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Theoretical Framework
Almost ten years after the economic breakdown of 2008, the landscape 
does not seem to have changed much. Silence seems to have fallen on the 
fate of undocumented migrants in Europe, their presence overshadowed 
by issues related to the signif icant number of new arrivals over the past 
years. While more ‘attractive’ migrants such as students, highly skilled, 
or intra-corporate transferees are quite well looked after8, there are very 
few European legislative provisions that relate to low-skilled/unskilled 
migrant workers who, on the other hand, constitute the great majority of 
the Sans-Papiers population.9
The most prominent example, the Seasonal Worker Directive (see Zoete-
weij in this volume), only targets ‘new arrivals’ (and circular migration): it 
thus refrains from taking into account the situation of those already present 
within the Schengen Space who, on the other hand, might have benefited 
from a directive related to low-skilled labour, had it been retroactively 
applicable. The main provisions that affect the situation of Sans-Papiers thus 
remain those that criminalise their irregular status (Facilitator unauthorized 
entry Directive, 2002/90/EC, Employers’ Sanctions Directive, 2009/52/EC, 
Returns Directive, 2008/115/EC; see Berntsen and De Lange in this volume), 
conveying the message that undocumented migration should not be toler-
ated. Also, single Member States have become more cautious in the use of 
regularisation measures and have, at the same time, both tightened their 
grip over national borders and increased pressure on irregular migrants 
already present in their territories, fast-tracking deportation and expulsion 
measures and making broad use of criminal and administrative detention, 
alongside strong anti-immigration rhetoric.
At European and national levels, laws are thus framed and policies 
passed that primarily aim at excluding and removing irregular migrants, 
often making their access to very basic human rights such as health, 
housing, or education particularly diff icult. Yet, ‘the incapacity of certain 
of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: The European Commission Proposals for the 
Stockholm Programme, CEPS Policy Brief No. 196, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
And S. Carrera and M. Merlino (October 2010), Assessing EU policy on irregular immigration 
under the Stockholm Programme, CEPS, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.
8 Student Directive, 2004/114/EC: Blue Card Directive, 2009/50EC: Intra-Corporate Transfers 
directive, 2014/66/EU
9 The fact that Sans-Papiers are mostly active in the low/unskilled fragments of the job market 
is, for example, highlighted by the Clandestino Project; see, for instance, pp. 49, 84, 89, and 135 
of the ‘Final Report’.
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national immigration legislation in terms of meeting local social realities 
and ensuring that those who reside in their territories have access to basic 
socio-economic rights has led to situations whereby local actors (mainly 
cities) have been encouraged to develop ¨creative¨ (informal) practices for 
social inclusion, community well-being and the provision of services to all 
their residents’.10 Such practices, which, without legally regularising it, do 
somehow ‘normalise’ the situation of undocumented migrants, are often 
carried out without, or even in defiance of, national directives and policies 
on irregular migration.11 With the passing of time, the void left by European 
and national legislative indifference towards the fate of Sans-Papiers has 
thus been f illed by bottom-up initiatives, fostered by grassroots movements 
that sensitise the population to the vulnerability of undocumented migrants 
and progressively facilitate their integration into the hosting society. These 
strategies bring to the fore the role that cities can play in the management 
of the migration process: academic research has already investigated the 
very signif icant contribution that municipalities make to improve the 
conditions of those Sans-Papiers living within their territory.12
Research dedicated to the inclusion policies enacted at the intermediate 
level between the two poles of State and municipality is less developed, 
conveying the impression of a dichotomous management of migration, torn 
10 S. Carrera and M. Merlino, Assessing EU policy on irregular immigration under the Stockholm 
Programme, p. 7. See also: B. Barber (2013), If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, 
Rising Cities, Yale: Yale University Press.
11 E. Hepburn and R. Zapata-Barrero (2014), ‘Introduction: Immigration Policies in Multilevel 
States’, in R. Zapata Barrero and E. Hepburn (eds.) The Politics of Immigration in Multi-level States, 
New York: Palgrave, p. 5: ‘Sub-state governments and parties may adopt quite distinctive policies 
on migration, which may diverge from, or even contradict, those of the State […] often, these 
sub-state political approaches to immigration conflict directly with central-state (national) 
models, resulting in tensions over policy coordination and the framing of immigration in 
different parts of a country’. 
12 On the topic, amongst others: T. Caponio (2005), ‘Policy networks and immigrants’ associa-
tions in Italy. The cases of Milan, Bologna and Naples’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 
31 pp. 931-950; M. Alexander (2007), Cities and labour immigration. Comparing policy responses 
in Amsterdam, Paris, Rome and Telaviv, Aldershot: Ashgate; P. Neyers and K. Rygiel (eds.) (2012), 
Citizenship, Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement London: Routledge; P. Neyers (2012), 
‘No One is Illegal between City and Nation’, Studies in Social Justice, 4(2) pp. 127-143; R. Dekker, 
H. Emilsson, B. Krieger, and P. Scholten (2015), ‘A Local Dimension of Integration Policies? A 
comparative Study of Berlin, Malmo and Rotterdam’, International Migration Review, 49(3) 
pp. 633-658; H. Bauder (2017), ‘Sanctuary Cities: Policies and Practices in International Perspective’, 
International Migration, 55(2) pp. 174-187. See also the website of the EUROCITIES network. 
Retrieved from: http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/issues/migration-integration-issue. The 
experience of CLIP (Cities for Local Integration Policies) can also be mentioned: https://www.
eurofound.europa.eu/clip-european-network-of-cities-for-local-integration-policies-for-migrants
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between rigid national attitudes, and (in some happy cases) more welcoming 
local ones.13 However, this approach risks overlooking some interesting 
examples in which effective ‘normalisation’ processes are carried out at 
a subnational, but not yet municipal level.14 Such cases are of particular 
interest because they are likely to involve a higher number of undocumented 
migrants and therefore have a bigger impact than merely municipal opera-
tions. Furthermore, practices recognised at a federal/regional level may 
have a more off icial character (and therefore more stability) than those 
only practised at a municipal level. In most of these cases, they would still 
only impact the undocumented migrants’ everyday lives, making them 
easier and safer, but, in some situations, they may end up impacting their 
off icial migration statuses. In these occurrences, they may practically turn 
into real regularisation mechanisms, thus adding an additional layer to 
the multifaceted legal framework related to the management of irregular 
migration.15
This latter possibility has been concretely enacted by a Swiss regularisation 
programme that began in 2017 in Canton Geneva, which will be discussed 
in the present paper. The discussion will be structured as follows: the f irst 
part will provide a brief overview of the functioning of the Swiss system in 
general, then zoom in on the framework related to irregular migration. We 
will then focus on the Papyrus Operation, presenting its main characteristics 
and elements of originality. Finally, we will draw a comparison between 
13 ‘Local policy is essentially identif ied with city level policy and, even more narrowly, with 
the interventions carried out by local/municipal administrations’, M. Borkert and T. Caponio 
(2010), Introduction, in C. Tiziana and B. Maren (eds.), The local dimension of migration policy 
and policymaking, Imiscoe Report Series, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
14 Very interesting in this respect is the case of Catalonia: on the basis of the Statute of Autonomy 
of 2006, the Catalan government is able to pass legislation on the reception of migrants and to 
formulate, within the limits of its devolved powers, its own integration policies. S. Schech, in 
‘Rescaling Sovereignty? ’ mentions ‘the Catalan Citizenship and Immigration Plan (2005-2008) 
[which] makes residency in Catalonia the sole criterion for a migrant’s inclusion in public 
policies and access to services’. See also: M. Bruquetas-Callejo et al. Immigration and Integration 
Policy-making in Spain, IMISCOE Working Paper 21, 2008; À. Castiñeira (2009), Immigration 
in Multinational States: The Case of Catalonia, in R. Zapata Barrero (ed.), Immigration and 
Self-Government of Minority Nations, Bern: Peter Lang. 
15 E. Hepburn and R. Zapata-Barrero, Introduction: Immigration Policies in Multilevel States, p. 6: 
‘As immigration has become ‘rescaled’ across several levels of multilevel states, there is an urgent 
need to develop a deeper understanding of how immigration is governed and framed by political 
actors across different territorial levels […] since the elaboration of multilevel governance, there 
have been far fewer examinations of this multilevel perspective at the state/sub-state political 
level, nor has it ever been examined with regard to the specif ic area of immigration, which is 
clearly a cross-cutting policy issue that affects both levels’. 
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this experiment and other similar ones already carried out in Europe, and 
we will close with a tentative assessment of whether such a model could 
ever be implemented outside of Switzerland.
Swiss Federalism and Migration Management
The Swiss confederation consists of 26 Cantons: each canton -- with its own 
territory, population, f inancial resources, and political power -- represents 
one almost statuary entity. Despite not being sovereign in external relations 
and also not fully independent in some internal matters, cantons enjoy a 
very signif icant degree of independence.16 Swiss federalism is oftentimes 
presented as ‘federalisme d’execution’ (which could be translated as ‘execu-
tive federalism’) because, while the federal government retains legislative 
responsibility, the implementation of the single normative provisions is 
delegated to each single canton, thus allowing a high degree of policy-making 
autonomy in such areas as education, health, and policing. While this type 
of organisation allows adaptation of the federal law to the specif ic situation 
of each single canton, such a high level of autonomy can lead to signif icant 
policy differences between one canton and another.
Such differences are particularly sharp when it comes to the implementa-
tion of national provisions in the f ield of migration: from the process of 
naturalisation to the one of renewal of long-term or short-period permits, 
cantons have the liberty to shape the general requirements set out in 
national legislation according to their own social, economic, and political 
specif icities.17 The same goes for the implementation of the only provision 
that allows for the regularisation of undocumented migrants present in the 
country, namely art. 30, al. 1, lett. b of the Law on Foreigners.
According to this provision, ‘derogations from the admission requirements 
are permitted in order to […] b. take account of serious cases of personal 
hardship or important public interests’. The content of the normative provi-
sion is further specif ied by an administrative memorandum, the OASA 
(Ordinance on admission, residence and economic activity), which states 
(art. 31) the criteria that should be taken into account when assessing a 
16 Art. 3 of the Swiss Constitution, and Title 3, Ch. 1, Sect. 1, artt. 42-49. See also H. Kriesi (1998), 
Le systeme politique suisse, Paris: Economica.
17 N. Wichmann, M. Hermann, G. D’Amato, D. Ef ionay-Mader, R. Fibbi, J. Menet, D. Ruedin 
(2011), Les marges de manœuvre au sein du fédéralisme: La politique de migration dans le cantons, 
Commission fédérale pour les questions de migration, Bern: CFM, retrieved from: https://www.
ekm.admin.ch/dam/data/ekm/dokumentation/materialien/mat_foederalismus_f.pdf.
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claim for ‘serious case of personal hardship’. According to this framework, 
a Sans-Papier willing to apply for regularisation needs, f irst of all, to show 
good integration into the country and, secondly, respect for the Swiss legal 
order. The third and fourth criteria relate to the claimant’s family and 
economic situation: in respect to the former, special attention is paid to the 
situation of the claimant’s children; in respect to the latter, the claimant’s 
ability and willingness to work will also be evaluated, thus becoming the 
f ifth object of scrutiny. The sixth element to be taken into account is related 
to the length of the migrants’ presence in Switzerland. The administrative 
guidelines clearly state that neither ‘the law, nor the jurisprudence of the 
Federal Tribunal explicitly foresee a minimum or a maximum length of 
stay [for the claim to be considered or to succeed]’. Nevertheless, possibly 
taking into account other normative references that are present in the Law 
on Foreigners (art. 84, al. 5) and in the Law on Asylum (art. 14, co. 2), the 
same guidelines state that ‘a presence of f ive years in Switzerland should 
be considered as a relevant indicator’. The seventh and the eighth elements 
relate to the health status of the migrant and to the migrant’s possibility to 
reintegrate into his or her country of origin.18
Migrants who would like to avail themselves of the provisions contained 
in art. 30, lett. b of the Federal Act should address their requests to the local 
migration authority, which gives a f irst consideration to the dossier and 
decides whether to pass it on to the central administrative authority on 
migration (State Secretariat for Migration), which gives the f inal decision. 
As art. 30, para. 1, lett b) was redacted as a ‘may’ and not as a ‘shall’ clause, 
there is no right for the migrant to be granted the permit – the concession 
of it depends solely on the discretionary evaluation of the administrative 
authority. The decision of the central authority on the dossier is free and 
does not necessarily have to take into account the evaluations of the local 
authority. On the other hand, statistics show that once the dossier has made 
it to the second step of the bureaucratic structure, the rate of approval is 
18 M. Caroni, T. Grasdorf-Meyer, L. Ott, and N. Scheiber (2014), Migrationsrecht, Stämpfli Verlag: 
Bern, p. 19; D. Ef ionay-Mäder, S. Schönenberger, and I. Steiner (2010), Visage des Sans-Papiers 
en Suisse, Federal Commission for Migration. Retrieved from: https://www.ekm.admin.ch/
dam/data/ekm/dokumentation/materialien/mat_sanspap_f.pdf ; M. Morlok, A. Oswald, H. 
Meier (B,S,S.), D. Ef ionayi-Mäder, D. Ruedin, D. Bader, and P. Wanner (2015), Les Sans-Papiers 
en Suisse en 2015, State Secretariat for Migration. Retrieved from: https://www.sem.admin.ch/
dam/data/sem/internationales/illegale-migration/sans_papiers/ber-sanspapiers-2015-f.pdf; R. 
Petry (2013), La situation juridique des migrants sans statut legal, Geneva: Schulthess; E. Piguet, 
‘Quotas d’Immigration: L’expérience Suisse’ Retrieved from: http://www2.unine.ch/repository/
default/content/sites/sfm/f iles/shared/pub/o/o_03.pdf.
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quite high – in other words, the federal off ice tends to rely on the evalu-
ations made by the cantons and to stand by their decisions. The decision 
of the local authority not to pass the dossier on to the federal off ice can 
be appealed before the cantonal tribunals according to the provisions of 
the cantonal law. The decision of the federal off ice can be appealed to the 
Federal Administrative Tribunal. The procedure clearly follows a path 
that takes into account the specif ic structure of the Swiss administration, 
f irst allowing the local authorities to have their say on the claim and then 
passing the dossier on to the central level.
As is apparent by the very structure of the norm, what is crucial in every 
aspect is the way each single canton decides to decline the very broad 
requirements set out in the OASA. Recent studies have conf irmed that 
the rates of regularisation for individuals are extremely varied from one 
canton to another: it is thus very diff icult, if not impossible, for an individual 
to be able to predict the outcome of his or her application, which clearly 
discourages interested people from applying and thus keeps the number 
of irregular permanencies quite stable.19 The elbow room is so broad that 
scholars agree that this Swiss regularisation mechanism is extremely patchy 
and not very effective. It is even argued by some, whether such a tool deserves 
the name of ‘regularisation mechanism’ at all.20 This trend is, on the other 
hand, very much in line with the off icial stance that Switzerland has on 
migration, which, traditionally cautious, has become very restrictive with 
the passing of the new Law on Foreigners in 2008.21
19 According to Philippe Wanner (2015), in Les Sans-Papiers en Suisse en 2015, the number of 
undocumented migrants in the country is around 76000. On the very limited legal certainty that 
Sans-Papiers can rely upon when submitting their application, see again D. Ef ionay-Mäder, S. 
Schönenberger, and I. Steiner (2010), Visage des Sans-Papiers en Suisse: ‘ la décision d’examiner 
les demandes de cas de rigueur ainsi que l’interprétation et la pondération des critères sont 
laissés à l’appréciation des cantons […] les requérants, mais également les organisations de 
soutien, ignorent toujours quels sont les critères décisifs pour l’acceptation des demandes de 
cas de rigueur par les cantons et les autorités fédérales. Aucun des spécialistes interrogés n’était 
réellement à même de déf inir des critères de décision manifestes et transparents. Ainsi, peu de 
Sans-Papiers prennent le risque de déposer une demande, puisqu’ils sont obligés de décliner leur 
identité et qu’en cas de décision négative, ils risquent le renvoi. Même les services de consultation 
sont extrêmement prudents lorsqu’ils évaluent l’opportunité du dépôt d’un dossier et parfois ils 
le déconseillent aux personnes concernées’.
20 R. Diethelm (2016), La régularisation des Sans-Papiers a l’aune de l’art. 30 al 1 let. B Letr, 
Actualité du droit des étrangers. Jurisprudence et analyses, ed. by Gaëlle Sauthier and Minh 
Son Nguyen, Bern: Stämpfli Verlag pp. 1- 28.
21 M. Caroni (2016), ‘Die rechtliche Stellung der Sans-Papiers verbessern’, in C. Abbt and J. 
Rochel (eds.), MigrationsLand Schweiz.15. Vorschlage für die Zukunft, Lucerne: Hier und Jetzt, 
pp. 103-116. 
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Operation Papyrus
Against this background, a very recent case has emerged, under the name 
‘Papyrus Operation’. The Canton of Geneva is amongst the richest and 
most highly populated in Switzerland, with a traditionally open attitude 
towards immigration. Almost 40% of the population is foreign, and the 
territory also has one of the highest percentages of regularisation by way 
of art. 30, al. 1, lett. b).
At the beginning of the 21st century, an attempt had already been made 
to ask for the regularisation, at the cantonal level, of all the Sans-Papiers 
working in the domestic economy, but the initiative was not successful.22 
Yet, lawyers and legal experts operating in associations representing and 
supporting irregular migrants kept the channels of communication with 
the cantonal authorities open. In turn, the latter remained aware of the 
presence of the roughly 13000 undocumented migrants in the canton. In 
2011, with a mandate of the Conseil d’Etat, the highest executive authority 
in the canton, a group of experts f inally had the chance to take concrete 
action. This was done by sampling cases that would stand a good chance of 
being regularised via the usual procedure, and drawing from them common 
characteristics that, in turn, could be used to revitalise the extenuated 
criteria set out in the OASA. These common elements were then converted 
into general requirements to be complied with in order to qualify for the 
new case-by-case regularisation programme that would be enacted by the 
canton.
The newly drafted provisions, while entirely respecting the guidelines 
set out in art. 30, al. 1, lett. b) of the Law on Foreigners, also materialised 
them into clear-cut and concrete provisions, reducing the discretion of the 
single decision maker. The applicants would now know that, in order to be 
able to submit their request, they would need to show complete f inancial 
independence (though without having to sustain further enquiries on 
the level of success attained with their professional activity, for instance), 
effective integration into the host society (which is simply proven with an 
A2 level of French), no criminal records, and ten years of uninterrupted 
stay in the territory of the canton (5 for families with school-aged children). 
Additionally, the drafters removed the requirement related to the possibility 
or impossibility for the applicants to return to their country of origin, which 
22 The proposition came from the Conseil d’État, and aimed at a case-by-case regularisation 
of domestic workers living in the Canton. See, for instance, the Press-communicate of 5 April 
2005. Retrieved from: https://www.ge.ch/conseil_etat/2005-2009/communiques/20050406.asp.
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somewhat confused the intent of art. 30, al. 1, lett b), blurring the lines 
between regularisations for so called ‘humanitarian reasons’ on the one 
hand, and ‘economic regularisations’ on the other.23
Once the criteria were drafted, the group of experts and the cantonal 
authorities engaged in multiple meetings with their federal counterparts, 
in order to def ine in detail all the aspects of the procedure, which then 
ceased to be only an ‘internal’ matter, becoming instead an off icial project, 
known and endorsed by the national authorities. This passage was of crucial 
importance. As seen previously, after a preliminary evaluation by the canton, 
the Sans-Papier’s dossier needs to be evaluated by the State Secretariat for 
Migration for f inal approval. Without the support of the federal authorities, 
the whole procedure would thus remain at the level of the practices we have 
mentioned at the beginning of this contribution, which, though facilitating 
undocumented migrants’ lives, do not assure them a secure legal status 
outside the city or town (or canton) of reference. Federal administration 
instead granted its support to the initiative, and thus committed to look 
favourably at the dossiers that, coming from Canton Geneva, would comply 
with the newly developed requirements. National authorities took a positive 
stance because cantonal ones took the commitment, through the regularisa-
tion of the Sans-Papiers, to bring the underground economy of some labour 
markets (mostly domestic work, but also construction and services) to the 
surface. The Government of the Canton of Geneva off icially launched the 
operation on 21 February 2017.
The authorities have carefully stressed that this should, in no way, be 
considered as amnesty, in the sense that each individual application will 
be assessed on its merits, and there is no automatic guarantee of a posi-
tive outcome. Yet, Operation Papyrus presents a signif icant improvement 
for the condition of the Sans-Papiers living in the Canton of Geneva in 
comparison with that of undocumented migrants living elsewhere in the 
country because, as said, this time the content of the broad criteria listed 
in art. 30, al. 1, lett. b) Law on Foreigners has been spelled out. Through this 
operation, Canton Geneva takes a stand against the excessive discretion of 
the cantonal authorities in the implementation of the ‘personal hardship’ 
provision and against the consequent lack of transparency of the criteria 
23 R. Petry (2017), La situation juridique des migrants sans statut legal; L. Della Torre (2017), 
State’s Discretion and the Challenge of Irregular Migration – the Example of Permanent Regu-
larization Practices in Spain and Switzerland, NCCR Working Papers. Retrieved from: http://
nccr-onthemove.ch/publications/states-discretion-and-the-challenge-of-irregular-migration-
the-example-of-permanent-regularization-practices-in-spain-and-switzerland-2/
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used to interpret this provision. This change, besides possibly facilitating 
the tasks of the administrative personnel called upon to apply the legal 
requirements should, most of all, make it easier for undocumented migrants 
to foresee the results of their requests, thus increasing their trust in the 
system and, ultimately, allowing them to take concrete steps to get out of 
their precarious status.
Analysis and Conclusions
The operation launched by Canton Geneva is the f irst of its kind ever tried in 
Switzerland. Yet, it can be placed against the broader framework represented 
by other de-irregularisation practices already well-established in other parts 
of Europe, with some very peculiar elements of distinction.
As anticipated at the beginning of the paper, in many cities, the common 
practice is to normalise the situation of Sans-Papiers substantially, through 
the use of informal routines that allow them to carry on a relatively safe 
life, e.g. refraining from asking them for papers when they attend hospitals, 
and allowing their children to go to school. In some cases, such as in the 
American ‘sanctuary cities’, for example, this support goes one step further, 
becoming something of a challenge towards the central government. In 
these ‘sanctuary cities’, local authorities refuse to carry out removal orders 
or to report Sans-Papiers migrants to the local police forces, thus de facto 
voiding national provisions and law enforcement measures and eliminating 
much of their effectiveness.24
With all their many specificities and differences, it seems that the protec-
tion mechanisms for Sans-Papiers at a local level share some common ele-
ments. First of all, and as with almost anything that relates to undocumented 
migrants, they are para-legal, in the sense that it is diff icult to place them 
within a f irm legal framework. Furthermore, they are generally carried 
out in the face of opposition – or, at best, indifference – from the national 
authorities: thus, even when not only implemented by civil society, but also 
endorsed by local authorities, such mechanisms generally do not have any 
effect outside the municipality that implements them. Finally, while the 
arguments behind these practices may sometimes make reference to the 
positive role that irregular migrants could play in addressing local labour 
shortages, they are mostly human rights-based, structured on the assump-
tion that granting protection to Sans-Papiers is the only way to make sure 
24 S. Schech, ‘Rescaling sovereignty?’, Griffith Law Review, 22 pp.758-803.
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that they are effectively in the position of exercising those human rights 
to which they should be entitled.
The Swiss case is very interesting because it adds new elements to the 
ones we have considered up to this point. It is still an operation launched 
only at a local, even if not municipal, level: as such, it has a broader effect 
than municipal practices, but, at the same time, it does not reach the 
national level. It is thus by no means to be confused with a national regu-
larisation programme. Similar to local practices of support and protection 
for irregular migrants, Operation Papyrus was also prepared by the intense 
work of the local organisations acting for the support and assistance of 
migrants. It is thus, by all standards, a ‘bottom-up’ operation, which, over 
the years, has managed to gain acknowledgement of the cantonal authori-
ties. At the same time, though, despite being a ‘bottom-up’ operation, it is 
much more effective and much more pervasive than the ones generally 
carried out at a municipal level: the operation does not content itself with 
facilitating the access of migrants to school, education, health care, and 
the like; rather, it grants these migrants a permission to remain that, once 
obtained, is viable throughout the country. This was possible because, 
and this is the second element that sets the Geneva example apart, the 
operation was not carried out against federal authorities, but in accordance 
with them. Finally, while the human rights approach certainly played a 
part in the motivations and pursued goals of those directly involved in 
the drafting of the Papyrus criteria, the economic goal of facilitating the 
emergence of some half-hidden and highly precarious labour sections was 
important to gain the attention and support of the cantonal and federal 
authorities.
Despite its severe off icial stance against irregular migration, Switzerland 
has thus managed to establish itself as one of the f irst countries in Europe 
that has allowed a regularisation procedure to take place at the local level, 
at the same time granting it national validity.
Such an operation was made possible by the combination of multiple 
factors. The peculiar conditions of Canton Geneva, very rich in migrant 
population and traditionally open to foreign work, need to be considered, 
as well as the very effective mobilisation of the organisations supporting 
irregular migrants. To this, the very peculiar characteristics of the Swiss 
Federalism and the great margin of manoeuvre granted to cantons in the 
handling of migration need to be added, together with a touch of that 
‘Swiss pragmatism’ that entails shying away from all-inclusive theoretical 
approaches, refusing generalised definitions of any modus operandi and, on 
the contrary, favouring a very concrete and case-by-case approach.
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It is diff icult to foresee whether such elements could be reproduced 
again, either inside or outside of Switzerland. As for the national level, the 
same pragmatic approach that allows for the possibility of reaching tailored 
and effective solutions also brings along the risk of fragmentation, and of 
‘conducting a sectoral policy, disregarding a coherent overview’.25 Some 
cantons have already specif ically declared that they will not enact such 
operations as Papyrus in their territory, and the occurrence of a patchwork 
legal framework for Sans-Papiers in the country thus becomes a concrete 
possibility. As for the international level, it remains to be seen whether other 
European states will ever allow municipalities and regional governments to 
enjoy the same elbow room as their Swiss counterparts, and whether they 
will be capable of structuring a regularisation reform that does not defy, 
but rather persuades, national authorities.
Migration is one of the phenomena that most challenge states to reassert 
their sovereignty and their power. Yet, it is precisely in this field that sovereignty 
is being rescaled. The impact and the persuasiveness of the Swiss example make 
a case of their own, but, at the same time, they confirm that the subnational 
level is the one where some of the most interesting attempts are made to 
absorb foreign population, to integrate it, and to overcome anti-immigration 
rhetoric, and, thus, the need to continue monitoring it. Switzerland, with its 
peculiar federal structure, could be, in this sense, an excellent laboratory.
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11 When Nationalism Meets Soft Skills
Towards a Comprehensive Framework for Explaining 
Ethno-migrant Inequality in the Dutch Labour Market
Hans Siebers
Abstract
The aim of this chapter is to outline a framework of explanation. Why is 
it so diff icult for people with a ‘non-Western’ background to participate 
in the labour market on equal terms with people without a migration 
background? There are different ways of structuring the various explana-
tions in the literature. On the one hand, inspired by Bourdieu, Siebers will 
distinguish various forms of capital – human, social, cultural – that may 
give access to economic capital, such as getting a well-paid or satisfy-
ing job. On the other hand, Siebers will discuss indirect discrimination 
when non-job-related capitals, such as social and cultural capital, play a 
role in harming the chances for people with a ‘non-Western’ migration 
background to access economic capital.
Keywords: soft skills, Bourdieu, forms of capital, non-Western migration 
background
Introduction
Ethno-migrant inequality in the labour market is a persistent problem 
in many countries.1 In the Netherlands, especially people with a f irst- or 
1 A. Heath and S. Y. Cheung (2007), Unequal Chances: Ethnic Minorities in Western Labour 
Markets, Oxford: Oxford University Press; F. van Tubergen, F. Maas, and H. Flap (2004), ‘The 
economic incorporation of immigrants in eighteen western countries: Origin, destination, and 
community effects’, American Sociological Review 69(5) pp. 704-727.
Rijken, Conny and Tesseltje de Lange (eds): Towards a Decent Labour Market for Low Waged 
Migrant Workers. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018  
doi: 10.5117/9789462987555_sieb
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second-generation ‘non-Western’ migration background2 f ind themselves 
in subordinated positions in the labour market. Their unemployment rates 
in particular, are a matter of great concern. In the f irst quarter of 2017, 
their unemployment rate was 12.8 percent, compared to 4.4 percent of the 
nonmigrant population.3 This factor of three of having higher chances of 
becoming unemployed if you have a migration background, than if you 
do not, has been visible and consistent for several decades already. This 
problem cannot be attributed to nationality. Unemployment rates amongst 
people with a second-generation ‘non-Western’ background (45 percent of 
the total population with a ‘non-Western’ migration background) are even 
higher (17 percent) than those belonging to the f irst generation (14 percent), 
even though many people of the second generation have Dutch nationality.4
At the meso level, these macro f igures are ref lected in f indings of a 
number of case studies we carried out in the Dutch public sector.5 In these 
organisations, people with a ‘non-Western’ background are underrepresented 
in the labour force. If they have a job, these jobs are usually low-waged and 
on the lower job levels. Having a ‘non-Western’ migration background, or 
2 Dutch classif ication systems def ine someone as having a migration background if at least 
one of his or her parents was born abroad. That includes f irst- and second-generation migrants. 
Subsequently, this classif ication differentiates between origins: so-called ‘Western’ and ‘non-
Western’ parts of the world. ‘Non-Western’ includes Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, the 
Middle East, Turkey, and Asia (except Japan and Indonesia). Other parts are seen as ‘Western’. 
This classif ication is based on a combination of assumed economic progress and assumed cultural 
difference, with the Netherlands presumably being closer to the ‘West’ than to ‘non-Western’ 
parts of the world. See: http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=82809NED
&D1=a&D2=0&D3=0&D4=a&D5=l&VW=T
3 Cbs.statline.nl.
4 CBS (2016), Jaarrapport Integratie 2016, Den Haag/Heerlen: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.
5 See H. Siebers (2009a), ‘(Post)bureaucratic organizational practices and the production of 
racioethnic inequality at work’, Journal of Management and Organization, 15(1), pp. 62-81; H. 
Siebers (2009), ‘Struggles for Recognition: The Politics of Racioethnic Identity among Dutch 
National Tax Administrators’, Scandinavian Journal of Management, 25(1), pp. 73-84; H. Siebers 
(2010), ‘Organisatiecultuur en verhulde discriminatie: Over het onthullen van discriminatie in 
hedendaagse organisaties’, in C.J. Forder (ed.), Gelijke Behandeling: Oordelen en Commentaar, Ni-
jmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers; H. Siebers (2010), ‘The Impact of Migrant-Hostile Discourse in Media 
and Politics on Racioethnic Closure in Career Development in The Netherlands’, International 
Sociology 25(4) pp. 475-500; H. Siebers (2017), ‘What turns migrants into ethnic minorities at work? 
Factors erecting ethnic boundaries among Dutch police off icers’, Sociology 51(3), pp. 608-625; H. 
Siebers and M.H.J. Dennissen (2015), ‘Is it cultural racism? Discursive oppression and exclusion 
of migrants in the Netherlands’, Current Sociology 63(3), pp. 470-489; H. Siebers and J. van Gastel 
(2015), ‘Why migrants earn less: In search of the factors producing the ethno-migrant pay gap in 
a Dutch public organization’, Work, Employment and Society 29(3), pp. 371-391.
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not, makes a difference in recruitment, hiring decisions, access to higher job 
levels, fair pay, development opportunities, promotion chances, and so on.
The aim of this chapter is to outline a framework of explanation. Why is it 
so diff icult for people with a ‘non-Western’ background to participate in the 
labour market on equal terms with people without a migration background? 
There are different ways of structuring the various explanations in the 
literature. On the one hand, inspired by Bourdieu6, I will distinguish vari-
ous forms of capital – human, social, and cultural – that may give access 
to economic capital, such as getting a well-paid or satisfying job. On the 
other hand, I will discuss indirect discrimination when non-job-related 
capitals, such as social and cultural capital, play a role in harming the 
chances for people with a ‘non-Western’ migration background to access 
economic capital. Direct discrimination is apparent when these people’s 
access to economic capital is directly diminished or when their capital is 
depreciated – Bourdieu uses the term symbolic violence here.
The chapter f irst discusses human capital, social capital, and discrimina-
tion, drawing on existing explanations in the literature. Next, my own contri-
butions to the literature will be presented. I will demonstrate the impact of 
nationalist discourses in media and politics on relations between nonmigrant 
employees and applicants, and their colleagues with a ‘non-Western’ migration 
background. I will also develop a cultural capital understanding of ‘soft skills’ 
requirements to understand how they exclude people with a ‘non-Western’ 
migration background in the labour market. I will highlight how ‘soft skills’ 
requirements converge with Dutch nationalism to fuel discrimination against 
people with a ‘non-Western’ migration background in Dutch work settings.
I will do so with a broad view drawing on research projects carried out in 
Dutch organisations, including the Dutch police; the Dutch tax administra-
tion; The Hague University of Applied Sciences; the provincial administration 
of Noord-Holland; the Dutch ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food 
Quality; the Dutch ministry of Education, Culture and Science; Deloitte; 
and the municipality of Eindhoven. Most of these projects combine a meso 
perspective (questionnaires and document analysis) with a micro focus 
on everyday interactions and experiences (observations and interviews).
They start with exploring the mechanisms and factors that may produce 
unequal chances in, for example, getting a job, fair promotion chances, and pay. 
6 P. Bourdieu, (1977), Outline of theory of practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ; P. 
Bourdieu, (1984), ‘Social space and symbolic power’, Sociological Theory 7(1), 14-25; P. Bourdieu, 
(1986), ‘The forms of capital’, in J Richardson (ed.) Handbook of Theory and Research for the 
Sociology of Education, Westport, CT: Greenwood.
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That means doing observations or asking respondents to keep a diary on their 
daily experiences, and conducting interviews with mixed samples of employees, 
applicants, supervisors, and selectors with nonmigration and ‘non-Western’ 
migration backgrounds to allow for comparison. Usually, we focus on triads 
of employees or applicants with similar characteristics in terms of gender, age, 
education, and work experiences, one being a nonmigrant and the other one 
having a ‘non-Western’ migration background, and their supervisor or selector.
Subsequently, the representativity of these explorative findings is assessed 
based on distributing questionnaires amongst all employees and applicants. 
These f indings are used for building models through structural equation 
modelling, to explain inequality between nonmigrant and ‘non-Western’ 
migrant respondents in access to economic capital like jobs, promotions, 
pay, etc. statistically.
That means that these projects are about those people with a migration 
background who are relatively well-off. The civil servants who work in 
public organisations have permanent residency rights, and, in most cases, 
also Dutch nationality. They have also had access to formal education, most 
of them at middle- or higher-education levels in the Netherlands. These 
people are not in the most precarious positions, like the undocumented 
migrants discussed by Berntsen & de Lange and Della Torre, the seasonal 
workers discussed by Herzfeld Olsson and Zoeteweij, or most of the intra-EU 
migrant workers discussed elsewhere in this volume.
Nevertheless, many of these civil servants with a ‘non-Western’ migration 
background were born from parents who came to the Netherlands in the 
second half of the previous century, often living and working in precarious 
positions. They currently face factors and mechanisms that have a negative 
impact on their chances to get a job, and to receive compensation appropriate 
to their qualif ications: they face ethno-migrant inequality.
Ethno-migrant Inequality
The term ethno-migrant inequality7 is used here since it is often unclear 
whether the inequality and the exclusion processes migrants face are due to 
their migration status or to them becoming the object of ethnicisation. For 
example, migrants may have less contact with influential people who may 
7 H. Siebers and J. van Gastel (2015), ‘Why migrants earn less: In search of the factors producing 
the ethno-migrant pay gap in a Dutch public organization’, Work, Employment and Society 29(3), 
pp. 371-391. 
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help them to get a job. That may be due to their recent arrival (migrancy 
status) having had little time so far to develop such contacts. However, 
fewer contacts may also result from the processes of ethnicisation when 
they are identif ied as people who represent a particular ethnic group with 
different cultural characteristics.8 Such ethnic identif ication may induce 
nonmigrants to consider them to not belong to their own group, and thus to 
avoid contact with them. It is diff icult for migrants to network at a reception 
when no one wants to talk with them. Such contact avoidance means that 
ethnicity is salient and operational. On many such issues, we have insuf-
f icient knowledge about what is at stake, ‘migrancy’9 or ethnicity. Therefore, 
the provisional term ethno-migrant inequality is used.
Human Capital
The f irst explanation of this inequality in the labour market highlights 
human capital, i.e. having a certain level and type of education, relevant 
work experience, on-the-job learning, being in good mental and physical 
health, and having proficiency in the required language(s). Migrants may 
possess less human capital and therefore have less access to (better paid) 
jobs and other forms of economic capital. This argument refers to migrants 
irrespective of nationality. Here, the place where one has acquired this 
human capital may make a difference: in the country of origin or the host 
country. The former may be rewarded less than the latter.
These sources of inequality seem quite harmless, since human capital re-
quirements are functional to the work that needs to be done. Thus, mastering 
the right knowledge and skills is a legitimate reason for having more chances 
to get a job. However, that does not solve the problem, it mainly transfers 
it to the f ield of education. Migrants may have come here with lower levels 
of education, but may also have experienced exclusion in the educational 
system here. Moreover, there is a problem of getting one’s foreign education 
credentials recognised, particularly for non-EU migrants and refugees.10
8 H. Siebers (2017), ‘What turns migrants into ethnic minorities at work? Factors erecting 
ethnic boundaries among Dutch police off icers’, Sociology 51(3), pp. 608-625; A. Wimmer (2013), 
Ethnic Boundary Making. Institutions, Power, Networks, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
9 Migrancy status refers to whether one has a f irst- or second-generation migration background 
or having no such background.
10 T. de Lange, E. Besselsen, S. Rahouti, and C. Rijken (2017), Van azc naar een baan. De Neder-
landse regelgeving over en praktijk van arbeidsmarktintegratie van vluchtelingen, Amsterdam: 
Universiteit van Amsterdam.
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In one of the organisations we studied, inequality in educational levels 
explains 24.5 percent of the lower chances that applicants with a ‘non-
Western’ migration background have of getting hired, compared to nonmi-
grant applicants. Here, ethno-migrant inequality in language proficiency 
and in tenure (proxy for the accumulation of relevant work experience) 
explains 41.1 per cent of ethno-migrant inequality in access to good jobs 
and corresponding salary scales. In yet another organisation, ethno-migrant 
inequality in levels of education and language proficiency explains 45.9 per 
cent of this inequality.11
Social Capital
Drawing on Bourdieu and Granovetter,12 a body of literature shows that 
ethno-migrant inequality may also be produced by unequal access to social 
capital. Having developed many weak ties, with influential people beyond 
your immediate social environment, is more effective for advancing in the 
labour market than having a smaller number of strong network ties within 
this environment. Migrants may rely on those strong or bonding ties when 
having arrived recently, especially in a not very hospitable society.
Ethno-migrant inequality in access to jobs due to migrants having fewer 
and weaker bridging ties is quite problematic. After all, getting a job with the 
help of someone in an influential position tells little about someone’s capacity 
to perform a particular job properly. In principle, having social capital is not 
something job-related, unless having an extensive network of contacts is 
helpful in doing the job. If migrants face more diff iculties to get hired due 
to having fewer network ties, without such network ties being instrumental 
for performing the job, we have a case of indirect discrimination.
In almost all organisations we studied, we found that people with a 
‘non-Western’ migration background f ind it more diff icult to network. To 
them, there is always the risk of becoming identif ied in ethnic terms, as a 
member of an ethnic minority. The fear associated with such risks affects 
their ability for networking for career purposes. Many feel hampered and 
uncomfortable in network activities, to move around in receptions and 
after-work drinks smoothly, and so on. They also feel uncomfortable when 
11 H. Siebers and J. van Gastel (2015), ‘Why migrants earn less: In search of the factors producing 
the ethno-migrant pay gap in a Dutch public organization’, Work, Employment and Society 29(3), 
pp. 371-391. 
12 P. Bourdieu (1986), ‘The forms of capital’, in J. Richardson (ed.) Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education, Westport, CT: Greenwood; M. Granovetter (1983), ‘The 
strength of weak ties: A network theory revisited’, Sociological theory, 1(1) pp. 201-233.
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they need to make use of their network connections, such as gathering 
information about a particular vacancy they would like to apply for, or 
to mobilise support for themselves in general. In some organisations, the 
fear of becoming involved in ethnic conflicts becomes very real, actually 
triggering processes of exclusion against them.13
In one organisation, we found that 21 percent of the reasons why ap-
plicants with a ‘non-Western’ migration background have less chances for 
being hired is due to them having fewer contacts within that organisation 
that may help them in the application procedure. In another organisation, 
though, we found that such network effects were ruled out in application 
and promotion decisions due to very strict formalisation and accountability 
regulations. Such bureaucratic procedures may help to meet justice demands 
and to ensure that the best person gets the right job.14
Direct Discrimination
As indicated, the fact that migrants’ lower levels of social capital make 
it more diff icult for them to get a well-paid and satisfying job, indicates 
indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination is the case when nonmigrants 
avoid or reject migrants in their efforts to establish network ties with them. 
Direct discrimination is also the case when migrants’ human capital is 
not recognised on equal terms as nonmigrants’ human capital, or when 
migrants are underemployed, i.e. working on job levels below their human 
capital qualif ications.
Many studies point to direct discrimination taking place in key personnel 
management activities. For example, there are many f ield experiments in 
which identical application letters are sent for vacancies, with only different 
names, indicating a migration background or not. Applications suggesting 
a migration background have a signif icantly lower chance of being invited 
for an interview, rather than those suggesting a nonmigrant background.15 
13 H. Siebers (2017), ‘What turns migrants into ethnic minorities at work? Factors erecting 
ethnic boundaries among Dutch police off icers’, Sociology, 51(3) pp. 608-625. 
14 H. Siebers (2009), ‘(Post)bureaucratic organizational practices and the production of 
racioethnic inequality at work’, Journal of Management and Organization, 15(1) pp. 62-81; H. Siebers 
(2010), ‘Organisatiecultuur en verhulde discriminatie: Over het onthullen van discriminatie in 
hedendaagse organisaties’, in C.J. Forder (ed.)(2009) Gelijke Behandeling: Oordelen en Commentaar, 
Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers.; H. Siebers and J. van Gastel (2015), ‘Why migrants earn less: 
In search of the factors producing the ethno-migrant pay gap in a Dutch public organization’, 
Work, Employment and Society, 29(3) pp. 371-391. 
15 E. Zschirnt and D. Ruedin (2016), ‘Ethnic discrimination in hiring decisions: a meta-analysis 
of correspondence tests 1990-2015’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42(7) pp. 1115-1134. 
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There are also many case studies of discrimination in everyday interactions 
at work.16
Thus, direct discrimination may explain a substantial part of ethno-
migrant inequality in the labour market, but what, in turn, explains direct 
discrimination? There are several theories that provide an explanation. 
There are racism theories that argue that racism drives discrimination.17 
There are also sociopsychological explanations for discrimination that point 
to cognitive and affective processes of stereotyping and prejudices driving 
discriminatory behaviour.18
These explanations are not convincing for several reasons. Firstly, they 
tend to ignore one another. Racism scholars tend to conclude that it must 
be racism whenever migrants experience discrimination, without consider-
ing other possible explanations. They also often equate dependent and 
independent variables – discrimination is racism –; but then racism can no 
longer explain discrimination. It cannot be a dependent and independent 
variable simultaneously.19
In a similar way, sociopsychological studies conclude that, when f ield 
experiments demonstrate discrimination in the labour market, it must be 
driven by stereotyping and prejudices, but without empirically showing 
that this is the case. They draw on experimental research on stereotyping 
For the Netherlands, see I. Andriessen, E. Nievers, L. Faulk, and J. Dagevos (2010), Liever Mark 
dan Mohammed? Onderzoek naar arbeidsmarktdiscriminatie van niet-westerse migranten via 
praktijktests, SCP; and L. Blommaert, F. van Tubergen, and M. Coenders (2012), ‘Implicit and 
explicit interethnic attitudes and ethnic discrimination in hiring’, Social Science Research, 
41(1) pp. 61-73.
16 E.g. H. Siebers (2009), ‘Struggles for Recognition: The Politics of Racioethnic Identity among 
Dutch National Tax Administrators’, Scandinavian Journal of Management, 25(1) pp.,73-84; 
K. Van Laer and M. Janssens (2011), ‘Ethnic minority professionals experiences with subtle 
discrimination in the workplace’, Human Relations, 64(9) pp. 1203-1227.
17 For overviews, see L. Back and J. Solomos (eds.) (2009), Theories of Race and Racism. A Reader, 
London and New York: Routledge; Ph. Essed and D.Th. Goldberg (eds.) (2002), Race and Critical 
Theories, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers; P. Hill Collins and J. Solomos (2010),The SAGE Handbook 
of Race and Ethnic Studies, London: Sage.
18 For example, M. Chen and J.A. Bargh (1997), ‘Nonconscious Behavioral Conf irmation 
Processes: The Self-Fulf illing Consequences of Automatic Stereotype Activation’, Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 33(5) pp. 541-560; N. Ellemers and M. Barreto (2008), ‘Putting 
your own down: How members of disadvantaged groups unwittingly perpetuate or exacerbate 
their disadvantage’, in A. Brief (ed.), Diversity at Work, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
A.G. Greenwald, M.R. Banaji, L.A. Rudman, S.D. Farnham, B.A. Nozek, and D.S. Mellott (2002), ‘A 
Unif ied Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-Esteem, and Self-Concept’, Psychological 
Review, 109(1) pp. 3-25.
19 H. Siebers (2017), ‘“Race” versus “ethnicity”? Critical race essentialism and the exclusion 
and oppression of migrants in the Netherlands’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40(3) pp. 369-387.
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and prejudices, but experimental f indings cannot simply be extrapolated 
to real-life settings in the labour market itself. These real-life settings are 
far more complicated than any experiment would be able to reconstruct.
Secondly, racism theories and sociopsychological explanations cannot 
explain variation in discrimination. Racism theories understand racism 
as a structural characteristic of the rise of modern societies. However, if 
def ined as a trait of something as totalising as modernity, discrimination 
would have to be something that always happens, under all circumstances.
Likewise, sociopsychological explanations argue that people automatically 
create cognitive in-group and out-group classif ications when they meet 
others whom they identify as belonging to another ethnic group. Due to 
the need for uncertainty reduction and self-esteem promotion, they tend 
to overestimate the traits of one’s own category and underestimate out-
group traits, as social identity theory has it. Or people would have a natural 
tendency to prefer in-group members because they feel attracted to similar 
others, as similarity-attraction paradigm claims. Therefore, people would 
have a natural tendency to produce stereotypes, prejudices, and discrimina-
tory behaviour towards out-group members. If creating stereotypes and 
prejudices is something people naturally do and if possibilities to control such 
creation are limited,20 discrimination would almost always have to occur.
The facts are different. As we found in our projects, in many day-to-day 
instances, migrant and nonmigrant colleagues cooperate very well most 
of the time. In the Netherlands, the vast majority of the migrant working 
population has found a job, independent of the help of fellow migrants. 
Ethnic identif ication does take place in some settings, but in other settings 
the very same people do not identify each other in ethnic terms but as 
colleagues.21 Identif ication processes and discrimination are much more 
variable than racism and sociopsychological theories assume.
Nationalism
There is another possible driver of direct discrimination: nationalism. So 
far, very little attention has been paid to it,22 whereas my own f indings 
20 E.g. B.D. Stewart and B.K. Payne (2008), ‘Bringing Automatic Stereotyping Under Control: 
Implementation Intentions as Eff icient Means of Thought Control’, Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 34(10) pp. 1332-1345. 
21 H. Siebers (2017), ’What turns migrants into ethnic minorities at work? Factors erecting 
ethnic boundaries among Dutch police off icers’, Sociology, 51(3) pp. 608-625.
22 For an exception, see R. Gowricharn and S. Çankaya (2015), ‘Policing the Nation: Acculturation 
and Street-level Bureaucrats in Professional Life’, Sociology, Epub ahead of print 29 September 
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highlight its central role in fomenting direct discrimination in the labour 
market.23 Nationalism alludes to the impact of politics and here we need to 
distinguish between direct policy impact and its wider discursive impact.
Policy interventions and regulations may produce ethno-migrant inequal-
ity. Van Tubergen et al.24 have shown that guest workers’ programmes in 
the 1960s, deliberately selecting labour migrants for their low educational 
qualif ications, hamper the labour market chances even for their children. 
Anderson25 has demonstrated how UK government policies are instrumental 
in reinforcing the precarity of migrant workers with a temporary work permit 
in the UK, as they need a recommendation letter from their employer to get 
their work permit renewed. Work permit schemes, such as the EU Blue Card, 
as well as the seasonal workers permit, discussed elsewhere in this volume, 
tie a migrant worker to a certain employer, specif ic sector, or specif ic job.
Politics also involves a wider discursive impact. From the 1980s onwards, 
so-called ‘non-Western’ migrants have been identif ied by the Dutch govern-
ment as ‘ethnic minorities’. Until recently,26 this def inition had a double 
foundation. On the one hand, these people are culturalised,27 i.e. understood 
as carriers of deviant cultural characteristics. On the other hand, they are 
understood as being in need for integration, i.e. f ind their place in societal 
institutions like the labour market.
At f irst, their cultural and ethnic identity were seen as beneficial to their 
participation in society. Some modest policies were initiated to support 
2016. DOI: 10.1177/0038038515601781.
23 H. Siebers (2010), ‘The Impact of Migrant-Hostile Discourse in Media and Politics on Racioeth-
nic Closure in Career Development in The Netherlands’, International Sociology, 25(4) pp. 475-500; 
H. Siebers (2017), ‘What turns migrants into ethnic minorities at work? Factors erecting ethnic 
boundaries among Dutch police off icers’, Sociology, 51(3) pp. 608-625; P. Mutsaers, H. Siebers, 
and A. de Ruijter (2014), ‘Becoming a Minority: Ethno-Manufacturing in the Netherlands’, in J. 
Tripathy and S. Padmanabhan (eds.), Becoming Minority: How Discourses and Policies Produce 
Minorities in Europe and India, New Delhi: Sage. 
24 F. van Tubergen, I. Maas, and H. Flap (2004), ‘The economic incorporation of immigrants in 
eighteen western countries: Origin, destination, and community effects’, American Sociological 
Review, 69(5) pp. 704-727. 
25 B. Anderson (2010), ‘Migration, immigration controls and the refashioning of precarious 
workers’, Work, Employment and Society, 24(2) pp. 300-317.
26 M. Bovens, M. Bokhorst, R. Jennissen, and G. Engbersen (2016), Migratie en classificatie: naar 
een meervoudig migratie-idioom, Den Haag: Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid.
27 J.W. Duyvendak, P. Geschiere, and E. Tonkens (2016), The Culturalization of Citizenship. 
Belonging and Polarization in a Globalizing World, London: Palgrave Macmillan.; H. Siebers (2009), 
‘Registreren van etniciteit is spelen met vuur’, Openbaar Bestuur, 19(2) pp. 2-6; H Siebers and 
M.H.J. Dennissen (2015), ‘Is it cultural racism? Discursive oppression and exclusion of migrants 
in the Netherlands’, Current Sociology, 63(3) pp. 470-489.
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this identity, such as education in their own language and culture. The 
government acknowledged a joint responsibility to facilitate their ways into 
the labour market. Until 2004, the Stimulering Evenredige Arbeidsdeelname 
Minderheden (SAMEN) law obliged organisations and companies to f ile 
reports annually on their efforts to let their labour force be a reflection of 
the regional demographic composition.
However, Wimmer and Glick Schiller28 remind us that the ethnicisation of 
migrants usually takes place within the construction of nationalism. National-
ism invents categorical distinctions between nationals and outsiders, distinc-
tions that subsequently develop into boundaries. By framing ‘non-Western’ 
migrants as ethnic groups, they were turned into the outsiders within. In 
the 1990s, this nationalist approach took on a civic form,29 with emphasis on 
creating the conditions for participation in society, like the labour market.
However, since the turn of the century, nationalism has shifted in an 
ethno-nationalist direction30 in which assumed Dutchness has become the 
standard in public discourse and policies.31 The same previous two aspects 
of the definition of ethnic minorities, assumedly being culturally different 
and needing societal integration, have reappeared in a new articulation. On 
the one hand, assumed cultural traits of ‘non-Western’ migrants are seen 
as incompatible with assumed Dutch values.32 On the other hand, these 
assumed incompatible cultural traits are held responsible for their poor 
levels of integration in society. Their exclusion is justif ied, arguing that 
their cultural traits are incompatible with assumed Dutchness and that 
they have poor prospects for participation in society anyway.33
This means blaming the victims. The nationalist ‘othering’ of migrants 
triggers exclusion processes and symbolic violence against people with 
a ‘non-Western’ migration background. The contents of the stigmas and 
28 A.Wimmer and N. Glick Schiller (2002), ‘Methodological nationalism and beyond: Nation-state 
building, migration and the social sciences’, Global Networks, 2(4) pp. 301-334.
29 E. Gellner (1983), Nations and Nationalism, Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press.
30 A.D. Smith (1986), The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford: Blackwell.
31 R. van Reekum (2012), ‘As nation, people and public collide: enacting Dutchness in public 
discourse’, Nations and Nationalism, 18(4) pp. 583-602; R. van Reekum and J.W. Duyvendak (2012), 
‘Running from our shadows: the performative impact of policy diagnoses in Dutch debates on 
immigrant integration’, Patterns of Justice, 46(5) pp. 445-466.
32 S. Suvarierol (2012), ‘Nation-freezing: images of the nation and the migrant in citizenship 
packages’, Nations and Nationalism, 18(2), pp. 210-229.
33 H. Siebers and M.H.J. Dennissen (2015), ‘Is it cultural racism? Discursive oppression and 
exclusion of migrants in the Netherlands’, Current Sociology, 63(3) pp. 470-489; S. Bonjour and J.W. 
Duyvendak (2017), ‘The “migrant with poor prospects”: racialized intersections of class and culture 
in Dutch Civic integration debates’, Ethnic and Racial Studies. DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2017.1339897.
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meanings that incite acts of discrimination in the organisations we studied 
exclusively reflect the negative connotations that the nationalist discourse in 
Dutch media and politics attributes to ‘non-Western’ migrants, such as their 
assumed involvement in crime, in terrorism, and in gender- and sexuality-
related violence. These nationalist stigmas are adopted by nonmigrants 
and trigger conflicts and exclusion against people with a ‘non-Western’ 
migration background in work settings, with negative consequences for 
the latter’s careers and payment.34
To give a few examples, one of our female respondents with a Moroccan 
background heard from her nonmigrant colleagues when she went to an 
after-work party, ‘Were you allowed off the chain this evening?’. Muslim 
employees have to answer questions from colleagues about why Islam 
incites terrorism, apparently suggesting they have something to do with it. 
A civil servant with a Surinamese background, working for the government 
supported by the nationalist PVV party, was told by her colleagues, after 
she was turned down for a promotion, ‘Where do your sort of people get 
the courage from to apply for such a job?’. A police off icer with a Turkish 
background was informed about the reasons why she did not get promoted 
to a managerial job, ‘You and me, we have been at war for centuries already’. 
Here, the nonmigrant selector reproduced images of cultural incompatibility 
and nationalist confrontations propagated by nationalist politicians.
The nationalist framing of particular categories of migrants as ‘ethnic 
minorities’ also creates feelings of insecurity on the part of these migrants 
when trying to network or use their social capital. An employee with a 
‘non-Western’ migration background who did manage to get promoted to 
a supervision post, at the start of team meetings, deliberately displayed a 
screen saver with a picture of his children. This was an attempt to remind his 
colleagues of the fact that he is a human being after all. He was compelled 
to do this when they tended to simply ignore him. Eventually, he had to be 
transferred to a nonmanagerial job.
The contents of these discrimination-inciting stigmas, stemming from 
Dutch nationalist discourses in media and politics, also explain part of the 
variability in direct discrimination. In organisations in which the primary 
process is closely linked to these contents, we see overt and blunt events 
of discrimination taking place. For example, in the Dutch police force, the 
association of ‘non-Western’ migrants with crime, in nationalist discourses 
34 H. Siebers (2010), ‘The Impact of Migrant-Hostile Discourse in Media and Politics on 
Racioethnic Closure in Career Development in The Netherlands’, International Sociology, 25(4) 
pp. 475-500.
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in media and politics, creates suspicion towards officers with a ‘non-Western’ 
background and triggers incidents of discrimination against them. Crime 
f ighting is a core business of the Dutch police.35 By contrast, no such inci-
dents took place in the former Dutch ministry of agriculture, since there is 
no connection between the ministry’s work and these nationalist stigmas.36
Cultural Capital: ‘soft skills’
My second contribution to understanding ethno-migrant inequality in 
the labour market refers to the role of so-called ‘soft skills’. It builds upon 
what Alvesson and Willmott37 have coined as identity regulation or socio-
ideological labour control. It means that job applicants and workers are no 
longer only assessed on input (human capital) and output (quantity and 
quality of one’s work and the observance of regulations and protocols), 
but also on the ways in which they perform their work and with which 
personality traits. These personality traits are often phrased as attitudes 
and ‘soft skills’ (being enthusiastic, motivated, communicative, proactive, 
assertive, authentic, creative, f lexible, etc.).
All the organisations that we studied have introduced these kinds of 
selection and assessment criteria. Nevertheless, their functionality is often 
very questionable. Most of the time, HR advisors and supervisors were unable 
to answer our question about why these qualif ications are necessary for 
achieving the work targets and results. Why should a tax administrator, 
whose job it is to control tax f iles, be creative? Why is a police off icer sup-
posed to be authentic? In addition, what is the surplus value for controlling 
how one achieves his or her targets, if the targets themselves are already 
assessed?
The processes to be achieved by requiring soft skills from employees, 
like open and fluent communication, are basically social processes. It has 
become fashionable to rephrase traits of social relations into personal or 
psychological traits,38 but this cannot be done without serious distortions. 
35 H. Siebers, (2017), ‘What turns migrants into ethnic minorities at work? Factors erecting 
ethnic boundaries among Dutch police off icers’, Sociology 51(3) 608-625.
36 H. Siebers and J. van Gastel, (2015), ‘Why migrants earn less: In search of the factors producing 
the ethno-migrant pay gap in a Dutch public organization’, Work, Employment and Society 29(3) 
371-391.
37 M. Alvesson and H. Willmott (2002), ‘Identity regulation as organizational control: producing 
the appropriate individual’, Journal of Management Studies, 39(5) pp. 619-644.
38 K.T. DiFruscia (2012), ‘Work Rage: The Invention of a Human Resource Management Anti-
Conflictual Fable’, Anthropology of Work Review 33(2) pp. 89-100.
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For example, it is inappropriate to lay the responsibility for good communica-
tion processes unilaterally on the shoulders of individual applicants and 
employees. One could just as well argue that it is the responsibility of an 
organisation to ensure that someone with the right human capital is able 
to work effectively and communicatively.
Thus, I argue that these ‘soft skills’ or personality prescriptions do not 
qualify as human capital, but as cultural capital. They are about cultural 
issues of identity construction and the presentation of self in everyday life.39 
They are resources for individuals to prof ile and distinguish themselves 
from others, to create distinction framed as higher valued culture.40 They 
become capital if people manage to infer the suggestion that they possess 
a scarce and valued property that can be used to access economic capital. 
Bourdieu41 shows that those who can claim to possess cultural capital are 
not worried about its functionality; those worries are only expressed by 
those with less such capital.
In all the organisations we studied, competition over soft skills, such as 
cultural capital in selection and promotion procedures, constitutes one 
of the main factors producing ethno-migrant inequality. Applicants and 
employees with a ‘non-Western’ migration background encounter serious 
problems whilst prof iling themselves in these terms, which reduces their 
chances for getting hired or promoted. In one of these organisations, this 
factor is responsible for 47.4 per cent of their lower chances for getting hired.
Next, in general, applicants and employees with a ‘non-Western’ migration 
background try to perform on human capital or job-related criteria. They 
profile their human capital in application procedures and perform in terms 
of quantity and quality of results. However, they are basically assessed 
on criteria that apply to the cultural f ield. Non-migrant applicants and 
employees are more aware of these real assessment criteria and focus more 
on those in application and assessment interviews. Thus, there is a mismatch 
between criteria that applicants and employees with a ‘non-Western’ migra-
tion background focus on, and the real criteria by which they are assessed, 
by their predominantly non-migrant selectors and supervisors.
In addition, human capital can be assessed in relatively objective terms, 
by checking one’s diplomas and relevant work experience. By contrast, ‘soft 
skills’ requirements are much more vague and ambiguous. There is no clear 
39 E. Goffman (1959), The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, New York: Radom House.
40 P. Bourdieu (1984), Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, Boston: Harvard 
University Press.
41 Ibidem.
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relationship between the linguistic sign of, for example, ‘creativity’ and the 
processes in reality to which the sign would refer. Criteria such as having to 
be ‘authentic’ are highly ambiguous. In other words, ‘soft skills’ suffer from 
denotational indeterminacy, which opens the door for their strategic use 
against people with a ‘non-Western’ migration background.42
As a result, assessments of an applicant’s or employee’s ‘soft skills’ can only 
be made drawing on the assessor’s subjective interpretations and impres-
sions. Assessments in the cultural f ield are a matter of taste, Bourdieu43 
argues, in which the above-mentioned negative images about migrants 
in political and media discourse can easily become salient. Selectors told 
us that they base their assessment on the impression they get from an 
applicant in the f irst seconds of the interview. Thus, the applicant who is 
identif ied as someone with a ‘non-Western’ migration background is at a 
disadvantage because such an identif ication can easily trigger the negative 
connotations nationalist discourses in media and politics attribute to such 
people. They have a double burden: they not only need to show that they 
have the right human capital, but also that they are properly assimilated 
in the cultural f ield.
This symbolic violence in assessing cultural capital at the cost of a 
particular group is legitimised in a culturalist way. In line with nationalist 
discourses, selectors and supervisors attribute the lower scores of migrant 
applicants and employees based on ‘soft skills’, such as assertiveness, 
communicativeness, and proactiveness, to the cultural backgrounds of 
these applicants and employees. They tend to bring values of modesty and 
reactive attitudes to work from their cultural backgrounds, which apparently 
are incompatible with what is demanded from them at work, just like the 
current nationalist discourse argues that ‘values’ ‘non-Western’ migrants 
would cherish would be incompatible with ‘Dutch values’. The question 
whether people with such diverse cultural backgrounds, stemming from 
very different parts of the world, would all have those same ‘non-Western’ 
values in common, is not raised.
It is much more likely that less proactive or assertive behaviour stems 
from the latent or overt insecurity these people have in common, due to 
fact that they have become the object of nationalist discourses. It is hard 
42 H. Siebers (2017), ‘What turns migrants into ethnic minorities at work? Factors erecting 
ethnic boundaries among Dutch police off icers’, Sociology, 51(3) pp. 608-625; B. Urciuoli (2008), 
‘Skills and selves in the new workplace’, American Ethnologist, 35(2) pp. 211-228.
43 P. Bourdieu (1984), Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, Boston: Harvard 
University Press.
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to become proactive and assertive if you do not feel secure.44 By introduc-
ing criteria for control and assessment that belong to the cultural f ield, 
discourses that are active and appropriate in that cultural f ield come to 
determine outcomes of the struggle for capital. The application of ‘soft 
skills’, i.e. cultural capital, as criteria for assessment and control, allows 
nationalist discourses on migrants and migration to land at the gate and on 
the work floor of organisations, so to speak, to erect boundaries between 
applicants and employees with a ‘non-Western’ migration background and 
those without a migration background, producing ethno-migrant inequality 
in Dutch public organisations.
Migrants are instructed on assumedly Dutch ‘soft skills’ in civic integra-
tion programmes45, and Dutch authorities such as COA make a lot of effort 
to train refugees in Dutch ‘soft skills,46 but that seems like an uphill battle. 
It would be far more fruitful to stop assessing applicants and employees 
based on their ‘soft skills’ altogether. Assessing applicant and employees on 
their ‘soft skills’ represents a clear example of indirect discrimination, as 
these skills are not job-related and work out disproportionately negatively 
for people with a ‘non-Western’ migration background.
Conclusion
Ethno-migrant inequality in access to economic capital in the labour 
market may be produced by several factors, including unequal access to 
human capital and social capital, direct discrimination, the impact of 
nationalist discourses, and the competition over cultural capital through 
the introduction of ‘soft skills’ as criteria for selection and assessment. In 
theory, sociopsychological factors and racism may also contribute to ethno-
migrant inequality through triggering discriminatory behaviour. However, 
in the Dutch case, explanations referring to them are not convincing, which 
44 Efforts like those by Geert Hofstede to pinpoint ‘cultures’ to specif ic traits (‘Dutch culture 
is[…]’) in a globalized world have been unsuccessful for various conceptual and methodological 
reasons. I argue that it is more likely that both assertive and nonassertive behaviour, for example, 
are present in and available from each and every cultural repertoire and that it is the context that 
renders one salient and not the other. That means that context matters, in this case, insecurity, 
not the cultural repertoires as such.
45 S. Suvarierol (2012), ‘Nation-freezing: images of the nation and the migrant in citizenship 
packages’, Nations and Nationalism, 18(2) pp. 210-229.
46 T. de Lange, E. Besselsen, S. Rahouti, and C. Rijken (2017), Van azc naar een baan. De Neder-
landse regelgeving over en praktijk van arbeidsmarktintegratie van vluchtelingen, Amsterdam: 
Universiteit van Amsterdam.
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does not rule out their salience and relevance elsewhere. Individual cases 
of ethno-migrant inequality on the macro, meso, and micro levels may be 
produced by different mixes of the factors discussed above. They are very 
historical, contextual, and thus variable. The explanatory framework set out 
here will, however, be helpful in analysing individual cases to produce those 
different results and to avoid biases and blind spots. With those results, much 
needed recommendations can be made for changing macro government 
policies and discourses, management and intervention approaches on the 
organisational level, and expectations and strategies taken by individual 
actors. These are good reasons for being prudent in developing national and 
macro level policies and focussing on individual sectors and organisations 
instead. The framework is far from perfect, though. More research is needed, 
in particular on how those various factors and explanations interrelate 
and articulate.
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This contribution researches the impact of collective agreements on female 
management and job opportunities of employees from disadvantaged 
groups (including migrants or their descendants) in 4053 enterprises in 
Europe. Graafland f inds that collective agreements stimulate female 
presence in board and executive positions, and the inflow of employees 
from disadvantaged groups (e.g. migrant workers, people with disabilities, 
long-term unemployed). Moreover, female management further enforces 
job opportunities of disadvantaged workers. Countries with high coverage 
of collective agreements therefore, directly as well as indirectly, through 
female management, foster integration of employees from disadvantaged 
groups into the labour market. The results imply that dismantling exten-
sions of collective agreements in the labour market increases gender 
inequality and inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged groups 
of employees.
Keywords: disadvantaged groups, collective agreements, female 
management
Introduction
Because of international differences in Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) policies of companies, research into CSR has become more focussed 
Rijken, Conny and Tesseltje de Lange (eds): Towards a Decent Labour Market for Low Waged 
Migrant Workers. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018  
doi: 10.5117/9789462987555_graa
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on its institutional roots.1 One of the institutions that has been relatively 
unexplored in CSR research is collective agreements. Only Ioannou and 
Serafeim have researched how labour unions affect CSR.2 Using ratings 
from ASSET43 for public companies in 42 countries, they found that union 
density stimulates both environmental and social CSR. The research of 
Ioannou and Serafeim does not, however, address which of the many social 
aspects that are included in the social dimension of CSR as constructed by 
ASSET4, are more or less encouraged by union coverage.
The social dimension of CSR comprises very heterogeneous aspects in 
the rating system of ASSET4, including customer and product responsibility, 
community interests, respect of human rights, diversity and opportunities, 
quality of employer-workforce relation,4 employment health and safety, 
and training and development. It is not surprising that union coverage 
improves aspects of the social dimension of CSR that concern core interests 
of incumbent employees that unions aim to protect, such as fair wages, the 
use of f ixed-term contracts, training and development, and health and 
safety. Previous research has shown, for example, that relative to uncovered 
workers, union-covered workers are more likely to receive more days of 
training.5 In addition, union-covered workers experience greater returns 
from training and face a higher wage growth. In establishments where 
unions are recognised, labour turnover is also reduced.6 Furthermore, 
1 R.V. Aguilera and G. Jackson (2003), ‘The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: 
Dimensions and determinants’, Academy of Management Review, 28 pp. 447-465; J.L. Campbell 
(2007), ‘Why would corporations behave in socially responsible ways? An institutional theory 
of corporate social responsibility’, Academy of Management Review, 32 pp. 946-967; G. Jackson 
and A. Apostolakou (2010), ‘Corporate social responsibility in Western Europe: an institutional 
mirror or substitute?’, Journal of Business Ethics, 94 pp. 371-394; S. Brammer, G. Jackson, and D. 
Matten (2012), ‘Corporate social responsibility and institutional theory: new perspectives on 
private governance’, Socio-Economic Review, 10 pp. 3-28.
2 I. Ioannou and G. Serafeim (2012), ‘What drives corporate social performance & quest; The 
role of nation-level intitutions’, Journal of International Business Studies, 43(9) pp. 834-864.
3 ASSET 4 is one of the major sustainability ratings agencies, often called ESG raters, as they 
rate companies on the three dimensions: environment, social, and governance. Other well-known 
ESG rating agencies are KLD, Sustainalytics, Vigeo, and FTSE4Good.
4 It seems that Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) failed to notice that the workforce and employment 
category in ASSET4 includes trade union representation, which makes their analysis partly 
tautological.
5 A.L. Booth, M. Francesconi, and G. Zoega (2003), ‘Unions, work-related training, and wages: 
Evidence for British men’, Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 57(1) pp. 68-91.
6 F.D. Blau and L.M. Kahn (1983), ‘Unionism, seniority, and turnover’, Industrial Relations, 
22(3) pp. 362-73. 
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labour unions use their collective bargaining and participation in health 
and safety committees to influence workplace health and safety standards.7
However, these findings do not give insight into how coverage by collective 
agreement affects labour issues that have a wider societal interest. In our 
research, we focus on two important, yet unexplored, social aspects of CSR that 
go beyond the immediate interests of incumbent workers, namely gender di-
versity in the management of the company and equal opportunities for groups 
that have a relative disadvantaged position on the labour market. To date, 
there has been no large scale, multi-country research into the relationship 
between collective agreements and these two dimensions of labour market 
equality. The core research question of this paper is therefore: Do collective 
agreements encourage gender diversity in the management of the company 
and equal opportunities for groups that have a relative disadvantaged position 
on the labour market, including migrants or their descendants?
We test our hypotheses on a sample of 4053 enterprises in twelve Euro-
pean countries for which detailed information about the share of employees 
represented by collective agreement, per f irm, is available. This data provides 
information about differences in union coverage among companies within 
countries and, therefore, provides a more accurate picture of the influence 
of collective agreements than macro indicators of union density do. In the 
next section, we present the conceptual framework. In section three, we 
describe our methodology. Following the methodology, we present our 
empirical f indings, followed by a discussion.
Conceptual Framework
Background
One of the neglected forces in institutional CSR theory is the role of collective 
agreements. A collective agreement is written between a representation 
of workers and an entrepreneur or business representation, and regulates 
the working and employment conditions as well as the labour relations 
management.8 It is established between the elected representatives of the 
7 For an overview, see K. Pouliakas and I. Theodossiou (2013), ‘The economics of health and 
safety at work: an interdisciplinary review of the theory and policy’, Journal of Economic Surveys, 
27(1) pp. 167-208.
8 J.M. Biedma-Ferrer, M. Lopez-Fernandez, and P.M. Romero-Fernandez (2015), The collective 
labour agreement as a key tool for driving corporate social responsibility: banking sector analysis, 
Retrieved from: http://www.ehu.eus/cuadernosdegestion/documentos/150525jb.pdf.
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workers and those who act on behalf of the company, but can be extended 
to employees and employers of other companies. Such cases of extension 
mechanisms exist to varying degrees in EU Member States.9
According to Aguilera and Jackson, the lack of attention to the role of 
collective agreements in CSR reflects weak employee participation in the 
United States, where the concept of CSR originated.10 Also, in the practice of 
CSR, labour unions have been largely excluded from participating as equal 
partners. Consequently, organised labour greeted CSR with ambivalence.11 
To unions, the concept of CSR lacks a distinct connection to the central role 
that corporations have as employers.12
Still, unions may play an important role in the realisation of CSR-related 
goals, because they are instrumental to voicing workers’ collective needs 
and desires to the management.13 Campbell argues that companies are 
more likely to behave in socially responsible ways when they are engaged in 
institutionalised dialogue with unions.14 Their influence may not be visible 
in voluntary, explicit CSR measures, but is more implicit through sector and 
national negotiations on labour-related issues.15 In countries that showed 
weakening of labour unions, f irms started to score higher on explicit CSR 
as a substitute for institutional regulation and social coordination.16 Still, 
to the extent that unions empower employees, corporations may also face 
pressure to adopt explicit CSR measures. For example, powerful labour 
unions may use their inf luence to pressure companies to adopt better 
labour standards throughout their supply chain and push for extended 
benefits for employees, focussing on health and safety provisions, labour 
relations policies, and more workplace amenities.17 For instance, they can 
pressure suppliers, who are known for the abuse of migrant workers, into 
paying them properly.
9 As a result, collective agreements can apply to (temporary) migrant workers, whether EU 
or non-EU nationals, ethnic minorities, and (or as) nationals alike.
10 R.V. Aguilera and G. Jackson (2003).
11 S. Brammer, G. Jackson, and D. Matten (2012).
12 H. de Geer, T. Borglund, and M. Frostenson (2010), ‘Reconciling CSR with welfare state actor 
roles – The problematic Swedish case’, Journal of Business Ethics, 89 pp. 269-283.
13 R.B. Freeman and J.L. Medoff (1984), What do unions do?, New York: Basic Books.
14 J.L. Campbell (2007).
15 D. Matten and J. Moon (2008), ‘¨Implicit¨ and ¨explicit¨ CSR: a conceptual framework for a 
comparative understanding of corporate social responsibility’, Academy of Management Review, 
33(2) pp. 404-424.
16 G. Jackson and A. Apostolakou (2010).
17 I. Ioannou and G. Serafeim (2012).
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Collective Agreements and Equal Opportunities for Women and 
Disadvantaged Groups
Based on union representation theory, we expect, however, that collective 
agreements might have negative effects on social issues of wider societal 
interest, such as equal opportunities for women and disadvantaged outsiders 
on the labour market.18 Union representation theory predicts that unions 
tend to advocate the interests of the median worker who often works 
full-time for a single employer. A union’s duty to protect and advance the 
collective interests of all of its members might conflict with the particular 
interests of specif ic groups. Although a minority of union members may 
signif icantly value equal opportunities for specif ic groups, the majority 
of union members may have little interest in these issues, which induces 
the union to disregard the interests of specif ic groups that are victims 
of discrimination.19 Consequently, union representation may encourage 
packages that do not reflect the preferences of marginal worker groups.20
Women and employees from disadvantaged groups are disproportionately 
represented in nonstandard atypical work, which may include part-time 
work, temporary agency work, flex-work, self-employed home care work, and 
contractor work.21 Previous studies have found that unions tend to under-
represent women’s interests systematically and to promote discriminatory 
policies, notwithstanding high rates of unionised women.22 One of the rea-
sons might be that women are underrepresented in union decision-making 
structures.23 Most of the union representatives are men and this may have 
a negative outcome for gender equality in the bargaining process. Previous 
research has also shown that unions tend to underrepresent the interests of 
foreign workers.24 Unions face the tension that the more immigrants that 
become active in the domestic labour market, the more competition there 
18 L. Lurie (2015), Do unions promote gender equality?, Retrieved from: http://scholarship.law.
duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1290&context=djglp
19 D.A. Widiss (2012), ‘Divergent Interests: Union Representation of Individual Employment 
Discrimination Claims’, Indiana Law Journal, 87(1).
20 J.W. Budd (2007), ‘The Effect of Unions on Employee Benef its and Non‐Wage Compensation: 
Monopoly, Power, Collective Voice and Facilitation’, in J.T. Bennett and B.E. Kaufman (eds.), 
What do unions do? A twenty year perspective, pp. 162-164.
21 L. Lurie (2013), ‘Can Unions Promote Employability? Senior Workers in Israel’s Collective 
Agreements’, Industrial Law Journal, 42 pp. 249-280.
22 A. McBride (2001), Gender Democracy in Trade Unions, Aldershot: Ashgate.
23 L. Lurie (2015).
24 E. Albin (2013), ‘Union Responsibility to Migrant Workers: A Global Justice Approach’, Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 34 pp. 133-153.
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is for traditional groups of employees that they represent, and the worse 
working conditions might become for these groups. Particularly in times 
of ample national supply of labour (such as in the years following the credit 
crisis in 2008), trade unions are likely to oppose recruitment of immigrant 
workers. Due to widespread unemployment, labour market competition 
might increase and inclusive union policies towards immigrants may thus 
clash with the interests of native workers.25 Unions may therefore be inclined 
to defend the interests of national members and resist migrants or hesitate 
to defend them, for example, against exploitation.
Based on union representation theory and previous empirical research, 
we therefore posit the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Collective agreements reduce female representa-
tion in board and executive positions
Hypothesis 2: Collective agreements reduce the inflow of employ-
ees from disadvantaged groups
Interrelationship between Women in Management and Hiring of 
Disadvantaged Groups
Besides a direct negative inf luence from collective agreements on the 
inflow of employees from disadvantaged groups, we also expect a negative 
indirect effect mediated by the share of women in the top management of 
the company. We base this argument on social role theory that predicts that 
women are more socialised into communal values reflecting a concern for 
others than men, and, therefore, more likely to be motivated by altruistic 
concerns.26 This has been confirmed by research that shows that female 
managers are more involved in corporate philanthropy.27 Because of their 
altruistic concerns, it is therefore likely that female board members or 
25 R. Penninx and J. Roosblad (Eds.) (2000), Trade unions, immigration, and immigrants in 
Europe, 1960-1993: A comparative study of the attitudes and actions of trade unions in seven West 
European countries, New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books.
26 E.S. Mason and P.E. Mudrack (1996), ‘Gender and ethical orientation: A test of gender and 
occupational socialization theories’, Journal of Business Ethics, 15(6) pp. 599-604; M. Williams 
and E. Polman (2015), ‘Is It Me or Her? How Gender Composition Evokes Interpersonally Sensitive 
Behavior on Collabourative Cross-Boundary Projects’, Organization Science, 26(2) pp. 334-355.
27 R.J. Williams (2003), ‘Women on corporate boards of directors and their inf luence on 
corporate philanthropy’, Journal of Business Ethics, 42(1) pp. 1-10; N.A. Ibrahim and J.P. Angelidis 
(2011), ‘Effect of board members’ gender on corporate social responsiveness orientation’, Journal 
of Applied Business Research , 10(1) pp. 35-40; C. Marquis and M. Lee (2013), ‘Who is governing 
whom? Executives, governance, and the structure of generosity in large U.S. f irms’, Strategic 
Management Journal, 34(4) pp. 483-497.
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executives will take more responsibility for providing job opportunities 
to people from disadvantaged groups than male top managers. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3: Female representation in board and executive 




The data has been taken from a large online survey that targeted small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and was set out in twelve European 
countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Poland, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, and the UK). The methodology 
of the survey has been described elsewhere.28 4053 responses were useable 
for our research. Using Cochran’s sample size formula, we f ind that this 
response is adequate for inferring reliable research f indings for the total 
population of companies in the twelve countries, using an alpha of 0.05.29 
Test results showed no response bias.
General Characteristics of the Sample
Table one presents an overview of the general characteristics of the com-
panies in the sample. The use of collective agreements differs signif icantly 
among the twelve countries that we distinguish, ranging from 15% in the UK 
to 95% in France due to the large-scale extension of collective agreements 
in that country. The different shares of employees in our sample of SMEs 
that is covered by collective agreements per country reflect the differences 
in macro shares reported by the European Union.
28 J.J. Graafland (2016), ‘Price competition, short-termism and environmental performance’, 
Journal of Cleaner Production, 116 pp. 125-134.
29 The total number of companies in the twelve countries equals 16091476 (Source: EU, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-f igures-analysis/performance-review/
index_en.htm#h2-1).
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Table 1  Sample characteristics (in %)
















uK 3 26 not 29 15
denmark 7 67 not 80 65
finland 4 69 very frequent 91 87
sweden 5 68 not 88 84
austria 2 28 seldom 95 72
france 7 8 very frequent 98 95
Germany 9 18 moderate 59 54
netherland 11 18 frequent 81 75
hungary 4 11 seldom 33 29
poland 7 13 seldom 25 47
italy 31 37 not 80 94
spain 11 17 very frequent 70 92
Company size
Micro (≤10 FTE) Small (11-50 FTE) Medium-sized (51-250 FTE)
30 41 29
Sector





4 17 19 19 4 3 4 30
a source: oeCd (https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?datasetCode=un_den). 





The descriptive statistics and correlations of the dependent and independent 
variables and among dependent, independent, and the control variables 
are reported in Table 2.
The independent variable ‘collective agreements’, was measured by a 
survey question measuring the ‘Share of employees covered by collective 
bargaining agreement as a % of the total number of employees in 2010.’ The 
representation of females in board or executive positions was measured by a 
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survey question asking for the ‘Share of women in the board and/or executive 
positions in 2010.’ The inflow of employees from disadvantaged groups was 
measured by a survey question on the ‘Share of employees recruited from 
disadvantaged groups (e.g. migrant workers, people with disabilities, long 
term unemployed) as a % of the total inflow in 2010.’
Table 2  Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3
1 Collective agreement 70.06 43.45 1
2 Women in board 23.38 25.82 0.02 1
3 inflow disadvantaged 7.18 14.61 0.02 0.17 1
4 austria 0.03 0.17 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03
5 denmark 0.15 0.38 -0.11 -0.07 0.01
6 finland 0.29 0.45 0.04 0.08 -0.05
7 france 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.05 0.11
8 Germany 0.42 0.49 -0.16 -0.02 -0.02
9 hungary 0.04 0.20 -0.19 0.06 0.05
10 italy 0.28 0.45 0.24 -0.01 -0.09
11 netherlands 0.10 0.30 -0.04 -0.11 0.05
12 poland 0.09 0.29 -0.19 0.14 0.02
13 spain 0.11 0.31 0.16 -0.01 -0.06
14 sweden 0.05 0.21 -0.01 -0.02 0.05
15 uK 0.03 0.17 -0.19 -0.01 0.03
16 Company size (fte, natural 
logarithm)
0.30 0.46 0.15 -0.07 0.05
17 low skilled 33.05 32.27 0.15 -0.09 0.13
18 medium skilled 41.92 29.99 0.07 -0.01 -0.07
19 high skilled 24.62 28.67 -0.24 0.12 -0.07
20 Young 10.20 13.83 0.00 -0.01 0.06
21 medium age 67.88 23.28 0.12 -0.02 -0.04
22 high aged 21.87 21.53 -0.13 0.03 0.00
23 energy 0.04 0.19 0.05 -0.01 0.01
24 material 0.17 0.38 0.09 -0.07 0.01
25 industrial 0.19 0.39 0.02 -0.13 -0.04
26 Consumer discretionary 0.19 0.39 0.02 0.06 -0.04
27 Consumer staples 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.02 0.02
28 financial 0.03 0.16 -0.04 0.01 -0.04
29 it 0.04 0.20 -0.07 -0.02 -0.03
30 B2C 1.93 1.02 0.02 0.10 0.01
31 intensity of price competition 5.10 1.87 0.08 -0.06 0.01
spearman’s correlation coefficients. italics p<0.05, bold p<0.01.
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In the regression analysis, we controlled for the external environment of the 
company (sector, position in the supply chain, intensity of price competition, 
and country) and for internal characteristics of the company (company 
size [number of FTEs], skill structure, and age structure). To define sectors, 
we used the Global Industry Classif ication Standard (GICS) (taking ‘other 
business’ as a reference). The position in the supply chain is measured by a 
five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Business to Business’ (B2B) to ‘Business to 
Consumer’ (B2C). The intensity of price competition is measured by the survey 
question ‘In the market for your main product or service, your enterprise is 
prone to price competition’ using a seven-point Likert scale ranging from ‘not 
at all’ (1) to ‘very much’ (7). The more competitive the market environment, 
the lower profitability, and, according to slack resource theory,30 the fewer 
resources a company has available for investing in CSR-related goals.
Results
Using regression analysis,31 we f irst estimated a null model consisting of 
all dependent, independent, and control variables. Then, we used stepwise 
estimation with backward selection in which we eliminated all insignificant 
control variables based on a criterion of alpha = 0.05. The results of f inal 
model are reported in Table 3.
Table 3  Estimation resultsa
Women in board Inflow of disadvantaged
Collective agreements 0.04*** 0.06**
Women in board 0.17***
r2 0.08 0.08
a n = 4,053. standardised coefficients; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. the (santorra-Bentler) 
global fit indices for model 2 are: Chi2 = 0.068; rmsea = 0.012; Cfi = 0.987; tli = 0.966; 
smrs = 0.004; r2 = 0.133. We controlled for sector, position in the supply chain, intensity of price 
competition, company size, skill structure, and age structure.
30 S.A. Waddock and S.B. Graves (1997), ‘The corporate social performance-f inancial perfor-
mance link’, Strategic Management Journal, 18 pp. 303-319.
31 We used structural equation modeling (SEM) in STATA with maximum likelihood as estimation 
technique and Satorra-Bentler correction for non-normality. For large samples (as in our research), 
SEM also provides a convenient method to estimate indirect effects. See P.E. Shrout and N. Bolger 
(2002), ‘Mediation in experimental and nonexperimental studies: New procedures and recommenda-
tions’, Psychological Methods, 7 pp. 422-445; T.D. Little, N.A. Card, J.A. Bovaird, K.J. Preacher, and 
C.S. Crandall (2007), Structural Equation Modeling of Mediation and Moderation With Contextual 
Factors. Retrieved from: http://quantpsy.org/pubs/little_card_bovaird_preacher_crandall_2007.pdf. 
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The global f it indices – CFI, TLI, and RMSEA – suggest a good model f it.32 
The estimation results show that the representation of women in the board 
and executive positions and the inflow of employees from disadvantaged 
groups are signif icantly, but positively, related to collective agreements. 
Hence, we reject hypothesis one and two. Hypothesis three, that the share 
of female managers increases the inflow of employees from disadvantaged 
groups, is supported. If we test the indirect effect of collective agreements 
on the inflow of employees from disadvantaged groups as mediated by the 
share of female managers, we f ind a small but signif icant positive effect (p 
value<0.001). Hence, by fostering the share of female managers, collective 
agreements indirectly increase the inflow of disadvantaged employees as 
well.
Discussion
In this paper, we set out to research the effect of collective agreements on 
social dimensions of CSR that concern wider societal interests, beyond the 
immediate interests of incumbent workers that unions typically represent, 
namely gender diversity in the management of the company and equal 
opportunities for groups that have a relative disadvantaged position in 
the labour market. Whereas previous cross-country research by Ioannou 
and Serafeim has shown that union coverage stimulates social and envi-
ronmental performance of large companies, we expected to f ind opposite 
results for gender equality and job opportunities for applicants that have a 
disadvantaged position in the labour market.33 This expectation was based 
on the union representation theory that predicts that unions advocate 
for the interests of the median worker, and that advancement of these 
interests conflict with the particular interests of specif ic groups that are 
disproportionately represented in nonstandard, atypical work.
Based on a sample of 4053 enterprises in Europe, and using micro data 
of the share of employees covered by collective bargaining agreement per 
company, we found, however, that collective bargaining stimulates both the 
presence of women managers in the top management of the enterprise as 
32 B.M. Byrne (2010), Structural equation modelling with AMOS. Basic concepts, applications, 
and programming, New York/London: Routledge; L.T. Hu and P.M. Bentler (1999), ‘Cutoff criteria 
for f it indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives’, 
Structural Equation Modeling, 6 pp. 1-55.
33 I. Ioannou and G. Serafeim (2012).
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well as the inflow of employees from disadvantaged groups. Moreover, we 
also detected a positive, indirect effect from collective agreements on the 
inflow of disadvantaged employees, as women managers are more inclined 
to hire labour from these groups, than male managers.
These results provide additional evidence for the positive effects of 
union coverage on CSR identif ied by Ioannou and Serafeim.34 Ioannou 
and Serafeim argue that labour unions may increase overall awareness 
within society by acting as the f irm’s ambassador for environmental and 
social policies. But the question remains why this is the case. A possible 
explanation is that unions take account of the negative societal effects 
that result from unemployment of employees from disadvantaged groups, 
because they often coordinate their actions at the macro level. For individual 
companies, these negative effects are largely a given and the benefits from 
f ighting them are negligible to the individual company. At the macro level, 
however, the unemployment of employees from disadvantaged groups is 
not a given and is rather dependent on the policies of unions at this level. 
They cause substantial societal costs that harm the interests of all union 
members. This motivates unions operating at the national level to bargain 
for policies at the meso and micro level in sectoral or f irm level agreements 
that provide more equal opportunities for disadvantaged groups. An example 
of such a policy is an agreement of the Dutch national unions Federatie 
Nederlandse Vakbeweging (FNV), Christelijk Nationaal Vakbond (CNV), and 
Reformatorisch Maatschappelijke Unie (RMU) with the company CêlaVíta 
that agreed to offer partly disabled employees jobs.35
Another explanation is that the weakening of the position of trade unions 
during that last decennia has triggered attempts to revitalise unions, with 
inclusion of underrepresented groups being a foremost strategy. In Europe, 
such organising has been implemented in the United Kingdom and, more 
recently, in the Netherlands.36 For example, in 2005, the FNV published 
a report De vakbeweging van de toekomst: Lessen uit het buitenland with 
the intent to redefine itself. One of the issues addressed in this report was 
the importance of ‘organising’ new groups of people, including migrant 
34 I. Ioannou and G. Serafeim (2012).
35 Retrieved from: http://www.rmu.nu/weblog/akkoord+over+cao+clavta_1312
36 S. Marino, R. Penninx, and J. Roosblad (2015), ‘Trade unions, immigration and immigrants 
in Europe revisited: Unions’ attitudes and actions under new conditions’, Comparative Migration 
Studies, 3(1) pp.?-? retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40878-015-0003-x
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workers.37,38 Marino et al. conclude that these revalidation efforts of unions, 
by a more inclusive strategy that takes seriously the interests of previously 
marginalised groups, suggest that inclusive attitudes toward migrant workers 
are inversely related to the degree of institutional embeddedness of unions.39 
If the institutional power of unions reduces, they become more dependent 
on union membership, which stimulates them to attract new, underrep-
resented groups of workers to increase union membership. However, this 
conclusion is not supported by our research, as our f indings indicate that 
union coverage stimulates a wider societal orientation.40 Consequently, 
collective agreements improve companies’ implementation of policies that 
foster equal opportunities for women and employees from disadvantaged 
groups in the labour market.
The policy implication that can be derived from our f indings is that 
societies should be careful in diminishing the role of unions, for example, 
by abolishing the legal extension of collective agreements. The results 
indicate that nullifying the power of unions may reduce the incentives for 
creating more equal opportunities for women in board positions and for 
hiring employees from groups with a disadvantaged position in the labour 
market. If the influence of unions diminishes, public spirit may decline 
and this will make it more challenging to integrate people with a migrant 
history into the labour market, amongst them, the refugees that recently 
entered Europe.
37 H. Connolly, S. Marino, and M.M. Lucio (2014), ‘Trade union renewal and the challenges of 
representation: Strategies towards migrant and ethnic minority workers in the Netherlands, 
Spain and the United Kingdom’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 20(1) pp. 5-20.
38 In 2004, former FNV chairwomen Jongerius proposed to introduce legally binding minimum 
quotas for the inflow of employees from migrant groups, but employers refused to support this 
idea. In a phone call with FNV in August 2017, it appeared that there are no examples yet of 
collective agreements that provide provisions to increase employment among migrant employees. 
39 S. Marino, R. Penninx, and J. Roosblad (2015).
40 If we also include the degree to which collective agreements are extended (based on the 
third column in Table 1) as indicator of institutional embeddedness of unions (besides the 
influence of coverage of collective agreements per f irm), we f ind no signif icant effects on the 
share of women in the board or the inf low of employees from disadvantaged groups. Hence, 
institutional embeddedness through extension of collective agreement does not negatively 
affect the share of women in the board or the inflow of employees from disadvantaged groups.
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